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Abstract 
ABSTRACT 
This work concerns how post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding are linked, 
particularly in the Palestinian context after the-Oslo peace agreements (1993). It focuses on 
the problems faced in reconstructing human settlements, using case studies from the Gaza 
Strip. 
Palestinians have suffered from prolonged Israeli occupation. For the last fifty years, 
`shelter' along with many spheres of Palestinian life have deteriorated. Peace initiatives with 
Israel in the 1990s brought hope of change, including reconstruction of human settlements. 
Seven years of frustrating negotiations since have worn away aspirations. With this legacy, 
the author recognises that for the Palestinian people to build a national homeland there is a 
need to review and evaluate their short-lived reconstruction and peacebuilding activities. 
Having introduced the context for the research, the author narrows down the scope to 
address the following question. 
Considering the impact of Israeli Occupation and the ill-fated peace 
agreement how can Palestinians (the Authority and people) with the help of 
the international community, achieve successful reconstruction programmes 
and sustain the peace process? 
The thesis starts by looking at the meaning and consequences of occupation, 
reviewing The Hague and the 4th Geneva Conventions that formulated the relationship 
between the occupier and occupied territories. Reacting to the recent Israeli-Palestinian 
peace initiative, the research looks at the link between peacebuilding and reconstruction. 
It reviews different options that claim to lead to the attainment of post-conflict 
reconstruction of human settlements. 
To refine and contextualise the argument, the work examines two empirical case 
studies. First, the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP) planned and carried out by 
UNRWA the programme aimed to improve living conditions of Palestinian refugees. 
The second case study investigates the Elkarama neighbourhood as an example of the 
Palestinian Housing Council (PHC) projects in the Gaza Strip. 
The author summarises the study, isolating main points, identifying principles and 
issues, which could create a framework for reconstruction of human settlements in the 
Palestinian Territories. Responding to shortcomings of the peace agreements and 
effects of continuous Israeli punitive measures, the author suggests that a flexible 
reconstruction approach should be established. These research conclusions are 
translated into practical recommendations for the reconstruction of human settlements in 
Palestine. 
Key Words: Peacebuilding, Reconstruction, Post-conflict, the Palestinian Territories, 
Housing, Human Settlements, Peace Implementation Programme, the Palestinian 
Housing Council, Elkarama Housing Project. 
To those who lose their lives in 
research for peace. May they 
find real peace: the 
Palestinian Martyrs. 
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Preface 
PREFACE 
When the author began his research, he along with millions of people around the 
world were led to hope that peace would prevail in the Middle East. Following the signing 
of the Oslo Agreements (1993-1994), it was expected that Israel would withdraw from the 
West Bank and Gaza within five years and that Palestinians would then be free to build their 
independent state. However, more than seven years have gone by and Israel continues to 
have direct security and overall administrative control of 61.2% of the West Bank and about 
30% of the Gaza Strip. This control has enabled Israel to double the number of settlers and 
to seal an entire nation into restricted areas, imprisoned in a network of bypass roads used by 
Jews only. 
Moreover, the mounting Palestinian frustration over the lack of progress in the peace 
process was further inflamed by a provocative visit to the Al-Aqsa mosque by Ariel Sharon 
on 28/9/2000. Sharon is remembered as the person responsible for the 1982 massacre of 
2000 Palestinians in the Lebanese refugee camps; Sabra and Shatila. The resulting 
demonstrations countered by heavy artillery, tanks and helicopter attacks; have been the 
bloodiest confrontation since the Oslo process began in 1993. Hundreds of Palestinians have 
been killed and injured on a daily basis. Years of reconstruction have been devastated. 
It is worth noting that before his departure, the former American President Bill 
Clinton has worked to diffuse the Intifada by presenting the Palestinians with an offer, he 
thought they could not refuse. Expectedly, the offer demonstrated disrespect and denial of 
the Palestinian basic rights. While superficially more generous than anything ever promised 
under the Oslo framework, it remained a recipe for dispossession. It guaranteed Israel the 
control of areas amounting to 35 percent of the West Bank. The proposed Palestinian mini- 
state would amount to only 15 percent of Palestine as a whole. Most ironically, Clinton's 
plan denied the right of return to the majority of millions of Palestinian refugees to their 
homes. 
Pessimistically, the author feels compelled to conclude that the process, which began 
in Oslo seven years ago, has failed. The so-called peace process is dead, shot to pieces, like 
the young children, by Israeli helicopters and machine guns. However, reconstruction must 
continue for the sake of the Palestinian people. It can be part of a peacebuilding process as 
in other post-conflict situations if there is first of all a just peace to build on. Until justice 
prevails, peace and proper reconstruction will at most be only a distant prospect. 
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Setting the Scene 
INTRODUCTION 
POST-OSLO RECONSTRUCTION OF PALESTINE 
1993-2000 
FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 
1.1 THE RESEARCH DEFINED 
This work mainly concerns how post conflict reconstruction and peace building are 
linked, particularly following the peace settlement in the Palestinian Territories. Research 
has given rise to three principal observations: 
" Occupation in reality is a continuation of warfare, and the Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories since 1967 is a typical example of how the long occupation can be 
as devastating as a full-scale war. 
" In peacebuilding, the third party (the international community) can assist, but the 
legitimate rights of the occupied people need to be recognised no matter how much aid is 
supplied; justice is the cornerstone for sustainable peace. 
0A successful reconstruction of human settlements is directly related to a sustainable 
peace process. 
1.1.1 The Phenomenon of Occupation 
Colonisation has largely disappeared in other parts of the world, however the 
Palestinian Territories remain under Israeli occupation, an internal colonisation. Since June 
of 1967, as a result of the armed conflict that erupted in the Middle East, Israeli military 
forces have occupied the remainder of the territory allocated to the Arab State under the 
partition plan outlined in UN resolution 181 (II) of 1947. Article 42 of the 4th Geneva 
Convention states: "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the 
authority of the hostile army. " 
Addressing the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the author claims that 
through occupation Israel has used punitive tactics to make the native Palestinians' lives as 
difficult as possible in an attempt to force them to leave. It is widely believed that armed 
conflict seems worse than occupation, as the former usually leads to the destruction of 
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human settlements. Although no settlement destruction is taking place in the Palestinian 
territories, the author argues that Israel has exercised a policy, which has destructive results 
similar to those suffered in the long run through armed conflict. Israel has carried out its 
policy of De-development, through three components: expropriation and dispossession, 
integration and externalisation, and de-institutionalisation. The first term expresses how 
Palestinian people have been denied full use and benefits of their resources. Integration and 
externalisation have created dependence on Israel. Palestinians have been pressurised into 
relying on externally generated income sources, primarily from Israel. The third component 
is de-institutionalisation, achieved by direct and indirect restrictions placed on indigenous 
institutions that might have planned for sustainable development in Gaza (Roy, 1995; Saigh, 
1988). 
Furthermore Israeli strategy causes the deterioration of infrastructure, restricts land use, puts 
obstacles in the way of acquiring a permit for building development, abuses the legal system, 
expropriates local resources, and finally and crucially enacts policies that violates human 
rights undermining Palestinian identity and self-respect. 
After decades of debilitating occupation, the last ten years have seen attempts to 
reach a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. The end of the Cold War, 
collapse of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (a major supporter of the Palestinian 
cause), the Gulf War, and Palestinian first uprising (Intifada) are all factors that came 
together and led to American-sponsored peace initiatives. Consequently, Israel traded 
being recognised as a legitimate state for recognition of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO). Secret negotiations (Oslo 1993) ended with the signing of peace 
accords. However issues such as Palestinian sovereignty, the future of Jerusalem, the 
unwanted existence of Israeli settlements in the Territories, Israel's borders, the sharing 
of water, security arrangements and the status of refugees: all of these were put off till a 
later date, a supposedly final status negotiation. From the Peace Accord (1994), Israeli 
troops were re-deployed away from populated areas and a Palestinian administration 
was established. 
With the conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the international 
community urgently committed resources to foster reconstruction activities with the aim 
of providing tangible benefits for the Palestinian population while laying the foundation 
for sustainable peace through long-term reconstruction. 
Introduction xvi ii 
Setting the Scene 
1.1.2 Sustainable Peacebuilding 
"Peace is best thought of not as a single or simple good, such as an absence of war 
or violent conflict, but instead as a complex and variable process. " (Doyle and 
Sambanis, 1999). This description is true once long-term peace is sought, as real peace 
requires more than an absence of violence. Martin Luther King expanded on this when 
he said, "Peace does not mean the absence of violence, but... the presence of justice". 
Even the end of violence is not guaranteed in every peace agreement as 
"sometimes peace agreements contain the seeds of their own destruction" (Hampson 
1996); lasting peace, must "... rise from recognition of the needs of the conflicting 
parties" (Ball and Hallevy, 1996: 20). In support The World Bank (1998) stressed that 
"Peace agreements must reflect, or at least not conflict, with the history, tradition, 
cultures and values of the involved populations", or in other words the needs of the 
conflicting parties. 
In an Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (1992) defined four areas of 
actions to secure a long-lasting peace. These are: 
" Preventive diplomacy, which is an action to prevent disputes from arising between 
parties to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the 
spread of the latter when they occur. 
" Peacemaking, which is an action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially 
through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
" Peacekeeping which is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, 
hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United 
Nations military and or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace- 
keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of 
conflict and the making of peace, and 
" Peacebuilding, which is a post-conflict action to identify and support structures 
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict. 
The former UN Secretary General recognised the relation between post-conflict 
reconstruction and peace building. Adopting a similar position Barakat (1994) 
considered: 
A proper development can not take place without lasting peace, peace can 
never be sustained without proper reconstruction and long term 
development. No matter how much effort is put into the three actions of 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, it is proper peace 
building that can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and 
peoples. 
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Kofi Annan (1998) also recognised the strong connection between peace-building, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. He extended the argument, urging "... the 
international community and national actors to consolidate a fragile peace and begin 
sustainable reconstruction. " Arguably, peace settlements enjoying high levels of 
assistance and support during the entire course of the peacemaking and peace building 
process are more likely to succeed than those that do not (Hampson, 1996). 
Reconstruction after a settlement between the conflicting parties has been reached can 
be useful in supporting and cementing progress toward peace. 
The author endorses the above propositions, but doubts that aid can replace the need 
for a just and comprehensive peace process. 
1.1.3 Reconstruction of Human Settlements as A Tool to Consolidate Peacebuilding I 
Most peace accords during the 1990s have been accompanied with ambitious 
reconstruction schemes, addressing political, social and economic objectives. Annan, 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, believed that 
Building a lasting peace requires a sustained and concerted effort to cope with 
the multiple legacies of conflict, the physical devastation brought about by war, 
the weakening or destruction of social and political institutions and, above all, 
the invisible scars that wars leave in the mind and hearts of people. 
Rehabilitation activities and reconstruction of human settlements can strengthen peace 
agreements. It can play a role to revive communities. If approached in an appropriate 
manner, it can restore dignity, trust and faith in the future, as people together learn to cope 
with the past and regain control over the present and the future. 
It is believed that embarking upon reconstruction activities without proper 
planning leads to a waste of resources and long term social problems within the 
community. Therefore, there is a need to formulate a comprehensive and appropriate 
reconstruction strategy. For a country emerging from prolonged conflict a 
reconstruction plan differs from one employed in normal, stable circumstances. The 
chosen strategy depends on the nature of the conflict itself and the extent of damage. It 
involves defining goals and objectives; setting priorities and targets, making plans and 
formulating polices for implementation. It must pay proper attention to the political and 
1 Human settlement according to the UNCHS (1987: 5) referred: "To all those components of the physical 
environment with which an individual or a community comes into contact and which are used on a regular basis 
for the whole range of human activities: the individual dwelling and its related services the dwellings immediate 
surroundings, community facilities, transportation and communication networks, and so on. " 
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relational context in which they are applied. In post-conflict situations, a flexible 
strategy is preferred as Amirahmadi (1992) argued 
In setting objectives, the government should be realistically modest and not 
utopian, accounting for resources, needs, perceptions, expectations, 
potentialities, and constraints. More importantly, there is a need to be realistic in 
terms of accounting for global trends as well as international and national 
constraints and opportunities. 
Barakat (1993) and Stiefel (1998) recognised that no blueprints exist for post- 
conflict reconstruction. They noted transferring successful policies to a new situation is 
impossible, but learning from past successes and failures is feasible. This urges the 
author himself to survey the issue in different contexts. In this research, the author examines 
case studies of human settlement reconstruction in the Palestinian Territories, looking 
specifically at reconstruction's interrelationship with the peace process. 
1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES 
Having introduced the major issues of this study, the research question for this thesis 
can be summarised as: 
Considering the impact of Israeli Occupation and the ill-fated peace 
agreement can Palestinians (the Authority and people) with the help of the 
international community, achieve successful reconstruction programmes 
and sustain the peace process? 
To answer this question certain objectives need to be pursued: 
The first is to develop a theoretical understanding of occupation, by reviewing: 
" International Humanitarian Law, specifically the Hague and the 4th Geneva 
Conventions, that has formulated the relationship between occupier and the 
occupied territories and the limits of the former's assumed power. 
0 Secondary case studies to show why the phenomenon of occupation still exists. 
" The main case study of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories since 1967 
and its effects on Palestinian civilians. 
The second objective is to comprehend the inseparable relationship between 
peacebuilding and reconstruction, through: 
0 Studying conflict transformation and peacebuilding. 
0 Recognising what conditions uphold peacebuilding activities. 
0 Seeing how third party intervention fosters reconstruction. 
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" Acknowledging national government and civil society and their joint role towards 
lasting peace and sustainable reconstruction. 
The third objective is to put in place a procedure that makes post-conflict 
reconstruction of human settlement attainable. The author pursues this objective 
through 
" Addressing reconstruction as a process that entails input and output faces obstacles 
and gives priority to very specific actions. 
. Stressing the significance of human settlement revitalisation on the road to full 
recovery. 
" Scrutinising previous policies adopted by post-war and developing countries in their 
efforts to reconstruct human settlements. 
The fourth is to examine in detail the Palestinian context, highlighting how the issues 
identified above relate to this context, through 
0 Undertaking fieldwork in the Palestinian Territories. 
" Analysing the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and its consequences over the last 
seven years. 
0 Selecting two representative case studies: 
" First, the peace implementation programme (PIP) planned and carried out by 
UNRWA to improve the living conditions of Palestinian refugees. 
" Second the Palestinian Housing Council (PHC) and its shelter projects in the 
Gaza Strip, the Elkarama neighbourhood being the main example. 
Objective five is to analyse the findings of the fieldwork with reference to the literature 
review and the main hypothesis. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
Having identified the scope and objectives of the study, it is necessary to follow 
an appropriate research methodology. The methodology has been chosen to suit the 
different aspects of the research question. The programme that has evolved contains a 
range of important elements. 
First: Literature Review 
A review has been carried out in order to broaden the author's insights into 
relevant theoretical and practical issues. Significantly, he had the opportunity to look at 
unpublished material such as reports produced by the PNA, UNRWA, and other 
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organisations working in the Palestinian Territories. The literature review has informed 
the core argument for Chapter One to Three in the dissertation. 
Second: Fieldwork 
The author conducted fieldwork over two visits, investigating primary and 
secondary data. Primary data was gathered from PHC, J NRWA and the Palestinian 
National Authority. Secondary data included project documents, reports of PHC, 
government documents, and international organisation reports. Structured and semi- 
structured questionnaires were instruments to gather information from beneficiaries, 
particularly residents of the case study. (See appendix 1) 
A survey of official PHC and the PNA institutions was also carried out using semi- 
structured interview techniques. Discussions were held with Palestinian intellectuals 
showing concern for the study' subject matter who had not taken part in the case studies 
or belonged to an institution covered by the survey. 
Third: Other learning Tools 
Despite limited time the author participated in events, workshops, field visits, 
conferences and was able to attend MA Course of Post-war Recovery Studies at the 
University of York, contributing to his understanding of the many and interrelated 
issues faced in post-conflict milieus. (See Chapter Four) 
1.4 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This study starts by exploring the phenomenon of the Military occupation with 
Chapter One discussing the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. The chapter, 
divided into two sections, first identifies the legal framework governing the relationship 
between occupier and the occupied according to the International Humanitarian Law, then 
demonstrates different types and various causes of occupations in modern history. This is 
followed by an analysis of the Israeli occupation and its policies during the last thirty-three 
years, which amounts to an undeclared continuous war by the State of Israel against 
Palestinians. 
The chapter concludes by questioning how Palestinians could achieve a lasting peace 
and sustainable reconstruction against such a background of continual occupation. 
Chapter Two highlights particular issues that arise in post-conflict peacebuilding and 
reconstruction, concentrating on the process of peacebuilding and how to achieve 
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sustainability. It argues that efforts must be coherent, comprehensive, integrated and aimed 
at addressing the root causes of conflicts. 
The chapter discusses the factors that bring about success, debating whether 
international aid can or can not lay the foundation for durable peace and recovery by funding 
post-conflict reconstruction. Having outlined the relationship between peace-building and 
post settlement reconstruction, the author surveys in the chapter issues such as local capacity 
building, the role of state and the policy of donors, exploring how different authors or 
organisations present these issues. 
In Chapter Three, the author reviews policies adopted for post-conflict reconstruction 
of human settlement, suggesting a framework for reconstruction, showing it as a process. 
Seeing the deficiencies evident in different theories, the chapter reviews the options that exist 
within a viable strategy. Various options are proposed, leading to an analysis of the priorities 
needed to guide workable policy. 
Chapter Four explains the methodology employed during this research, offering 
a review of the author's strategy. Experiences are outlined, describing objectives and 
difficulties, the various techniques and instruments used to collect data explained. How 
best to store, analyse and present findings, is discussed. The chapter notes the other 
methodological and learning tools employed by the author to develop his ideas over the 
last three years. 
Chapter five presents the case studies; the author sets the scene describing the general 
situation in the Palestinian Territories in the aftermath of the peace agreements. The chapter 
discusses how the political process has moved forward with successive agreements under the 
Declaration of Principles, reviewing the main events, phases, and arrangements. 
Furthermore, the chapter claims that political uncertainties hinder efforts to achieve stable 
peace and quick recovery, demonstrating, in the Palestinian context, how the economy has 
deteriorated as a result of the Israeli policy of border-closure. Other characteristics of the 
present context are analysed. The chapter ends with a discussion of the shelter and human 
settlement situation, stressing the need for intervention to improve the Palestinian people's 
living condition. 
Chapter Six discusses the first case study, showing that the United Nation 
General Assembly - responding to the Palestinian Israeli peace process 1993 - has made 
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a decisive contribution in the attempt to ensure the occupied territories' economic and 
social stability. UNRWA responded by initiating the Peace Implementation Programme 
(PIP). Drawing on fieldwork findings, the chapter examines the project four 
components. Various issues are raised, in addition to measuring the impact of the 
project on the overall situation in the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. 
Chapter Seven demonstrates how housing is considered as the most difficult 
problem, heading the priorities of the PNA. It shows that with international help the 
Palestinian Housing Council was established to provide new housing units to the 
Palestinian people. To evaluate the success-failure of the project, the author starts by 
describing the PHC and its activities then subsequently discusses the main findings of 
the field survey of the Elkarama Housing project. The chapter examines issues such as 
the characteristics of residents, public participation, process of allocation, satisfaction, 
perception of the project, refugees' attitude and the impact of the peace agreement on 
the Council initiatives. 
Chapter Eight presents a summary and conclusion of this research, proposing ways in 
which improvements in shelter prevision may be achieved. 
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Chapter One 
PROLONGING COLONISATION: ISRAELI 
OCCUPATION OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of colonisation has faded from other parts of the world. In the 
Palestinian Territories it remains, in the form of Israeli occupation, an internal colonisation. 
Since June 1967, the Israeli military forces have occupied the remainder of the territory 
allocated to the Palestinian State under the partition plan in UN resolution 181 (II) of 1947. ' 
This territory constitutes the remainder of Mandated Palestine comprising the West Bank, 
with East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Frontiers of these areas were in place by the 
Armistice Agreements of 1949 between Israel, Jordan and Egypt. The Israeli military forces 
also occupied the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights. (See attached 
figure 1.4) 
In this case Israel is a belligerent occupant of those territories and should respect 
International Humanitarian Law with respect to the governance of these territories. Also the 
conduct of the occupying power should reflect the occupied people's status as "protected 
persons. " 
This chapter is divided into two sections. Firstly, the author identifies the legal 
framework (drawing on International Humanitarian Law) that governs the relationship 
between occupier and the occupied. The Hague Convention and the 4th Geneva Convention 
articles cite detailed description of how this relationship should be enacted to maintain the 
occupied civilians rights of `protected persons'. Identifying these responsibilities will help 
us assess the strategies and means adopted by the Israeli Occupation during the past 33-year 
period. 
The second demonstrates different types of occupations comparable with Israeli 
occupation. Various causes can be noted when analysing cases of occupation. In the 
USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, the aim of occupation was to support the communist 
regime in Kabul, while American presence in Panama was motivated by a conflict between 
1 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 called for the partition of the British-ruled Palestine 
Mandate into a Palestinian State and Jewish state. It was approved on November 29,1947. 
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former allies. Other examples include Turkish occupation of North Cyprus. American 
occupation of Grenada, Indonesia's actions in East Timor and the prolonged Israeli 
occupation of the Palestinian Territories. 
The author proclaims that Israel's occupation is an act of undeclared war launched 
against Palestinian civilians. The term of war is appropriate since Israel has and still refuses 
to adhere to the de jure applicability of the International Law specifically the 4th Geneva 
Convention. Instead of treating Palestinians as `protected persons', from the outset Israel 
imposed countless repressive measures, such as administrative detention, deportation, home 
demolition and other forms of collective punishment, inflicting enormous suffering and harm 
on the occupied populace. 
1.2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCCUPATION 
International Law can be dated back to the 1860s 2. At that time, two conferences 
were convened to establish treaties on specific aspects of war. The main goal was to 
"... institutionalise the rules of warfare" in order to eliminate any uncertainties as to scope 
and content. The inspiration behind such agreements was "... respect for humanity", and the 
primary aim was to protect "... all victims of war without any discrimination". The 
fundamental principles are: 
... 
in any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods 
or means of warfare is not unlimited. This type of law governs the relationship 
between the individual and the enemy, as opposed to that between the individual 
and his own State, which is governed by human rights law. 
Emma Playfair (1992: 5) valued the Hague Regulations of 1907 as an innovation 
protecting "... persons taking no active part in the hostilities" and "... who, at any given 
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, 
in the hands of a Party or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. " The Hague 
Convention deals with certain aspects related to the administration of occupied territories. 
On the other hand, the formulation of the 4`h Geneva Convention is clear in its title: "... to 
provide for humanitarian treatment of civilian persons under occupation". The convention 
2 The first conference on international humanitarian law was held in 1864 in Geneva, Switzerland on the 
fate of wounded soldiers on the battlefield. The second convened in St. Petersburg, Russia in 1868 to 
prohibit the use of explosive rifle bullets. These two conferences spawned two distinct, although not 
exclusive, trends in the law of armed conflict; each characterised by its particular perspective. The first 
such trend was known as the "law of Geneva", which was concerned with the condition of war victims 
who had fallen into enemy hands, such as prisoners of war or 
interned civilians. The second was known 
as "the law of The Hague", which related to the conduct of war proper, as well as 
its permissible means 
and methods 
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includes certain provisions for dealing with the specific rights of the Occupied population. 
referring to civilians' right to protection. 
1.2.1 Administration of the Occupied Territories 
In The Hague Regulations, Article 42, states that "Territory is considered occupied 
when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. " Initially, occupation was 
viewed as a by-product of military actions, and therefore was referred to in legal literature as 
belligerent occupation. Under international law, occupation is considered temporary in 
nature and involves no transfer of sovereignty. Occupation does not grant the occupying 
power `state authority' over the population or over the occupied territory itself. 
In the distant past, occupation was seen as an outcome of war. Events of the twentieth 
century has shown occupation could be the result of a threat to use force, when a pressurised 
government concedes effective control over its territory to avoid armed conflict. Also Mare 
(1998) posited that occupation could be established as part of an armistice agreement 
between enemies; it also could be the product of a peace agreement. In all these 
circumstances, International Law is applicable. The 4th Geneva Convention and the Hague 
Regulations establish basic principles for all manner of occupation. In exercising its powers, 
the occupant must comply with two requirements or parameters: fulfilment of its military 
needs and respect for the interests of the inhabitants. International rules strike a careful 
balance between these two: 
The occupying power must not exercise its authority in order to further its own 
interests or meet the needs of its own population. In no case can it exploit the 
inhabitants, the resources or other assets of the territory under its control for the 
benefit of its own territory or population. (Article 27 of Hague Convention) 
Strict limitations are placed on the belligerent occupier and its interference in the 
activity of the territory under control. Benvenisti (1992: 23) claimed that this interference 
made it necessary for the occupier to have certain powers in order to bring its administration 
into effect. He cited that: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the 
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (Article 27 of Hague 
Convention) 
The occupier is entitled to power to administer the occupied region for one reason only - 
restoration and maintenance of public order and safety. However, the Israeli lawyer E. 
Benvenisti argued that the term "public order and safety' could be given wide interpretation. 
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He explained it allowed the occupier to deny the population of occupied territory certain 
rights, of political and civil nature 3. Benvenisti built his argument on Article 27 of the 
Convention which states that the occupier can take measures such as "... denial of all or part 
of the features of political life and participation, altering pre-occupation administrative 
structures, amending legislation in force ... and/ or 
introducing new legislation". 
Benvenisti did not show that there were certain limitations. The occupier's powers in this 
respect are subject to the principle of necessity and proportionality, and to the limitations and 
guarantees provided by the Hague Regulations and 4th Geneva Convention. The Palestinian 
Mission at the United Nations (PMUN) argued that the above exceptions were made only for 
limited purposes to: 
Meet it's [the occupier] own military or security needs; to cover expenses 
involved in the occupation; and to protect the interests and well-being of the 
inhabitants. Any interference with public or privately owned property of the 
occupied population can be taken only for one of these purposes 4. 
The mission continued "This principle also establishes the general concept in international 
law that any alterations to property by the occupier (1) must not have a permanent effect and 
(2) must not be carried out to the detriment of the local population. " 
Both conventions provide safeguards to prevent an abuse of "very extensive and 
complex" prescriptive powers of the occupier. 
" As to the issue of sovereignty: occupying power is only empowered to administer 
the territory it occupies. Thus, any act of annexation is illegal under the provisions 
of the Convention. Further, the Occupying Power is prevented from integrating the 
administration of the occupied territory into that of its sovereign held territory. It is 
also prevented from transferring part or all of its population to the territory it 
occupies. 
" Article 64 of the Convention states the penal laws of the occupied territory shall 
remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the 
Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an 
obstacle to the application of the present Convention. 
" Articles 66 and 67 ... empower the occupier to establish military courts 
for the purpose of 
trying security-related offences, however, these courts shall act "in accordance with 
general principles of law, in particular the principle that the penalty shall be proportioned 
to the offence. They shall take into consideration the fact that the accused is not a 
national of the Occupying Power. " 
3 Benvenisti, E (1992) The International Law of Occupation. Princeton University Press 
' The Palestinian Mission at the United Nations (PMUN) (2000): The Israeli Occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories" http:: halestine-L111.01tenth'ppaper. htm) 
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" Article 49 (6) of the 4th Geneva Convention is intended as a corollary to the requirement 
of customary law whereby the occupant is not allowed to use the property of the 
occupied country, or of its inhabitants, to further its own economic or other interests. 
" Article 46 (2) reinforces the prohibition of the use of land for purposes other than 
military need, as set forth in the Hague Regulations. Similar principles also apply to 
water, which can constitute either public or private property. Under international law, 
water is generally considered immovable property and, if state owned, is highly 
restricted to military use only or for the needs of the occupied population. As such. the 
occupant is forbidden to use water to promote its own economy or to pump it to its 
national territory. (Hague Regulations of 1907, http: //palestine-un. org/tenth/paper. htm ) 
The occupying power is thus prohibited from annexing the occupied territory or 
changing its political status and is bound to respect and maintain political and other 
institutions that exist in the territory. International law provides clear instructions concerning 
protecting people under military occupation. 
1.2.2 Protected Persons under Occupation 
The bulk of the 4th Geneva Convention was designed to protect the civilian 
population, individually and collectively. "At any given moment and in any manner 
whatsoever" and in "all cases of partial or total occupation" (Article. 2) 5. 
This contribution is significant because, it "... delineates a bill of rights for the occupied 
population, a set of internationally approved guidelines for the lawful administration of 
occupied territories. " The occupant is directed to treat the occupied people with 
standards similar to the ones employed for its nationals. Article 27, stipulates that 
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, 
their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and 
their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and 
shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and 
against insults and public curiosity. 
Further, protected persons under no circumstances are to be deprived of the benefits relating 
to the institutions or government of the said territory. This also extends to agreements 
between authorities of the occupied territories and the occupying power or any annexation by 
the occupying power of the whole or part of the occupied territory. The 4th Geneva 
Convention makes it clear that the occupant is required to develop the economic, social and 
educational infrastructures and to respect the right of the occupied people to a decent life. 
Examples of acts prohibited, in specific terms are provided for in articles 31 - 60. These 
articles prohibit coercion, ill-treatment and torture, settlement and transfer of population to 
5 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (1949): The Geneva Conventions of August 12. 
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the occupied territory, deportation, reprisals against civilians, collective punishment. denial 
of the right to due process and fair trial, etc. Appendix (1) shows in detail articles of the 
convention relating to the Israeli occupation. 
1.2.3 International Community and Occupation 
While the UN has no formal role in adopting the Geneva or Hague Laws. it is the 
international body with powers to ensure respect for these laws. This is so, since any 
unilateral, or multilateral effort to enforce the Convention's provisions which involves use of 
force or application of sanctions would require authorisation from the Security Council. The 
role of the UN is derived from its powers in maintaining international peace, and 
guaranteeing respect for principles of the UN Charter, including the inadmissibility of the 
acquisition of land by force, and the necessity for international peace and the respect of 
human rights. However, in UN approaches to solve world different types of Occupation, one 
can detect double standards. For example, in the case of South Lebanon, actions taken by 
the Security Council have constantly fallen short of reaching a point at which Israel would 
have been forced to implement the Security Council 425 6. Thus, Israel has been allowed to 
continue its occupation of these territories for the past 22 years. In contrast Mare, (1998: 17) 
demonstrated how the United Nation and its various departments were able to take swift 
action against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990 even without giving the Iraq-Kuwait crisis 
a chance to be resolved through alternative means. The same approach was adopted in the 
case of the UN's non-intervention in the former Yugoslav republics. Mare attributed this 
malfunctioning to the Security Council's structure and the power of permanent members 
with their vested interests. 
1.3 OCCUPATION IN MODERN HISTORY 
Most aggressive occupiers do not recognise the applicability of International Law to 
their actions in foreign countries under their control. Benvenisti (1992: 34) maintained this 
denial was "... an indirect outcome of their purported justification for employing this act". A 
recurrent supposed motive is that a state uses force to support another state, although actual 
control would be in the occupant's hands. Occupations in Afghanistan, Grenada, and 
Panama would seem to follow this pattern. Countries have given different reasons for 
6 Resolution 425 calls upon Israel to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and 
withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. This resolution was adopted in the wake of the "Litany 
Operation" led by Israeli military forces in March 1978 in southern Lebanon with the purpose of 
destroying the positions of the Palestinian Liberation organisation (PLO) there. Since then, Resolution 
425 has been constantly invoked internationally to demand the unconditional Israeli withdrawal from 
Lebanon. Israel withdrew under strong pressure of the Islamic resistance in May 2000. 
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committing this act. Many occupants in the previous five decades claimed that they were 
invited by the territories' lawful government to assist it in quelling `illegal' opposition forces. 
Some occupiers, such as Iraq (invading Kuwait) went further by claiming that the new 
established Kuwaiti government requested incorporation into the Iraqi State. Other 
belligerents insisted that their action helped establish new national entities such as in 
Bangladesh and Northern Cyprus. The third vindication for occupying another country has 
been to argue that the occupier was installing a government, and operated it under formal 
mandate. In this scenario, privileges were often secured in bilateral treaties with the local 
government. 
Assisting an Indigenous Government: The USSR Occupation of Afghanistan. 
On April 27,1978 a coup brought to power a communist government in Afghanistan. 
A treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation was signed on December 5, 
1978 formally tying Afghanistan with Moscow. In December 1979 after a failed attempt to 
remove the new Afghan president, Soviet forces entered the country to defend it from "... the 
imperialist enemies of the Afghan people"(Benvenisti, 1992: 52). Moscow claimed that it 
was answering a request from the Afghan government to intervene. A new pro-soviet 
government was appointed. It issued a statement that it had asked the USSR for urgent 
political, moral and economic assistance, including military assistance. Accordingly, the 
Soviet Union argued that it was not interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs. The Soviets 
claimed that the country was living under its own laws and norms, and its government alone 
was determining national polices, therefore trying to convince the world that they were 
acting within the perimeters of International Law. 
Despite the formal policy of non-intervention, the Soviet Union with massive support, 
immense investments with its horde of advisors, implemented measures on all levels of 
government deemed necessary for the successful socialist transformation of Afghan society 
and to overcome any armed resistance. One policy meant that USSR disrupted the language 
system used before for intertribal communications by promoting the use of tribal languages 
in instruction in schools and universities (Benvenisti, 1992: 52). This action aimed to break- 
up the Afghan national identity. 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was widely denounced. The UN General 
Assembly condemned it in an emergency session. One hundred and four nations joined in 
condemning the USSR's policy. In other forums third world countries also denounced the 
Soviet occupation. Significantly, the Afghan people themselves resisted in a military 
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manner the occupation. Despite the Soviet withdrawal in 1990, the consequences of their 
occupation still inflict damage on the Afghan nation, caught up in civil war. 
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Attempts to Annex Adjacent Regions. East Timor 
East Timor, a tiny half-island a few hundred miles north of Australia, for 400 years, 
until 1974 was a Portuguese colony. Then a new Portuguese government stated that it would 
free the remaining scraps of its colonial empire including East Timor. In anticipation of 
independence, Indonesia, East Timor's powerful neighbour, made plans, directed by military 
leaders determined to control East Timor. Indonesian agents sabotaged the region's peaceful 
progress toward independence, claiming that intervention was necessary to restore peace and 
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security in East Timor. Intermittent military offensives against the Timorese have continued 
ever since, displacing large segments of the civilian population. 
During the cold war, the International community seemed to be complicit in this 
occupation. The US has coddled Indonesia as a valuable ally in the war against communism 
and as a lucrative trading partner, providing Indonesia and its military with funding, training 
and weapons. After the cold war, in a dramatic policy, the Indonesian government opened 
East Timor to settlers, business-people, and tourists from other provinces of Indonesia, as 
well as to foreign tourists. From the Indonesian perspective, this new glasnost strategy was a 
disaster. For the East Timorese independence movement, it offered the opportunity to gain 
the attention of the world. The price of recognition, however, was dear. 
In January 1999, Indonesia and Portugal formally agreed to allow the UN to conduct a 
referendum on Indonesia's autonomy proposal. The agreement included a commitment from 
Indonesia that, should autonomy be rejected, East Timor will be `separated' from Indonesia. 
On August 30,1999, the United Nations sponsored a referendum in which the East Timorese 
were asked to either accept or reject integration with Indonesia. After centuries of 
occupation, the East Timorese chose to become an independent state. 
Appointing a Preferable Regime: USA Occupation of Grenada and Panama 
Occupation of Grenada exemplified a seemingly straightforward military 
operation that led to deeper political consequences. On October 13,1983, a coup was 
launched and military rule was established in the Caribbean's smallest independent 
country. The American administration saw the coup as a threat to USA's security in the 
region. The US claimed that a strong Cuban and the Soviet presence on the island had 
been established through the regime's decision to construct a large new airport on the 
island. American Administration feared Grenadian leaders might use the airport to land 
Soviet and Cuban planes carrying military cargo. Some 1,900 Marines and a small 
force provided by other Caribbean nations invaded the island. The American president 
Reagan told reporters that the Organisation of East Caribbean States had asked the 
United States to invade Grenada and restore peace and security in the area. 
While Marines advanced, the Organisation of American States, of which the US is a 
member, denounced the invasion. The United Nations General Assembly and Security 
Council "deeply deplored" the intervention. At home, the success at Grenada mitigated the 
nation's grief over the deaths of 241 Marines in Beirut, killed in Lebanon on October 23, 
when a bomb exploded in the Marines' headquarters. 
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Occupation of Panama 
By 1983, the effective ruler of Panama was Manuel Noriega, who according to 
Chomsky (1987) "... a criminal who had been a cohort of US intelligence. " The US 
government knew that Noriega was involved in drug trafficking since at least 1972. 
Nevertheless, he stayed on the CIA payroll. In 1983, a US Senate committee concluded that 
Panama was a major centre for the laundering of drug funds and drug trafficking. The US 
government continued to value Noriega's services. By mid 1980s, among other things, 
Noriega seemed to have been dragging his feet about helping the US in the contra war. His 
independence also threatened the USA interests in the Panama Canal. Most of the 
administration of the Canal was due to go over to Panama in the year 2000; Washington 
imposed economic sanctions that virtually destroyed the economy. Next a military coup was 
tried, but failed. Then, in December 1989, the US invaded Panama outright, killing 
thousands of civilians. A new government was appointed to ensure a compliant government 
for the administration. No military occupation administration was established. The Untied 
States immediately recognised this government as the legal government of Panama. By 
deferring to this government, the US's troops rejected the applicability of the law of 
occupation to their presence in Panama. United States captured General Noriega and the 
troops began to pull out and return to their bases in Panama. 
The USA occupation was internationally criticised. Southern and Central American 
government condemned the invasion, while the Organisation of American States and the UN 
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General Assembly" strongly deplored" the action and called for the immediate withdrawal of 
the occupation forces. 
Self-determination for Occupied Regions versus the Territorial integrity: The Turkish 
Occupation of North Cyprus 
In July 1974, a coup against Cyprus's president was organised. The president was 
following a policy of an independent and non-aligned Cyprus in which Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots would agree upon new constitutional arrangements. Turkey 
claimed that the coup was led by Greek mainland officers to overthrow the legitimate 
government. Alleging a right of unilateral military intervention as guarantor of the 
Constitution, five days later Turkey invaded Cyprus, declaring, 
The purpose of our peaceful action is to eliminate the danger directed 
against the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus and the rights of all 
Cypriots as a whole and to restore the independence, territorial integrity and 
security and the order established by the basic Articles of the Constitution. 
Turkey extended her invasion to occupy 36.4% of Cyprus. Human right 
organisations report that the Turkish government has employed forcible mass 
displacement, deportation, expulsion, and forced evacuations of persons from their 
homes. The UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions deploring the Turkish 
occupation, demanding its immediate withdrawal, and deploring all unilateral actions 
that change the demographic structure of Cyprus or promote other faits accomplis. The 
Security Council declared the 1983 declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus legally invalid, and called upon all states not to recognise any 
Cypriot state other than the legitimate state. It also refused the Turkish demands for the 
recognition of the existence of two peoples in Cyprus and their respective rights to self- 
determination, and called for a single bi-communal republic as the solution to the crisis. 
1.4 THE PROLONGED ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE PALESTINIAN 
TERRITORIES 
Turbulent political conditions in Palestine from 1920 up to 1948 contributed to the 
creation of the State of Israel and its spread into mandated Palestine and the expulsion of 
approximately 750,000 Palestinians from their homes. In the wake of the 1948 war, the rest 
of Palestine was divided: Gaza Strip falling under Egyptian Military Administration and the 
West Bank being joined forcibly to the Kingdom of Jordan. The hostilities between the State 
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of Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries continued. In 1956, a war broke out followed 
by a further major conflict in 1967. 
As a result of this war, Israeli occupation grew to encompass the rest of the historical 
Palestine including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the 
Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. In addition, 360,000 Palestinians were expelled from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip to neighbouring Arab countries. The recurring cycle of conflict and 
consequence makes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stand off one of the most vigorous in the 
world. The Palestinian Mission to the United Nations argues that the Israeli occupation of 
the Palestinian Territories and the policies and practices of the occupying Power in this 
regard represent a unique case for several reasons: 
" The multiplicity and intensity of Israel's grave breaches and serious violations of the 4th 
Geneva Convention and other acts contrary to its provisions, all of which have caused 
the immense suffering of the Palestinian population. 
" Those breaches and other acts have continued for an extensive period of time, almost 33 
years, in total disregard for the clear position of the international community and in 
blatant violation of many Security Council and other UN resolutions. 
" The Israeli occupation has effectively transformed the situation in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, from one of "normal" occupation to one of 
active expansion and annexation, i. e. colonisation, of the Palestinian land and has denied 
the legitimate national rights of an entire people. 
1.4.1 The Israeli Occupation and International Law 
Under basic rules of international law, the Israeli government is a "belligerent 
occupant" of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights and Jerusalem. The Palestinian 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza are considered "protected persons" and the areas in 
which they live are `occupied' territories according to the provisions of Article 42 of the 
Hague Convention and Article 4 of the 4th Geneva Convention 
In the United Nations view, the 4th Geneva Convention is applicable to the Israeli 
Occupied Territories. The Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly have 
repeatedly reiterated this viewpoint ever since the Israeli occupation began. For example, the 
General Assembly reaffirmed in December 1978: 
That the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time 
of war, of 12 August 1949 is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by 
Israel since 1967 including Jerusalem. 
It has been noted that the Israeli government has considered the Hague Convention of 
1907 and the 4tß' Geneva Convention of 1949 as irrelevant to the Palestinian area 
occupied since 1967. The Israeli opposition has been based on the assumption that the 
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applicability of international regulations governing military occupations is dependent on 
the legitimacy of the sovereign rights of previous occupiers (Shehada, 1988: 6). 
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Yehuda Blum, former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations considered the Zionist 
conquest of Palestine in 1948 as a form of self-defence against aggression by Arab armies. 
He claimed that the Arab involvement was a violation of the international boundaries of 
Palestine (Aruri, 1989: 14). Moreover, Blum asserted that because Jordan and Egypt did not 
constitute a legitimate sovereign in the occupied territories, therefore the 4th Geneva 
Convention was inapplicable. Concerning Israel's colonial settlement in these territories, he 
claimed that article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention bans forced transfers, not voluntary 
acts of individuals. 
The International Association of Democratic Lawyers repudiated this interpretation of 
international law: 
" Israel's attempt to exempt itself from the international obligation as an occupant is 
negated by the provisions of the regulations concerning the laws and customs of War on 
Land of 1907 and by the Fourth Geneva Convention. They are applicable in all cases of 
occupation of all or part of the territory of a high contracting party, with no reference to 
the validity or otherwise of titles to ownership and no nice distinction between de facto 
and de jute requisition of territory. 
" The Geneva Convention seeks to protect primarily the population and not as Israel 
claims the rights of the evicted states, irrespective of the legitimacy of their sovereign 
claims. As a high contracting party Israel's obligation under the Geneva Convention is 
beyond contest. The United Nations bodies have confirmed this obligation. Moreover, 
Israel's argument that the Jewish settlers are engaged in a voluntary as opposed to a 
forcible act holds no water, as the broad policy goal of the settlements is to make a 
temporary illegal occupation permanent. 
" Israel is also in violation of international humanitarian law, which recognises wars of 
national liberation as a category of international armed conflict. The United Nations had 
already declared the Palestinian struggles as falling under that category. The right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination, recognised by the United Nations, is considered 
an integral part of the norms of peremptory law. (International Association of Democratic 
Lawyers, 1984; Quoted in Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, 1994) 
Despite an international consensus that Israel's control over the Occupied Territories 
since 1967 is illegal, the UN did not take effective measures necessary to protect Palestinian 
rights. On different occasions, the Security Council has condemned Israel's actions in the 
areas of settlement building and expansion, wilful and extra judicial killing of civilians, 
deportations, including mass deportations, and generally in relation to any violation of 
humanitarian law in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. But why is it that the 
UN is not acting in defence of several human rights cases, including the right to self- 
determination, despite the fact that world organisations have consistently categorised 
Palestinian rights as legitimate, and Israel's actions against these rights were widely 
condemned? 
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In fact, several reasons may be advanced to these two questions, the most important of 
which relate to the way decisions are taken within the world organisation, and the differences 
in powers vested in both the UN's Security Council, and its General Assembly. The Security 
Council, being the main body empowered to take measures under the UN Charter to enforce 
the UN's decisions is a political organisation. As such, politics rather than law have proven 
to play major role in decision making at the level of the Security Council. The Veto power 
vested in the permanent members of the Security Council is another factor that makes these 
members of the Security Council under duty to ensuring respect for international law, peace 
and human rights, a duty that corresponds with their powers. A reading of the use of the 
Veto within the Security Council proves that it was used frequently by the US in relation to 
Palestine, in certain cases against the will of the rest of the international community, except 
for Israel and the US itself. 
It is worth to note that the peace agreements, which have been signed in the last few 
years, deprived the territories of their international legal cover leaving the final decision to 
unilateral negotiations between the two parties. 
1.4.2 Colonisation; Ideologies and Beliefs 
Though Israeli society seems to be divided over the future of the Palestinian 
Territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), the ideologies of the successive Israeli 
governments consider the Strip as part of Israel (Government of Israeli Web Site, 2000). 
Literature proves that Israeli policy in the Gaza Strip is directly linked to Zionist ideology 
concerning Palestine. In The Jewish State, Theodor Herzel (189? ) proposed to establish a 
Jewish state on the land of Eretz Israel. Said (1996: 15) explained this term to include the 
whole land of Palestine and parts of Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. Sara Roy (1995: 34) 
showed how the Zionist Movement planned to settle in Palestine. She quoted a Zionist 
settler who wrote in 1882: 
"The final goal is... to gain control of Palestine and to restore to the Jewish 
people the political independence of which it has been deprived for 2000 
years. This goal.. . would 
be accomplished both by agricultural and industrial 
development and by military means. " 
Said examined the motivation of the Zionist movement, tracing back to the late 
1800s. He argued that nationalist ferment sweeping Europe in late nineteenth century 
influenced the Zionist movement. Its particular focus was adopted from the ancient 
Jewish ambition to return to Zion. The modern movement received 
impetus from the 
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increasingly intolerable conditions facing the large Jewish community in Russia. Said 
added, Zionism grew out of a general nationalist expansionism. He stated 
Zionism was of European provenance: its institutions referred to and identified 
themselves as colonising undertaking in the manner of European colonisation of 
Africa and Asia. Its whole rhetoric and ideological language borrowed heavily 
not only from Jewish theology but also from the rhetoric and language of the 
British in Africa and India or the French in Algeria. 
Supporting Said's argument, Ryan (1989: 570) indicated that in 1861 the Twelfth Zionist 
Congress set up a colonisation department. Villages established in Palestine were called 
colonies. The term `Yishuv' denoting the entire body of Jews in Palestine means also 
colonies 
In its explanation of the prolonged occupation, the Jewish State has claimed that there 
is an inseparable bond between Jewish people and the land of Israel, including the occupied 
territories (Shehada, 1988: 4). Newman (1984: 22) pointed out four other viewpoints to 
control the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, relating to a specific perspective within Zionist 
ideology. These are, 
" The "strategic" argument emphasises maintaining secure and defensible boundaries for 
the State of Israel. 
" The "historical" is based on the right to settle in the regions occupied by the Jewish 
Kingdom thousands of years ago. 
" The "religious" claims possession of all the "land of Israel" due to the Davidic Promise 
given to the Jewish people. 
" The argument for "negotiation" concludes peace with the Arabs can be obtained in return 
for territories captured in 1967. 
Senan (1992: 116) added through an `economic' argument where Israel justified 
occupation of the Palestinian Territories because they present a market for its products 
and a source of raw materials including cheap labour. 
To carry out its policy of colonisation, the Zionist movement ignored the very 
existence of the native Palestinian, declared that people are nothing, and proclaimed 
their land empty in accordance with the application of nineteenth century European 
techniques to the Asian and African continents (Ryan, 1989: 570). Today Palestinians 
are denied political rights to which they are entitled as a people or civil and religious 
rights promised by a former occupier (the British). Zionist ideology of the latest 
occupiers must preclude these rights. Consequently Palestinians become a people living 
on sufferance, merely tolerated within their own country. 
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1.4.3 Israel and Gaza Strip: After the Occupation 
Following the occupation of Arab Territories in 1967, the Israeli government had 
to decide what to do with the regions and the desired type of colonisation. It decided 
using different means to eradicate the Palestinian identity. Senan (1992: 12 1) mentioned 
two methods. Firstly, the Israelis tried to change Palestinian cultural identity through 
actions that affects people's attitude towards their national rights. Secondly, they tried 
to change the physical characteristics of the region. To achieve the first goal, the 
occupier undertook actions such as closing schools, universities, non-government 
organisations, associations and theatres. Social class changes, demographic 
transformation, economic pressure have become methods. Also Senan (1992: 121) 
stated in general terms that "... to achieve the purpose, the colonial power sometimes 
takes direct actions such as bulldozing mountains, cutting trees and building settlements 
or indirect actions such as planning policies, administrative systems and land 
expropriation. " He concluded that the Israeli aim has been to change the identity of the 
region and to control its inhabitants. 
The next part of this chapter offers a review of the Israeli occupation policies over 
the last three decades. 
1.5. ISRAELI POLICIES 
Historically before the 1967 war, underdevelopment characterised the Strip. But 
since then, Israel has adopted a policy of de-development. To understand its objective 
Murray (1992: 15) quoted Yitshak Rabin, the late Israel's Prime Minster who said in 
1985: "There will be no development in the territories initiated by the Israeli 
Government, and no permits will be given for expanding agriculture or industry, which 
may compete with the state of Israel. " Roy (1995: 3) argued that this attitude constitutes 
a policy of De-development. She saw this emphasis at work through expropriation and 
dispossession, integration and externalisation, and de-institutionalisation. The first 
term expressed how Palestinian people have been denied full use and benefits of their 
resources. As a result their capacity for improvement has been constrained and 
weakened. This is evident in water and land issues. Dispossession of essential 
economic resources has deprived Gaza's economy of vital production factors. This has 
imposed constraints on internal economic capacity and the economy's ability to sustain 
the area's population. Deprived of its resources, Gazan economy has been forced to 
rely on external resources. 
Chapter One 18 
, qq 
Israeli Military Occupation 
Dependence on Israel was achieved by integration and externalisation. Roy 
recognised that Palestinians were encouraged to rely on externally generated income sources. 
Sayigh (1988: 269) included measures to force labour away from indigenous jobs to intensive 
work outside Gaza, also to re-direct trade towards Israel. As a consequence Gaza's internal 
productive base and capacity has been diminished, and de-development escalated. 
Israel used a third component for economic de-development, de-institutionalisation. 
Roy referred to the direct or indirect restrictions placed on indigenous institutions that given 
the opportunity could have planned for sustainable development in Gaza. Abu Amr 
(1988: 78) showed this policy working through restrictive attitudes. He gave examples of 
expenditure and investment patterns of the Israeli government in Gaza that offered little to 
promote institutional growth in economically critical sectors such as industry and agriculture. 
Israel's position extended to eroding Palestinian initiatives to build independent institutions. 
Hiltermann (1993: 22) explained "Since the authorities have been singularly incapable of 
forestalling the emergence of a Palestinian civil society, they have singled out Palestinian 
institutions and popular organisations for specific repressive measures. " 
Sayigh (1988: 268) proposed that the Israeli dispossession policy has been 
practised systematically since the beginning as a continuous process rather than as a 
one-time act of vengefulness. Over the years of occupation, Palestinians have been 
deprived of a large part of their national, collective and individual political, social and 
cultural rights and freedom. The deprivation extended to control over a Palestinian 
future. To emphasise: dispossession in its broad sense has been a central, crucial and 
persistent objective of Zionist and subsequently Israeli state policy, from the first 
Zionist Congress in 1897, to the Israeli State and other Zionist fundamentalists today. 
From a historical perspective, the experience of the occupied territories, since 1967, has 
fallen within the continuum of long-term Zionist objectives and policies translated from 
one phase to another. Yet, while objectives and policies have never been secrets, their 
self-centred nature has not deterred Zionists, or those calling themselves Israelis, from 
claiming that they would be beneficial to the indigenous population. Overall, the crisis 
of shelter in Gaza strip has worsened through various Israeli measures as Al Agha 
(1997: 3) explained: 
The Israeli authorities implemented a policy that sought to make Palestinians 
lives as difficult as possible in an attempt to force them to leave. This policy 
manifested itself in the housing sector by restricting new construction and 
making it difficult to maintain existing building. Consequently, many 
residential buildings were abandoned. 
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In the following section, the author reviews the Israeli measures, which targeted the 
Palestinian human settlements. 
1.5.1 Deteriorating the Infrastructure 
Physical infrastructure: Even in Gaza under Egyptian Administration, physical 
infrastructure received low priority. But Abed (1990: 5) contended that it did not materially 
deteriorate during the period. Since 1967, the infrastructure and public utilities have 
declined steadily. During Occupation, virtually no upgrading, maintenance or expansion 
was carried out despite increased demand and pressure. Tuqan (1995: 85) attributed these 
deficiencies to a lack of government support or effective local authority and investment. The 
infrastructure has generally deteriorated. Per capita, such facilities as paved roads, hospital 
beds and the surface area of schoolrooms have declined during the thirty-two years of 
occupation, though some improvements have been introduced to serve the occupier's 
interests. Benvenisti and Khayat (1984: 25) argued that "Physical infrastructure is primarily 
planned to accommodate Israeli interests especially settlement construction, Jewish 
agricultural development, and military needs" 
In an UNCTAD report, Abu Eisheh (1994) documented the shortage of water 
supplies, and the generation of power. The report showed that Palestinians purchase power 
from the Israeli Electricity Company. The report's author provided an analysis of 
consumption rates. In Israel, the total consumption per capita has been ten times more than 
that of Palestinians. The author noted that most towns, villages and refugee camps have 
been exposed to sudden disconnection of electric power, which lasted for many hours a day. 
This has been the result of a shortage of transformers and overloaded electricity lines. 
Sewerage Services. Abu Eisheh (1994: 13) reported that existing sewer collection 
systems are incapable of meeting increased demand. There were no comprehensive 
treatment systems in most towns though facilities for partial treatment existed. 
Management of the wastewater disposal system was limited and most of the time left to 
run freely in the Gaza Valley and into the Mediterranean Sea causing an environmental 
and health crisis. Refuse collection and disposal was another problem. Nothing 
appeared to have been done in this sector. No plans for development of garbage 
disposal or re-use schemes exist. Finally, the report argued that Israeli authorities 
controlled all policy decisions related to development of services and infrastructure. 
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Social infrastructure 
Medical care has never been adequate. It has been used as a weapon against the 
Palestinian population. The occupier has failed to initiate a health system (Union of 
Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1989: 412). The Union 
described the situation under occupation: 
There are people who need doctors and doctors who need work, but no 
bridge between them. The existing health apparatus is incapable of 
absorbing physicians and other health professionals. 
Murray (1992: 56) added that Israel has not built a single hospital in Gaza. The ratio 
between beds to population has been reduced to half of what it was in 1967. In early 1989 as 
a punitive measure, Murray mentioned that the Israeli government cancelled medical 
insurance for Palestinians, which has meant the withdrawal of treatment from patients 
including children and elderly people. 
Educational Institutions. Education has suffered. In the Gaza Strip, the majority of 
institutions have been under the direction of the military government and UNRWA. The 
government has provided education to secondary school level and some vocational training. 
Roy (1995: 176) described the government imposed restrictions on the kinds of textbook and 
curricula used, the number of schools and classrooms that could be built, the expansion of 
existing schools, the number of teachers that could be hired, the kinds of courses taught, the 
kinds of departments established. Murray added three quarters of these schools lack libraries 
and science labs and most have been overcrowded, some with 60 children in a class. Murray 
(1992: 75) noted that some had double or three shifts. 
Sayigh (1988: 270) explained Israeli process of harassment was to disrupt the cultural 
heritage and institutions, involving censorship and control of teaching and reading material, 
especially in Arabic. On many occasions, harassment was taken the form of outright closure 
of educational institutions and newspapers, as well as detention of individuals for long 
periods, with or without trial. United Nation reported: "The Israeli authorities have erased 
from school syllabuses any material referring to Palestine, love of the country, Palestinian 
nationalism and the Palestinian people's national identity" (UNRWA, 1991: 12). Israel has 
made education a crime and heavy burden for those with little wealth. Despite all 
deficiencies, Palestinians have long taken pride in the high level of educational attainment. 
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1.5.2 A Dire Shortage of Shelter 
There is direct relationship between housing and development policies. When a 
country initiates progressive programmes, it often attempts to link housing strategies with 
overall development to achieve an improved spatial distribution of population and economic 
activities. A state's government normally aims to mobilise scarce resources to accommodate 
high rates of population growth and urbanisation. In the Palestinian territories, several 
authors have asserted that the Israeli occupation has considerably depressed the housing 
sector. Mohammed Shaded (1997) argued that the impact of the occupation accompanied by 
the absence of Palestinian sovereignty has resulted in no national agency being responsible 
for the planning, financing and development of housing 7. The absence of a Palestinian 
economic authority has led to an ad hoc growth in various sectors. At the same time. Israeli 
policies have directly served the Israeli interests, not the Palestinian. The Palestinian 
Reconstruction and Development Programme prepared by the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (1992: 220) posited that a total of $3,750 million is needed for expenditure on 
public projects. It estimated a total need of around 185,000 housing units during the period 
under study to accommodate the forecast population increase in the Palestinian Territories. 
Other measures helped to deteriorate the physical infrastructure were employed. These 
include the following: 
Planning Restrictions on Accessing. the Palestinian Land 
Coon (1992: 35) demonstrated that the crucial feature of development policy in the 
Palestinian Territories was that there were no `development areas'. "If a Palestinian 
asks.. . where 
in his village, or any other village, or anywhere outside the villages, 
development of any type is allowed, the answer he will be given is that no such 
development area exists. " Planning affects a society's prospects, including investment 
in infrastructure, housing, commercial and industrial ventures, and transport, water and 
sewage systems. Planning and land use decisions influence social and economic 
development; determine if houses and offices can be built, and where. Senan 
(1992: 120) claimed: In the occupied Palestinian Territories it is different: for many 
hundreds of Palestinians the town planning system has been the means of deciding that 
homes they have built should be bulldozed to the ground. " The other side of the coin of 
planning and land use policies is Israel's creation of a network of new settlements and 
roads specifically for, and used exclusively by Jewish settlers. Israeli planning policies 
NI. tiha,, icd is a former Director of the Palestinian Housing Council. 
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effectively have stifled all Palestinian development, simultaneously and steadily they 
reduced the area over which Palestinians had rights and ownership. Planning has not 
been so much a means of mediating as an instrument for conducting the conflict. 
Land use and planning policies become an important instrument as Israeli authorities 
exhausted legal means. They have focused on restricting legal condition for development 
and land use. Israeli law deemed that development could only take place where a detailed 
plan existed, and has been approved. The process in the Gaza Strip has evolved so that all 
Israeli planning authorities include representatives from settlers (Al-Haq, 1992: 15). 
Palestinians have no part in the decision-making or consultative process as in Gaza Plan of 
1986. Benvenisti and Khayat (1988: 56) stressed: The interest and needs of the local 
Palestinians population were not only ignored, but `the physical planning process reflects 
Israel's interests exclusively, while the needs and interests of the Palestinian population were 
viewed as a constraint to be overcome. " 
Israel has acquired Arab land through dispossession, expropriation and confiscation. 
Before the occupation, the total area of the Gaza Strip, approximately 140 square miles, was 
under Palestinian use. Since 1967 government confiscation and the establishment of Jewish 
settlements has restricted land availability. In 1986, Benvenisti estimated that the 
government controlled over 34 percent of Gaza Strip land. Roy (1995) indicated that further 
increases have been noted between 1986 and 1995. She noted that "Most of the methods 
Israel uses to acquire Palestinian land are illegal under international law; those whose 
principles are not strictly illegal have, however, been violated by the Israeli authorities" 
Land confiscation has been a subtle process. The registration system in Palestine was 
based the Ottoman Land Code, amended later under the British Mandate and Israeli 
Occupation. Under the Ottoman Code, there was no category of `State Land'. Abd Alhadi 
(1994: 15) outlined that land was divided into the following categories: 
" Waqf land used for religious purposes. 
" Mulk land given by the Ottoman Sultan or Emir to local Muslim residents. 
" Khuraj land given to non-Muslims. 
" Miri, Matruke and Mawat land, which, although owned 
by the Ottoman Sultan, were 
handed over and used for public purposes under certain conditions. Matruke land could 
be used for road construction, cemeteries, etc. Mawat was unused, as the Ottoman Code 
stated it is further from the village than the human voice can carry. 
The final category gave Israeli the opportunity to declare this land as `State Land'. 
None of this land has been used for Palestinian development. Furthermore, Palestinians 
were not allowed to stay in this land, all of which is classified by Israel as Israeli State Land 
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whose sale or lease to non-Jews was prohibited for all time under the Basic Law of Israel 
(Coon, 1992: 55), 
To enable the Israeli government to appropriate the property from Palestinian owners. 
legislation has been enforced: 
" The regulation of 1943 concerning the expropriation of land in the public interest, 
promulgated by the British Mandate administration; 
" The Defence (Emergency Regulations) promulgated by the British Mandate 
administration (1945), allowed the military to evict residents and confiscate land and 
real estate; 
" The Emergency Regulation (Cultivation of Wastelands) of October 1948. Under this 
Act, the ministry of Agriculture could confiscate land of its choice, after its green patrol 
previously made it barren. This was carried out by spraying the crops with substances 
capable of transforming fertile land into barren land in a short period. After this, the 
ministry issued orders for confiscation to set up colonies. 
" The law of Security Areas allowing land to be confiscated for security reasons, forcing 
residents to leave. 
" The Absentees' Property law of March 1950 to replace the Emergency Regulations on 
Absentees Property of December 1948. 
" The law of Taking Action 1953 states that land not cultivated or used, the government 
has the right to repossess for defence and settlement needs. (Tuqan, 1995: 58) 
Emma Playfair, (1989: 101-176) argued in a blatant violation of the International Law, 
Israeli government amended these laws to: (1) Administer all lands registered as a State Land 
before 1967; (2) Seize privately owned land for military purposes; (3) Close areas for training 
purposes; (4) Repossess land belonging to Jews before 1948; (5) Expropriate land for public 
purposes and (6) Seize land by declaring it state land. By regulating land use practices in the 
Palestinian Territories, Israel has controlled land owned and used by Palestinians. Demant 
(1989: 230) listed methods to restrict land use: 
" Construction prohibitions are imposed on Palestinian construction through military order 
393. 
" Combat Zones: Military order 271 effectively prohibits the use of approximately one 
million dunums, as it is too dangerous to use land located within a military firing zone, 
" Nature reserves considered by the authorities as an integral part of their land seizure 
programme have provided a pretext under which hundreds of thousands of dunums of 
land have been confiscated without compensation. 
" State land: Military order 59,1976. allows a military commander to 
declare uncultivated 
and unregistered land as state land unless ownership can be proved to the satisfactorily of 
the Ministry of Civil Administration. According to the Israeli authorities, this method of 
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land acquisition is legal on the basis of the Ottoman Land Code of 1855 which declared 
that uncultivated or unregistered land belonged to the Sultan, therefore, could be classed 
as state land. Israel's acquisition of "state land" has only been possible since Military 
Order 291 was issued. This military order halted the process of land registration. As a 
result, Palestinians have been unable to register their land since 1968. 
" Closed Military Areas: in 1970, Military Order 378 gave commanders power to declare 
these areas. 
Building Permits 
The Israeli government has used building permits to stop any proposed development. 
Israeli planning authorities refuse building permits to Palestinian: when land is designated as 
`agricultural' the prohibition on subsiding land, and the prohibition on more than one house 
on each plot of land; as well as the charge that prospective land is not properly registered. 
The "virtual absence of any development areas means... almost any development could be 
said to contravene the plans" (Coon, 1992: 72). Very few appeals against demolition orders 
or refusals for building permits have been made, this as Coon portrayed, was because no one 
has ever appealed successfully. 
The Suppression of Financial Institutions 
Financial assistance is widely used to bring down the cost of borrowing to an 
affordable level. Although specialised institutions were established all over the world, the 
Palestinian Territories under occupation had no such facilities. Before the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, eight banks were operating in the West Bank and 
three in Gaza. One of the first military orders issued by the Israeli occupation forces was to 
close all working banks. Branches of Israeli banks were allowed to open. Despite the 
available chance to enjoy a complete monopoly, Sabri (1997) claimed that the Israeli Banks 
were not keen to provide a substantive banking services. It limited its services to attract 
deposits and facilitate trade with Israel. In reality, the territories have been left without a 
formal banking system. 
Restriction on Building Materials 
Understandably developing new building materials industries greatly assists efforts to 
provide the required infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of housing units, which are 
urgently needed. Regarding the potential for a Palestinian construction industry, it is 
assumed that it is able to produce building materials including, stone. marble. concrete, 
ravel, cement blocks, terrazzo floor tiles, plastics, PVC pipes, electrical control boards, steel 
1 INIVERST 
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water tanks and solar heating equipment. However, the building materials industry in the 
Palestinian territories has failed to do so. It suffered from restrictions on expansion, from 
heavy taxation and from Israeli competition. In addition, the Israeli refusal to grant permits 
for major factories, e. g. cement, placed a heavy constraint on the sector and made it 
dependent on imports from and through Israel. According to Saraf (1997: 717-718) the 
building materials industry in the West Bank and Gaza faced multiple, interrelated problems. 
It faced the following difficulties: 
" Unequal competition with Israeli products, Israeli practices have aggravated the 
already existing difficulties inherent in competing with the relatively better quality 
and lower priced Israeli manufacturers, which benefit from unrestricted access to 
local Palestinian markets. 
" Restrictive practices by Israeli authorities, including delay or obstacles in issuing 
building or operating permits for enterprises which are considered to compete with 
existing Israeli industries, and or which considered to compete with existing Israeli 
industries, and or with represent a basic industry such as cement. 
0 The Israeli domination of the Palestinian external trade sector. 
" Factories and plants are subjected to tax rates and assessments, such taxes include 
value-added tax, production tax, customs tariff, import tariff and others. 
" The lack of an adequate and efficient banking system. The absence of normal credit 
services represents a serious constraint for those aiming to expand successful 
operations, and deprives producers of the means to modernise production facilities. 
" Raw materials and machinery required for the production process within the 
factories can only be imported by Israeli authorities. 
" Palestinian manufacturers are prevented from building the infrastructure required for 
their plants, such as roads, electricity and water. 
"A low level of technical expertise. All firms with sophisticated machinery suffer 
from a serious lack of qualified maintenance and repair technicians. 
" The lack of an industrial data bank and of programmes for research and 
development, studies, and technical assistance. 
1.5.3 Demolition of Palestinian Houses 
Since the beginning of occupation, Israeli authorities have accelerated their house 
demolition operations. Benvenisti (1988: 15) believed the occupation determined to use 
planning and demolition as instruments of punishment and reward for political and security 
purposes. In 1988, on planning grounds at least 255 houses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
were demolished. In 1989, this had increased to 331 (B'tselem, 1992). Al-Haq, a 
Palestinian Centre for Human Right estimated during the first two years of the Intifada at 
Chapter One 26 
Israeli Military Occupation 
least 400 homes were demolished on the pretext of security, though in only one percent of 
cases had the suspect been convicted prior to demolition. Nevertheless, the Israeli High 
Court has never overturned a demolition order (Al-Haq, 1992). 
I 
Figure 1.5: Israeli soldiers bulldoze a Palestinian house 
Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace. http: //. wýwýw. tinep. org 
S 
To punish Palestinians, engaging in resistance activities, Israel destroyed their living 
shelters. B'Tsalem calculated Israeli authorities demolished at least 2,200 Palestinian houses 
and hundreds of other structures. It claimed more than 13,000 Palestinians have lost homes 
over the past ten years due to Israeli policy (B'Tsalem, 1999). This has occurred in addition 
to deliberate policy to destroy large areas of refugee camps to support its operations. The 
financial costs of demolition are enormous. Al-Haq (1992) estimated during a two years of 
the Intifada it cost a total $ 12 million. In contrast, no buildings built by Israelis in the 
Palestinian Territories have been demolished, even if they lacked planning permission. 
Demolition has caused homelessness; forcing affected families to live in houses built without 
permits. Sayigh (1988: 269) embraced such measures as a mean to"... social disruption, loss 
of roots and considerable anguish... economic destruction, and above all to the tangible 
degree of depopulation resulting". 
The legal basis of housing demolition policies are British Defence Emergency 
Regulations, allowing authorities to demolish sealed rooms or confiscate a house in the 
interests of security. The Emergency Defence Regulations restricted demolition to instances 
where the accused had been tried by a military court and found guilty (Shehada, 1988). 
According to Israeli Basic Law (1960) state land could only be used for Jewish benefit: a 
policy through which Israeli has presented "... its far reaching apartheid legislation as 
progressive social democracy" (Matter, 1989: 195). Increasing numbers of Palestinians have 
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discovered that their land is state land and duly confiscated from them. In parallel to this 
policy, the building of the Jewish Colonies in the occupied territories has intensified. 
1.5.4 Construction of Jewish Settlements 
Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories have been the cornerstone of Israel's 
colonising policy and have the most lasting consequences on Palestinian land. Settlements 
are not a few houses scattered on top of hills, some of them are real cities with all the 
necessary infrastructure, roads, industrial areas, and schools. Thousands of dunams of 
agricultural and grazing land have been confiscated from Palestinian farmers for their 
establishment; they have preferential and quasi-unlimited access to water resources. Senan 
(1992: 115) quoted Mosheh Dayan -one of the founders of the Jewish State- who explained 
the idea behind the settlements in the territories. 
The Jewish settlements in the occupied territories are important not because they 
keep security more than the army does but because the army without the 
settlements can not stay in the territories... without them the Israeli Army would 
be a foreign army who controls a strange nation. 
The Israeli Labour Government started building settlements in 1971. With the right- 
wing Likud Party coming to power, the scale of construction increased. The signing of 
Camp David Accords in 1978 gave the settlements a new dimension (Matter, 1989: 344). 
The agreements proposed autonomy for Gaza Strip, intensifying Israeli desire to prevent any 
future assumption of the Palestinian Territories claiming to be a sovereign state. Increasing 
absorption of land and the installation of Jewish settlement has had considerable effect on 
development. Land confiscation has removed valuable agriculture land from Palestinians. 
This practice has resulted in displaced people and resources, causing massive overcrowding 
in other areas. An ILO report (1993 : 49) outlined the consequences: 
To establish a settlement in the Occupied Territories means: to use its land 
and water resources, to build expensive infrastructure (in particular access 
roads) and thus to modify the environment. Furthermore, these settlements 
are considered by the government as Israeli pockets and as such settlers 
benefit from the application of Israeli legislation and jurisdiction, as well as 
tax benefits. 
Also to fill these settlements Israel transferred part of its population as well as 
scores of new immigrants to the Occupied Territories, in violation of the 4th Geneva 
Convention 8. Matter (1989: 345) argued settlements also isolate Arab communities 
8 Fourth Geneva Convention expressly forbids transfer of the Occupying Power's population to the Occupied 
Territories in its article 49. Despite constant international pressure on successive Israeli governments, 
settlements expansion in the West Bank and Gaza has never been stopped or been reversed. 
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minimising the possibility of them building a political union. Benvenisti (1988) 
emphasised this point. Eighteen settlements were built between 1978 and 1985 and 
established between the largest population centres in four regional blocs along or near 
Gaza's coastline. Israel granted the Jewish community use of at least 25 percent of 
Gazan land where Gaza's Arab population had 224,500 dunums; its 4000 Jewish had 
91,000 dunums. Therefore, every Jew in Gaza Strip has been allowed 23 dunums, 
whereas each Arab inhabitant possessed as little as 0.2. 
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Figure 1.6,1.7,1.8: The Israeli Settlements in the Palestinian Territories 
Source: Foundation for Peace in the Middle East, http: //wvvw. filmep. org 
The extraordinary population density in the Strip compared to the Israeli can be 
attributed to land confiscation and settlement policy. Roy (1995: 120) alleged that "The 
Chapter One 29 
r` 
i _ý 
-" -- 
Israeli . tIilitarv Occupation 
land available for use by the Palestinian population was over 14 times greater in 1945 
than it was in 1994". Gaza Strip has one of the world's highest densities: 5.929 people 
per square mile. By contrast, Jewish built-up areas have 282 people in 1997. Jewish 
settlers have 73 times more land to live on and 699 times more land per capita than each 
camp resident. 
The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (1994) estimated 65% of land 
confiscated has been used for Settlements, the rest was turned into closed military areas. 
The Israeli Government attracts the settlers to live in Gaza Strip by offering incentives 
that amount to approximately two-thirds of housing and infrastructure costs. The centre 
elaborated "... it is 30-40 percent cheaper to buy houses in the territories than it is to buy 
a similar house in Israel. Loans are more convenient, infrastructure is provided free of 
charge, in addition to substantial tax discounts". 
Israeli Occupation has been a conscious and consistent expropriation of land from 
Gaza's Palestinian sector and donated to Jewish settlers. Under these circumstances 
Gaza's physical infrastructure has suffered marked deterioration. 
The deliberate confiscation of land and settlement policy is an illustration of economic 
de-development. It aimed to support the expansion of a Jewish settler community on 
Arab land to institutionalise Israeli State control and eclipse the chance of establishing 
Palestinian sovereignty. From another angle, Coon (1992: 103) observed that the 
building of settlements contributes to pollution and environmental damage. Untreated 
sewage was allowed to flow into Arab land and water resources. He also mentioned 
other practices such as poisoning water, burning forests, uprooting hundreds of 
thousands of trees causing serious damage to the Palestinian environment. 
1.5.5 Expropriating Palestinian Natural Resources: Water as example 
Since the beginning of the occupation, the state of Israel acted in violation of 
international law and launched a policy aimed at appropriating to itself the natural resources 
and the land of the protected population under the Geneva Convention, using military orders. 
Water is a more valuable commodity in the Middle East than oil (Murray, 1992: 62). The 
scarcity of water is a serious issue in many countries in the Middle East, but the situation in 
Palestine is even more dramatic because of Israel's use of water as a prime political tool and 
a weapon. Israel has succeeded in exploiting Palestinian water. Jewish settlers taking the 
best land have also literally drained precious water resources away from Palestinian farmers. 
Since occupation began, Palestinians have needed special permits to drill new wells for 
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drinking water and irrigation. Until the Israeli re-deployment from Gaza, not a single permit 
had been granted to Palestinians to dig deep wells for irrigation purposes (Roy, 1995: 169). 
The amount of water supplied has not changed though the Palestinian population has 
grown. Meanwhile, settlers use water at a quarter the cost paid by their Palestinian 
neighbours. According to Israeli estimates the settlers were using 19 times more water per 
capita than the densely crowded Palestinians. Further, deep settler wells in the sandy Gaza 
Strip have lowered the level of shallow Palestinian wells allowing sea-water penetration. 
Salinity has poisoned citrus trees (Benvenisti and Khayat, 1988: 26). 
Israel's management has never aimed at sustainable development of water supplies '. 
In contrast, Abu Eisheh (UNCTAD report) presented a thorough description of the 
infrastructure in the Occupied Territories. He started with the issue of water services. Abu 
Eisheh concluded that inefficiency and inadequacy of the existing utilities were mainly due 
to poor planning, limited exploitation of water resources, limited extent of services, high 
losses and leakage, lack of water tanks and the deteriorating quality of water. Further, Roy 
(1995: 168) illustrated the problem of a lack of a national plan: 
Gaza City has fifteen useable municipal wells but needs approximately thirty to 
meet local demand. Khan Younis has only six wells supplying the majority of 
its water, five of which were built during Egyptian rule... total demand for 
water for residential use will more than double between 1986 and 2000, 
although there will be a 20 percent decline in usable drinking water during that 
time. 
She also showed the inequality between Jews and Arabs regarding allocation of 
permits for well digging, affecting the absolute amount of water available for Palestinians. 
The Israeli Plan (1986) calculated average consumption of domestic water in the Gaza Strip 
is 35 cubic meters per person per year. Thus, consumption was 10 times higher than the 
lowest international level, 60 percent below acceptable standards, and 20 percent of the rate 
in Israel. Abu Eisheh argued the occupied territories suffer from bad water due to lack of 
treatment and quality control. 
From the above, the author suggests Israel's policy has been driven by political 
motives. Zionists declared water as a state-owned commodity. Water is part of the nation's 
ideology - regarded as central to its practical application (Brown, 
1989: 371). Providing full 
supply has ideological relevance among social priorities in Israel. Water is the prerequisite 
symbol of its political goal representing the fulfilment of certain social values. 
9 Concerning water, military order 92 issued on the 1 -5th of 
August 1967, military order 158,11 
November 1967, and military order 291,19 December 1968, transferred all powers regarding the 
exploitation and administration of water resources in the West Bank to the Israeli military administration. 
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1.5.6 Targeting Human Capital 
The Israeli Occupation has had a terrifying impact on the Palestinian people. A direct 
impact is the demographic change. Areas occupied by Israeli in June 1967 contained 
between 1.3 and 1.35 million Palestinians. This population represented over half of the 
estimated 2.65 million Palestinians in the world. In 1994, the number who remained in these 
zones was about 1.3 million or approximately the same as lived there twenty-seven years 
ago. But this similarity reveals a dramatic drop from 50 to less than 30 percent of the total 
Palestinian population. The drop implies a massive displacement of Palestinians from the 
region, though this was not the only effect. Abu Lughod (1989: 120) summarised the 
changes as: 
" Massive expulsion of residents sufficient to destabilise numbers, despite a natural 
increase rate that has averaged 3.5 percent per year. 
" Distortion in normal characteristics of the residual population, due to the selectivity of 
expulsions and migrations. 
" Transformation of the remaining population from a diversified independent society of 
peasants, businessmen, and professionals to a proletarianised and dependent reserve 
labour army at the mercy of Israeli political and economic interests. 
0 Encouraging migration to North and South American countries. 
Since 1967 and afterwards, deliberately, the Israeli policy has reduced a diversified 
society to a labour army dependent on the Israeli economy. The opening of the Israeli labour 
market has increased the size of the working class. Meanwhile, a large number of 
individuals belonging to various segments of the petite bourgeoisie joined the working class, 
as a result of deterioration in economic conditions. Before the Intifada, PNA (1998) 
estimated the number of those working in Israel was about 45.900 workers, in addition to the 
almost ten to twenty thousand workers who were drawn to Israel through the black market. 
This number constitutes 50 percent of the overall labour force in the Strip. Some causes are: 
the confiscation of land and the deprivation of irrigating water, neglect of the institutions of 
technical training; repressive control of the building industry; incursion into the Palestinian 
tourist industry; exposing Palestinian handicrafts to stiff competition from cheap Israeli 
goods, and denying them government support. Another general factor is the harassment of 
economic enterprise through deterrent licensing requirement (Abu Amr, 1988). 
Dependence of the working class on the Israeli labour market and the fluctuating 
Israeli economy has resulted in a state of uncertainty. Anxiety characterised the 
conditions of the working class, which expanded and contracted for reasons beyond its 
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control. Needs of the Israeli market direct certain trends. For instance, the need of 
construction workers in Israel increased the number of this type of employee within the 
working class. Construction workers comprised 45.1 percent of the total number of 
workers from the Strip employed in Israel (PCBS, 1997). Abu Amr (1989: 320) noted 
that the dependence and frustration caused by the continued occupation fostered certain 
social moral trends. These include pronounced consumerist tendencies, deterioration of 
moral values, the use of drugs and frequent visits to brothels in Israel became common 
practice among an increasing number of workers. Abu Amr mentioned another social 
dilemma, the increasing number of women and children into the labour force. Many 
were to be found working in Israel. As for child workers, these were employed as 
agricultural labourers in settlements and on Israeli farms in the Strip and in Israel 
Abed (1990) surveyed the challenge confronting Palestinian middle class. He 
explained it has been attacked through an extensive `brain drain' on human resources. 
This has occurred through not only emigration to Arab rich States, but also Israel's 
thinning out the age and occupation structure of the remaining professional staff. Abed 
mentioned the fact that Palestinians abroad tend to be generally prominent in the 
medical sciences. However, he adds that the occupied areas did not have a single 
specialist in pathology, anaesthesiology, and bioengineering or in any number of other 
highly specialised occupations. 
1.5.7 Violence Against and Ill-treatment of the Civilian Population 
Zargar (1988: 37) made the point: "Wars for the hearts and minds of people and 
nations are more insidious [than overt warfare] often causing greater suffering". Barakat 
(1993: 3 7) showed two groups of civilians after war, those that had near miss experiences of 
death and who had a remote miss. The first group develops severe fear reactions, as well as 
higher levels of psychiatric damage due to anxiety and emotional stress of later air raids. 
The second group shows diminished levels of fear and greater capacity to withstand the 
emotional stress of later air raids. 
Barakat (1993: 37) argued that "War as experience, with what it contains of 
confrontation with death, separation of family members, war time stress, general fear of 
invasion, bombardment, capture and occupation, often lead the victims to develop the 
syndrome known as post traumatic stress". He concluded that the common reaction to those 
people can be summed up as unfortunate survivors and the consequences for them may 
range from fairly mild, transient irritants to profound psychological disturbance, culminating 
sooner or later in acts of self destruction either by suicide or spiritual annihilation. 
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Numerous forms of physical violence and ill treatment have been routinely and 
systematically used against the civilian population in Palestine. These include summary 
executions by special undercover units and indiscriminate shootings with live ammunition or 
rubber-coated bullets by the Israeli army and by armed Jewish settlers, resulting in scores of 
injuries and death. There have been numerous cases whereby the shootings by soldiers and 
settlers have resulted in massacres of Palestinian civilians, such as the massacre at Al-Haram 
Al-Sharif on 8 October 1990 and the massacre of 29 Palestinians in Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in 
Hebron on 25 February 1994 by a settler. 
Another extreme form of Israeli violence against the civilian population is the use of torture 
in prisons for both repressive and interrogative purposes. It would seem that Israel is the only 
nation in the world that has codified and legalised the use of torture in interrogation. The 
violence perpetrated against the Palestinian population also includes random and/or 
excessive beatings, physical harassment and the use of tear gas in confined places. Arbitrary 
arrests, humiliation, delays and even the obstruction and outright denial of access to medical 
treatment have been daily occurrences at checkpoints. 
Humiliation of the Palestinian People 
Sayigh (1988: 265) mentioned another form of dispossession, the denial of respect to 
the Palestinians as human beings. In August 2000, the Rabbi Ovadia Joseph described 
Palestinians as snakes. He continued his public speech stating that since God created Arabs 
he has regretted his shameful mistake. It was not the first time for a highly placed Israeli to 
show disrespect to the Palestinians and the Arabs. Matthew Engel in the Guardian 
14/9/2000 disclosed how Golda Meir the late Israeli Prime Minister used to deny the 
existence of the Palestinian people. Meir told a British parliamentary delegation: `But they 
[Palestinian people] are not human beings, they are not people, they are Arabs'. The latest 
incident, which proves the argument, occurred on 6/9/2000. A group of Israeli soldiers 
stopped three Palestinian workers as they were returning home from their work in Israel and, 
for no reason at all, subjected them to 40 minutes of torture. The San Francisco Chronicle 
reported on 19/9/2000 that the soldiers "... punched the three men, slammed their heads 
against a tone wall, forced them to swallow their own blood, and cursed their mothers and 
sisters. " (Marshall, 2000). Then, the soldiers took photographs of themselves with their 
victims, holding their heads by the hair like hunting trophies. 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories lack all citizen rights. Murray (1992: 20) 
explained: "They are treated as 'resident aliens' who can be deprived of life". She 
continued: 
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They are governed by almost 1,300 military orders in the West Bank and 
some 1.000 in the Gaza Strip which control every aspect of life, determining 
what Palestinians can read, where they can drive, whether they can 
whitewash their house or repair a window, plant tomato or pick wild thyme. 
Only a few of these orders have been translated to Arabic or made 
accessible to Palestinian lawyers. 
1.5.8 Exhausting the Mental Health of the Palestinians under Occupation 
El Sarraj et at. (1996: 595) asserted physical violence, torture, collective punishment 
and other types of abuse, deployed in current national and political struggles as a form of 
state organised violence, aiming to inflict physical and mental suffering for political 
purposes. During the Israeli occupation, its army used measures to frighten and punish the 
population for resistance activities. These measures varied, with curfew, house demolition; 
and torture being some of those used. 
The psychological effects of political violence is a matter of great concern; The Gaza 
Community for Mental Health Programme has conducted several studies focusing on 
emotional distress caused from exposure to traumatic events. Research showed that they 
produced long-term negative effects on cognitive performance. Problems with memory, 
concentration, learning, and intellectual impairment are common among Palestinians who 
have experienced Israeli treatment (Qouta et al. 1995: 290). Below, surveys on mental health 
in the occupied territories are reviewed. 
Torture Al-Haq (1988: 21) reported that torture has been used in Israeli prisons 
and detention centres to obtain confessions and information. A study conducted by the 
Gaza Community for Mental Health Programme examined links between the torture and 
subsequent disorders: depression, anxiety, anti-social behaviour and non-specific 
physical complaints. El Saraj, et al. (1996: 597) revealed: 
Torture victims have the typical symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, 
which are re-experiencing of the traumatic event through recurrent and 
intrusive recollections, dreams, and flashbacks about the event; persistent 
avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general 
responsiveness through avoiding significant feeling, activities, and recall; 
resistant symptom increased arousal, such as sleeping difficulties, irritation, 
and concentration problems. 
Torture affects children. Young Palestinians have been exposed to traumatic political 
experiences. A study, by the same programme, outlined the more the sample participated in 
the struggle against the occupier, the more they suffered from concentration, attention, and 
memory problems. It confirmed that traumatic experiences have increased the 
instances of 
depression and risk-taking among Palestinian children (Qouta et al, 1995: 301). 
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Another study concluded that exposure to traumatic conflict experiences 
interrupted intellectual development, resulting in poor academic performance. 
Furthermore, research disclosed that poor living conditions and other deprivations (that 
have worsened during the occupation) might lead to poor intellectual development 
(Raija, et al, 1997: 1198). 
Another investigation assessing impact of house demolition reported: "When a 
family witnesses the destruction of its own home by enemy soldiers, the psychological 
effect is immense". It recorded that "Depression was high in the `loss group', which 
may be interpreted as an indication of the specific effect of the loss of one's home" (El 
Sarraj, et al., 1993: 198). Further researchers found that adults who had suffered from 
their house being demolished revealed a high level of anxiety, depression and paranoiac 
symptoms. Women suffered more than men did. An old Palestinian woman describing 
her experience, said: 
When I returned to my home in the evening, I found it destroyed. The 
furniture was scattered and broken. I began to weep. At that moment, I 
began to remember the time when we were uprooted from our country, 
Palestine. We settled in the Khan Yunis camp for 35 years. Then we left 
the camp to live here in the El Ammal project until our home was destroyed. 
When the soldiers imposed the curfew, I did not expect them to demolish 
our home. Their motive was revenge. Whenever we achieve a step of 
progress, Israel forces us to go back (B'tselem, 1996: 14). 
As detachment from direct involvement does not guarantee security El Sarraj 
(1993) pointed out those who throw stones were not made of stones. They suffer like 
any human being facing violence and loss. 
1.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we began by reviewing the provisions of International law as they 
applied to territories and their inhabitants under occupation. After examining several other 
cases of occupation by outside powers during the twentieth century, we studied in detail the 
Israeli occupations of the Palestinian Territories, concluding that the behaviour of the 
occupying power could be considered as an undeclared war. 
Israeli authorities implemented a policy that sought to make Palestinians' lives as 
difficult as possible in an attempt to force them to leave. The chapter attributed the Israeli 
Occupation policy to various causes, including, history, economy, politics, strategy and 
religions. While Said traced it back to the early days of the establishment of the Zionist 
movement in the late 1800s when colonisation dominated European thought. 
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The thesis discussed the impact of Israeli occupation on the Gaza Strip explaining how 
Israel has commenced a policy of De-development through expropriation and dispossession, 
integration and externalisation, and de-institutionalisation. The first term expressed how 
Palestinian people have been denied full use and benefits of their resources. Integration and 
externalisation have created dependence. Palestinians have been pushed to rely on externally 
generated income sources, mainly Israel. The third component has been de- 
institutionalisation, achieved by direct and indirect restrictions placed on indigenous 
organisations that might have planned for sustainable development. 
Though there is no settlement destruction in the Palestinian territories the author 
argues that Israeli occupation has had a similarly detrimental effect. Destructive Israeli 
strategies included: the deteriorating of infrastructure, restriction on land, difficulties to 
gain a permit for development, abuse of the legal system, expropriation of local 
resources, and finally and crucially through policies to undermine Palestinian identity, 
human rights and self-respect. Each Israeli practice has employed its methods and 
tricks. In this research, the author distinguishes occupation as undeclared war. In the 
table below it is outlined the similarities between the occupation as undeclared war and 
conventional war; differences are limited to the range of the destruction and the tool 
used. 
War Occupation (undeclared war) 
Infrastructure 
and Physical 
Environment 
Destruction of infrastructure and 
residential areas with its network 
of services 
Deterioration of Infrastructure. 
Acute housing crises. 
Lack of services. 
Human 
Capital 
Institutional 
Capacity 
Economy 
Reduction in manpower due to 
mortality, disability both physical 
and mental and migration and lack 
of security. 
It differs from one party to other 
Lack of security would force local 
businesses and banks, etc. to 
operate outside the war zone, or 
even outside the country, thus 
causing a loss of investment; loss 
of crops and deterioration of 
agricultural land, in rural areas. 
People leaving their jobs and 
occupations in trade for survival 
and security for themselves and 
Reduction in manpower due to 
mortality, disability both physical 
and mental and migration, and lack 
of security 
Weakness of the existing 
institutions. 
Lack of security would force local 
businesses and banks to leave the 
occupied country, thus causing a loss 
of investment; loss of crops and 
deterioration of agricultural land, in 
rural areas. People leaving their jobs 
and occupations in trade for survival 
and security for themselves and their 
families, 
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their families, 
Lack of goods in the local markets 
causing inflation and a black 
market, making it very difficult for 
families to get hold of food, etc., 
Social Impact Social change Social change 
People are traumatised People are traumatised 
Evolution of morals and culture Evolution of morals and culture 
(the war culture) 
Table 1.1: Similarities between Conventional War and the Military Occupation. 
Source: The Author 
In 1993, an agreement was signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation regarding the Gaza Strip and West Bank. From this Treaty, Israeli troops 
were re-deployed and a Palestinian authority with limited power was established. 
However, Israel's policies and measures related to settlement building, destruction of 
the economic and social structure, have all increased substantially. The severe 
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, often in the form of general 
closures, has become an issue of increasing concern during the past several years. In 
addition to violating international law, all of these policies and practices constitute 
direct violations of the existing Palestinian-Israeli agreements concluded within the 
Middle East peace process. 
The next chapter studies the interrelationship between peacebuilding and 
reconstruction process. 
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Chapter Two 
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND 
PEACEBUILDING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War raised hopes that a less polarised international community 
would give `peace dividends' to speed up reconstruction and development in many 
impoverished and war-torn societies. The cold war's conclusion failed to bring about 
peaceful relationships within or between all countries; ninety new conflicts - it is estimated - 
erupted between 1989 and 1996. However, the end of the cold war saw increasing demand 
for peacebuilding and reconstruction in the world (DAC, 1997). Consequently, the need to 
address conflict transformation has not diminished. 
In fact, in the last few years extensive research has been undertaken in the field of 
conflict transformation, reconstruction and peacebuilding. Multilateral institutions and 
bilateral agencies have made efforts to understand better how to assist war-torn countries. 
There is a consensus that peacebuilding approaches must be coherent, comprehensive, 
integrated and consider conflicts' root causes. Also it is acknowledged that intervention 
from the international community may be necessary. 
Stiefel (1999) claimed that the last decade has witnessed the establishment of 
more effective and coherent frameworks of post-conflict reconstruction. In 1996/97 the 
World Bank produced a policy paper for its involvement in post-conflict reconstruction 
and decided to establish a "Post-conflict Unit" to respond to the needs of its operators in 
conflict and post-conflict situations (World Bank, 1997). Different UN agencies have 
worked toward better policy for co-operation in conflict-prevention and post-conflict 
recovery. "These guidelines provide valuable indications on the latest, collective views 
and commitments of donor countries on ways in which the international community 
should address issues such as conflict prevention, peacebuilding and reconstruction" 
(UN, 1995). 
The chapter is broken down into sections, each highlighting a different issue. The 
validity or otherwise of the phrase 'post-conflict' 
is analysed along with the use of the term 
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post settlement' - the preferred term in this study. The author reviews how different 
scholars see peacebuilding, examining what is necessary to achieve sustainable progress, and 
discusses the notion if reconstruction can bring about long-term peace. Looking at the 
relationship between peacebuilding and post settlement reconstruction, the author explores 
issues such as local capacity building, the role of state and policy of donors, and how various 
authors or organisations `pitch' these points '. 
2.2 POST CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 
2.2.1 Conceptual Clarification 
During the last decade, the term `post-conflict' has become increasingly popular 
among relief organisations, development agencies, research centres, and international 
financial institutions 2. For example, surveying the entry "post conflict" on the World Wide 
Web the author found thousands of separate publications. The question is, does the term 
`post-conflict' cover the case of the Palestinian territories. After reviewing documents and 
surveying a range of definitions, it could be argued that the term is vague in relation to on- 
the-ground cases. `Post-conflict' does not adequately portray the problems, which continue 
to confront people from countries suffering from the effects of warfare. Macrae and 
Bradbury (1998: 32) went so far to disclaim the term "post-conflict" as misleading. In their 
1 The literature review focuses on the various aspects and dilemmas involved in the process of post-conflict 
peacebuilding and reconstruction. This chapter draws on a collection of books, articles, reports, and Internet 
documents. In doing so the following list was consulted: Amirahmadi (1990), Anan (1998), (Anderson, 1996); 
(Anderson and Woodrow, 1989); (Ardon, 1998); (Ball, 1992); (Ball and Halevy1996); (Barakat 1998,1994, 
1993); (Barakat and Cockburn, 1991,1992); (Barakat, Ehsan, and Strand, 1994), (Barakat and Hoffman, 1995), 
(Birgitte, 1998); (Borter, 1986); (Boutros-Ghali, 1992,1995), (Boyce and Pastor, 1997), (Brown, et al., 1992); 
(Brynen, 1995); (Burton, 1990), (Bush, 1995); (Canadian Peacebuilding Co-ordinating Committee, 1998) 
(Cassen, 1986); (Clausewit, 1995); (Clement, 1994); (Colleta et al., 1996; 1996a); (Collier, 1994); (Doyle, and 
Sambanis, 1999); (Dudley, 1993); (Duffield, 1996); (Ellwood, 1992), (Evans, 1993), (Fagen, 1995); (Feeney, 
1998); (Fischer, 1995); (Fischer, et al, 1994); (Fisher, G, 1980); (Fisher, 1995); (FitzGerald, et a11997) (Forman 
and R. Parhad, 1998), (Galtung, 1995); (Galtung, 1996) (Hampson, 1996); (Hewitt: 1994); (Hill, 1996); 
(Hoffman, 1998), (Holsti, 1996), (Janssen, 1983), (King, 1997); (Kumar, 1997), (Kumar, et al., 1997); (Lake, 
1990); (Lederach, 1997), (Little, 1983); (Macrae and Bradbury, 1998); (Miall, and O. Ramsotham and T. 
Woodhouse , 
1999); (Michael and Webb, 1992); (Minear, and Weiss, 1995); (Institute for international Conflict 
Research, 1998); ((berg,. ); (OECD , 
1997), (Overseas Development Administration, 1997); (Parry, 1972), 
(Smillie, 1999); (Stewart, 1993,1998); (Stiefel, 1994), 1998) (Stiglitz, 1998); (The World Bank, 1997,198, 
1999; 2000), (The World Bank Group in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGWG), 1994), (UNDP, 1993. 
1994,1995,1998); (UN, 1994,1996), (UNRISD, 1994), (Weiss, 1995), (WSP, 1996,1997a, 1997b, 1997c), 
(Wusten, 1993); (Zahlan, 1997); (Zartmans, (ed. ), 1996). 
2 Political conflict can be defined as the clashing of opposing interests or positional differences over national 
values and issues like independence, self-determination, borders and territory, access to or 
distribution of 
domestic or international power. Possible instruments used in the course of conflict are negotiation, authoritative 
decisions, threat, pressure, passive or active withdrawals, or the use of physical violence and war. (Institute for 
international Conflict Research, 1998). Carl Von Clausewitz (1995) suggested that war is an actual, intentional 
and widespread-armed conflict between political communities. 
He added that war is the continuation of policy 
by other means, which fits with his general definition of «'ar as 
"an act of violence intended to compel our 
opponent to fulfil our will. " 
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view, the concept implies an absolute cessation. It is too broad. failing to differentiate 
between stable and unstable regions in the same territory. In the above authors' opinion, 
certain uses of the term underestimate structural problems related to a post-war environment. 
They claimed issues such as extreme poverty and authoritarian rule tend to be ignored in 
policies based on the concept of post-conflict. Further, Smillie (1999: 6) pointed out `post- 
conflict' was not very helpful as a planning tool in situations of protracted violence such as 
in Afghanistan, Sudan, Angola, Sri Lanka. At the same time a number of armed conflicts. 
initiated during the cold war era and sustained by the bipolar state system, have been 
resolved. Wars and communal conflicts erupting in the early and mid-1990s have also been 
brought to some kind of conclusion. The author argues that conflicts have ended due to 
international military intervention (as in Bosnia and Kosovo) are likely to be unstable. 
Jeff Crisp supported the doubts regarding the term `post-conflict situation' to always 
fit the context as in examples cited above. He justified his position: 
" First, the term is based on a misinterpretation of the notion of conflict. Much current 
discourse on development confuses conflict in the general sense with the more specific 
phenomenon of armed or violent aggression. 
" Second, few states can be classified as post-conflict. In most countries where a cease- 
fire is in effect, it would be more accurate to call them transitional societies between war 
and peace. 
" Finally the ideological and strategic implications of `post-conflict' has been used to 
legitimate certain trends, that Crisp challenged: 
If donor states want to spend less on humanitarian relief; if they want to 
disengage from crisis-affected countries; if they want to suggest that the 
situation in those countries have `normalised'; and if they want to impose the 
rigours of structural adjustment on the world's poorest and most devastated 
countries, then what better way than to suggest that such states have entered a 
'post-conflict' phase? 
Paradoxically, some countries' violence and instability have been described as taking 
place in post conflict zones. It is believed that the term - `post- peaceful settlement' - is more 
flexible and might help to reduce misrepresentation. However, in this research the author 
still employs the term post-conflict as more familiar to researchers and readers. 
2.2.2 Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding 
Doyle and Sambanis (1999) suggested that "Peace is best thought of not as a single or 
simple good, such as an absence of war or violent conflict, but instead as a complex and 
variable process. " Long-term peace or real peace requires more than an absence of violence. 
However, violence never vets completely eliminated. To define peace, Hoffman (1998: 6) 
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suggested that peace has been defined in a number of ways including what is called 
"negative peace" and "positive peace". According to Hoffman, the term negative peace 
refers to peace as the absence of war, whereas positive peace involves more. Zia (2000) 
defined peace as "The existence of peaceful relationships, active association and planned co- 
operation among persons and groups for achieving greater aims such as justice, security. and 
constructive transformation of conflict". To move from conflict to sustainable peace, Ball 
and Hallevy (1996: 22) recognised that movement from one to the next phase is not 
automatic. It has been possible to define a theoretical cycle consisting of peace - conflict - 
reconciliation, but it is difficult to isolate the moment at which peace or normality has been 
transformed into conflict (Clements, 1994). The dynamic nature of conflict makes it 
problematic to distinguish when and where violence ends and conditions for genuine peace 
have emerged (DAC, 1997). A clear progression from conditions of peace to heightened 
socio-political tensions culminating in violent conflict before receding back again to peace is 
the exception rather than the norm. Similarly, certain parts of a country may be at peace 
while conflict is flaring in other areas, characterising the nation as at peace and at war. Due 
to the complexity noted above, it is necessary to identify common characteristics of different 
phases of the conflict transformation. 
Attempts have been made to identify, to the extent possible, the common 
characteristics of different phases of the peace process. The key connection among the levels 
of peace, Miall et al (1999: 11) explained, has been the principle that conflict should be 
resolved, or managed, as close to its source as is feasible. John Burton (1990: 6) 
distinguished between conflict resolution, management and settlement. Management is 
"... by alternative dispute resolution skills" and can confine or limit conflict; settlement is 
"... by authoritative and legal processes" and can be imposed by decision-makers. Burton 
suggested by contrast: "Conflict resolution means terminating conflict by methods that are 
analytical and that get to the root of the problem. Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere 
management or `settlement', points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is 
a permanent solution to a problem. " 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992: 35) detailed approaches to peace. He defined four 
possible areas of actions to nurture the peace process, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The circle from preventive to peacebuilding aims to lessen 
the chance of relapse into a violent conflict. Boutros-Ghali clarified preventive diplomacy as 
an action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from 
escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. 
Gareth Evans 
(1993: 7) explained that preventive diplomacy should include a full range of methods such as 
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negotiation, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means when 
applied before a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict. 
Peacemaking is an action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through 
peaceful means. It can be understood as close to the preventive diplomacy involving the 
same range of methods, which includes negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful 
means. But applied after a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict. Evans 
(1993: 7) posited that initial peace making efforts must aim at the immediate goals of 
cessation of hostilities, and stabilisation of the situation on the ground. Subsequent efforts, 
which might continue in parallel with the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, might be 
aimed at securing a durable political settlement. 
Peacekeeping is the military intervention and peaceful resolution of violence in a 
conflict, by non-enforcement means. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the 
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. 
Peacebuilding is a post-conflict action to identify and support structures tending to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Galtung (1996: 22) 
pointed out that peacebuilding should address the practical implementation of social change 
through socio-economic reconstruction and development. Doyle and Sambanis (1999) 
argued that peacebuilding should aim to build capacities for negotiation, civil society 
reconciliation, fair courts, and an electoral process. Boutros-Ghali (1992: 36) saw 
peacebuilding as the creation of a new environment to forestall the recurrence of conflicts. 
He recognised the need for sustained co-operative efforts to deal with underlying economic, 
social, cultural and humanitarian causes and effects of conflict. Further he explained, the 
term should: (1) be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, (2) be undertaken on 
the basis of agreements ending conflicts, emphasising the need for measures to promote 
peace and co-operation, stressing the need for co-ordinated action and (3) complement efforts 
at peacemaking and at peace keeping. 
Peacebuilding depends on the prior achievement of a minimum standard of 
peacekeeping and peacemaking. Evans (1993: 11) stressed that peacekeeping is critical for 
better peacebuilding while the character of peacebuilding is interdependent with 
peacemaking, and peacekeeping (Doyle and Sambanis, 1999). Peacemaking negotiations 
create the mandate for post-conflict peacebuilding. Evans argued that peacekeeping 
outcomes define the political context within which peacemaking and building takes place. 
1-lc added that good peacekeeping supports the norms and standards of acceptable behaviour 
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that will lead to a convergence of the parties' expectations about a feasible political 
settlement. 
2.3. SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
Given that lasting settlements are difficult to achieve, the question of what determines 
success in peace arrangements is critical. Some notable successes and some conspicuous 
failures mark recent history. The definition of a successful settlement is highly problematic 
in the conflict resolution literature. Hampson (1996: 21) showed that the "Process must 
produce some set of arrangements that lasts for generations or stands some other test of time, 
demonstrating robustness and permanence. " He criticised the definition, arguing that it can 
not be concluded that a peace settlement has succeeded for all time. Mitchell and Webb 
(1996: 57) argued: 
The notion of success is inherently relative because some processes never 
manage to get the parties into dialogue let alone to agree to cessation of fighting. 
Others reach dialogue but fail to find possible agreement. Still others achieve 
agreement only to see it repudiated. Still others break down at the 
implementation stage and the process ends in recrimination and accusation of 
bad faith. 
Hampson (1996: 17) proposed that durability or success of the peace process is defined 
in terms of (1) whether violence came to an end (2) the extent to which the parties 
fulfilled their specific commitments and obligations. By these standards, no settlement 
has been a complete success, but some are more successful than others. The author of 
this thesis sees the difference as conditional. 
2.3.1 Ripeness for Peace 
Druckman (1986: 41) stressed the need for a ripening process to foster the right 
moment. Zartmans (1996: 18) argued only under certain conditions are conflicts ripe for 
negotiated settlement that go beyond a mutually hurting stalemate. Doyle and Sambanis 
(1999) believed that if conflict has lasted for long time, peacebuilding tended to be easier, 
since war-weariness reinforces the parties' desire to keep the peace. This means that the 
parties share perspectives that continued confrontation is more burdensome than the cost and 
burden of settlement. 
There are important differences in the way ripeness is defined. According to Zartmans 
(1996: 19), there are four independent conditions (1) a hurting stalemate to the conflict, (2) 
looming catastrophe (I) valid representatives and (4) a way out of the conflict. Not all 
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conditions need be present, but some are prerequisites. These are based on `'a shared 
perception of the desirability of an accord, willingness to reach compromise from formulas 
in which national interests are protected, and approaches or processes of dispute resolution 
acceptable to the parities" (Haass, 1999: 25). Hampson (1996: 17) suggested additional 
requirements for ripeness: 
" The parties have refined their interests because of changes in leadership or constituency 
pressures, for example, and are no longer content with the status quo. 
" Old norms and pattern of behaviour have been replaced with new norms facilitating the 
possibilities for compromise and the achievement of a durable settlement. 
0 The parties share perceptions about the desirability of an accord. 
0 The parties have agreed on a common bridging process to settle differences. 
In Stedman's viewpoint (1991: 13) the hurting stalemate model put too much weight 
on the power relationship between the parties, and failed to take account of changes in the 
context which may also foster negotiation. Miall et al (1999: 112) clarified that although it 
has been possible to point to cases of successful negotiations which have followed hurting 
stalemates, it has been also possible to point to hurting stalemate which did not lead to 
successful negotiations for example Cyprus. It may be argued in these cases that the 
stalemate was not hurting enough, but then there was no clear evidence from case studies as 
to how long a stalemate has to last or how much it has to hurt. There should be a distinction 
between ripeness for negotiations to start and ripeness for negotiations to succeed. 
Miall et al (1999: 112) indicated the need for "A model that sees conflicts moving from 
unripeness, through a ripe moment to resolution, is perhaps too coarse grained to take 
account of the many changes that come together over time and result in a settlement: 
redefinition of parties goals, changes in the parties constituencies, contextual changes, shifts 
in perceptions attitudes and behaviour patterns. " They concluded, "Ripeness is not sudden 
but rather a complex process of transformations as the situation shifts in public attitudes and 
new perceptions and vision among decision-makers. " 
2.3.2 Negotiation and Agreement Provision 
The settlement must contain basic principles and satisfy minimum needs. "Sometimes 
peace agreements contain the seeds of their own destruction" (Hampson, 1996: 3). Holsti 
(1996: 24) clarified that some agreements were badly designed, and this was the main source 
of their failure. The Versailles peace treaty that followed the First World War was a case in 
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point. The agreement included punitive terms that led to the rise of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s 
and the tragic events that accompanied his regime. 
To achieve agreement success, negotiating delegations must have their people's full 
support, and be seen by other delegates as legitimate representatives. Without credibility, the 
resulting accord could end up `shelved' in the best case or lead to more bloodshed in the 
worst. The Camp David Agreement (1978) is a case in point. Egyptian officials were 
representing the Palestinians. Negotiations yielded an agreement that lacked credibility; a 
fact resulted in the agreement's failure at the Palestinian level. 
The World Bank (1998) proclaimed that "Peace agreements must reflect, or at least 
not conflict, with the history, tradition, cultures and values of the involved populations 3. « 
Furthermore, Holsti (1996: 26) attributed success to depend on ability to anticipate and devise 
means to cope with the issues of the future. Failure to do so may set the stage for future eras 
of conflict and war. The success or failure of peacemaking efforts in international politics is 
determined by whether or not a peace settlement fulfils a number of separate but interrelated 
functions. The World Bank (1998) stated that to minimise discontent, make progress, and 
reach the broadest possible consensus, the peace accords must be comprehensive, transparent 
and inclusive. Holsti (1996: 26) explained the prerequisite: 
" The provision of a system of governance that embodies certain norms of what constitutes 
acceptable behaviour. 
" Legitimacy based on shared principles of justice that are incorporated into the peace 
settlement. 
" Assimilation which demonstrates that the gains of living within the system... outweigh 
the potential advantage of seeking to destroy or dominate it. 
" Conflict resolving procedures and institutions for identifying, monitoring, managing and 
resolving major conflict between members of the system, including the capacities to 
impose settlement terms where continuation of a conflict poses a threat to the system as a 
whole. 
" Recognition that war is a fundamental problem so that the design of new orders 
develops 
and fosters explicit norms against the use of force. 
" Procedures for peaceful change, including methods and procedures 
for reviewing 
settlement terms , 
for raising grievances in general for adjusting commitments and 
responsibility to new social, economic, demographic and diplomatic conditions, and 
" Anticipation of future issues, that 
is a system of anticipating issues that are potential 
sources of new conflict and handling them before they erupt into violence. 
'The World Bank 
: http: /IWBLN00I8. Worldbank. or 'Netsv, orlalESSD'icdb. nsf/D4856F112E805DF4852566C9007C27A6 
I 763?? 849A59C I F68-ý? 5699600592FA7'SFILEAN'P l . pdf 
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Hampson (1996: 18) suggested that Holsti's criteria could help scrutinise the terms of a 
peace settlement in order to assess whether it is sufficiently comprehensive and durable to 
prevent, or otherwise deter, new challenges to the peaceful order that has just been created. 
2.3.3 Tackling the Conflict's Root Causes 
Too much diplomacy or mediation while ignoring root causes in a situation of 
protracted conflict can be counterproductive. Hampson (1996: 18) put it "Such activism no 
matter how well intentioned or politically useful as a demonstration of concern, can lead 
parties in a dispute to avoid facing reality and making tough, but necessary decisions. " 
Lederach (1997: 17) emphasised peacebuilding requires analysis of the many contributory 
factors that interact in generating and transforming the conflict. 
Hoffman (1998: 5) proposes important directive. First, conflict and chaos that must be 
overcome. Second, to do this root causes of conflict must be identified. Third, they must 
also be addressed. Post agreement stages can be fragile and unstable. To avoid the potential 
for renewed conflict this requires an in-depth, comprehensive understanding of its 
background and root causes. There is a consensus in literature on the point that building a 
lasting peace, the process must have knowledge of the past and must satisfy the parties' basic 
needs. Addressing root causes implies the need to look deeply in the anatomy of the conflict. 
Some conflicts are rooted in "... a multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping tensions 
evolving from ethnicity, religions, nationalism, communal strife, socio-economic problems, 
regional grievances and so on. " These conflicts are marked by self-sustaining patterns of 
hostility and violence. They usually involve fierce competition among differing factions for 
access to and control of the states' political institutions and or the search for national 
autonomy and self-determination. Doyle and Sambanis (1999) suggested that international 
capacities should always aim to assist self-determination as a way to promote long-term 
peace. However, self-determination for some must not come at the expense of others. In 
ethnic wars of secession, partitioning states along ethnic lines may be a suitable solution to 
end internal repression and violence. In this case of conflict, there is a need for a greater 
level of comprehensiveness of solution. Ball and Hallevy (1996: 20) remarked 
Future peace rises from recognition of needs of the conflicting parties. Both 
sides must make a deliberate effort to understand the other's logic not in order to 
surrender. but to identify and proceed from existing points of agreement. Also 
isolating impasses is crucial so that resolution can be sought in the context of a 
shared vision. 
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2.3.4 Bottom-up Process 
Peace plans are often conceived from the top down. This is only half of the process. 
Peace must also be built from the ground up. Stiefel (1999: 14) stressed "Peace and solutions 
to the challenges of war-torn societies can not be brought from outside but must be achieved 
primarily by internal actors". He (1999: 23) argued that local, private and internal actors are 
the main forces for peacebuilding, adding that: 
The imposition or achievement of a `negative' peace which usually follows the 
ending of armed hostilities is not sufficient ... the challenge is to build a 'positive peace', peace that is sustainable because it can ensure social, political, 
economic and military security and stability and mitigate new tensions and 
conflicts. 
Lederach (1995: 19), addressing the principle of public engagement, suggested "... that 
peacebuilding must actively envision, include, respect and promote the human and cultural 
resources from within a given setting. This involved a new set of `lenses' through which it 
primarily saw the setting and the people as validating and building on the long-term goal of 
transformation. The World Bank (1999) emphasised "All aspects of the conflict - social, 
political and economic - must be addressed openly, allowing all interested members of 
society an equal opportunity to participate, including women's associations, civil society". 
Oberg (2000) suggested in later stages of peacebuilding the need for projects to build 
people to people peace, giving examples of multi-national school programmes; youth-to- 
youth exchange programmes; village visitation programmes; joint police training; joint 
workshops for professionals and journalists, teachers, nurses, lawyers, farmers, and sports 
teams. These are designed to deal with common problems, identify and carry out 
reconstruction projects. Perhaps even make it a minimum condition for receiving money 
and the material. One can argue that people in war-torn societies need good experiences and 
see their hopes fulfilled. When people observe that peace pays, then life and normality can 
return. 
2.3.5 An Effective Third Party Involvement 
In the literature, there have been fierce discussions regarding the intervention of the 
third party. (Zartman. 1996; Mitchell and Webb, 1988; Lederach, 1995; Hampson, 1996, 
Miall et al, 1999) debate different issues of third party intervention. Mitchell and Webb 
(1988: 19) pointed out that the third parties include international organisations, great and 
regional powers. Skilftil and properly executed third party interventions could have 
important implications for long term management and resolution of the conflict. Third 
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parties could serve as a crucial catalyst in developing a supportive relationship between 
adversaries. They could establish the conditions that lead not only to conflict de-escalation 
but also a redefining of conflict as a problem to be solved, not a contest to be won. Miall et 
al (1999: 59) agreed that third parties are often essential, 
They typically help the conflicting and confidence, setting agendas, clarifying 
issues and formulating agreements. They can facilitate meetings by arranging 
venues, reducing tensions, exploring the interests of the parties and sometimes 
guiding the parties to unrealised possibilities. 
Hampson indicated that third party intervention could proffer carrots or wield sticks to 
ensure that the process does not become derailed. As Fisher (1981) observed, protracted 
conflicts contain a large number of different constituencies with different demands, it seems 
unreasonable to expect that a single intervention strategy could deal fully with all of them. It 
seems more useful to envision intervention as a co-ordinated series of concurrent and 
consecutive strategies direct towards the long-term goal of resolving the conflict. 
The third party can employ the `carrot' of aid to pressure recipients into adopting 
more accommodating positions on the peace process. Such an effort was made during 
the American-Israel loan guarantee dispute of 1991-1992. It can be argued that United 
States pressure worked. The pressure contributed to election results in Israel that led to 
a change in Israel's position toward settlement and toward the entire Middle East peace 
process. The intervention of an honest third party thus transforms a dynamic barraging 
system into a three or multi-cornered relationship in which the third party effectively 
becomes one of the negotiators in a now transformed multilateral negotiation system. 
The tasks of the third party can cover a wide range of functions throughout the pre- 
negotiation, negotiation, and implementation phases of the peace settlement process. 
The role that third parties play in the full range of activities associated with the 
negotiation and implementation of peace agreements is therefore possibly element in 
explaining why some peace settlements succeed and others fail (Hampson, 1996). 
To sum up, strategies for peacebuilding must be sculpted to fit the case. Lederach 
(1997) wrote, "It entails, in a whole range of approaches, the interaction of national and 
international actors to create sustainable relationships between torn communities. " Benign 
relationships can be difficult to realise in post war situations. Resistance to agreement can be 
motivated by prevalent ideologies. For instance, radical religious movements believe to 
make peace with an enemy violates divine law. In another context, resistant attitudes result 
from loyalty to a country acting as a proxy. Objections to peaceful relationships need to be 
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understood: essential even to start negotiations for a settlement. The peace should be 
planned to resolve a particular conflict by addressing the root causes of the conflict and 
capacities for change; the war-related hostility; and the specific degree of international 
commitment available to assist change. 
2.4 PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES 
Hoffman (1998: 5) posited that if the task is peacebuilding then we must consider the 
nature of peace, the goal toward which peacebuilding activity is directed, must consider that 
which must be rebuilt. Peacebuilding is a set of strategies, which aim to ensure that dispute, 
armed conflicts and other major crises do not arise in the first place, or if they do arise that 
they do not subsequently recur. According to Evans (1993: 9), these strategies could be 
understood under two broad groups, international regimes and in country peacebuilding 
measures. He explained that 
" International regimes are international laws, norms, agreements and arrangements, 
global, regional or bilateral in scope-designed to minimise threats to security, promote 
confidence and trust and create frameworks for dialogue and co-operation. 
" `In country peacebuilding' to national and international efforts which aim at economic 
development, institution building and more generally, the creation or restoration within 
countries of the conditions necessary to make them stable and viable states. 
Expanding on Evan' classification, Hampson (1996: 45) stated that peace settlements that 
enjoy high levels of assistance and support during the entire course of the peacemaking and 
peacebuilding process are arguably more likely to succeed than those that do not. Aid can 
play a role to reinforce politics. Whereas economic efforts can be useful in supporting and 
cementing progress toward peace, they will constitute enough of a force to pave a path from 
hostility to peace". He added aid could be a valuable aspect of peace facilitation within the 
realistic parameters of their potential. However, aid can not substitute legitimate rights. It 
may help to provide a non-violence situation, but it can not secure a lasting peace. 
Moreover, aid can generate unexpected dilemmas. Some initiatives can actually be 
destructive, as they create unfulfilled expectations that then embitter the populace. Part of 
the reason for these unmet expectations is people sometimes get the impression that an 
initiative will make a quick difference, when in fact most initiatives take years to become 
fully effective. Not only is it important to avoid making unrealistic forecasts; it is equally 
vital to make every effort to follow through on commitments once they are made. Especially 
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when the diplomatic atmosphere is problematic, initiatives require sustained efforts and 
dedication at the highest levels. 
Due to the significance of the issue, in the following section, the author discusses the 
role of aid and international capacities in peacebuilding. 
2.4.1 Aid and Peacebuilding 
Aid policy in modem history began when Truman, the American president announced 
in the aftermath of the Second World War: 
We must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our 
advance and technical progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped countries. 
Aid in war-exhausted countries can do much to lessen the human and economic costs 
of conflict even during the hostilities. When there are limited domestic financial and human 
capacities, foreign assistance plays a crucial role in helping war-torn countries in political, 
social, and economic rehabilitation. Colletta (1996) and Collier (1994) claimed that foreign 
aid is particularly important in the first phase of reconstruction to assist in the rehabilitation 
of vital social services and productive infrastructure as well as to finance reintegration 
programmes for ex-combatants and civil returnees. Pugh (1998) indicated the fact that 
funding mechanisms and donations can be used as political tools to lead peacebuilding 
In the current days aid becomes an important discipline of research, major 
international donors have come to recognise the dire need to study aid trends and to bring 
together efforts to reach and integrate a coherent and co-ordinated framework. Stiefel 
(1999: 14) stressed the importance of 
Defining an assistance policy and implementing it, requires clear analysis based 
on a holistic understanding of the post-war situation and the specific country 
context, the legacies of the war, the root causes of conflict, the different actors 
involved, and more generally the dynamics of peace and war. This is 
particularly important given the essentially political nature of rebuilding, which 
can turn the most trivial administrative task into a political act. The 
effectiveness of international assistance depends on the ability to understand the 
political context and to fit constructively into it. 
Aid as the World Bank (1999: 2) definition --implies the idea of a gift of assistance 
rendered or a unilateral transfer a quid sine que". Dudley (199' ): 10) explained the wide 
range objcctive of aid is to "... help bring about change, whether in terms of how a seed is 
sown or to ww hose benefit political power is used. He argued that "In the case of poor and 
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conflict countries, external aid is often limited to balance-of-payments support, humanitarian 
assistance provided by foreign aid agencies and financial aid by international institutions" 
Who are the Donors? 
The World Bank (1999: 6) demonstrated that aid could be categorised regarding the 
donor side to include official development assistance and official development finance. The 
Bank explained "The first is a subset of the second and comprises grants plus concessional 
loans that have at least a 25 percent grant component. Official development finance is all 
financing that flows from developed country governments and multilateral agencies to the 
developing world. " 
Both types can be divided into multilateral and bilateral aid. Bilateral assistance is 
administrated by agencies of donor governments (such as the U. S. Agency for International 
Development or Japan's Fund). Multilateral assistance is funded by contributions from 
wealthy countries and administered by agencies, such as the United Nations Development 
Programme and the World Bank. 
Each group has its own advantages and disadvantages. Some bilateral aid is tied as it 
must be used to procure goods and services from the donor country. This reduces the value 
of that assistance by about 25 per cent. Janssen, (1983: 23) argued that 
0 National considerations tend to be less prominent in multilateral programme. 
" Multilateral aid assists the proper co-ordination of the overall assistance flows and this 
reduces unproductive duplication. 
0 Aid flows from multilateral agencies fluctuate less than flows from bilateral agreements. 
According to Stewart (1998) in the recent years, a number of donors have created 
functional units to design and deliver assistance for post-conflict recovery. He estimated that 
in 1998 there were around two dozen such entities in various multilateral and bilateral 
agencies, including several within the UN system. This heterogeneous group now holds 
semi-annual meetings to share information and resources, to establish common standards 
and principles, to collect "best practices" and "lessons to be learned" and to explore 
initiatives towards high-priority countries. 
Multilateral ý ýýýfýpý 
United Nations System 
FAO, Special Relief Operations Service 
International Organisation for Migration 
UNICEF, Office of Emergency Programs 
UNDP, Emergency Response Division 
UNHCHR, High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Bilateral 
Canada: Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), Peacebuilding Unit; and 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade (DFAIT), Peacebuilding and Human Security 
Division 
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UNHCR, Reintegration and self-reliance Unit Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conflict 
OCHA (Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Prevention and Crisis Management Division 
Affairs) 
UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), Division Sweden: Swedish International Development 
for Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability Co-operation Agency (SIDA), Division for 
UN Research Institute for Social Development Humanitarian Assistance 
(UNRISD), War-Torn Societies Project 
UN World Food Program (WFP) United Kingdom: Department for International 
World Health Organisation, Interagency Development (DFID), Conflict and Human Affairs 
Co-operation Unit Dept. 
Breton Woods Institutions 
IMF, Development Issues Division United States: United States Agency for International 
World Bank, Post-Conflict Unit Development (USAID), Bureau for Humanitarian 
European Commission Response, Office of Transition Initiatives 
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) 
Table 2.1: Functional Units Devoted to Post-Conflict Assistance 
Source: The World Bank (1999) 
Material & Technical Aid 
Dudley (1993: 17) categorised aid to include two types of aid: material and technical. 
He explained that Material aid involved large amounts of money and tended to attract more 
attention from donors and potential beneficiaries. More specifically, aid involves the donor 
countries in one of three types of financial expenditure: 
" Capital (grants, and loans) 
" Technical assistance. 
" Grants: are gifts, they do not have to be repaid. Although, they may require local 
expenditure by the recipient governments, which would not otherwise have taken 
place e. g. the cost of a visiting expert. 
Technical assistance: is mainly where human skills and knowledge are transferred 
from industrialised countries of the developed world to the less developed countries 
of the Third World. 
For some authors the neglect of technical aid has not been an oversight but a deliberate 
decision; they question whether technical aid is a valid aid strategy. Dudley (1993: 17) 
mentioned critics regarding technical aid. It has been seen, from within the third world as a 
product of a patronising attitude on the part of an outsider who believe they are better able to 
say what is good for someone than that person can him or 
herself The critics considered the 
attitude of technical aid workers to be both mistaken and racist. 
According to Dudley (1993: 18) "Material aid is inadequate and, for the foreseeable 
future, is likely to remain so". He justified his stand by the changing nature of need in the 
developing world with an inadequate indigenous technical 
knowledge for the resulted 
problems such as changing aspirations and new social 
institutions. Clearly, in such 
circumstances there is a case for external expertise 
in the new technologies and in the 
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processes of technical and institutional change commonly found in societies in transition. In 
the material aid approach, the donors understand what they are giving and despite some 
problems of tied aid and re-payment conditions, the beneficiaries understand what they are 
receiving. It seems according to Anderson (1996) that in recipient countries, the principal 
beneficiaries of material aid frequently appeared to be officials and consultants, the benefits 
taking the form of imported vehicles, salaries and fees. 
The disparity between the material resources required and those, which are available, 
suggests that the standards of living of the majority will not be improved though materials 
aid alone. If there are to be significant, improvements in living conditions they will need to 
come about largely through better use of existing resources. 
Aid: Project or Programme 
In addition to the previous categorisation of aid, Cassen (1994) clarified that there are 
two main types of aid, project aid and programme aid. According to Cassen: the difference: 
"Project aid makes a specific capital asset or piece of technical assistance available often to 
specific beneficiaries". While "Programme aid makes a cash sum available for the benefit of 
the entire recipient economy, or a sector of it, and is usually accompanied by policy 
discussions. " 
Baun (1992) argued that "There was no attempt to provide an explicit definition of 
what comprises a project". International organisations according to Baun (1992) have used 
the concept of project broadly to mean the use of resources for a specific. This results in 
projects, which can range in size from a multi-billion dollar project to training programme 
for primary school teachers. 
The literature reflects both disadvantages and advantages in employing project as 
opposed to programme aid. For example, the World Bank (1999) argued that project has 
become the primary means of transferring financial resources for development policies in 
developing countries. There has been a changed emphasis in the types of projects funded by 
the aid agencies with an increasing stress on projects explicitly devoted to the alleviation of 
poverty in the third world. The World Bank (1999) argued that these projects must be: 
Perceived to be manageable... They can be administrated through a well known 
and clearly defined set of procedures... they have clearly defined objectives and 
purposes and resources needed to achieve them. 
A criticism laid against project aid is that donors and the aid agencies promote their 
favoured ventures with insufficient regard to the overall development needs of recipient 
countries. This study acknowledges the criticism 
by the different case studies used to obtain 
Chapter Two 55 
16J, 
, nlllll' ll, u'llb/ 
Pi, o , 
6ll/41111, 
evidence to support this opinion. Pugh (1998) criticised tlik, ; ýIýIýýýº; ºý hm ii t. ilmilI(I ilj;, i 11 
would not help to build the local capacities and the institution(d (k"v(, IOjnww 
Partners are funded to implement not to exist. Projects become thiti; iiiic ()i OtIit 
for funding. They offer a formalised process for allocating gencr-A ly 1 i. xcd suns 
for specific tasks to be completed during an agreed time frame and which can he 
audited in a particular way. 
Stewart et al. (1997) argued that efforts are a waste of resources only if new projects 
are likely to be immediately destroyed. They concluded that development efforts should be 
continuous and sustainable. According to Pugh (1998): "Project aid reinforces a donor- 
centred, top-down approach". From reviewing different experiences in the World, he 
claimed "It is become clear that implementing partners generally write proposals for specific 
projects that they believe will fit in with the funding priorities of donors. " Project 
evaluations are couched in terms of the original aims of the proposal and with keen regard 
for the priorities of the donor. Pugh added that `Projectism' reinforced the bureaucratisation 
of peacebuilding processes. Since so many organisations are dependent for their survival on 
a more or less continuous and cyclical process of application and evaluation, they have to 
develop the bureaucratic mechanisms necessary to maintain this. This in turn limits the 
communication between donors and implementers to one of bureaucratic exchange. From 
the project implementers' perspective, the importance of sustainability appears to be poorly 
understood in the donor community. 
Pugh (1998) claimed that Projectism - an indication of short-termism- has been 
evident particularly in the funding and contract cycles that commonly last from 3 to 12 
months. Short-term staff is always in fear of being dismissed and often untold until the very 
end of the contract whether or not they will be re-hired. Having recognised the different 
categories of donor assistance, it has become clear that aid is reinforced by a variety of 
motivations. 
Aid Motivation 
The issue of aid neutrality in the post-conflict rebuilding gives rise to lively debates. It 
is understood that politics has an important influence on project relevance and execution. 
Politics' motivates the international, national, sub national, organisational, consultancy and 
individual level. The political motivation of the client governmental aid agencies has 
implication for all stages of the funded programmes or projects. The literature explains how 
a rich country's assistance can not be isolated from its general policies. This was explained 
by Hewitt (1994: 3) 
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The motive at the height of the Cold War was a strategic one. It used aid to 
strengthen friendly countries as a way of confronting the immediate danger from 
unfriendly ones. 
The World Bank (1999) clarified that aid policies from its start had twin objectives 
" The first objective was to promote long-term growth and poverty reduction in 
developing countries; the underlying motivation of donors was a combination of altruism 
and a more self-interested concern that, in the long term. their economic and political 
security would benefit if poor countries were growing. 
" The second objective was to promote the short-term political and strategic interests of 
donors. Aid went to regimes that were political allies of major Western powers. Thus 
the strategic and developmental objectives were potentially, but not necessarily in 
harmony. 
Little gave an example of the biggest aid programme in the modem history. The 
Marshal plan founded and funded by the USA to help recovering Western Europe in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. USA intervened to stop the expected spread of 
communism in the early days of the Cold War. Stiefel (1999: 20) recognised that more often 
the imperatives of domestic politics in donor countries influence the attribution and form of 
external assistance, and often negatively affect the design and quality of external assistance. 
Joseph Stiglitz gave an example of motivated aid "In some cases food aid has been 
motivated by the desire to get rid of the mounting agricultural surpluses that result from the 
misguided and distortionary agricultural policies in many developed countries 4. " 
Obviously, donors have a number of motivations in giving aid. This incentive to help 
the needy countries might be due to moral, altruistic, strategic, commercial, political and 
cultural reasons. But whatever the motive, a rich country assistance policy can not be 
isolated from its foreign and economic policy. 
It could be argued that bilateral aid is less impersonal. However, commentators claim 
that in this sort of assistance donors like to be associated with their aid and gain credit for it. 
Most commentators would agree that the administration and distribution of multilateral aid 
are not ideal. Both bilateral and multilateral aid suffers 
from excessive bureaucratisation, 
which limits the level of achievement. Both concentrate on economic reform 
issues and 
ignore other needs. FitzGerald (1997: 63) noted that the 
international financial institutions 
have been too narrowly focused on economic issues and have no consideration to the other 
needs of the wounded communities. 
4 Can Aid Facilitate Development? A New Vision for Development 
Co-operation in the 21st Century by Joseph 
Stiglitz Senior Vice President and Chief Economist The World Bank 
Tokyo. Japan, September 1.1997 
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One can also add that there is a negative attitude of donor countries and an 
unsatisfactory arrangement under which the multilateral assistance functions. Specifically 
donor countries were more prepared to give large sums of aid because they can direct it to 
those developing countries which they have special reasons for wanting to help and can 
avoid hostile countries. Further donors tend not to deal with government hostile to the 
donors' policies. The case of Iran is an example, as Amirahmadi (1992) explained how the 
United States and the Western countries did not help in the post-war reconstruction and 
development there despite the dire need for assistance. The strategic motives were 
significant in many aid programmes, which were to follow, and as evidence from the 
literature to have an influence on the character and distribution of aid. From another angle, 
Stiefel (1999: 20) claimed that very often external assistance has been used to further the 
particular interests of the donor as part of a donor's strategy. The selfish intervenor can use 
the power of aid to manipulate events, such as trade deals to his advantage. One can claim 
that some rich countries put strict conditions on their aid criteria in order to hire their own 
experts or contract with native companies. In effect, the dominant intervention paradigms 
focus on creating stability rather than security; law and order rather than justice; and the 
ability of societies to participate in global capitalism rather than provide welfare. 
Sustainable Peacebuilding and Aid 
Sustainable recovery and peacebuilding requires laying new foundations for social 
peace, political stability, and economic growth in the war-torn countries. Shepard Forman et 
al (1998) suggested to move from conflict-to-peace and to advance political, and socio- 
economic transitions, donors must support an array of essential activities. This array should 
include drafting and implementing peace accords, planning and monitoring disarmament, 
demobilising and reintegrating combatants, training local police, and restoring human 
security. It supports moves to build the national institutions, improve local governance, and 
monitor human rights. Furthermore, it provides essential services, restore transportation and 
communication links, rebuild social capital, repair infrastructure, jump-start industrial and 
agricultural production, reconstitute financial institutions, and revive commercial activity. 
Post-conflict countries suffer enormously in their ability to manage and absorb foreign 
assistance. Due to prolonged and extensive violence, recipients may 
lack the human, 
technical, and administrative capacities required to make use of large quantities of aid or to 
co-ordinate the multiple donors and NGOs that arrive to assist their recovery. 
The donor 
community should design interventions that enable recipients to acquire these capacities as 
quickly as possible. Efforts to build state capacity ought to 
be measurable, with clear 
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benchmarks to gauge progress in different spheres of activity. In order to avoid the 
preceding pitfalls, Lake (1990: 23-27) called for strategies to improve aid effects. It was 
proposed the creation of a reconstruction fund to be administered by multilateral institutions 
rather than bilateral ones. The World Bank published a series of working papers tackling the 
role of the donor countries in the current post-conflict situation. Also, the War-torn Societies 
Project has produced an important series of publications tackling the issue of external 
assistance claiming that it required major efforts primarily at the international level. WSP 
explored these issues with senior managers from bilateral and multilateral agencies in a 
workshop held in Bossey, Geneva, in June 1998. On the basis of WSP's and the participants' 
experience, they concluded that 
The quality of external assistance to war-torn societies can and must be 
dramatically improved if it is to contribute effectively to rebuilding. This requires 
major reform and explicit political commitment. Both the approach and the 
operational practice of aid need to change. 
To avoid doing harm through unplanned intervention, Forman et at (1998); DAC (1997); 
Stiefel (1999); the World Bank (1999; 2000) proposed that donors could nurture recipient 
capacities in several ways if they: 
Adopt Flexible Time Frame: Time is very important when donor countries decide to 
intervene. In view of the formidable challenges, donors need to be realistic about the length 
of their engagement. Understandably, where donors confront an essentially settled conflict, 
they may wish to negotiate an explicit timetable with the government. This timetable must 
be flexible. In cases where the `peace' is more of an uncertain truce, as in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon setting firm withdrawal deadlines may 
be impractical. DAC (1997) recognised that planning, programming and disbursement 
procedures must allow for timely responses to changing circumstances and take account of 
the exceptional conditions facing post-conflict communities. DAC suggested flexibility with 
regard to the areas and activities eligible for support, in line with the special needs and 
priorities of countries in crisis or recovery, is also essential in order to strike a balance 
between immediate humanitarian needs and the requirements of rehabilitation, long-term 
reconstruction and peace-building. Timely fulfilment of pledges for resources is also critical. 
Ensure Accountable Promises: Peace accords, and the aid commitments that accompany 
them, generate tremendous expectations within societies torn by conflict. By promising to 
launch ambitious reconstruction programmes, it is believed that pledges of aid can help 
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consolidate fragile peace agreements. Forman et al (1998) claimed that much of the aid 
pledged by the international community arrives only after considerable delays, or never at 
all. Donors make pledges, but there is typically a lag before these are translated into 
commitments, and still further into disbursements. Unsustainable and unpredictable 
disbursements can wreak havoc on reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts and shatter local 
expectations. Stiefel (1999) stressed the importance of regularity of assistance. He believed 
that it "... is often more important than the quantity". Small but stable commitments are 
more useful to governments of war-torn countries than large but erratic assistance on which 
they can not count. At the other hand, he argued that "Irregular assistance greatly limits the 
capacity of national actors to plan rebuilding strategies and has a debilitating impact. " 
Track Aid Delivery: To ensure the efficacy and legitimacy of its efforts, the donor 
community must improve its capacities to monitor the delivery and implementation of post- 
conflict assistance. Donors urgently need a standardised accounting system for reporting aid 
flows, one that can be applied in every circumstance. Such a comprehensive database, 
broken down by pledges, commitments, and disbursements, should be updated quarterly and 
be readily accessible to all stakeholders and interested observers. 
Assess the Impact of Aid: Sometimes societies emerging from conflict may receive aid that 
is redundant, harmful or squandered. By injecting large amounts of assistance into post- 
conflict countries, donors unwittingly but inevitably distort local systems of production and 
exchange. DAC (1997) pointed out that "... long-term assistance can lead to aid 
dependency". It indicated that aid could lead to corruption within countries emerging from 
conflict. For these reasons Forman et al. (1998) suggested, "The international community 
needs to develop tools to evaluate [aid] impact". While Stiefel argued that long-term 
commitments and partnerships require periodic reassessment of orientations, programmes, 
plans and terms of collaboration. 
Delegate a Central Role for the Domestic Actors: The international donors tend to deliver 
assistance as quickly as possible and announce their desire to rely on local capacities to 
shape, supervise, and implement reconstruction efforts. At a rhetorical level. donors concede 
that donor-driven aid must yield to true partnership and local ownership. In practice, donors 
preoccupied with speed frequently surrender to the temptation to 
design recovery programs 
with little recipient input - and to deliver aid through their own 
implementing agencies and 
service providers rather than through local actors who alone can ensure the sustainability of 
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the effort. DAC (1997) insisted that peacebuilding activities must be enhanced by initiatives 
targeted to the grass-root level. On the other hand, Forman et al (1998) stressed the 
importance of engagement of local government in broad consultation of the recovery efforts. 
Stiefel (1999) warned donors from delegating to external NGOs as interlocutors and 
counterparts fearing this would weaken the emerging government and local capacity 
buildings. 
Foster Reconstruction Activities: Hill (1996: 80) posited "... to put a society on the road of 
peacebuilding, reconstruction needs to start immediately. " Hill made the point "Post-conflict 
societies need reconstruction because most people do not have the means to make their own 
living and must depend on relief from the outside. " This is the crux of reconstruction. Each 
peacebuilding activity should do double or treble duty, humanitarian relief is needed, it 
should be provided so as to rehabilitate roads, dig irrigation ditches, or assist health care. 
That, too, should lead naturally and by plan into sustainable development. Employment 
should be the focus of relief strategies in order to promote training and leave behind 
capacities that could be nurtured by the local inhabitants. 
Reconstruction and peacebuilding are strongly connected, unstability can frustrate 
reconstruction, and reconstruction is necessary to achieve and sustain peace. This has been 
recognised by Barakat (1994: 1), who emphasised 
A proper development can not take place without lasting peace, peace can 
never be sustained without proper reconstruction and long term development. 
No matter how much effort is put into the three actions of preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, it is proper peacebuilding that can 
prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples. 
Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations (1998) argued that "International 
community and national actors have to work together to consolidate a fragile peace and 
begin sustainable reconstruction. " DAC (1997) observed that there has been a problematic 
ad-hocness toward peacebuilding and reconstruction. Therefore, it recommended a 
discussion of aims, expectations and strategies of the issue. In the following section, the 
author discusses the post-conflict reconstruction as a tool for peacebuilding. 
2.5 PEACEBUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Kofi Annan (1999) the Secretary General of the United Nations believed that 
Building a lasting peace requires a sustained and concerted effort to cope with 
the multiple legacies of conflict: the physical devastation brought about by war, 
the weakening or destruction of social and political institutions and, above all, 
the invisible scars that wars leave in the mind and hearts of people. 
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In Annan's statement, he noted the interrelationship between reconstruction and 
peacebuilding. Since the end of the Second World War, the US's initiative to assist the 
Europeans' recovery had led to the concepts of post-conflict reconstruction and 
peacebuilding. Now, "Post-conflict society quickly begins to search for a 'peace dividend' 
usually in the form of improved standards of living" (The World: 1999). Post-conflict 
reconstruction is a major element of peace building. In fact, most of the peace accords 
ending internal conflicts during the 1990s have been accompanied by ambitious 
reconstruction schemes addressing multiple political, social, and economic objectives. "In 
the time after reaching a settlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities have become 
paramount" (Annan, 1999). The aim of reconstruction is "... to rehabilitate societies to 
accept peace as the ideal option for life" (Stiefel, 1999). Reconstruction is needed to help 
prevent crises. Therefore, reconstruction needs to be incorporated into peace scenarios and 
to be more assertive in curative efforts. It can no longer wait for conditions congenial to 
serious, long-term efforts but must help bring them about in order to achieve the wished 
peace. Barakat (1998: 15) noted how a physical reconstruction programme has been used by 
Habitat to enforce peacebuilding in the Afghan capital. He narrated: 
West of Kabul City, a small river separates Qualaie-Wahid, an area occupied by 
Pushtuns and Tajiks and Qualiai-e-Nazir, occupied and controlled by the Hisbe- 
Wahdat faction. A pedestrian bridge, which once spanned the river and provided 
access for the Hazaras to reach medical clinics and the Tajiks and Pushtuns to 
reach the market, was destroyed. Acting as mediators, UNCHS staff identified 
elders in both communities to convince the Mujahideen commanders to lay 
down their arms and to participate in rebuilding the bridge... Gradually, people 
began to venture across the bridge and the traffic between the two sides 
increased, bringing with it trade and co-operation and the reduction if not the 
removal of the tension. 
Reconstruction of post-conflict society is no simple project. Reconstruction is usually 
understood less exclusively as a technical matter - isolated from other conditions and events 
in societies. Reconstruct as a verb suggests that something destroyed can be re-created. This 
may apply to buildings or some other physical structures, but not so easily to social, 
psychological and mental structures. Of course, building peace requires sound foundations 
of righting wrongs and social justice. Clements (1994) illustrated that reconstructing war- 
torn society means, reconstructing of human beings, souls and bodies, social structure, 
culture, environment, and a peace culture of reconciliation, repentance, 
forgiveness, respect, 
healing of collectively and individually acting out the sorrow, learning to live with it and 
simultaneously moving toward a vision of peaceful existence. 
Also Zahlan (1997: 147) 
added that the process encompasses "... many and 
diverse elements: community life. work 
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and employment, financial policies, the construction industry, infrastructure". It must meet 
the social, psychological, spiritual and cultural needs of the beneficiaries, building with them 
to promote self-reliance. Stiefel (1999: 16) drew the attention to the need to understand the 
major actors' role in the recovery process. UNRISD (1994) claimed that there has been 
confusion at both national and international levels about responsibilities and mandates: who 
does what, and why in war-torn countries. Absence of any of these actors could result in 
programme failure, long delays in responding to urgent needs, waste of scarce resources and 
significantly could result in renewed conflict. Understandably, the input of these three actors 
needs to be balanced. Stiefel (1999: 16) claimed that 
The real importance of actors in rebuilding processes does not seem to 
correspond to the importance and weight given to them by the international 
community or by the media, the importance and role of some actors, internal 
actors generally, the local people, the private sector, women is greatly 
underestimated. In contrast, the importance and role of other actors, external 
actors generally, the United Nations and other multinational institutions, 
bilateral aid agencies and to a lesser extent, the state and public sector is 
overestimated. 
Having understood the role of the international community in peacebuilding and 
reconstruction, below the author surveys the social, economy, institution reconstruction and 
the expected role of national and local actors, challenges they face and the nature of 
relationships between them. 
2.5.1 Social Reconstruction 
The World Bank (1998) defined the civil society as "... All the non-state actors that 
make up a free society. " "The main sources that allow society to rebuild after a war lie 
undoubtedly in the people themselves, their resilience, creativity, pragmatism and capacity to 
adapt" Stiefel (1999: 16) recognised. However, Anderson (1996) indicated that violence 
disrupts the normal healthy relationships that existed between the full range of groups in 
society. The disruption is exacerbated by the breakdown of communication channels 
between groups and the corrosion of trust often encouraged by opportunistic political 
leaders. Further, it appears in the psycho-social trauma for those who suffered the impact of 
the conflict. People have lived through intensely painful experience such as: the 
loss of 
human life and of material possessions, constant and widespread violence. torture, 
repression, rape, abuse, and discrimination. 
Therefore. The WSP (1998) stressed that social 
reconstruction is the primary challenge of post-war societies. 
The project suggested that 
relations must be mended between the present, the past and 
the future to prevent bitter 
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memories of the past from poisoning visions of the future. Smilli (1999: 2 z, ) considered the 
challenges to be a difficult, he argues: "Building the social rather than physical infrastructure 
is, and always has been, the most difficult challenge of development. " 
For a community to recover from a conflict and its impact Barakat and Hoffman 
(1995: 85) suggested three stages, which need to be passed through: 
" Hope: Hope finds its expression in relief rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. 
Concrete initiatives even during protracted conflicts when peace appears an elusive goal 
must be undertaken and executed so that people respect each other and enjoy 
participating in their communities. 
" Healing: Considering the destructive impact of war, healing is a significant step on the 
way to recovery. Healing is realised through long-term, comprehensive multifaceted 
strategies to end violence, rehabilitate communities, including those individuals and 
groups with a vested interest in waging wars. 
" Reconciliation: The authors state "Until a post war society is built up in which citizens 
can live in harmony, all other reconstruction is of limited value. Post conflict recovery 
projects should aim to reconcile groups in society as well as supply physical and material 
benefits. " 
WSP publications viewed reconstruction through socio-economic regeneration 
programme: "Reconciliation, the healing of bitter memories, the mending of relations and 
the restoration of trust is an infinitely complex and delicate exercise and may take a 
generation or more. " Barakat and Hoffman (1995) stressed the need for "Mechanisms to 
address trauma and practical conflict resolution; skills required to work toward mutually 
acceptable future outcomes must accompany structural measures and reconstruction 
initiatives. " Stiefel (1999: 16) elaborated the process: 
The challenge of rebuilding itself, if approached as a common task, can heal 
relations and restore dignity, trust and faith in the future as people learn to cope 
together with the past and regain control over the present. The situation can be 
healed through appropriately designed rebuilding strategies that pay attention to 
the political and relational context in which they are applied. Development or 
humanitarian rebuilding strategies should be designed and applied in such a way 
that they not only address primary objectives but at the same time improve and 
build trust in the peace benefits. If poorly designed they can fuel tensions, 
leading to new conflict. 
The vast majority of literature describes social reconstruction in terms of local 
empowerment and capacity building. Public participation in decision making can greatly 
enhance social reconstruction. As Lcdcrach (1997: 25) argued, 
local empowerment, capacity 
building and accountability- have the potential to transform societies. Participation has long 
been acknowledged as a requirement in the work of tackling the 
issue of post war rebuilding. 
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International organisations have recognised the importance of public participation in 
recovery programmes. WSP in its publications has highlighted that local involvement is 
necessary to diffuse local conflicts, to mend relations and solve problems. Rebuilding the 
country and restoring governmental legitimacy requires redefining relations between the 
centre and provinces, regions and local authorities. Agenda 21 of the 1992 UN Rio 
Conference on Environment and Development emphasised the value of a people-centred 
approach. Subsequently the Secretary General endorsed the position 
In order to fulfil their potential, people must participate actively in formulating 
their own goals, and their voices must be heard in decision-making bodies as 
they seek to pursue their own most appropriate path to development 
It could be argued that the strengthening of local coping mechanisms plays a crucial 
role in the process of igniting a social recovery. All dynamics of a society possess capacities 
as well as vulnerabilities, therefore the aim should be to strengthen these capacities while 
taking precautions against vulnerabilities. It is because of this that recovery efforts should 
incorporate the participation of local partners in planning and implementation. The WSP 
investigates how the public participation functions in its studies; its analysis explores ways to 
involve local communities in its reports. The World Bank now includes participation criteria 
(i. e. public debates with popular, gender and NGO involvement) in its lending policy, mainly 
for small-scale social development projects. 
Parry (1972) defined participation as "... taking part in the formulation, passage or 
implementation of public policies". More precision is required in describing the nature of 
participation in a particular context, identifying who takes part in what, when and how, and 
with what results. Lederach (1997: 49) pointed out, capacity building is a process not an 
outcome, and communities can be encouraged not only to realise immediate survival goals 
but to envisage change, and to consider whether projects contribute to that change. Borter 
(1986) stated that "Participation facilitates in the political realm the pre-eminence of human 
development and self-determination, both committed to the ideals of freedom and equality". 
Anderson (1996) stressed that people can achieve recovery through putting in place 
"appropriate structures of decision making". People must participate fully in the planning 
and implementation of development strategies. Pugh argued: "Communities have a right to 
ownership of the transformation of their societies. Without active participation people can 
not become `stakeholders' in ventures and enterprises ostensibly generated to assist them. If 
local participation is lacking political ownership of the rehabilitation process remains in the 
hands of external agencies. " 
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Local participation has been considered very significant in reconstructions official 
documents. Amirahmadi (1990: 247) stated that a reconstruction strategy is founded on the 
capabilities of people in conflict-torn areas and stressed the importance of obsen ing the 
cultural, traditional, and psychological characteristics of the people in each area. Barakat and 
Hoffman (1995: 89) suggested 
The local community is the primary resource for reconstruction. It is crucial to 
work with the community and not for it. People need to be helped to help 
themselves. Programmes have to be geared up to the REAL NEEDS and 
PRIORITIES of the community. This requires major changes in attitude and 
methods of working with the community. The community must have the sense 
of ownership and responsibility towards the projects, as the only way of 
ensuring true sustainability and initial self-reliance. One way of fostering this is 
by the community contributing to the project, material resources, labour, cash, 
etc. 
The two authors completed their argument, stressing it is crucial to involve the 
community in planning, design and implementation of reconstruction. They warned the 
... community should never 
be exploited, ignored, bypassed or helped to develop false 
expectation". Participation as active, broad-based local involvement in political decision 
making, an end in itself; can be distinguished from participation as a means to make 
decisions appropriate and enhance the impact of public expenditures on efficiency, equity, 
private initiative and so on. 
Pugh (1998) cited the Overseas Development Institute's identification of five levels of 
public participation: 
" Information disclosure: people are merely informed about matters that affect them. 
" People are given a voice about issues where external actors have defined problems 
and processes, control analysis and have no obligation to take people's views into 
account. 
" People are encouraged to engage in achieving project goals to reduce 
its costs and 
comply with procedural requirements. 
" People participate with external actors from an early stage 
in project design, 
implementation and assessment. 
" People take initiatives independently of external actors who 
in turn facilitate the 
achievement of goals defined by local communities. 
Public involvement varies according to the project's nature as the ODI pointed out 
"There is considerable divergence between the levels of participation in social development 
programmes and in major infrastructure projects". In infrastructure projects. participation 
is 
extraneous to the project. In contrast, Pugh continued. in "social 
development, public 
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participation is often integral to the project at the level of procedural participation and 
above. " 
Pugh (1998: 11) argued, though the need is greater, participation seems to have 
obstacles that slow its pace in war-torn societies. Stiefel (1999: 17) claimed that It may not 
be easy for governments and external actors to know about positive local initiatives and 
projects". Pugh predicted that transforming society by tackling social, educational and 
attitudinal barriers to peace will confront social classes. New corrupt classes may establish 
themselves as essential to people's existence, creating a counterfeit legitimacy by providing 
the means for ordinary people to `get by' in an economy distorted by grave shortages. Stiefel 
(1999: 17) emphasised that if people do not trust each other and lack trust and confidence in 
government and in the rebuilding process in general, then the best rebuilding strategies are 
likely to fail. 
In the general sense, there is a tendency to see entire peoples who were recently at 
conflict with each other either as traumatised victims who lack the ability to make decisions 
about the future or as unable to participate. Pugh (1998: 10) explained that misperceptions on 
the part of external actors about the general and particular social capital, which they arrive to 
support, are liable to inhibit participation. Supporting the argument, Stiefel (1999: 19) 
claimed that governments and international actors do not build sufficiently on local forces, 
dynamics and initiatives. He justified his attitude: "Local people are often seen more as a 
liability than an asset". Moreover, Pugh (1998) expected that the conditionality adopted by 
external actors to manipulate participation by creating or empowering only local institutions 
that demonstrate a commitment to externally determined goals may be a strategy resulting in 
social exclusion. 
Finally, the argument that without social rebuilding, no real recovery can be achieved 
can sum up this discussion. - Physical building without communal reconstruction results 
in 
chaos and disorder. Amirahmadi (1992) pointed out: 
Reconstruction is essential therapy for a wounded society. Social therapy 
centres on people rebuilding their communities, 
both physically and 
emotionally, and this process can succeed only 
if there is a national 
commitment to healing. Long-term habitability must 
become a priority and the 
guiding goal of the reconstruction. 
2.5.2 National Institutional Rebuilding 
Stiglitz (1998) mentioned the need to pay particular attention to the state role. 
He 
argued that the government is expected to manage 
both its own affairs and manage the 
affairs of others. The key question is to identify the role of 
the government - both what the 
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government should do and how it should do it. And the question should not be whether a 
particular activity should be carried on in the state or community. but how the two can best 
complement each other, acting as partners in the reconstruction effort. Related issues include 
what tasks should be undertaken at what level of government, and how governments can 
most effectively interact with civil society, donors creating the conditions that are most 
conducive to the sustainable reconstruction. WSP (1998) argued that rebuilding requires a 
collective effort in which the state plays an essential role. 
Conflicts tend to seriously undermine the capacity of the state to govern, as well as its 
political autonomy and administrative ability to promote a broadly based reconstruction 
programme. However, Carbonnier (1998) indicated that except in cases of overall state 
collapse, governments are supposed to design and implement overall policies. The absence 
of policies other than those strictly dictated by the conflict efforts may actually be one policy 
option that reflects a deliberate attempt to withhold public services and supplies from parts of 
the country to weaken the rebel. Stewart (1993) stressed that strong government structures 
with sufficient revenue to support the provision of essential social services are crucial to 
avoiding the large numbers. of indirect deaths associated with war. Supporting Stewart fs 
argument, Stiefel (1999: 17) mentioned that the United Nations has recognised that the 
central problem of Somalia and Afghanistan has been one of governance. Without some 
kind of formula for the restoration of public administration, it would be impossible to find 
ways to provide social services, regulate economic activity, protect the environment, and 
promote reconciliation. Stiefel (1999: 18) clarified the consequences of weak states in the 
aftermath of conflict as governments that are narrowly based, resource poor and unwilling or 
unable to meet the needs of their populations. 
The World Bank Group in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGWG) (1998: 1) argued 
that the institutional capacity of government depends largely upon such factors as the quality 
and quantity of staff engaged in government. There must be a sufficient degree of skills, 
training and management at the local level to carry out the relevant tasks, and enough funds 
to finance local priorities. 
Post-conflict governments are inevitably required to overcome enormous challenges. 
\\BGWG (1998: 1) pointed out that post-conflict government is required to create new 
administrative and political organisations. Understandably, a post conflict government is 
required to absorb enormous amounts of physical capital quickly. In the early stages of 
reconstruction, the needs for roads, schools. energy. telecommunications, and other elements 
of the infrastructure are huge. «'SP (1994) diagnosed that one of the problems facing the 
conflict government is the absence of mature and functioning democratic systems, which 
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implies that imperfect mixtures of authoritarianism and pluralism must be accepted. The 
WSP added that in this case, 'a formal democratic process is likely to be imposed artificially 
from outside. Stiglitz (1998) explained that beyond the political tensions involved. there 
often arise significant problems related to the nature of the bureaucracy - the government 
structure, technical competence and resource base. There may be basic problems with 
respect to personnel needs, attitudes and training in local government. He added significant 
practical problems could inhibit the implementation of government efforts. Due to lack of 
co-ordination, accountability, and weak administrative capacity political central decision 
makers are likely to resist any diminution of their powers. For example, a Minister of 
Finance may oppose the transfer of revenue sources to fund projects, which is called for by 
the Cabinet. In fact, reliance on state funding can mean chronic delays, revenue shortfalls 
and reduced local autonomy. 
2.5.3 Economic Reconstruction and the Responsibility of the State 
Carbonnier (1998) argued that post-conflict governments, are critically short of 
expertise in macro-economic management, and have to wrestle with the competing demands 
of economic stabilisation and peacebuilding requirements. He explained the plight by saying 
"While the former requires drastic cuts in government expenditure, the latter implies 
increased public spending to cope with the pressing requirements of the peace agenda. " In 
addition, Birgitte (1998) stated that countries emerging from conflict must revise the existing 
constitution to reflect the new political reality, changes in power relationships, and 
ideological objectives. Though the phenomenon is not of course confined to war-torn 
societies, problems of accountability do arise at the local level. The World Bank stated that 
malfeasance (at any level of government) is a waste of resources. Corruption has been found 
to be a serious problem pervading national administration in a number of post conflict 
countries. This of course will lead to "Broken trust and relationships between social groups 
and authorities". WSP (1998) explained that "Problems of relationships between people and 
institutions are compounded by the lack of neutral spaces in which they can meet and talk. " 
Stiefel (1999: 19) attributed the limitation of neutral space to 
The authoritarian tendencies of many post-war governments are not conducive 
to constructive communication and genuine open dialogue, often governments 
simply do not see the need to bring civil society in its widest sense into the 
policy debate, instead they work on the basis that the urgency of the rebuilding 
task diminishes the need to take time for dialogue, and that civil society accepts 
this. External actors, particularly those involved in security related and relief 
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operations tend to support such an approach and sacrifice participation in the 
name of urgency of needs. 
Facing these formidable tasks, the state is required to make an effective intervention, and to 
find appropriate ingredients to carry out its responsibilities. Stiglitz (1997) claimed "The 
hard part of capacity building is the institutional building. The state is required to create 
institutions, which have the capacity* to make key decisions concerning reconstruction. 
Many complex factors will affect the state contribution in the reconstruction, as Stiefel 
(1999: 20) explained these factors to include; 
The political climate, the socio-economic environment; the extent to which 
community are willing to participate effectively, which facilitates or restricts the 
free expression of popular feeling; and the functional responsibilities and 
financial resources available, or the extent to which local representatives are able 
to make decisions relating to the planning and implementation of reconstruction 
projects and programmes. 
State responsibilities include creating an environment, which enables new knowledge 
to be absorbed, adapted to the circumstances of the country, and put to use for the civil 
society. In addition, government is required to strengthen the capabilities of the services, 
including the development of an effective civil service and a restructuring of the public 
sector, to make more effective use of incentives and of market and market-like mechanisms. 
The World Bank (1999) argued that creating enabling environment for the private sector, 
which includes markets and the legal infrastructure that is necessary for markets to function 
well- is an important role of the state. Based on the World Development Report, Stiglitz 
(1997) argued that Central ingredients to the involvement of government are: 
"A legal infrastructure, providing (and enforcing) competition laws. 
" The government provision of infrastructure, where private infrastructure does not occur 
"A regulatory framework which encourages the private provision of infrastructure where 
possible, which maximises the extent of feasible competition, and which ensures that 
where competition is not possible, there is not abuse of market power 
"A stable macroeconomic framework 
"A stable and effective financial system, which requires a regulatory framework that not 
only ensures safety and soundness, but also enhances competition, protects depositors, 
creates confidence that there is a "level playing field" in securities markets by protecting 
investors from abuses, and identifies undeserved groups within society 
" An adjustment strategy, a strategy 
for the elimination of those distortions in the economy 
that interfere with the efficient deployment of resources. 
Different authors suggest decentralisation to improve the operations of government. 
Stiefel (1999) stated that the decentralisation of the state and issues related to it are more 
important than is generally acknowledged. He claimed that the centre could not rebuild by 
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itself. It requires the active participation of provincial and local authorities. WSP (1994) 
asserted that decentralisation brings decision making closer to the people, accompanied by 
established mechanisms of local accountability. Decentralisation of government functions 
must include the devolution of authority and resources. WSP (1994) explained: 
"Decentralisation of the state does not necessarily imply federalism, but it does raise the 
potentially divisive question of the future form the state will take, and this will eventually 
have to be dealt with. " 
The World Bank (1998) argued that decentralisation contributes to support the proposition 
that the accountability is improved, and malfeasance is becoming correspondingly less 
likely, when decisions are made at the local level. Stiglitz argued that corruption would be 
less likely under a decentralised system where at least some of the following conditions are 
met: (1) active participation in, and discussion of, local government decision making by the 
local population; (2) open, clear and simple routine accounting procedures and reports; and 
(3) some means by which corruption can be sanctioned - through, for example, the electoral 
process and the access of local people to cheap and effective systems to ensure due process 
and public accountability. 
However, Barakat (1993: 103) debated the possibility of total decentralisation in cases 
of post conflict countries. He argued "It is vital to have communal planning authorities to 
implement the measures which other centralised units consider necessary. Barakat quoted 
Amirahmadi (1989) who argued that "Controlled decentralisation is seen as a half way 
solution that could meet the needs of the centre and to some extent those of the people. " 
2.5.4 Physical Reconstruction 
Canadian Peacebuilding Co-ordinating Committee (1998) pointed out that housing 
and community services are essential to peacebuilding in a variety of specific contexts 5. The 
committee gave examples of Bosnia after the Civil war, Russia after the demobilisation of its 
forces in the aftermath of the Cold War. According to the committee, principal facets of the 
issue include: 
The urgent need for a 'roof over the head' of people left displaced and homeless 
by civil strife, for reasons of health, morale, community sanitation, and a return 
to civil society. 
The highly political and the emotionally-charged nature of housing and 
community services projects after conflict has taken place, given that neighbours 
Working Group on Housing and Community Scrviccs as Peacebuildin 
toolhw. cpcc. ottawa. on. ca`Nv, -, 
hoLisin -e. html 
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may have been engaged in destroying each other's homes and families, and that 
who is served first is a matter of great symbolic as well as practical import; 
The economic potential of housing and community services construction as a 
source of renewal, given the many local enterprises, which can become 
involved. 
The potential for housing and community services construction and renovation 
projects to act as a catalyst for reconciliation and co-operative action on other 
practical questions which can serve to rebuild trust. 
The potential for the specific solutions to current and future housing and 
community services needs to overcome problems of the past, whether economic, 
environmental, design, social, etc., and for innovations to leap over previous 
technologies and processes. 
In the next chapter, the author studies the reconstruction of the human settlement in more 
details. 
2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The above discussion provided a review of different issues of post conflict 
reconstruction and peacebuilding. Research in this field with its concomitant writing has 
expanded rapidly through the last decade of the twentieth century to the present. The 
proliferation of material suggested the difficulties of supplying a comprehensive review. 
The great amount of documents or reports did not preclude debate about what is an 
appropriate theory and practice for post-war reconstruction. The chapter argued for the dire 
need for an accepted model designed both to be flexible enough to embrace different 
situations and focused enough to demand the respect of key actors. 
Despite the evident complications the author specifies and endorses certain priorities in 
post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction 
" Peace is best thought of not as a single or simple good, such as an absence of war or 
violent conflict, but instead as a complex and variable process. However, no peace is 
perfect. Violence can not be completely eradicated. 
" Conflict resolution means ending conflict by methods that are analytical and that get to 
the root of the problem. Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere management or 
'settlement', points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is a permanent 
solution to a problem. 
" The ingredients of lasting peace process include ripeness for peace, third party 
intervention, just agreement provision and fostering post-settlement recovery. 
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" The peacebuilding and reconstruction relationship is 
development can not take place without lasting peace, 
without proper reconstruction and long term development. 
a symbiotic one. A proper 
peace can never be sustained 
" Post conflict reconstruction calls for a special approach emphasising integrative 
strategies, political development and rapid and flexible action. It must be dealt with as a 
long-term development challenge, planned and implemented in a manner to encourage 
the peace building. 
" In ensuring co-ordination amongst a diverse spectrum of internal and external actors, the 
confidence and peacebuilding efforts will be further strengthened. 
" The local community is the primary resource for reconstruction. It is crucial to work 
with the community and not for it. People need to be helped to help themselves. 
Programmes have to be geared up to the REAL NEEDS and PRIORITIES of the 
community. This requires major changes in attitudes and methods of working with the 
community. The community must have the sense of ownership and responsibility 
towards the projects, as the only way of ensuring true sustainability and initial self- 
reliance. One way of fostering this is by the community contributing to the project. 
(Barakat and Hoffman, 1995: 89) 
"A united government together with local actors is fully in charge of making policies and 
setting national priorities that can lead to a sound reconstruction and development 
strategy with minimum interference but maximum support from the international 
community. (Fischer, 1995: 58) 
" The support and assistance external actors give to societies emerging from conflict is 
important, though not determinant, and present forms of assistance are often ineffective, 
inappropriate, and can be harmful (Stiefel, 1999: 19). The main donors' task is to 
enhance the local capacities. The quality of post conflict assistance is more important 
than its quantity. 
" International community must avoiding doing harm by employing measures to ensure 
that aid is helping to sustain peace. The chapter reviews measures to include: timing, 
tracking the aid delivery, assessing the impact of aid and delegating responsibilities to 
domestic actors. 
It has been suggested that a framework of a successful post conflict reconstruction 
process is seen as a triangle with three major elements a physical, economic and social 
rebuilding. The next chapter highlights issues of post conflict reconstruction of human 
settlement. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter explained how the Israeli occupation has caused deterioration of the 
Palestinian human settlements. The second provided an understanding of how 
reconstruction alongside other factors could be a tool to achieve sustainable peace. It 
showed the strong interrelationship between peacebuilding and reconstruction. In this 
chapter, the author continues the literature survey. He reviews policies for post-conflict 
reconstruction of human settlement. This includes studying a framework of reconstruction. 
It presents reconstruction as process, receiving input, producing outputs, facing challenges 
and building on available opportunities. In the second part of the chapter, the author 
addresses the issue of human settlement construction'. 
The case of many urban communities in the Third World reveals urgency to the 
struggle for adequate shelter. UNCHS (1995: 6) reported that challenges facing the 
developing world include the growth of sub-standard housing, inadequate employment 
opportunities and infrastructure, mounting poverty and a widening gap between rich and 
poor. Half of the world's population lives in slums of some kind, one hundred million are 
utterly homeless, between thirty and fifty per cent lack access to basic drinking water and 
sanitation facilities (Devas and Rakodi, 1993: 11). 
In this chapter, the author narrows the literature to tackle the issue of reconstruction of human settlement. A list 
of books, articles and Internet documents was consulted. These include (Abrams, 1964), (Acioly, 1995), (Al- 
Zubaidi, 1989), (Amirahmadi, 1992); (Arimah, 1997), (Awotona et a, 1995), (Barakat, 1993); (Barakat and 
Hoffman, 1995) (Barcello, 1998); (Beard, 1991); (Brown et at., 1992), (Burgess, 1994); (Mathey, 1994); 
(Burgess, 1982); (Carbonnier, 1998); (Chambers, 1993); (Cobbett, 1999); (Davis, 1989), (DDSMS, 1995); 
(FitzGerald, 1997); (UNCHS, ); (Hamdi, 1997,1995,1995a), (Harroday, ); (Hundsalz, 1994), (King, 1997); 
(Kumar, 1997); (Lake et al. 1990), (Lim, 1983). (Logan, 1998), (Lybe, 1992), (Mathey, 1992); (MIT web site, 
2000); (Nordberg, 2000) (OECD, 1997: 11), (Koengisberger, 1964,1986); (Overseas Development Institute, 
1997); (Patricia, 1997); (Pugh, 1998); (Rakodi and Devas (eds. ), 1993); (Rondinelli; 1986); (Saebi, 1991); 
(Schaffer, 1982); (Shengs, 1995); (Stiefel, 1998); (UNDP, 1998); (USAID, 1996); (The World Bank, 1993, 
1998); (Tipple, 1994); (Turner, 1986); (UNCHS, 1987,1989,1976,1996,1995,1997); (UNCHS-ILO, 1995); 
(UNRISD, 1994); (Wakely, 1986); (Warah, 2000); (Whyte (ed. ), 1995), (WSP, 1994,1997) 
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Beginning by claiming a ground for the emergence of diverse theories, the author 
explores established reasons for the significance of the human settlement issues and 
assessing their impact on the socio-economic and socio-cultural situations. This introductory 
analysis is followed by the recognition that since the Second World War two major schools 
of thought providing solutions for human settlements' problems could be distinguished. 
First, a so-called Orthodox approach held sway. Second, after about 1970 an Alternative 
method became popular, also termed a Support Strategy. Broadly, the Orthodox school 
stressed state intervention to solve the massive shelter crisis that followed World War Two. 
Then after notable failures (particularly in the context of the developing world) a subsequent 
approach gained credence. The first section concludes with an evaluation of the two 
methods. The author generally claims that neither approach has been always successful. 
Seeing the deficiencies apparent in each school of thought and perhaps in any 
theoretical bias, the second part of the chapter commences with a review of what policy 
options could exist within formulating a viable strategy. Options such as urban upgrading 
and local involvement to meet housing needs are proposed at this point, leading on to an 
analysis of what priorities need to underpin policy. Therefore, the next section undertakes a 
rigorous exploration of the priorities in any meaningful shelter strategy. In turn the relevance 
of different conditions are assessed in the search for a workable and flexible policy. The 
issue of moving a country from relief to reconstruction is worth starting with. 
3.2 FROM RELIEF TO RECONSTRUCTION 
Reviewing recovery literature shows the term `transition' is both a common 
expression and carries a range of meanings. Since several disciplines are involved, varying 
interpretations have emerged. Much of the language of development treats the process as a 
sequence in the case of countries, from poorest to developing to developed; in the case of 
communities, from dependency to sustainability; in the case of agencies, from relief to 
reconstruction to development. 
The World Bank's document on reconstruction (1998: 3) referred to `post-conflict, 
situations as "... transitions from war to peace. " The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) (1996) defined the concept of `transition' as "... a rapid change from 
relief operations to reconstruction and sustainable development". Transition is more than the 
passage of time between war and peace. It implies retraining individuals in activities 
detached from the war, making society as a whole aware of the suffering of its members. 
Activities include attending to the specific needs of ex-combatants, of women and of 
children" (Smillie, 1999: 7). Stages might not be chronological or mutually exclusive. They 
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vary with the scale of damage, level and the size of reconstruction, and the relevant society's 
ability to cope with the responsibilities and to formulate strategies. 
The first stage of recovery is emergency relief, which as OECD (1997: 11) explained, 
involves immediate and short-term survival assistance for victims of violent conflict. The 
stage's goal is to cope with the situation meeting people's requirements. Overlapping with 
emergency is the restoration or recovery stage. The author of this thesis also makes the point 
that urgency precludes real planning; it must be prepared beforehand. The replacement 
stage's goal is to return the community to a pre-conflict state: building permanent housing, 
resettling displaced persons, resuming public services, reviving industries and creating jobs. 
To achieve this work substantial comprehensive planning and massive resources are 
required. This is followed or accompanied by a fourth stage, developmental reconstruction, 
advancing the community beyond a pre-conflict level. This stage is very difficult in conflict- 
torn societies. Conflicts do not only destroy part of what exists; they prevent society from 
making new investments, from utilising production capacity and resources, and from 
developing skills and technical capabilities. 
Smillie (1999: 5) speculated how the random movement from one stage to another may 
undermine the whole process of recovery. Overseas Development Institute (1997: 10) 
admitted, "The premature phasing out of relief rations before compensating development 
opportunities are provided" happen as a result of misunderstanding. Pugh (1998) alluded to 
Bosnia, describing it as in "... limbo because it is not part of the development issue - it is not 
a developing country. It is in transition from aid to something else. " 
Linking Stages 
Pugh (1998) observed that the international community has set out principles and 
guidelines for best practices to overcome contradictions and integrate stages in a coherent 
strategy. Several commentators pointed out that stages of recovery should be linked. A plan 
to connect these stages might reduce mismanagement. The author finds that the standard 
approach of a linear link between relief and development dominates the literature with both 
seen as distinct and sequential types of actions. See Figure (3.1) 
Stiefel (1994: 17) explained transition to imply a linear progression from acute conflict 
to peace, to post-conflict rehabilitation and long-term development. The concept is based on 
the notion that at each distinct stage, a specialised body or organisation would tackle the job 
and then pass on responsibility through a discrete and phased programming. As an image of 
a continuum, it offers a simple organising shape for chronic emergencies. It fails however; 
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to provide any understanding of how relief and development agencies should act or interact. 
Commenting on the approach Smillie (1999: 13) illustrated that the concept was discredited 
for positing a linear progression from one stage to another. At each of the stages, there were 
supposedly specialist agencies that would take and then pass on responsibility for those in 
need of assistance, as though they were on a conveyer belt that would move them from one 
operation to the next. This approach, in fact, had long been standard practice in the response 
to natural disasters: emergency, reconstruction, then back to normal. 
Complex rebuilding cannot be the responsibility of one body. UNDP (1995) 
acknowledged the fact that "No single organisation can aspire to deal on its own with the 
social and economic devastation of a country... multilateral and bilateral agencies, 
governmental and non-governmental, all have a role to play and all bring their specific 
contributions to the whole [but] it is only in the aggregate that full logic of a country's 
situation can be addressed. " 
UNDP 
UNCHR 
WHO 
WORLD 
BANK 
............... A 
C UNCHR 
T UNCHS 
0 NGOs 
R 
S 
DHA 
UNDRO Relief 
UNHCR 
NGOs 
Conflict 
Reconstruction 
Rehabilitation 
Cease-fire Peace 
THE STATE OF CONFLICT 
Figure 3.1: Stages of Reconstruction, Actors in relation to the State of Conflict 
Source: Barakat and Hoffman (1995) adopted by the author 
A 
C 
T 
I 
O 
N 
S 
It could be argued that that continuum is the concept moving from relief to 
rehabilitation, a development increasingly questionable as a method for analysis. Stiefel 
(1994: 17) argued that the concept in the case of conflict is "... inappropriate and 
operationally misleading. " Carbonnier (1998) claimed "... many contemporary conflicts do 
not follow any set chronological pattern. " The literature contains studies highlighting that 
relief, development, economic and politico-military actions are often simultaneous 
processes. Formal peace agreements do not ensure a gradual return to normality as a fragile 
peace can be disrupted by recurrent violence. King (1997: 19-23) pointed out that there is 
little agreement on the point at which conflict definitely ends. Smillie (1999: 6) insisted the 
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dividing line between pre-conflict, war and post-conflict situations is ambiguous and should 
not serve as a criterion. 
In searching for alternatives, other phrases have become popular. USAID (1996) 
developed principles and operating guidelines, stressing the need to identify and address the 
root causes of vulnerabilities, to build on local capacities and to support rather than displace 
indigenous attempts to recover. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) 
studies (1997) suggested that the idea of a `continuum' should perhaps be replaced by 
contiguity' to reflect the dynamic aspects of relief and development. The word `contiguity' 
still suggests adjacent rather than integrated approaches. 
Integrating various activities to build a sustainable development appears a logical 
approach. Smillie (1999: 10) argued that integrated frameworks should make it easier to 
define optimal policy responses (representing optimal policy mixes) for challenges faced in 
the rebuilding process. But policy mixes are not easily replaced, as they are situation- and 
context- specific. He added that the integration of activities happens more naturally and 
becomes more realistic and do-able the closer decisions are to the field. Local actors, for 
example, tend to integrate relief and development activities more naturally than national 
actors, who in turn do so more easily and naturally than external actors do. The World Bank 
(1998: 3) acknowledged these facts "Since the Bank does not normally work in areas of 
violent conflict, the distinction between one `phase' and another is important. Linkages can 
and must be made for sustained reconstruction and development to avoid recurrent relief. " 
Contiguity has come to play a prominent role in linking recovery stages. The notion of 
combining the two terms into `developmental relief, though often restricted to small-scale 
examples, is not new as the literature shows. There is a close relationship between physical 
recovery and economic regeneration programmes that should not only present quantitative 
objectives, but other goals such as building confidence and trust between warring factions. 
The concept `recovery' is often limited to a technical perspective. A wide range of issues 
from political to social, cultural and financial should be considered to ensure success. 
Interaction sustains benefits gained though physical and economic programmes. 
3.3. RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES 
Barakat (1993); Stiefel (1999) and WSP (1994) recognised that no blueprints exist for 
post-conflict reconstruction. WSP stated: 
While objectives, 'technical' challenges and problems are similar in post-conflict 
situations, the political context and configuration of actors, quality and nature of 
relations between actors and institutions are unique... guidelines relating to 
priorities and methods of approach can be formulated. 
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Stiefel (1999: 15) accepted that different societies face similar problems when emerging from 
conflict. He (1999: 4) noted transferring successful policies to a new situation is impossible, 
but learning from past successes and failures is feasible. Amirahmadi (1992) posited that 
formulating an overall post-conflict reconstruction strategy gives rise to fierce debate, as 
such a strategy must satisfy and cut across ideologies, social groups, time periods and 
cultures. He assumed that the chosen strategy depends on the nature of the conflict itself and 
the extent of damage. Thus, Amirahmadi claimed that each nation must fashion its own 
national reconstruction strategy. Barakat (1993) defined a generic reconstruction strategy as: 
That body of knowledge which helps determine the most important tasks that 
have to be implemented at each stage of reconstruction, the type and amount of 
resources needs, and the location of reconstruction projects. A strategy involves 
defining goals and objectives; setting priorities and targets making plans or 
facilitating market mechanisms and formulating polices for implementation. 
For a country emerging from prolonged conflict a reconstruction plan differs from one 
employed in normal, stable circumstances. Amirahmadi (1992) pointed out: "A 
reconstruction and development plan is distinguished... by its mode of formulation which 
would require greater use of rapid techniques of project and damages appraisal and analysis, 
best statistical techniques". 
A strategy, UN (1995) indicated, helps a country's resources to be managed in a 
consistent and succinct manner; the best way to estimate available resources (human, 
financial and other) necessary to attain objectives. The same document held that a plan acts 
as a `kick-start' for long-term rebuilding: an operational instrument for organising and 
presenting development-related programmes and projects within a coherent planning and 
national framework. For instance, The World Bank (1993: 4) emergency assistance 
programme for the Palestinian Territories, was designed to: 
Emphasise short gestation, rehabilitation and maintenance activities that make 
better use of existing infrastructure; support temporary works programmes to 
help alleviate immediate poverty and unemployment measures; concentrate 
efforts where living standards are especially low as it would be necessary to 
supplement local capacity, make use of local capacity for programme 
implementation, including the UN system, non governmental organisation, 
universities and research institutions, institute mechanisms for efficient and 
transparent procurement, accounting, monitoring and reporting to ensure 
effective use of funds, ensure sufficient flexibility to incorporate changes dictated 
by the unfolding peace negotiations, actual experience with implementation, and 
the results of the various feasibility studies, and technical analysis. 
Chapter Three 80 
Reconstruction of Human Settlements 
In contrast, the literature contains material disputing the value of strategic planning. 
Some authors allege countries emerging from prolonged conflict are incapable of producing 
a manageable plan. They indicate that post conflict countries usually suffer from unbearable 
poverty and limitation of resources especially human. Under such circumstances, a strategic 
plan has little hope of success. These states often lack the tools and means for 
implementation. Critics of the strategic plan cite examples of failure in communist 
countries over the last century. However, the author is convinced in all cases, countries 
need a vision to manage their development and reconstruction activities. Reacting to 
opponents who claim a plan is too rigid, Amirahmadi (1992) emphasised that a strategy 
must be versatile and flexible, broad enough to be used by different sectors and levels of 
political administration; able to accommodate the changing mix of problems arising. 
Arguably, a plan is most necessary for a country embarking on the formidable task of 
reconstruction. 
DDSMS (1995: 100) showed the need for planning, claiming it is essential for post- 
conflict countries because: 
0 It provides basic elements for formalising a vision of the future. 
0 Opportunities for rapid assessment of the post-conflict situation and the possible options. 
"A step to strengthen direction and control by government, lost through the enormity of 
immediate problems, destruction of essential institutions. 
" Gives a clearer vision of the future for government and donor community through a 
strategic statement of purpose. 
" It is a tool for co-ordination of interventions from international community organisations. 
Without this mechanism there is a potential for duplication of effort and contradictory 
support and advice. With a plan the chance of confusion is reduced. 
Amirahmadi (1992) in support argued that it must meet the needs of each socio- 
economic group, focusing resources on urgent problems. The strategy must also strike a 
balance between competing demands for the immediate relief and the need to invest in 
activities that will eventually restore the country's long-term economic base. In the post- 
conflict atmosphere of economic austerity, many forces compete for scarce resources, and 
governments can be drawn into wasteful social projects that are attractive on political 
grounds. Therefore, Stiefel (1999: 19) stressed that the state's role is to set priorities and 
drawing on rebuilding goals, objectives and visions. Even if complete success can not be 
attained, this is just what a strategic plan can offer, a target and an inspiration. 
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3.3.1 Priorities 
Amirahmadi (1992) contended: "Defining priorities for reconstruction [has] became a 
fulcrum for partisan debate and political contest". After hostilities, setting an agenda is most 
important and difficult. A multiplicity of problems and challenges requires urgent action. 
Problems are interrelated, and challenges and mandates may call for actions that clash with 
the efforts of other agents or with the longer-term objectives of development. A prioritised 
and phased programme is the viable option. The immediate basic needs must be 
distinguished from the less immediate or medium term and longer term requirements. From 
this perspective, DDSMS (1995: 97) commented that priorities must be based on 'weighing' 
challenges and problems, assessing their potential to reinforce conflict or advance the peace 
process. War-affected governments must agree on priorities, each reflected in the strategic 
plan, implying that it can be regularly redesigned, pliant enough to respond to changing 
circumstances. Acceptance of a strategic plan can depend on whether or not it is amenable 
to change. 
Amirahmadi (1992) concluded a strategy for reconstruction should contain a 
prioritised action programme, to address all critical physical, human, and institutional 
factors. Presenting an example, Brown et at. (1992: 195) argued that priority should be given 
to restoring the state sector's technocratic capacities. The public sector should be supported 
to enhance its capacity to intervene in the provision of services as well as in the 
strengthening and regulating of markets. Ball and Hallevy (1996: 35) asserted preference 
should be given to (1) rehabilitate the state apparatus, security system and public services - 
education and health; (2) restore physical infrastructure and productive assets; (3) reintegrate 
refugees and returnees; and (4) clear mines. Other analysts claim political stability should be 
favoured over other objectives, as economic rebuilding efforts would be automatically 
impaired if war re-started. It is essential to assess how standard economic recipes apply to 
post conflict settings, evaluating their interaction with peace-building and reconstruction 
agendas. 
The author recognises how priorities tend to follow the ruling party's ideology. The 
Iranian context, in the wake of the Iraqi Iranian war, demonstrates ideological influence on a 
strategic plan. Amirahmadi (1992) described that under the conservative government, 
different political groups sought to highlight their social and economic agendas. Debate 
centred on four issues: (1) rebuilding the military; (2) reinvigorating the national economy; (3) 
promoting the economic well being of the poor. and (4) reconstructing conflict-damaged 
areas. The Iranian author claims "Only the most radical faction of the government was 
concerned with equity and social justice". Conservative and pragmatist 
factions believed 
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that economic growth and efficiency should guide reconstruction, and these views came to 
dominate official policy. 
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Figure 3.2: Framework of Post-conflict Reconstruction 
Source: Amirahmadi (1992), Adopted by the Author. 
3.3.2 Challenges 
Stiefel (1998: 12) recognised the fact that the challenges of post-conflict rebuilding are 
infinitely more difficult and complex than generally known. Case studies reveal that the 
reconstruction process faces obstacles. Lack of knowledge and understanding of the process, 
time, financial resources and political situation: each can represent a stumbling block. 
Planners need to address how to overcome these obstacles. 
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Knowledge and Information 
Literature shows that understanding, coherence and balance is required virtually in 
every element of reconstruction and development. USAID (1996) acknowledged that lack 
of in-depth knowledge of the historical, political, social and economic context of the country 
might undermine the effectiveness of the intervention. The legacy of conflict means large 
proportions of the population lack the skills to build a nation. Pugh (1998) realised that 
conflict disrupts or destroys existing social patterns of decision-making. He added this to 
other impacts, such as injury, psychological disorientation and displacement that diminishes 
the capacity of communities to participate in rehabilitation and deprive people, temporarily 
perhaps, of an organised voice. As Ball and Hallevy (1996: 25) put it: "Conflict drains 
communities of leadership and human resources and inhibits the resistance of individuals to 
the pull of suspicion, division, and chauvinism. " 
The result, Smillie (1999: 37) claimed, would be that "... inappropriate management, career 
incentives and a lack of meaningful evaluation all work to impede reconstruction". 
Whyte (1995: 169) claimed there is no quick and easy solution. He set out how the 
process could take years, if not decades, to achieve a reasonable solution for the problem. 
Another major challenge in this regard is the very few who happen to be educated or 
professionals are not attracted to work in the public service. This is sometimes due to the 
weakness of the financial incentive. Others do not wish to be in public life on the 
government's side. Whyte mentioned South Africa where his investigations revealed it 
suffered from a scarcity of trained human resources. No qualified cadres are available from 
the black majority. He noted that the few-trained people gravitate to the private sector. 
Training and education systems need overhauling to provide required talents and bolster 
local skills, leaving the less needy to rely on outsiders. 
Smillie (1999: 30) clarified; knowledge is not the same as information. While both 
may be in short supply, much greater emphasis has been placed on the latter consequently 
leading to formulaic applications of irrelevant data. Information is an important factor 
bearing upon the question of efficiency. United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (1994: 5) stressed: "Effective rebuilding can only occur on the basis of 
adequate information both about the causes and effects of war, and about existing local 
capacities. " When there is insufficient or asymmetrical information, it is difficult for 
government decision-makers to predict the consequences of their decisions, and serious 
efficiency losses can follow. Disparities between a decision maker's ideas about effects and 
the actual impact of a decision are likely to be much greater in post conflict countries. 
Discrepancies may be reduced to some extent by having decision makers closer to `where 
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the action is', through the creation of (at least partially) autonomous centres of decision 
making functioning independently of central authority. Schaffer (1982) saw local 
participation in planning and decision making as a way to counteract lack of information. 
Knowledge and information are intimately connected; but in post conflict situations. 
little time is available for learning. Not knowing when to act can lead to paralysis, as there 
are no previous examples known to draw on for inspiration. Therefore, time is a very crucial 
factor. 
Timing and Speed 
WSP (1994) stated that the advent of peace brings high public expectations, sharply 
contrasting with the government's capacity to deliver in a short time. Smillie (1999: 41) 
recognised that the long-term schedule needed to achieve recovery programmes represents a 
considerable obstacle. Extensive time is required to rebuild institutions, revive the rule of 
law, and good governance; even more to break through the authoritarian and unforgiving 
nature of some regimes. He stressed: "Getting the timing right knowing when to start 
recovery, when to modify the approach, and when to move from one stage to another is 
essential for conflict resolution, reconstruction, and development". It is important to know 
when, and how to move from basic relief to activities with developmental objectives. 
Amirahmadi (1990: 268) refined the argument asserting reconstruction should be 
defined, planned, and implemented in stages. Further, he argued that fast reconstruction is 
seen as vital in capturing political will and public enthusiasm - critical for the allocation of 
decreasing resources. He continued, it is necessary for reconstruction to keep pace with the 
speed of people returning to their settlements. Barakat (1993: 105) quoted Beard (1991: 83) 
who stated "Every day that passes without sharp decision makes the task of ... planning 
more difficult". However, Barakat and Hoffman (1995) argued gradual reconstruction 
allows more space for local people to participate and most importantly, it helps in developing 
much needed local skills. UNRISD (1994) emphasised that it is better to take the time 
needed to plan properly in order to avoid projects that are duplicative, unnecessary, or 
counterproductive. Often availability of finance is key in decisions about time-scale, 
whether to hurry or delay recovery. Moving with inappropriate haste from one phase to the 
next, within continuum programmes, can cause delays later 
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Finance and Funding 
Barakat (1993: 83) argued that one of the challenges is the intensification and 
acceleration of economic tendencies operative during the conflict. Barakat explained these 
tendencies to include the government's approach to provide people with direct contributions 
in cash and food, etc. Stewart et at (1997) pointed out the problem is more aggravated where 
tax collection capacity is lost (e. g. Somalia, Afghanistan, and Cambodia). Government 
expenditure on the other hand tends to rise as a proportion of GDP chiefly through the drain 
of the war effort. Consequently, as Carbonnier (1998) claimed budget deficit increases, as 
reported for all countries where data is available. Collapse of public and private institutions 
aggravate the deficit accompanied by the dispersal of skilled labour, either mobilised for the 
war or fleeing abroad. 
Barakat and Hoffman (1995: 83) pointed out that the state of post-conflict economy is 
dependent on a number of factors (1) pre-conflict economic conditions; (2) the extent of 
damage to economic installation and the degree of opportunity and productivity losses; (3) 
the potential for revival of the economy; (4) the availability of national and international 
resources; (5) the degree of adaptation needed as a result of population displacement; 
mortality and occupation of territories. It is believed that a peace settlement reduces military 
expenditure, but increases spending for urgent reconstruction requirements and the 
restoration of health and education services. There is thus a pressing need to both raise funds 
and contain budget deficit. Barakat (1993 : 84) argued that the economic challenges could be 
overcome over two stages: (1) bottleneck removing stage; and (2) capacity utilisation stage. 
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Amirahmadi indicated that the first bottlenecks needing to be removed are shortage of 
foreign exchange and shortage of skilled labour force. 
Stewart et al (1997: 10) revealed that in several countries, governments could maintain their 
capacity to spend on the basic social services such as the education and the health. The share 
of investment in total public expenditure tends to fall in countries at conflict. This happens 
to a greater extent than in other developing countries implementing expenditure-cutting 
measures under stabilisation policies. As far as the allocation of government resources is 
concerned, empirical surveys of war economies show that, as expected, the share of military 
expenditure tends to increase (Barakat, 1993) 
Literature shows efforts to set guidelines to overcome the problem. FitzGerald 
(1997: 54) argued governments may increasingly resort to indirect taxation (e. g. taxes on 
gasoline and/or electricity, import duty on non-essential consumer goods) and user fees for 
public goods and services (e. g. transportation and health services). Carbonnier (1998) 
stressed that this option must be assessed on a case-by-case basis that are often politically 
costly for the government, and may revive inflation. Besides, indirect taxation may lead to a 
more regressive tax system and widen gaps between the rich and poor. However, he argued 
that sometimes it represents the only short-term solution as increasing direct tax collection in 
the short run might not be realistic in post-conflict countries often accustomed to major tax 
evasion and lacking efficient tax administration. 
Based on various arguments, Barakat (1993) suggested the activation of building material 
industry exercises a central role in the economy. "This helps to generate income, stimulate 
people to improve their own environments and encourage the young people to enter 
technical vocation". Politics contributes to overcoming or duplicating the challenge of the 
economy. 
Politics and Ideology 
Positively or negatively politics affects post conflict reconstruction. WSP (1997) 
recognised the fact that "Post-war societies tend to be unstable, politically volatile and 
politicised. Amirahmadi (1992) noted that even recovery "... tends to become politicised". 
Barakat (1993: 75) argued that during conflict as well as in its direct aftermath, politics tends 
to take precedence over decision making. Actors affect the structure and balance of power. 
Politics plays a crucial role in understanding the rationale and behaviour of capital and 
investors, consumers, etc. Simultaneously peace both places demands on resources and 
increases public expectations. Shortages that occur generate societal tension and intensify 
pressure on the state to implement immediate corrective measures. 
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Barakat and Hoffman (1995: 82) described the interaction between reconstruction and 
politics as follows: first, politics is affected by the conflict between raised expectation on 
behalf of the affected communities and inability of the state to deliver. Second, it is shaped 
by delays in taking political decisions that are crucial for reconstruction and are closely 
connected to economic and military restructuring. Third, reinforcement of the ideology and 
politics of the ruling party characterises the political dimension. As Stiefel (1999) pointed 
out "In such a context no problem, solution or policy can ever be purely technical, inevitably 
they will have an impact or be perceived in terms of relationships and power. " In different 
war-torn countries, the ruling party tends to undertake a programme of physical 
reconstruction aiming to promote the party's interests alienating other groups. In Hanoi's 
case after the American-Vietnamese war, according to Logan (1998), socialist ideology 
contributed to poor standards of reconstruction. Almost thirty years after the war's end, the 
Vietnamese Government still struggles to balance its ideology in terms of economics and 
urban development with a relatively open minded search for best value and practice. A 
holistic approach is needed; Lake et al. (1990) and Kumar (1997) stressed the importance of 
a coherent and integrated approach between politics, recovery and the peace process. 
General agreement exists about the need to resolve prevailing crises, but political 
chaos can prevent specific measures from being implemented. Logan (1998) indicated that a 
planning vision is a prerequisite, yet inevitably it is linked with the political context in which 
reconstruction is occurring. He cited the work in Hanoi that represented an example of 
political, social and ideological reconstruction. He concluded that a narrow approach based 
on a rigid universalised ideology is best avoided. 
3.3.3 Input 
The literature shows that resource mobilisation is a principal step. "This is a decisive 
element in formulating a reconstruction strategy", Barakat and Hoffman (1995: 76) argued. 
They contend resources should be mobilised based on studies and plans; unskilful 
mobilisation has often led to delays. Amirahmadi (1992) described resources as the input to 
the reconstruction machine. He identified input resources as human, material, financial and 
technical. To Barakat (1993), these evolve though three stages: identification, mobilisation 
and utilisation. He added resources have to be recognised in terms of inter-institutional 
quality, co-operation and co-ordination, skilled workforce, training institutes, dynamic and 
modem sectors and their amount and to what degree each is available. 
Anderson (1998) revealed the importance of mobilising local capacities and 
indigenous resources to establish a healthy society capable of coping ,v ith the heavy 
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developmental process. Existing and potential resources for reconstruction and cleanups 
must be quickly identified and mobilised. Indigenous resources must be distinguished from 
external ones; the latter weighed in terms of their potential to cause dependence, unwanted 
control of, or uneven, development. After specifying and analysing, resources are mobilised. 
Anderson (1998) argued that mobilisation depends on government action, but is augmented 
through utilisation of grass root organisations: self-help projects, women's groups, co- 
operatives for training people and providing materials for rebuilding. Once more, we may 
see the value of an overall vision or aim which appeals to the community as a whole, a 
strategy which goes beyond the involvement of just one sector of society. 
3.3.4 Output 
In addition to principles of prioritisation, a reconstruction strategy should incorporate 
explicit short and long-term output. To ensure success, goals must be translated into well- 
thought-out objectives that realistically consider society's resources, expectations, constraints 
and capabilities. After assessment, a hierarchy of goals must be formed, based on a set of 
national priorities. Kumar (1997: 33) argued that rebuilding efforts must end with: (1) 
restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, basic social services and government 
functions; (2) structural reform in political, economic, social, and security sectors; (3) 
institution-building. A UN report illustrates there is a need for a consensus on the recovery 
outputs that should encompass, restoration of human habitability, reconstruction of the 
economy, rebuilding of national defence and the correction of social imbalances caused by 
conflict. 
The World Bank (1998: 6) stated: "Post-conflict reconstruction has two overall 
objectives", first to facilitate transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased; 
second to support economic and social development. To a large extent, reconstruction relies 
on the success of this transition, on rebuilding of domestic economy and restoring of access 
to external resources. The Bank (1998: 12) listed objectives necessary for a country to leave 
the transitional period's chaos behind and move forward on to the development track. The 
World Bank assumes the following as output of a recovery process: 
" Jump-starting the economy through investment in essential productive sectors; creating 
conditions for resumption of trade, savings and domestic and foreign investment, and 
promoting macro-economic stabilisation, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and 
restoring a legal and regulatory framework. 
" Re-establishing governance by strengthening state 
institutions, restoring law and order, 
enabling organisations of civil society to work effectively. 
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0 Rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure, financing education and health. 
" Targeting assistance to those affected by war through reintegration of displaced 
populations, de-mobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, revitalisation of the 
local communities most disrupted through such means as credit lines to subsistence 
agriculture and micro-enterprises, and support for vulnerable groups such as female 
headed households. 
" Supporting de-mining programmes (producing mining surveys), where relevant; de- 
mining the infrastructure as part of comprehensive development strategies for supporting 
a return to normal life in mine-polluted areas. 
" Normalising financial arrangements, planning a `workout' of arrears, debt rescheduling, 
and longer-term path to financial stability. 
Having reviewed approaches to post-conflict reconstruction, the author chooses to 
focus on the case of human settlement reconstruction due to its comprehensiveness and 
multi-faceted nature. Rebuilding of human settlements involve social, cultural, economic 
and political recovery. 
3.4 RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN SETTLEMENT 
Shelter becomes defined as more than just the structure in which people live, as living 
conditions encompass more than the conditions in the shelter itself. UNCHS (1987: 5) 
referred the term 
To all those components of the physical environment with which an individual 
or a community comes into contact and which are used on a regular basis for the 
whole range of human activities, the individual dwelling and its related services, 
the dwellings' immediate surroundings, community facilities, transportation and 
communication networks, and so on. 
UNCHS (1997: 6) defined `adequate shelter' as "Physical shelter plus related services and 
infrastructure, including inputs (land, finance, etc. ) required to produce and maintain it". 
The above definitions show the comprehensiveness and holistic nature of the topic. 
Significance of the human settlement issue was further underlined when convening parties in 
the Habitat conference (1996) report that the human settlement activities contribute to 
generate economic development and social, cultural spiritual and scientific advancement. A 
holistic approach to human settlement development and management has emerged: an 
approach not limited to technical issues. Shelters in both urban and rural communities are 
essential to rebuilding societies and trust in country institutions. Since the Habitat 
Declaration (1976 in the Vancouver Conference), human settlement reconstruction has been 
perceived as bound up with wider issues. Human settlement policy "... can only be effective 
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when it is integrated into a wider development policy framework, which can ensure 
coherence between different levels, sectors and instruments" Z. Policy-makers link issues of 
human settlement to economic, social policy, culture and the less tangible considerations of 
urban living such as safety and tolerance (UNDP: 1996)'. 
As shown above, reconstruction is supposed to contribute to macroeconomics 
objectives. It is argued that reconstruction is an appropriate kick-start that could lead to all 
other aspects of post-conflict recovery. Reconstruction of human settlements contributes 
much to well being, confidence and security; the ways in which reconstruction is approached 
have an impact over development goals. Shelter construction can influence environmental 
sustainability and the mitigation of expected natural and man-made disasters. The design of 
shelter projects both reflects and protects something important about culture and religious 
beliefs. UNCHS (1996b: 7) claims, through improving productivity and transport networks, 
construction of human settlements adds to the nation's wealth. Reversing the emphasis, 
UNCHS-ILO (1995) saw construction as a prime productive asset and store of wealth. It can 
expand job opportunities and incomes, if encouraged by a policy framework. 
From social policy's viewpoint, decisions over human settlement reconstruction can 
have far-reaching impact on wider goals such as equal access to social services for deprived 
groups (UNCHS: 1995). The World Bank (1993) mentioned that relationships are reciprocal 
where inadequate shelter and unequal access reinforce discrimination based on social 
characteristics. On the hand, by providing services (maintenance and financing of basic 
services: health, education, water, and sanitation) the state meets different needs, ensuring no 
group is denied affordable access. In dispute, settlements that are characterised by misery 
are potentials for violence, insecurity and alienation. In the case of post-conflict 
communities, this raises the probability of peacebuilding failure. Such conflicting views 
highlight the importance of the phrase `adequate shelter' in the chapter's subsequent 
argument. 
As shown in the last chapter, reconstruction can play a role to revive communities. By 
adopting a right policy, this contributes to the ability of different groups to play a full part in 
the rebuilding process and to ensure that their distinctive needs are met. Commentators point 
out that a policy must include all the community groups, particularly deprived groups, and 
must ensure that special measures are taken to promote their participation in the fruits of the 
peace-buildings activities. 
2 UNCHS http: //vy, ww. unchs. org'unchs/englislti'sheltet-. htmi 
3 The Future of Human Settlements: Good Policy http: /\v, \vv\v-. undp. or `un/habitat/pc3/3crp-2. 
html 
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Confirming the issue's significance, debates on human rights generate claims that 
securing adequate shelter is imperative. A community's contextual details must not be 
dismissed. Nevertheless, often a far-reaching moral and political vision breaks down barriers 
to action and change. Without this, policy tends to have little chance of success. 
Culture and human security goals (such as safety, good technical design, provision of 
various facilities) must be taken in consideration when adopting a policy. A policy must 
tolerate diversity and respect the cultures of the ruined communities. If these dimensions are 
not integrated into settlement planning and management, success in one sphere of urban 
living could result in failure in others. 
3.4.1 Human Settlements Policies 
A country emerging from prolonged conflict has to prioritise actions to meet the 
population need for adequate shelter. Despite a notable increased awareness of the issue of 
post-conflict housing, it is believed that there is a paucity of materials, which can give 
absolute solutions. The author finds it imperative to examine the issues in different context 
but with common circumstances. This ensures understanding of which model works 
properly, which sectors can lead the process, to name two contingencies. Western, Second 
World War policies favoured heavy intervention by central authorities in development 
planning (Koenigsberger, 1987). Hamdi (1997: 405) stated that later inappropriate 
application of these Western-planning methods is a key factor underlying the poor 
performance of the policies in the developing world. Not surprisingly, at present some built 
environment professionals warn against the uncritical adoption of a further set of generalised 
models and approaches to urban challenges, this time developed primarily by international 
agencies working in the Third World. 
Wakely (1987: 25) indicated that by the time developing countries realised that the post 
war solution - large-scale government construction programmes - was unfeasible, they had 
no resources left for shelter needs. After that policy had proved a failure, a dramatic shift 
away from the post-war approach occurred. Nowadays, the swing toward a new synthesis of 
public sector, private sector. and NGOs and Community Based Organisations recognises the 
limitations of both centralised state planning and neo-liberal economics (Burgess, 1992: 76). 
Burgess advocated a policy combining settlement approaches and development paradigms. 
UNCHS (1996) argued that policies have "... moved from blueprint or top-down to process 
or bottom-up approaches to planning and management, which focus on learning by doing 
and which prioritise greater participation by a broader range of social groups in decision 
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making and the processes of governance. Effective governance is now acknowledged to be 
the central issue in development planning and management. " 
Hamdi (1997: 406) in support asserted that thoughts on human settlement have 
polarised into two schools, indicating changes in development theory. He named the two 
schools, providers and supporters. The first, the Orthodox School, promotes government as 
effective principal providers of shelter. The second, Alternative School, recognises NGOs 
and small informal private enterprises in shelter production. Under Hamdi 's category, one 
can adopt UNCHS phases for describing the shift in human settlement policy. UNCHS 
(1995) mentioned four phases to mark development over the last five decades. 
" Phase one started in the aftermath of the Second World War and lasted during the 1960s 
and early 1970s. It was dominated by physical planning concern with little attention to 
social, economic and environmental links. Large-scale investment in public housing by 
governments was the norm, producing shelter such as tower blocks that few people 
wanted to live in: the most expensive and least efficient use of scarce resources. 
" Phase two: from the mid 1970s to mid 1980s saw the beginnings of a more market- 
oriented approach to human settlements with greater attention paid to popular 
participation, self-help models on a project by project basis. This was much more 
successful than phase one, but was unsustainable and far too limited in reach and scale. 
" Phase three: prevailed from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s refocusing again on 
creating a supportive legal, financial and regulatory framework for the development of 
human settlements with a greater role for the private sector and poor people themselves, 
with close ties to macroeconomics policy. 
" Phase four (the present day) continues the emphasis on enabling strategies but places 
sustainable development, human security and urban governance at the centre of planning 
and management. 
Below different categorisations are surveyed to isolate common characters of these policies. 
3.4.2 The Providers School 
Koenigsberger (1987: 15) specified, by the end of the Second World War, politicians 
and experts were impressed by dramatic reduction in the cost of motorcars through mass 
manufacturing methods. It was obvious: model mass production of needed shelters on a 
similar principle. The method was tried successfully in the United Kingdom for producing 
emergency shelters immediately after the war. Reduction of construction time was more 
important than cost reductions. This formula was misapplied in less developed countries 
where mass production and prefabrication methods were tried out with little success. 
Western prefabrication methods had been designed to save labour and they did this 
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successfully. In the third world, labour was cheap. Reducing construction time would prove 
to be an inadequate reason for investment in the new methods. 
The provider school was apparent in the public housing (Wakely, 1987). Wakely gave 
an imaginary picture of the approach by describing it as ministries staffed by engineers. 
architects, accountants and managers seeing their responsibility as designing and producing 
permanent dwellings. These designers and producers saw little need to contact directly the 
users of their products. Wakely continued to say: it represents a careful balance of technical 
feasibility, building and planning regulations to enable supply, quality and costs to be 
controlled. Priorities are set by the professional staff who may have recourse to some sample 
surveys of consumer demand but usually rely on their own beliefs of what people need or 
ought to have. Any real attempt at understanding immediate demands or longer term 
aspirations of households and communities, of classes or cultures different from their own, is 
very infrequent. 
Claiming failure of the provider paradigm, Hamdi (1997: 412) attributed the failure to 
the adherence to high standards of space, construction and utilities and thus prohibitively 
high costs of production. He argued that these policies direct resources away from other 
sector production, such as industry, making resources difficult to maintain and administer 
over the long term. 
The government and its representatives usually can not complete the building process which 
lead as Hamdi claimed to their willingness to exercise controls and constraints on building 
activities of others in an attempt to achieve the same ends. However, in the case of 
completing projects with the required standards, UNCHS (1989: 11) alleged that official 
housing standards placed resulting houses beyond the affordability of low-income target 
groups. Awotona et al (1995: 3) argued that this kind of production falls largely into the 
range of middle income families who can afford to meet the expenses. Also Hamdi argued it 
demands large plant, sophisticated organisation, and large amounts of up-front capital and 
large markets to guarantee economies of scale. None of that is available in developing 
countries. Furthermore, a professional elite of international consultants, architects, planners 
and engineers dominate these processes whose livelihood is dependent on a flourishing 
housing industry. 
Despite the failure of this approach in the eyes of the above commentators, it has been 
used and has worked reasonably well. Singapore as a third world country has been able to 
implement successful human settlement policies. It has been able to deliver a successful 
housing programme and is admired for producing low-cost, affordable housing en masse. 
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The Housing and Development Board built more than half a million units of public housing 
from 1960 to 1990.85% of Singaporeans now live in public housing estates. An UNDP"s 
report (2000) acknowledged that "The contribution of the public housing programme to the 
well being of Singaporeans has been met. The quality of housing and living environment in 
Singapore has been favourably compared to the situation in other urban centres in Asia and 
beyond the region. " 
The public housing sector is a substantial and dynamic contributor to the dynamics and 
growth of the national economy. The T NDP report mentions that this massive housing 
programme generated much-needed employment and economic activity during the early 
1960s 4. The public housing programme has made a noticeable contribution to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the country, and has provided employment to those in the 
construction industry as well as to those in related industries. For the average Singaporean, 
ownership of high-quality affordable public housing has probably been the single most 
palpable material benefit of the country's rapid economic growth. 
All public housing built is in the form of high-rise flats. There has been much 
criticism locally and internationally concerning the necessity and desirability of living in 
high-rise buildings (Lim, 1983). This generated criticism centres on the possible long-term 
psychological and social effects of high-rise living and the safety factors of congested and 
high-rise structures. UNDP attributes this shortcoming to the acute land shortage on the 
island and the need to maximise land utilisation. The author of the UNDP report concludes 
that in order to provide quality living conditions with as large a dwelling space as can be 
afforded, and given the high population density of Singapore, the housing units had to be 
high-rise. 
To sum up, the UNDP report lists the key elements of the Singapore shelter policy. 
These include: a strong political commitment to public policy; financial commitment which 
comes in the form of loans and subsidies; legislative support which allows the government to 
acquire land cheaply and quickly and to exercise legal authority on matters related to public 
housing development and administration; and finally supportive government policies. 
3.4.3 The Enablers School 
Wally N'Dow, Assistant Secretary General of UNCHS contended: "If the United 
Nations is to be relevant in the new global society of the 21st century, it needs the active 
involvement of civil society, the very society that, in the final analysis, it was set up to 
UNDP (2000) The Provision of Public Housing in Singapore 
WT _ý, ýýý ý ýl inl ýýr ýtcý1c hýý ýrac 5oocial'cascs ()2-public2ü° ohosing. 
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serve". It is generally recognised that governments alone cannot bear the responsibility of 
providing housing, infrastructure and other basic services (Warah, 2000). In post-conflict 
countries, scarce public funds and traumatised populations are stretching capacity to deal 
with multifaceted human settlement problems. Warah held that the enablement provides a 
mechanism for resolving the `needs/demand gap' in provision of basic services between 
what people need and can afford and what the market can provide. It also enables different 
sectors to gain access to each other's skills and resources, providing a means for sharing 
risks and maximising returns on investment. 
Hundsalz (1994: 4) emphasised the importance of establishing a partnership as a key 
tool for the Support paradigm. While Awotona et al (1995: 8) pointed out that through 
building partnerships between individuals and communities, local government, non- 
governmental organisations and community-based organisation, the private sector builds 
complementary and co-operative relationships. Generally partnerships require government 
or another agency to play a strong role in bringing parties together, and in facilitating the 
exploration of common ground and the scope for combined action. Hamdi (1997: 413) 
cautioned that governments' strategic interventions should be directed to improve the means 
by which hundreds gain access to land, eventual building materials, cheap credit, better 
utilities, larger markets and easier transportation. 
Government invests to provide components rather than whole assemblies (Turner, 
1987). "This is done by providing roads and transportation to open up land for settlement or 
by draining land, providing a water supply, an electricity supply or complementary social 
and community services and schools. Projects and programmes of these kinds cost less per 
capita served and generate usually far more investment. Governments' and local authorities' 
role is to support the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
community-based groups" (Warah, 2000). 
Outlining benefits Hamdi (1997: 414) compared the two schools. He indicated that 
small building enterprises, collective rather than individual effort, user control and economic 
self-sufficiency... a fragmented rather than consolidated, building industry is better equipped 
to respond to market demands and more resilient to fluctuations in building activity as has 
been thought in the past. Instead of controlling quality's standards, or normalising 
production processes, the more diversity built into the system in quality and cost, the greater 
likelihood that needs and budgets are met. Small builders with low overheads and very little 
physical plant can carry diverse workloads, more than usually at affordable costs. 
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Enablement Options: 
Two influential options are site and services projects, and urban renewal and 
upgrading schemes. 
Sites and Services: Koenigsberger (1987: 17) traced this approach back to the late 1960s 
considering the thought a major breakthrough. Sites and services projects represent a change 
in emphasis from either providers or supporters. The enabler approach is coupled with 
various self-help and `aided self-help' programmes. It introduces a different vision of roles 
and costs involving people producing their own housing. 
Government and international donors' investments focus on delivering land services 
utilities and housing loans (Hamdi, 1997: 415). The public sector undertook to provide 
building plots, access roads, water and sewerage etc. and private building plots with access 
roads, water and construction of houses. In money terms, it was hoped public sector 
construction could be as low as one tenth of total expenditure. The limited public sector 
funds could thus produce up to 9 or 10 times more housing units than in cases of unilateral 
public sector housing projects. With self-help, construction methods assisted in providing an 
efficient impact (Hamdi, 1997: 414). Projects' effect on housing stock has been generally 
greater than anticipated, largely affordable and accessible to target populations. Socio- 
economically speaking, the schemes show a general record of success. 
Nevertheless, projects encounter problems and produce unexpected results. Criticism 
has grown as site and service projects are completed and their impact measured. Most have 
experienced delays in implementation, materials and loan compensations not as successful as 
expected (Burgess, 1992: 383). Support packages for small businesses have had problems. 
Two early projects encountered cost recovery difficulties. Architects and planners were 
worried by the emphasis on technically rational design and the use of coefficients as sole 
determinants. These projects lacked artistic sensibility. 
Family labour has been less involved in the construction process than anticipated. 
These projects tend to fail to reach those most in need, unless governments continue to offer 
heavy subsidies for land and infrastructure: an unsustainable service. Programmes require 
high investment to create infrastructure. Demand lending agencies place a burden on 
government to recover their costs. The desire to see sites consolidated with permanent 
materials with standards set by municipal authorities also raises expenditure. Otto 
Koenigsberger (1987: 30) noted 
Site and service projects were not quite as successful as their sponsors had 
hoped. However large, they remained one-off projects and did not become part 
of a repeatable and repeated nation-wide policy. Because they were numerically 
insufficient, they did not radically affect the housing market. As long as there is 
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a severe housing shortage, not only among the poor, but also among middle 
income groups, many of cheap subsidised plots of the Site and Services projects 
did not reach the poor for whom they were intended and ended up in a 
financially stronger middle class market. 
Urban Upgrading and Maximising the Local Involvement: Sites and service 
programmes differ from settlement upgrading projects and programmes (Turner, 1987). The 
latter deals with existing population, usually with some form of self-organisation and often 
with more than one claiming to represent the community. At the present time upgrading and 
local involvement have become the recognised priorities of housing policy. Over the last 
two decades many international organisations and national governments have analysed the 
limited successes of the project-oriented approaches of 1970s and 80s, particularly their cost 
recovery and reliability. Emphasis altered toward upgrading and local participation. 
In recognition of these changes, agencies such as the World Bank and UNDP 
changed their lending policies. Instead of making large transfers of financial 
resources to project building, the World Bank directed its funds more toward the 
reform of policies and institutions, to public administration, to local banks and to 
providing technical assistance. It is more on the basis of effective user demand 
and less on [that of] preconceived notions of adequate housing. (Hamdi, 1997: 
418). 
The most recent stage is characterised by providing public and private housing 
finance, financial and regulatory reform to encourage private sector involvement. The World 
Bank funds and authorises the idea of upgrading. "It was agreed to use the underprivileged 
people's goodwill and managerial gifts to improve their houses and neighbourhoods" 
(Koenigsberger: 1986). In return, they were to be given security of tenure and a certain 
amount of public sector help with infrastructure construction. UNCHS and ILO (1995: 132) 
look at upgrading in two ways: 
" Upgrading of infrastructure in a settlement through government or other initiatives with 
house improvement schemes; 
" Upgrading of the housing stock independent of service plans or projects distinguished 
from maintenance by the scale and likelihood of including extensions or even complete 
rebuilding of units. 
`Urban upgrading project' as Massachusetts Institute of Technology website (2000) 
described in urban communities can mean many things 5. The upgrading at its simplest has 
come to mean a package of basic services. It customarily provides a package of 
improvements in streets, footpaths and drainage as well. Solid waste collection is frequently 
MIT web site (2000): What is Urban Upgrading, 
http:, ! wwww-. mit. edu, 'afs/athena'orýg- «/urbanupgrading/upgrading/doing/ 
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included with its positive impact on health, along with streetlights for security and night 
activity. However, it is agreed that physical improvement is only the beginning. Upgrading 
programmes should address health issues need by providing clinics and health education 
programs, school facilities and teacher training are needed to attack the lack of basic 
education, and lastly programs are offered to increase income earning opportunities and the 
general economic health of a community. 
Various authors review the advantages of this school. For example: 
" Planning is reliant on local knowledge and skills in preparation and implementation 
"With preference for activities which are administration sparing rather than 
administration-intensive" (Chambers, 1993) 
" The benefits are simply that people obtain an improved, healthy and secure living 
environment without being displaced. The investments they have already made to their 
properties remain and are enhanced. (MIT, 2000) 
" Programmes are gradually enhanced through a series of small-scale additional projects 
coupled with strategic interventions. Appropriate technologies and local enterprises are 
promoted: enterprises that do not offer only materials, services and utilities from formal 
outlets, but supply themselves. Therefore, links are built up between large producers, 
small manufactures and between different kinds of technologies. (Hamdi, 1997) 
" Turner (1987) attributed the approach's success to the fact that the land and people are 
already there and the community usually has some form of organisation with which 
authorities can negotiate. As improvements are generally limited to public and 
community needs which the great majority of residents see as high priorities, projects 
gain more support and tend to be simpler and therefore, faster to implement and more 
cost effective. Work follows the acquisition of land and the organisation of the people, 
wherever the initiative originated. 
" Costs of the upgrading projects can range from very low - affordable by all families - to 
very high requiring outside financing. In some areas the community took the initiative 
and provided free labour, which lowered the costs appreciably for both community and 
the city. (MIT: 2000). 
" At the beginning rather than the end: meaning interventions rather than projects. Policy 
makers and consultants adopt a strategic role and act as catalysts, introducing the 
necessary methods and techniques, bringing experience from elsewhere, identifying 
further opportunities and possible courses of action, disseminating principles and 
removing barriers that hinder progress. 
" Urban upgrading is dependent on building coalitions and 
fostering co-operation between 
government and non-government groups, agreement between often competing 
government departments, between expatriate or outside experts and local professional 
counterparts, and between community groups with sometimes differing vested interests, 
particularly early on in the programme preparation. (Hamdi. 1997) 
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Authors such as Hundsalz (1994: 6-8). Shengs (1995: 3) and Tipple (1994: 4-13) 
criticised the paradigm. The value of the approach in terms of its policy impact on the 
situation of disadvantaged people is disputed (Sheng, 1995: 3). When governments liberalise 
policies without including safeguards to ensure shelter for the poor, their options do not 
improve substantially. They might end up being excluded from access to essential inputs, 
especially land and finance (Hundsalz, 1995: 3). Sheng (1995: 6-7) argued the private sector 
provides shelter for those able to afford it, where financially beneficial to the sector. It does 
not provide a viable solution for poor citizens. 
The problem is greater than facilitating the sector through removing the obstacles 
(Sheng, 1994). The poorer social group's lack of purchasing power remains an undeniable 
challenge. Acoily (1994: 1) considered the approach successful in theory, but in practice, 
confronted by certain situations, the strategy becomes unrealistic or difficult to operate. He 
referred to the lack of local government capacity, scarcity of financial resources, outdated 
legislation, and institutional stagnation. Support strategies reduce the maximum use of 
resources (Tipple, 1994: 4-13). National resources could be more effectively directed 
towards actors, than the sector's developing the delivery capacity, Tipple added. 
3.5 PILLARS OF A SUCCESSFUL POLICY 
Radically, the author argues that no strategy has proven to be the perfect solution as its 
advocates had hoped it would. However, there is a consensus that to alleviate poor human 
settlement conditions, major important areas for action have been recognised. First in post- 
conflict situations the situation quickly reveals the importance of housing and community 
services to the work of short-term peacebuilding and longer-term reconstruction. To achieve 
this aim, a number of objectives should be employed such as more serviced land must be 
made available. Flow of finance needs to be improved and expanded. Facilitating the 
production of affordable housing by stimulating the construction sector is required, 
reforming standards, norms and regulations. Also there is an urgent need for action to 
generate employment and protect the most vulnerable and poorest members of society. Each 
priority in turn is examined below. 
3.5.1 Adequate Infrastructure 
It could be claimed that water, sewerage, electricity, roads, clinics and schools in post- 
conflict countries are in a dilapidated condition. The quality of physical and social 
infrastructure is a significant element of the overall quality of human settlements and an 
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important determinant of a population's living condition. Furnishing neighbourhoods with a 
basic level of infrastructure services is an important task. 
In this sphere, agreement exists that government intervention is required to secure 
basic services, adequate investment in infrastructure networks crucial to meet shelter needs 
(UNCHS and ILO, 1995: 182). Also The World Bank (1993) elaborated the services should 
contain housing upgrading, hygiene; water; provision of toilets; their maintenance and 
disposal of sewerage; storm water drainage and mosquito eradication; garbage disposal and 
fly control; family health care, bathing and clothes washing facilities. 
Different programmes have been initiated and yet done very little to raise the low 
quality of life. This can be attributed to the trend of the planning and implementing agencies 
to see the solution as providing better infrastructure and constructing new houses and treating 
the problem of the provision of services as objectives in themselves, rather than elements of 
a package that bring about improvements in community. Also authorities do not respond to 
the community's priorities either in components or method of implementation. Rigid 
projects are developed, assuming incorrectly that the needs and priorities for each 
community are the same. The responsible agency should therefore, act as facilitator of 
community needs and not implementers of preconceived proposals. 
In order to maintain the programme, ILO (1995: 70) quoted five conditions necessary 
for successful infrastructure projects: 
" Communities must be involved in all stages, not simply as unpaid labour. The World 
Bank agreed that existing communities should be encouraged to participate in the 
process of planning and building of infrastructure projects, to ensure accountability and 
smooth implementation. 
" Stakeholders' roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined at the outset and both 
parties prepared to fulfil obligations. 
" The facilitator agency must act as a supporter of the community, not as the owner or 
manger of the programme. 
" The contact between the community and the facilitator agency should be through staff 
whose primary skills are in organising and motivating communities rather than in 
technical matters. 
" Government agencies need to fulfil the limited 
but vital tasks of motivation, facilitation, 
training, and technical assistance. 
3.5.2 Sustainable and Affordable Finance System 
After long periods of neglect during the conflict, settlements face infrastructure problems and 
severe shortage of resources. An adequate supply of affordable funds for land, 
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infrastructure, housing, building materials and business-development is critical if the real 
demand is to be met. The case is repeated in most of the Third World countries as Arimah 
(1997) claimed: "Usually the responsible authorities for human settlements suffer from a 
weak financial position with a major problem being poor revenue collection records. " He 
added that countries' implementation of plans is poor mainly since most national authorities 
lack financial resources, which, he argues, are crucial for service provision and infrastructure 
operation. Barcello (1998) stated that obstacles include: the lack of responsible authorities 
power to raise adequate revenue together with their poor revenue collection procedures, 
inability to make decisions, and the confused legislative basis for the performance of local 
government functions. 
The World Bank (1993: 4 1) acknowledged the need for a financial system. It indicated 
that a system has to reconcile three objectives: affordability to beneficiaries, viability to 
developers, and resources' mobilisation for the process as a whole. An UNDP report (1996) 
indicated that affordable systems may not be viable, at least on a large scale while viable 
systems may not be accessible to the target groups and the poor among them. Commentators 
contend that to attain the expected result access to credit must be provided on a much bigger 
scale. Given the scarcity of resources available it is vital attempts to assist the poorest 
members of the population, using subsidies, are carefully targeted. There can be no excuse 
for thinking that poor people can not take part successfully in credit programmes. 
The literature demonstrates guidelines to initiate and help decision-makers planning 
for financial policy. Key priorities in securing a stable and sustainable flow of financial 
resources for human settlements development are: 
" Stimulating national and local economies to attract public and private resources and 
investment, generate employment and increase revenues. 
" Strengthening fiscal and financial management capacity, developing taxation, pricing 
mechanisms and other sources of revenue. 
" Enhancing public revenue with fiscal instruments conducive to equity and sustainable 
development. 
" Strengthening legal and regulatory frameworks to enable 
financial markets to work, 
draw in resources and encourage partnerships. 
0 Promoting increased and equitable access to credit 
for all people. 
" Adopting timely, transparent, predictable and performance-based mechanisms 
for 
transferring finds between different levels of government. 
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" Targeting subsidies to those not served by markets, and promoting credit and other 
mechanisms appropriate to their needs. 
3.5.3 Land Management 
In 1964, Charles Abraham claimed that wherever he travelled, land issues in one form 
or another loomed large. He added no country was without a land problem of some sort. 
Inadequate supplies of land have been the areas of greatest failure in shelter strategies. It is 
considered as the most important factor underlying the poor performance of many shelter 
projects, infrastructure development, and transport planning. Barakat (1993) recognised that 
land issues such as ownership and speculation often are obstacles facing reconstruction. In 
developing countries the problem is identified by the following basic issues, which influence 
any policy for shelter 
Land Ownership: Abraham (1964: 26) recognised that land ownership in many 
developing countries is the major source of wealth. He explained that the title of land often 
gives prestige. In law, land includes all structures that may be developed on it. So far, most 
community landlords inherit ownership from their relatives. An inherited piece of land is an 
obstacle in the development process. Since, land is divided between extended family 
members, a small land plot cannot be viable for large-scale development. Many of these 
families can not sell their land due to cultural obligations. In addition, they fail to make 
maximum use of it. On the other hand, for the less prosperous ownership of land is still a 
primary aspiration though a distant hope. This in turn affects the availability of land for 
public development. 
Cost of Land: Land cost is expected to be affordable, sustainable and cost effective 
thus unless free or very cheap land can be provided, cost may affect the success of human 
settlement policy. In countries offering few alternatives for investment of cash, land 
increment is as profitable a reward as any competing investment can offer. Sometimes, 
rising land costs simply correspond to the political situation. Land cost has soared not 
because there is a dearth of land or solely because of land hoarding or the increased demand 
for urban land per se. The reasons for rising land prices also include: 
0 Failure to provide easier acces to nearby sites. 
" Freedom from land taxation. installation of public utilities and roads that 
have enhanced 
value without equivalent assessment for benefits. 
" Excessive concentration of ownership 
in some places and such excessive 
fragmentation of ownership in governing land titles or lack of adequate 
compulsory purchase procedures that could bring more land into use. 
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High land cost may not be the only obstacle. There are other problems such as land 
speculation. Rondinelli (1983) identified speculation as a major factor controlling costs. He 
explained speculation: ``It is driving the price of housing and urban services out of the range 
of an increasing proportion of the population every year". Abraham (1964) illustrated that in 
many countries income is so low that land at any price is beyond the family means. 
A number of methods have been adopted to curb rising prices. Zoning, price control, 
subdivision controls, and other devices have been imported by developing countries. 
UNCHS and ILO (1995) argued that situations can be improved by making decisions about 
land use, density and location of government uses in a way which increases the efficiency of 
urban and land use, rather than simply through sectional preference. Barakat (1993) 
proposed that price control legislation, along with a proper compensation procedure, to make 
available to public authorities an adequate proportion of low cost land, would help bring to 
fruition the hoped-for reconstruction and redevelopment plan. 
Land Regulation & Acquisition Cobbett (1999) argued that in many instances, 
proper government policy might remove such obstacles. Governments have the power to 
guide the use of land, curb misuse, prevent abuse, non-use or disuse and direct its re-use. 
According to UNCHS (1995) governments must manage supply, insisting on vacant land 
within built up areas being used efficiently, penalising speculators, and ensuring new land on 
the urban periphery is developed conservatively. The report exemplifies "that valuable 
agricultural land is preserved by guiding development along public transport corridors 
provided with essential infrastructure. 
A large number of devices for regulating land use are now in operation. The devices 
include: price or rent controls, zoning, restriction on the sale price of land; subdivision 
controls and building regulations; purchase or regulation of development rights. Others 
entail: public reserve lands; tax levies to control use or bring land into use, or to discourage 
its use, land, building, or rent subsidisation in various forms, excess condemnation, public 
purchase of more land than needed. 
Barakat (1993: 125) mentions the fact that land acquisition by city councils has been a 
common practice all over Europe during and immediately after the war. Hill (1998) alludes 
to the German experience in land readjustment. It was in the late 1800s that comprehensive 
land readjustment was tried for the first time in modem Europe. According to Hill, it is also 
practised today in cultures as far-flung from one another as Scandinavia and Malaysia. He 
explained that this policy involves expropriation under conditions of scarce resources and 
then re-percolation or redistribution of property rights based on land values to guarantee land 
is put to the highest and best Lise. 
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Other methods have been employed in the world. One is municipal ownership, a form 
through which German cities derived large sums from ground rents to control the 
distribution of the population. Another method employed in German cities, Beard writes, is 
compulsory purchase. Some 400 acres were expropriated. Immediately afterwards, the 
National Board of High Commissioners for Reconstruction was established. The Board was 
empowered to issue acquisition directives to the Burgomasters. Next, the reconstruction 
registry was set up. The registry recorded compensation claims for lost premises, to be paid 
later when a new building was erected in its place. A commission of experts determined the 
value of the expropriated site and land values. Compensation was not paid at the time, 
though owners had the right to acquire another piece of land of the same value. 
However, UNCHS (1996) doubted the viability to implement the complex array of 
controls and regulations. It is seen as costly to administer and usually ineffective, sometimes 
adding to bottlenecks in land market, and the pressure for holding land vacant for speculative 
gain. 
3.5.4 Generating Job Opportunities 
In countries suffering from conflict, unemployment is common. Reconstruction could 
be the solution. According to UNCHS and ILO (1995: 141), shelter could be a major factor 
in income both for citizens and their countries. Furthermore, the construction industry is a 
significant source of employment for unskilled poor. UNCHS publications stated that 
income-earning and generation opportunities should not simply be an optional extra but a 
major consideration in the development of the most suitable approach to shelter delivery. 
Lybe (1992: 83) distinguished major and minor works as: 
" Major works include roads, drains, sewerage, electricity etc., which belong to the public 
domain proper. 
" Minor works comprise local storm-water drainage in flood prone areas, small scale 
paving of access streets and footpaths, on site sanitation, community buildings, and 
locally based waste disposal systems. All these are items of direct interest to inhabitants 
and tend to recur as high priorities in local surveys. 
Absorbing labour is not an end in itself. There is no place in the new era for making 
work for its own sake (Hamdi. 1997: 417). UNCHS and ILO (1995: 142) emphasised that 
paying unemployed people to dig countless holes only to pay others to fill them in again may 
have seemed like a good idea once but in these days. it make no sense under hardship 
conditions of economies. Increasing the use of local labourers in shelter work programmes 
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should be carried out on the understanding that they provide better productivity than other 
methods when the multiplied effect is accounted for. 
MIT website (2000) mentioned that settlements upgrading projects provide 
opportunities for labour-intensive growth via official encouragement to small-scale 
entrepreneurs in the construction sector, the use of dwellings for small businesses, and public 
investment in infrastructure. The World Bank (1993: 15) suggested to support the creation of 
job opportunities, requirements must be supplied through vocational training for men and 
women, formation and management of co-operatives, loans for small businesses and land 
and buildings on rental or hire purchase basis for small industries. The Bank elaborates that 
these elements need to be linked to demands for skills from employers and marketing and 
demand for manufactured products. Programmes, in which training is seen as an end in 
itself, can disillusion participants when there are no follow-on jobs, or when products lie 
unsold because there is no demand for them. 
3.5.5 Stimulate Building Industry 
Construction is involved in all human activity. Building materials and construction 
industries are basic means for the erecting, expansion, improvement and maintenance of 
human settlements. Understandably, to attain reconstruction objectives and the development 
of physical infrastructure, the building-material industry should gain attention. According to 
UNCHS "Construction activities can account for 80 per cent of total capital assets, and 
building investments yield large benefits over the long term. " However, the World Bank 
(1993: 138) reported that in the developing world the construction industry is often poorly 
organised and building materials are very costly, especially if needing to be imported. The 
Bank claimed mismanagement is a common problem. It is manifested in underproduction of 
necessary material, lack of variety, inefficiencies in production, and a lack of distribution 
networks resulting in chronic shortages for residential and infrastructure construction. 
UNCHS (1995: 12) exemplified the problem, stating, most developing countries are endowed 
with abundant natural resources that could meet the demand for basic building materials 
using largely indigenous inputs, but local production of building materials in a large number 
of countries falls short of demand. Nordberg (2000) posited that the scarcity of building 
materials has also affected development plans in other sectors, including agriculture, health 
and education. Regarding locally produced building materials, such as aggregates, bricks, 
tiles; limestone, in some countries where a monopoly operates, shortages have been created 
deliberately to force up the price. The resulting steep rises in land costs and building 
materials effectively removes decent housing from the reach of low-and medium income 
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groups. When this happens in poor settlements the poor are forced to use inappropriate 
building materials. He added that a number of factors, such as inadequate infrastructure, 
poor transportation, lack of capital and low level of skills recur as problems in developing 
countries. 
The World Bank (1993: 18) stated that the key to creating a well-functioning building 
materials industry is the elimination of monopolistic practice, the breaking down of artificial 
barriers to competition through strong antitrust legislation and the entry of small firms into 
the sector in all phases of production. The Bank also mentions that governments should 
encourage the building industry by reducing import controls and by facilitating licensing 
requirements for small producers, contractors, and developers. UNCHS (1987) called for 
policies that enable small industry to provide building materials and job opportunities. Small 
and local building material industries have a number of strengths, including: 
" They use a variety of local materials and a minimum of imported inputs. 
" They have the knowledge of local conditions, special requirement neighbourhoods and 
can offer a service based on customers' special requirements. 
" They can develop on a very small scale, often in the home, and can give employment to 
local skilled, unskilled and unemployed labour. 
The World Bank (1993: 19) espoused the importance of establishing building research 
institutions, which can instruct the development and use of local materials and building 
technologies. 
3.5.6 Legal and Regulatory Framework 
In post-conflict context, policy-makers are required to produce a legal framework for 
the reconstruction activities. Good policy means balancing issues to ensure that the legal and 
regulatory framework is neither pedantic nor easily abused. This can be achieved by 
removing regulations that cause `bottlenecks' in the delivery of shelter. As the World Bank 
(1993) reported: "The goal here is to secure a framework that is `light but firm' in which a 
small number of rules and regulations are implemented rigorously; rather than a heavy but 
loose system in which large numbers of norms and sanctions are unused, or are used 
selectively according to political patronage or financial interests. " 
UNCHS and ILO (1995: 153) stated that the imposition of rules and regulations based 
on a blueprint of `how life should be' rather than a response to 'how life is' has tended to be 
the norm in the past. Shelter solutions resulting in this prescribed `top-down' process reflect 
official interpretations of demand and can drain away residents' incomes without giving 
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them what they need. UNCHS (1987) held that inappropriate buildings codes favour 
imported construction materials, which despite their high cost or scarcity, are often imposed 
as the only choice available. UNCHS (1996: 298-300) emphasised that planning control and 
zoning systems should be `permissive' and flexible, devolved to the lowest level possible, 
and integrated into one responsible department or agency. 
Deficiencies in the legal system cause too many human settlement projects to fail. The 
shortcomings of human settlement policies are rooted in "Remote bureaucratic decisions and 
delays and poor execution of projects and programmes by specialised bodies". The author 
attributed poor results to ineffective local institutions and staff, lack of a co-ordination 
framework in planning. He argued that "Over-concentration of development responsibilities 
and decision making powers in national ministries and other central bodies do not lead to 
efficient implementation of national development policies". While on the other hand local 
institutions are neglected, heavy handed and cumbersome central ministerial bureaucracies 
thwart local initiatives in the pursuit of development opportunities, he adds. Below the 
author reviews why projects fail to achieve their stated objectives: 
Lack of Institutional Co-ordination 
Ambiguities in the relationship between stockholders such as international 
organisations state ministries and local agencies and authorities is the result. It leads to 
bureaucratic enforcement procedures, handicapping rapid implementation of projects. The 
dilemma is the lack of experienced people down the line, fluctuation of scruples in public 
service and the suddenness with which new countries have had to adapt to these parameters. 
Institutional co-ordination problems arise between different ministries in the same cabinet. 
Problems rise about the allocation of open space and its abuse by developers who violate 
planning regulations. 
According to Abraham (1964) other reasons exist for the institutional lack of co- 
ordination. Traditions of good public service are less matured. Authors such as Abraham, 
UNCHS, and Awotona et al. mentioned corruption as a reason for chaos. They argued that 
very often civil servants rely on other sources of income to maintain decent living standards. 
Opportunists among them may see public service as a short bridge to affluence. Abraham 
pointed out that business looks on graft as essential oil to lubricate officials when 
administrative delays and frustrations seem endless. Where permits are required 
for building 
or importing, there is an open black market in some countries. Those who need contraband 
manage to get it. 
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Delays are common and represent a physical constraint on human settlement projects. 
Where construction projects are implemented, the cost is often higher than anticipated. and 
this represents a financial constraint on successful implementation. This is due to various 
factors such as poor estimates, variations by the client, inappropriate technology and design. 
inappropriate tendering and contractual procedures, inefficient on-site supervision and 
construction management. Habitat Debate (1998) listed further reasons, such as inadequate 
capacity for the planning and design of projects, difficulty in obtaining tenders for small 
projects in which international contractors are not interested or for projects which are too 
large for local contractors to handle, inefficiency in planning, design and construction, and 
difficulties in obtaining materials and other crucial inputs. 
Political Interference and Lack of Political Will 
In a post-conflict context, it would be unfair to view political corruption outside the 
new conditions accompanying the transitional stage. Countries in transition face new types 
of political organisations where the ethics of government service have not been developed. 
Herculean and unfamiliar duties, the phlegmatic state of public opinion and the press, the 
dearth of civic organisations, as well as other political pressures can all combine to hinder 
progress. Abraham (1964) claimed: "Projects have failed due to the legal, administrative and 
political weaknesses. This results in inadequacy of support for the pursuit of the objective 
and aims of the human settlement policy. " Abraham stated that public works and housing 
programmes, in particular have provided vast opportunities for politicians to exercise their 
power through construction contracts, purchase of materials, loans to the worthy and low 
rent dwellings to those who vote right. Excessive politicisation has interfered with 
professional conduct in technical issues and has, in turn interfered with the legitimate sources 
and lines of authority. 
Political interference in the law and control system has limited the ability of the 
implementing authority to fully control events, regulate and control development. Abraham 
claimed that powerful government officials have been known to enforce approvals of 
projects that do not meet stipulated requirements. High demand for space has led authorities 
to overlook the standards required for various uses and abuse of development controls 
especially in relation to open spaces. 
Politicians interfere in the implementation of court judgements. This in turn leads to fear of 
court interventions to enforce law and regulations. In the case, there 
is court intervention, 
political interference can over-rule it for political considerations. 
For similar reasons, central 
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government can not take corrupted figures to court when the latter violates regulations and 
vice versa. 
Beneficiaries Non-compliance with the Legal Framework 
Different studies show that beneficiaries of projects in the third world countries tend 
not to comply with regulations and their signed commitments. Declining economic 
conditions, the high percentage of unemployment, too much expectation and too few 
achievements, each of these can encourage people to challenge the law and regulations. 
Poor enforcement machinery is another reason. 
In addition, the inability of the implementers to employ adequate qualified work force 
affects the beneficiaries' attitudes. This situation may arise from inadequate finance, 
equipment, or from political interference in the responsible authority's activities. Arimah 
(1997) explained that no-compliance is often the result of inadequate penalties. He added 
this may happen if the fines levied on offenders are low and affordable hence do not deter 
them, when compared to gains they make from inefficient mode of production. 
People's lack of knowledge of regulation and the lack of responsibility of the civil society in 
building the nation contribute to this apathy. Arimah (1997) examined the degree of 
compliance with regulations. The extent to which people are aware of their existence is 
important because it partly determines how many people comply. He noted that the level of 
awareness is very low. 
3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Having understood the relationship between reconstruction and peacebuilding in the 
previous chapter, the author devoted this chapter to analyse the issue of post-conflict 
reconstruction of human settlements, starting by tackling the post-conflict reconstruction at 
the policy level, explaining how to approach the process. It showed reconstruction as a 
process has input, output, challenges and priorities. The chapter narrowed its scope to focus 
on human settlement reconstruction and implementation. It defines human settlements to 
cover physical shelter plus related services and infrastructure, including inputs such as land, 
finance, etc. required to produce and maintain it. Also it has shown how the issue is a 
significant one and worth research and analytical studies. 
The chapter presented the fact that the shelter problem is not only confined to post- 
conflict countries. In almost all Third World countries, adequate shelter in suitable 
conditions is an uphill battle. The rapid pace of urbanisation, the weak rate of economic 
growth, the availability of land for housing and public services, the increase in land prices 
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and inappropriate strategies for urban planning and land appropriation all directly contribute 
to this problem. 
Shelter strategies in most Third World countries are often at odds with policies to 
improve the lives and living conditions of its residents. Two schools of thought have been 
discussed in this chapter. The Orthodox paradigm emerged to meet the shortage of shelter 
supply in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Alternative paradigm emerged in 
response to the repeated failure of the first school. Both schools have their opponents and 
advocates. After reviewing the conflicting opinions regarding each school, the author argued 
that there is no school can offer a perfect solution, since each country has its own challenges 
and opportunities. 
However, the adoption of an alternative and effective shelter strategy is only possible 
with a basic restructuring of the priorities and development directions. Commitment to 
social development is necessary to ensure that the required resources are channelled for the 
benefit of the underprivileged and provide them with adequate and decent living conditions. 
Another issue is the cultural suitability. Governments in developing countries tend, failing to 
meet the problem of human settlements, to import solutions from more advanced nations. 
UNCHS Agenda disputed if any policy can be imposed on a global level. Policies must be 
determined together with the people concerned. 
It is also important that sufficient land in suitable locations is allocated for housing and 
public services. Without positive intervention, land becomes increasingly scarce, as 
population in most Third World countries is on the increase. This priority should come 
before other concerns if resources are limited. 
The chapter showed the need for adequate infrastructure and provision of essential 
services, giving rise to the related issues of how to get right the framework of land 
management and put into place an appropriate and affordable financial system to bring 
properties in reach of all citizens. The egalitarian issues are somewhat offset by the further 
needs of stimulating the construction sector. The problem that some priorities could conflict 
with other prerequisites the author addresses, principally in the conclusion. For a strategy to 
be successful, the whole population needs to be catered for, involving economic stimuli and 
special provisions to supplement the poorest members of society who cannot compete for 
various reasons in a solely market-led economy. The chapter presented the need for getting 
right the legal and regulatory framework. 
The chapter emphasised the results of failing to address these issues; firstly examining 
the failure of policy through the vagaries of the legal system which could contain antiquated 
statutes hindering the smooth implementation of up-to-date methods for housing provision. 
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Restrictive regulations are investigated as another side of the same legal constraints that 
might be encountered. Since strong institutions are essential in delivering an efficient 
housing policy to the public, the lack of institutional co-ordination is given attention as a 
recurrent cause of failure. Deficient institutions could result from the broader issue of 
political inference or lack of a political will to facilitate an effective shelter policy. Most 
governments have usually met with failure or only limited success. Efforts to improve 
quality of life are also often negated by the rapidly deteriorating housing conditions in the 
slum and squatter areas. The lack of appropriate planning and land policies hinders any 
attempts to shelter the poor effectively. This review with a of the causes of behind the failure 
of shelter policies in so many countries can be taken to imply a series of measures which 
may need to be taken to bring better success in the future. 
Building on the gathered information from the first three chapters, the author goes on 
to describe, interpret and assess the methods used in conducting his fieldwork in Gaza Strip. 
Chapter four reviews generic research activities and methodologies adopted and modified to 
carry out work in the field, determining priorities in the face of changing circumstances. The 
discussion of methodology leads to three subsequent chapters that cover ongoing 
reconstruction activities in the Gaza Strip. 
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RESEARCH AND 
FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A methodology defines how a phenomenon is studied, while methods are specific 
research techniques. These include quantitative techniques, such as statistical correlation, as 
well as qualitative techniques like observation, interviewing and audio recording. No one 
can claim that the information gained from various research methods is false. Data are more 
or less useful, depending on their relevance to theories and methodologies used and the 
hypothesis tested and or the research topic selected. This attitude toward a methodology 
leads to a discursive style in how material is expressed in a chapter. The author writes this 
chapter while keeping in mind that it needs to be lively, interesting, and informative. It 
should avoid listing the information in a way as Silverman (2000: 7) described it "Because 
we're here, because we're here, because we're here". The chapter consists of three main 
sections: 
First: it offers a theoretical review of the research strategy, which includes 
understanding the evaluation of case studies. After elaborating its aim, the author discusses 
components of and criteria for evaluation. 
Second: the experience of this research is addressed, describing objectives and 
difficulties. Various techniques and instruments used to collect data are explained. The 
means of collecting, analysing and presenting are discussed. 
Third: the chapter introduces other methodological and learning tools which were 
employed by the author to develop his ideas over the last three years. 
4.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
To answer the main research question (see the introduction) and building on the 
conceptual literature review, two case studies have been selected 
for this thesis. The first 
case study is the Elkarama Housing Project; 
initiated and completed by the Palestinian 
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Housing Council (PHC). The second is the Peace Implementation Programme, initiated and 
implemented by UNRWA. Evaluation of the two case studies helped the author bring 
greater comprehension of specific problems and produce data and lessons to learn. It is 
intended to judge the value or worth of both experiences. Evaluation is a learning tool to 
assess the value of what has already taken place to improve future work. Measuring, 
analysing and interpreting change helped determine how the objectives of the two case 
studies have been achieved and whether the initial assumptions were right, and to make 
judgements about the efficiency; effectiveness; impact and suitability of the work. 
Rubin (1995: 5) argued that sometimes evaluations are expected to show clearly 
whether a project has been successful. He posited that "It is often very difficult to reveal 
clear evidence of success, because this may depend on so many factors, some of which are 
beyond the control of the project. " In addition, it is often easier to indicate failure where 
different groups of people will have different perceptions about what constitutes failure and 
success. The time scale can also be a factor: A project may be deemed a failure at one stage, 
but several years later it may become clear that there were some positive effects. In order to 
make it clearer for the researcher, evaluation criteria have been developed by different 
international organisations and research institutes. 
4.2.1 Evaluation Components 
Evaluating a development project examines the relationship between the general aim, 
the objectives, the inputs and outputs of the project. Below is an explanation of what these 
terms mean, 
Aim: is the overall objective that the project is meant to contribute to in the long run. 
Objectives: The operational reasons for a project. The fruit which the project is 
expected to achieve within a reasonable time. 
Outputs: The results that can be guaranteed by the project as a result of its activities. 
Input: All those things, which are necessary in a project to carry out the activities 
planned and achieve the intended outputs. It may include funds, personnel, material, 
etc. 
In this regard, Rubin (1995: 6) distinguished five indicators related to the evaluation 
criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance and sustainability. 
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Efficiency: What is the cost of achieving the project's objectives? 
It is the measure of output of the project (qualitative and quantitative) in relation to 
total resource input. Efficiency aims to make the best use of resources available, by 
producing maximum output whilst minimising input and waste. A project may be very 
effective in working towards its objectives, but it may do so at very high cost both socially 
and economically, which is neither reasonable nor sustainable. There may be ways of 
achieving the same output more cheaply. Adjustment may involve looking at how things are 
organised, what type of technology is employed as well as the way finances are managed. 
Efficient projects aim at short-term objectives and may be ineffective in relation to longer 
time scale goals or inequitable in terms of whose resources are used 
Efficiency: how the results stand in relation to 
the efforts expended. How economically inputs 
are converted into outputs. Whether the same 
results could have been achieved in another, better way 
Inputs Outputs 
Figure 4.1: Efficiency as a Relation between the Input and the Outputs of a Development Project. 
Source: (NORAD, 1993: 31) Adopted by the Author. 
Effectiveness: The extent to which the project's 
objectives have been achieved: whether this can be 
expected to happen on the basis of the outputs of the 
project. 
Outputs Objectives 
Figure 4.2: Effectiveness as a Relation between the Outputs and the Objectives of a Development 
Project. 
Source: (NORAD, 1993: 31) Adopted by the Author. 
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Effectiveness gauges how far the project or programme goes toward achieving its 
objectives. 
NORAD (1993: 30) explained it is a measure of whether the purpose has been or is 
likely to be fulfilled. This category grades how much certain output contributes to realising 
the intended purpose. The term thus also indicates something about the content of the 
project and whether it contributes to development in an expected manner. Devas and 
Rodkodi (1993) demonstrated that effectiveness requires that clear lines of responsibility be 
established for tasks and processes of management and accountability whilst at the same 
time linking policy formulation with implementation. 
The Impact: What are effects of the project? 
NORAD (1993: 30) illustrated that the impact of the project has both foreseen and 
unforeseen consequences for a society. Impact can be intended and unintended, positive and 
negative, immediate or long-term. Its effect can be recorded on the micro and macro-level. 
Sometimes, a distinction is made between shorter-term results as outcomes and longer-term 
results as impact. In this research, impact of projects covers the social, economic, technical 
environmental and other effects on individual beneficiaries. 
Impact: The changes and effects positive and negative, 
planned and unforeseen of the project, seen in relation to 
target groups and others who are affected. 
Objectives Aim 
Figure 4.3: Impact as a Relation between the Aim and the Objectives of a Development Project. 
Source: (NORAD, 1993: 3 1) Adopted by the Author. 
Relevance: Is the project relevant? 
A project may or may not prove to be appropriate to the needs of the beneficiaries it is 
designed to help. There might be other problems that should take priority. NORAD (1993) 
showed that the overall approach and strategy of the project should be consistent with the 
problem and intended effects. Relevance means an overall assessment of whether the project 
is in keeping with the overall goal, the donor and recipient policy, as well as with local need 
and priorities. The target group, (prime beneficiaries of a project) should be the most 
important stakeholders. There is increasing evidence that the more people are enabled to 
Chapter Four 117 
Research and Fieldht'ork Methodology 
participate in decisions about development activities, which affect them, the more successful 
and sustainable those activities become. The most important questions for the target group 
are: 
" Did the project tackle their real needs? 
" Are the results significant? 
" Are the results worth the efforts? 
Relevance: The degree to which the projectcan still be 
justified in relation to local and national development 
priorities. 
Outputs Objectives Aim 
Figure 4.4: Relevance as a Relation Between the aim, the objectives, and the Outputs of a 
Development Project. 
Source: (NORAD, 1993: 3 1) Adopted by the Author. 
Sustainability: An assessment of the extent to which 
the positive effects of the project will still continue 
after external assistance has been concluded. 
Inputs Outputs Objectives Aim 
Figure 4.5: Sustainability as a Relation between the all the Project Elements. 
Source: (NORAD, 1993: 3 1) Adopted by the Author. 
Sustainability is the final test of the success of a project. The term addresses the question: 
"Will project activities and benefits continue after external support is withdrawn? " 
Sustainability represents an "overall assessment of the extent to which the positive change 
achieved as a result of the project can be expected to last also after the project has been 
terminated. " (NORAD, 1993: 30). It evaluates the relation between necessary local 
resources and how recipients view specific projects. Further issues of how far beneficiaries 
have been involved and have taken charge of finding the necessary resources are explored. 
In addition, sustainability refers to how successful has the project been in combining long- 
term economic, social. political development with environmental concerns. 
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4.3 METHODS AND TOOLS FOR INVESTIGATION 
In this section, research methods selected for collecting research information are 
examined. The nature of data, the degree of required accuracy, and the availability of 
resources determined the methods used. The combination of these factors decided to a large 
extent the research methods chosen. The author, conducting fieldwork, did not start with a 
prescribed model, but has adjusted focus as his grasp of the situation developed. In such a 
case, it was necessary to be equipped with an orientation that enabled him to focus on issues 
and evidence deserving most attention. To achieve this outcome a combination of methods 
needed to be practised. These included: close-ended questionnaires with a few open-ended 
questions, interviews and observations, focusing on group interviews (Aldiwan) and 
investigating the life histories of residents and recording their physical environment. 
Employing these techniques could help indicate the degree of the project's success. 
4.3.1 Review of Existing knowledge (Literature Review) 
In a preliminary stage, a literature review was essential to give insight into the existing 
knowledge on the research's case studies. Specifically, to conduct research a consistent 
reference-point or aim must be defined and adhered to. This focus served as an inchoate 
basis for observing and gathering data about the topic and then for describing and 
understanding its implications. Researchers develop concepts, formulate hypotheses, and 
test their ideas. Investigators carry out these activities in various sequences, combinations, 
employing a broad scope of methods to realise their objective of bringing new information to 
the discipline, addressing and proposing remedies to the recognised problem. This complex 
activity represents the process of research. In this research, a comprehensive literature 
search was conducted over the last few years. It included an understanding of the previous 
work and research carried out concerning the topic. It aimed at development of a conceptual 
framework covering the main features, aspects, dimensions, factors and variables of the 
reconstruction of human settlements. Library research is the first step in doing a literature 
survey. In addition, the following web sites provided an up-to-date information 
" Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: 
http: //www. arts. mcgill. ca/programs/polisci/faculty/rexb/pblinks. htm 
" The War-tom Societies Project (WSP): 
http: //www. unrisd. org/wsp/talk. htm 
" The World Bank Unit of Post-conflict Reconstruction: 
http: //wbIn0018. world bank. org'essd/essd. nsf/Post-Conflict/home 
" Journal of Human Assistance Review: http: //www. jha. ac/ 
" The Palestinian Refugee 
Info-net at the Macgill University: 
http: //NwNww. arts. mcgiI1. ca/MEPP/meppnet. htmI 
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The literature review focused on the various aspects and dilemmas involved in the 
process post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. This drew on a collection of books, 
articles, reports, and Internet documents. The list below is a sample of the consulted 
materials, 
Military and Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories: (Abed, 1990); (Arun, 
1989); (B'tselem, 1992), (Barakat, 1993: 37); (Benvenisti, 1988: 15); (Benvenisti, 1992): 
(Coon, 1992); (Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949); (Hague Regulations of 1907. 
http: //palestine-un. org/tenth/paper. htnal), (International Labour Office, 1992); (Mission at the 
United Nation, PMUN web site, http: //palestine-un. oro; (Murray, 1991); (Chomsky, 1987); 
(Palestinian Liberation Organisation 1992); (Roy, 1995); (Roy, 1989); (Said 1994): 
(Sayiegh, 1989); (Senan, 1992); (Tuqan, 1995: 85). 
Post Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding: (Amirahmadi, 1990); (Annan, 1998); 
(Ball and Halevy, 1996), (Barakat 1998; 1994; 1993); (Barakat and Hoffman, 1995), 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992), (Doyle, and N. Sambanis, 1999); (Duffield, 1996); (Evans, 1993); 
(Forman and Parhad, 1998); (Galtung, 1995); (Galtung, 1996); (Hampson, 1996); (Hill, 
1996), (Holsti, 1996), (King, 1997); (Kumar, et al., 1997); (Lake, 1990); (Lederach, 1997); 
(Macrae and Bradbury, 1998); (Miall, et al., 1999); (Minear, and Weiss, 1995): (OECD 
, 1997), (Smillie, 1999); (Stiefel, 1994; 1998), (The World Bank, 1997,1998,1999; 2000), (WSP, 1996,1997a, 1997b, 1997c); (Zartmans, 1996). 
Reconstruction of Human Settlements: (Abrams, 1964); (Acoily, 1995); (Awotona et al, 
1995); (Azimi-Bolourian, 1986); (Barakat, 1993); (Barcello, 1998); (Burgess, 1994); 
(Burgess, 1982); (Carbonnier, 1998); (Chambers, 1993); (Cobbett, 1999); (Davis, 1989); 
(Hamdi, 1997,1995,1995a), (Hundsalz, 1994); (King, 1997); (Kumar, 1997); (Lybe, 1992), 
(Mathey, 1992), (MIT web site, 2000); (Nordberg, 2000); (Koengisberger, 1964,1986); 
(Pugh, 1998), (Rakodi and Devas (eds. ), 1993), (Rondinelli, 1986), (Shengs, 1995), (UNDP, 
1998), (USAID, 1996); (The World Bank, 1993) (Tipple, 1994), (Turner, 1986): (UNCHS, 
1987,1989,1976,1996,1995,1997); (UNCHS-ILO, 1995); (Wakely, 1986); (Warah, 2000) 
4.3.2 Preliminary Field-visit: 
There is a need to discover the area of research by conducting a pre-study visit. It is 
useful to enable the researcher to fully understand the situation. Barakat and Ellis 
(1996: 149-156) stated that pre-fieldwork preparation gives the researcher as much 
information as possible about the situation. He continued that through pre-fieldwork survey, 
the researcher gains a better understanding of the conflict and analysis of collected data. 
Results of the pre-study should be available before the fieldwork starts. The author of this 
thesis prepared a checklist to examine the situation in the Palestinian Territories, building on 
the findings of the War-torn Societies project (1999) '. A literature survey was carried out 
before leaving to Gaza in order to prepare the ground for the field visit. Further, a visit to 
' WSP (1999). The first four years. http: ý\ \\ %v. unrisd. org! wsp ovCrvic\ý 'toc. htm 
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Gaza in January 1999 was conducted to answer the researcher's inquiry regarding the 
situation. The issues covered include: 
0 The conflict and reconciliation. 
40 Root causes of the conflict (the Israeli Occupation). 
" Impact of the conflict. 
" Moving towards reconciliation. 
" Analysis of the peace process. 
" Consequences of the peace agreements. 
" Major actors in the rebuilding process: internal and external, individual and institutional 
" Rebuilding process: politically, economically, and socially. 
" Challenges and opportunities for the reconstruction of Palestine. 
" The answers for these questions are distributed over this research. It serves to provide a 
background for the fieldwork and the two case studies. 
4.3.3 Interview with Key Figures 
This is the method most widely used in evaluation work. Its main advantage is that it 
provides a reasonable and efficient means of gaining deeper insights into concrete questions 
and issues. Interviews broaden the scope of investigation, identifying relevant links between 
the author's theoretical background and the `on the ground' situation. The interviewer may 
take up a variety of problem areas through the choice of informants and through questions 
that can yield insight on matters outside the planning framework as such concerning 
unforeseen impacts of a project. 
NORAD (1993: 42) stressed the importance of the selection of key research 
informants. It distinguished them to be those "... individuals who, through their position or 
role, know a lot about the subject under study. " 
In this thesis the interviewees have been selected on the basis of the author's own 
knowledge. He has practised a snowball method, in which selection is carried out through 
recommendation from others. With each-passed on recommendation, the `pool' of 
interviewees has grown. Through this method, a wide-ranging group of policy makers have 
been met, in the Palestinian National Authority, PHC and UNRWA. In Appendix (5), the 
author presents a list of interviewees, their names and occupations. 
In his second fieldwork, the author managed to meet officials working in the 
Palestinian Housing Council. This gave a prompt start to the research. The head of the 
Council Mr. Usama Elsa'dawy showed enthusiasm and understanding of the research topic. 
He offered unlimited help. provided information and asked his employees to do the same. 
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The interviews with other council employees lasted three days and covered the various 
themes regarding the PHC projects in Gaza Strip. 
In Gaza, UNRWA's field office, the official in charge of public relations was reluctant 
to allow the researcher to enter into the organisation's offices. He offered little help, only 
provided the author with descriptions of UNRWA's mandate and press releases. After 
discussion, the UNRWA's official co-operated, justifying his initial attitude by the political 
sensitivity of the subject under study. He asked the author to submit a letter to the chief of 
the field office to approve the proposed meeting. At last, five of UNRWA's field office 
directors were met. Those are responsible for Shelter Programme, Education, Health, 
Project Management and Development Planning Programmes. In UNRWA's headquarters, 
the author met a British employee whose assistance was limited to offering available relevant 
documents and some promises to answer questions via the electronic email that never 
worked. Before going to interviews, the author prepared checklist in advance. This 
preparation helped the interviewer focus on the subject and to save time afterward during the 
analysis stage. 
The interviews were structured to encourage respondents to express themselves, 
allowing them flexibility to air their own agenda. Generally, at the same time, this semi- 
structured style helps an interviewer hold the exchange within a specific ambit of discussion. 
Also, the interviewer followed up ideas, expanded on motives and sensed feelings more 
effectively. 
4.3.4 Questionnaire 
Using questionnaires is noted as a universal method for collecting information: its 
purpose to generate information in a systematic fashion by presenting all informants with 
questions in a similar form and recording responses in a methodical way. It exemplifies the 
scientific approach to data gathering. Separate authors argue questionnaires make the 
information received more reliable by eliminating differences in the way questions are asked 
and presented. Specifically in this study, the author was convinced of using this method. He 
put in place a set of questions that have enabled him to explore the level of satisfaction with 
the project, measuring the residents' general opinion of the Elkarama type of approach to 
housing provision. Data from PHC was necessary to conduct this survey . 
The questionnaire was divided into sections: 
To identify individual characteristics. 
To grasp the resident's perception of the project and services. 
To measure their satisfaction with the performance of major actors. 
To identify possibilities for public participation. 
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0 To gain insights into the refugees' attitude toward resettlement schemes. 
The questionnaire was five pages long with eighty question, some of which were 
open-ended allowing as many households as possible to respond. 
In this process, a pilot survey was essential. Editing followed, clarifying questions, 
introducing others and cancelling those considered irrelevant. Another benefit was that the 
pilot revealed the value of personal contact with respondents to acquire higher returns in a 
short period. Questionnaires were distributed without aid from any one except a resident and 
Jom'a a gatekeeper who introduced the author to other gatekeepers who in turn helped meet 
family households. 
Sampling 
Since it would be untenable to meet every programme-user, researchers have to take a 
sample of people, places, and/or events to reveal information about the larger group. Ziesel 
(1997) argued that "generalising always entails some errors, ... researchers may generalise 
too much, too little or in the wrong way". To avoid this shortfall the researcher needs to 
ensure that the sample is representative. No commentator should depend on their own 
judgement of whom to include in the sample, as Hall and Hall (1996: 29) pointed out an 
individual's assessment can introduce all kinds of unsuspected biases. A large sample size is 
no solution. If chosen prejudicially, a more extensive sample would still result in some being 
under-represented. The author's survey of reports clarified that the best means of ensuring a 
representative example of the population concerned is to use random methods in the 
selection process. Hall and Hall (1996: 30) validated this mode of research arguing that 
chance can better provide an unbiased sample than rigid selection procedure. In their view, 
utilising chance as a determinant means that everyone in the population has the same 
possibility of being selected. The choice of the sample group is made impersonal and 
objective through the technique of random selection. 
In an attempt to carry out this principle in practice, the author asked the PHC for a list 
of all those living in the Elkarama project. Unfortunately, the official in charge claimed that 
they had no up-dated list. Thus, another way was needed to delineate a representative 
sample group. First, I isolated local areas in terms of blocks and floors, and then specifying a 
group, used random numbers to select a sample of houses. An abstract of 10% was taken 
from 416 units in the Elkarama project. In total, 39 answered questionnaires were received 
from three residents per block (13 blocks altogether). 
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Questionnaire Results: The Data Matrix 
Hall and Hall (1996: 32) publicised data matrix as an elementary way to organise great 
amounts of information. They purported the need to use a matrix, as "with all surveys the 
answers need to be collected to allow comparisons between different groups and categories'". 
It has been proposed that this matrix rests at the heart of the questionnaire method. In the 
present research, the author collected close-ended answers in a data matrix: a configuration 
of rows and columns running horizontally and vertically. Columns represented the 
respondents' answers as rows designated each different question, topic or variable. 
Visualisation helped the researcher absorb the process of data analysis. 
After preparing the matrix, the author began analysing the questionnaire. The data 
was sieved using Excel 95 software and through simple average counts and percentages. 
Subsequently, processed data has been tabulated and presented in chapter Seven. 
4.3.5 Observing 
In the case of the Palestinian Housing Council, after data collection had been 
completed through a questionnaire, a major pitfall was recognised. The data lacked sharp 
observation and communal relevance, failing to reflect the liveliness of the evidence about 
the Elkarama project. A method was needed that did not detract from the resident's 
significance or the meaningfulness of the data collection. 
In his fieldwork the author could speak the residents' language, share their tradition, 
culture and religion. Using his Palestinian background, he adopted a Direct Observation 
approach. It is the least structured method described, valuable for mapping any unforeseen 
impacts on individuals or the local community, and for expanding the perspectives drawn up 
(NORAD, 1993: 46). The shift in approach heightened the study of the impact of the 
Elkarama scheme, and how the residents perceived it. This approach made possible an 
investigation of housing from the `inside'. Consequently, the author had the scope to more 
effectively interpret the lives and conditions of the residents. To achieve the best outcome, it 
was necessary to build up a rapport with informants and interview them on as many 
occasions as time allowed. Thus, it could be argued, informal interviewing and unstructured 
observation play a vital role in research practices, depending on the circumstances. 
The technique has a negative side; its very time-consuming. Personal opinions and 
failure to understand what is happening can lead to major errors. Personal characteristics of 
the observer such as gender and age frequently influence what information is considered 
relevant and made accessible. 
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With experiences gained from the first case study, the author realised this approach 
would enable him to carry out his last fieldwork in refugee camps in Gaza Strip. In addition, 
the residence of the author's family in a refugee camp had an impact, assisting the task of 
data gathering. Other university friends helped the author understand conditions in other 
refugee camps such as the Al Shati and Al Nuseirat Camp. However, being a closed society, 
it was undesirable and suspicious to be seen walking through the narrow alleys observing 
and taking photographs. The local people asked various questions; what are you doing here? 
Are you looking for someone? On another occasion, the residents thought the author was a 
representative of a humanitarian organisation. A considerable time was spent listening to 
complaints. However, this might give useful extra information. 
The method was found most suitable for the following reasons: 
. To gain deeper insight into socio-cultural conditions, processes and patterns of 
behaviour, when there is a need for background knowledge to enable interpretation of 
existing data gathered by other methods. 
" To study unforeseen effects and processes not taken into consideration when the project 
was formulated. 
0 To avoid the actual collection of data influence on the quality of information gathered. 
_ t. 
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Figure 4.6: Group Interview (Aldiwan) 
4.3.6 Group Interview (Aldiwan) 
2 lo. 
The effective researcher needs to grasp the culture and customs in the studied 
community. The author realised that Aldiwan could be an opportunity to attend meetings 
where street members come together and discuss 
daily life problems, identifying needs and 
possible solutions. The meetings helped elicit 
information on the impact both foreseen and 
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unforeseen of a project. This approach was time-effective and provided direct contact with 
beneficiaries involved. In such a group setting, participants stimulated each other; more was 
achieved in a few hours than by conducting lengthy individual interviews. 
Discussion's points needed to be presented so they were clearly understood. Every 
one wishing to say something was given the chance to express his opinion freely without 
showing either deference or disrespect. A further advantage was that participants tend to 
correct and corroborate each other, improving the data's validity. Another benefit was direct 
contact with respondents in the form of both verbal and non-verbal responses, which gave 
insights into their views, attitudes, priorities and reactions. 
A pitfall of the approach was that a few could dominate. In addition, discussions 
could be misleading especially for a researcher from a different background. Attendants in 
debates may not reveal information on attitudes and behaviours if feeling vulnerable or 
protective. The author with his brother's help was able to attend meetings that broadened his 
knowledge, providing fresh vital information. In addition, he attended regularly meetings of 
his family's Diwan. 
To sum up, it possible to claim that a combination of research methods produces more 
complete and richer information than can be obtained by using each method on its own. 
4.3.7 Difficulties in Conducting the Fieldwork 
When doing her fieldwork in Gaza Strip, Roy (1995: 10) realised that "There are many 
methodological difficulties in conducting research in the Palestinian Territories". Although 
the author's background has helped him to write from the heart of the events, it also exposed 
him to the following dilemmas: 
" It limited field visits since the author is carrying a Palestinian passport; it 
is much more 
difficult to move within the Palestinian Territories for native Palestinians. The author's 
attempt to gather information from the West Bank was time-consuming. To travel from 
Gaza to Ber Ziet University, it took about five hours due to various Israeli obstacles and 
checkpoints. On the other hand, due to the author's nationality, he could not go on a 
field-visit (1998-1999) with MA students to Lebanon. 
. The author, with neither relatives 
in the PNA nor with a declared political opinion 
supporting their position, had problems conducting fieldwork in Gaza Strip. It took three 
or four weeks to gain permission to visit the West Bank that others obtain in a few days 
or hours. The permission is issued by an Israeli -Palestinian liaison office. 
Weak institutional infrastructure restricts research opportunities. Studies are difficult to 
obtain. The author visited the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation for 
available information about refugees. Having persisted the author finally received a 
photocopy of two tables from a Norwegian report. Officials justified the delay: "it is a 
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confidential report". The whole report had been published in 1993 and was available on 
line. 
"A problem of inaccessibility of data was made worse through friction between 
international, foreign agencies and non-governmental organisations. No culture of co- 
operation exists; instead, they are extremely guarded, reluctant to release information. 
The author found extensive duplication. Studies had been conducted by different 
organisations on the same subject, repeating each other, in some cases by the same local 
researchers. 
"A fourth problem is data interpretation. It could be claimed that in a conflict subject such 
as the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, research always follows the author's bias. 
" Fieldwork offers an `on the ground' example of the need for special skills. For instance, 
access to Elkarama was more problematic than anticipated. The first meeting in 
Elkarama was an appointment with the head of the local committees. He, a well-known 
police officer, asked the author to begin distributing the questionnaire in the evening 
when more likely to meet male households. The author was obliged to follow his 
direction. The first meeting was unpleasant. The author was confronted by suspicion, 
reluctance, and even insults from residents in block 13. I had to `plead' that this survey 
was part of an academic research and not for political use. One resident asked to show 
him a security-pass. Eventually when accustomed to seeing the author in the project's 
precinct, they started to treat him in a more humane manner. 
" The above obstacles do not compare with problems encountered when the author went 
through Erez checkpoint on his way to Tel Aviv Airport. As a Palestinian he was 
required to pass a security check, enforced by a Russian teenager (a Jew newly 
immigrated Israel) who could not speak Arabic, or English and hardly spoke Hebrew. 
The soldier seized CDs, damaged the author's computer with its documents. As a result, 
280 digital photographs and other items were lost. However, the experience served the 
author to give testimony how the Israeli soldiers have become used to humiliating the 
Palestinian workers every morning. 
4.3.8 Reflections from the Fieldwork 
A case study's quality depends to a great extent on the investigator's quality (Robson, 
1993). It is believed that one can not be a good researcher just by reading associated texts. 
Research is more than just reading which can be haphazard or just solving problems, which 
can remain merely pragmatic. Building on the above statements the author further endorses 
Zeisel's description (1997: 3 1): research is "a creative endeavour requiring a subtle blend of 
personal skill and impersonal order". Balancing this relationship between personal 
conviction and dispassionate, scientific practice is essential in achieving meaningful results 
from fieldwork. Experience in the field provided essential practical skills. Fieldwork has 
had a pronounced influence on the author's vision as a researcher and fieldwork surveyor. 
Difficulties, encounters and the gradual mollifying of hardened attitudes have brought home 
a range of lessons, such as: the need to use plain language when addressing residents and not 
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asking questions they may fail to understand, or refuse to answer. Establish a social base to 
break through small talk and cliche answers, until resistance dissolves and real opportunities 
emerge for the researcher to see more than the semblance of truth. Reflections include: 
" As a researcher, you must approach people recognising the knowledge they have 
acquired is more than an outsider or even a local surveyor. 
" You should try to find contacts to facilitate your work: the gatekeeper Jom'a was a case 
in point. You must be humble interviewing less educated people, listen to their 
narratives while reading their eyes' expression. You can learn more from non-verbal 
communications. 
" Another lesson was appearance. In Gaza, it is a fact that appearance is important. When 
interviewing an essential informant or official, it is preferred the researcher wear formal 
clothes and behave in a formal manner. When meeting people, try to match in your 
demeanour to the class and background of those being interviewed. 
" Be adaptive and flexible. Interviews may need to be postponed. This happened with 
appointments with architects, planners, and PNA officials. On different occasions, after 
long waiting in some cases, the author was told that the interviewee could not see him 
that day. Such uncertainties make having a contingency or alternative plan a good idea. 
" The time scale and constant interruptions suggest the researcher should grasp any 
opportunity. Where facilities are weak, all opportunities to support your work should be 
seized: public lectures, watching TV interviews, and listening while riding a taxi, etc. 
" The author's bias: a detached and unbiased attitude may be preferable, but this ideal can 
not always be sustained, especially when the researcher is of the same culture as the 
group of interviewees and may understand certain unspoken aspirations and 
assumptions. In this context, the interviewee may be disinclined to explain the everyday 
course of life to someone deemed an insider who should know it already. This can lead 
to residents perhaps withholding significant information. Studying his society, a 
researcher can be at a disadvantage. However, his immediacy can provide the study with 
a sense of personal feeling, giving it character that it would otherwise not possess. 
4.4 OTHER LEARNING TOOLS 
Research is a long process requiring different techniques to formulate the hypothesis 
and questions. The first year of this research included activities with MA students 
introducing the author to post-conflict recovery as an academic topic. The following section 
demonstrates briefly the context and impact of a variety of learning tools in chronological 
order. 
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4.4.1 The Author's Participation in the Masters' Course of Post-war Recovery Studies 
(October 1997-February 1998) 2 
Attending the MA of Post-war Recovery Studies modules helped the author 
understand and articulate the multifaceted issues of post conflict reconstruction. The four 
are, understanding conflict and international response, practical skills of working with 
communities in conflict, strategic planning and project evaluation and managerial. 
organisational and training skills. The course aims to: 
. Analyse and understand the nature of conflict, the impact of war and its demands on 
local, national and international actors. 
" Understand the recovery process through an exploration of the dynamics of rebuilding 
social, economic, psychological, political and physical frameworks of war-torn societies. 
" Impart international principles and ethics of conflict resolution and peace building in 
relation to reconstruction and development. 
" Provide technical, organisational and managerial training, designing intervention 
programmes, working with communities, project monitoring and evaluation. 
4.4.2 Field visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan December 1997 
Afghanistan has suffered from armed conflict for the last two decades. Since the 
Soviet invasion (1979-1989), the country has been afflicted, exasperated by civil war after 
the Soviet withdrawal. The crisis has attracted international organisations and NGOs. These 
circumstances validated a field visit that aimed to: "Investigate relief and reconstruction 
programmes, and achieve a better understanding of the peacebuilding framework in an 
Afghan context. " 
The group examined the Urban Rehabilitation Programme, established by UNCHS Habitat, 
the project of Friendship Bridge, Madera a French NGO and its project Food for Work. The 
group attended Shuras and Jergas, traditional methods for consultation. In addition, the 
group went to a refugee camp in Jalalabad meeting with Taliban members. 
The visit made the author aware of various and new concepts in post-conflict reconstruction. 
These thoughts include, 
" The project of Friendship Bridge stresses that reconstruction can be used as a therapy 
and tool for peacebuilding. 
0 Habitat concept of "Small project, big impact. " 
" Duplication, inefficiencies, multiplicity of agencies working 
in Afghanistan can lead to 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness. 
2 Following the successful completion of the MA, the author transferred to prepare an MPhil- DPhil degree 
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" When planning for post conflict reconstruction, a 
holistic reconstruction scale is 
required. 
" Such schemes must create and protect livelihoods, and plan for the future. It aims to 
create a programme to give coherence and cohesion in relief and development efforts. 
" The visit showed the benefit of the involvement of the community, offering a greater 
chance for self-sufficiency and bringing together people through physical activities. 
4.4.3 Indigenous Recovery and Peacebuilding Workshop in Pakistan (11-13 December 
1997) 
During the field-visit in Afghanistan, a three days workshop was organised jointly by 
the PRDU and the Norwegian Church Aid in Pakistan. The workshop discussed issues of 
indigenous recovery and peacebuilding. Three themes under the focus were perceived as 
critical for recovery: first, the relief to development continuum and its role in peacebuilding; 
second, approaches to enhancing communities' coping mechanisms; and third the cultural 
heritage and its relation to recovery. The workshop was enhanced by the participation of 
thirty representatives from local and international NGOs and UN agencies working in 
Afghanistan. The fifteen MA students started with a short presentation before each theme 
was discussed. The author expressed his feelings about cultural heritage and the need to 
preserve it in times of conflict. The event contributed to clarifying more concepts in the 
author's mind and to support his own field-visit findings. The workshops helped to: 
0 Explore different aspects of recovery and peace building. 
0 Highlight strategic issues for the role of aid in Afghanistan. 
0 Inform strategies of concerned actors both local and international. 
" Document the experience of participants, through a report for the 
benefit of a wider 
audience in the Aid Community for Afghanistan. (Ozerderm, 1998: 242) 
4.4.4 From Rhetoric to Reality the Role of Aid in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan 
Workshop held in York 12-15 January 1998 3 
In January 1998, the University of York hosted more than 60 participants from 
Afghan and international NGOs, donor communities, UN organisationsand academic 
circles. The three days conference debated the move from rhetoric to the reality of how 
to build peace. In the workshops, the exponents of rhetoric were challenged to set 
workable, achievable goals for Afghan groups. Lessons from this important event 
3 See Atmar, H, S. Barakat and A. Strand (eds. ) (1998) From Rhetoric to Reality the Role of Aid in Local 
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan" report of Workshop held in York 12-15 January, PRDU, the University of York. 
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include: 
" There is interrelationship between peacebuilding and reconstruction activities. 
" There is no need to invent new jargon in the language of recovery and peace building. 
These terms are only used in new project funding proposals, for example in the 
transforming the relief community into the new `commanders of poverty' (Strand, 1998). 
" It was feared that the relief agencies were taking on the much-criticised habits of Afghan 
commanders - not listening to people, and using relief funding for their own benefits. 
" Aid could no longer be considered as welfare but should attempt to address underlying 
problems causing the conflict. 
" Stress on Human Rights, adding there is no solution without justice' in a stable society. 
"A process remote from the political and economic reality of the conflict country cannot 
achieve Peace. 
4.4.5. Training at the Housing and Urban Development Corporation. March and April 
1998 
Jordan has been the country most affected by the Palestinian Israeli wars. The author 
received training in the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC), the 
Jordanian government agency responsible for the housing and urban sector. In the aftermath 
of the 1948,1967 wars a massive influx of Palestinians took refuge in Jordan. Nowadays, 
Palestinians exceed two million. Some have been integrated in the community and hold 
Jordanian passports, but a considerable number live in ten miserable refugee camps in 
Jordan. Other Palestinians squat on the outskirts of the capital Amman, indicating the 
unresolved shelter situation. The HUDC's tasks can be described as: study, formulate and 
implement policies affecting the shelter sector, provide direct provision of housing units, 
upgrade under-serviced urban pockets, undertake projects jointly with/on behalf of the 
private sector to build-up the private sector's performance/capability for the low-income 
target groups, help and encourage communities/local governments to participate in house 
production, provide housing for civil servants and military employees, and upgrade under- 
serviced areas on behalf of local governments and infrastructure authorities. 
The author gave one of the corporations' projects a particular concern, the urban 
upgrading of East Wehdat, which had been implemented in the 1980s. The project aimed to 
improve living conditions of about 400 families informally settled on an extremely 
undeveloped site. The corporation sought to enable these beneficiaries to secure land tenure 
and provide them with basic infrastructure. shelter and communal facilities. HUDC has 
received two international awards for the project success. 
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The author has gained a great deal of experience, staying forty days in HUDC. The East 
Wehdat provided an example of good practice from which much could be learned: 
" The need for a specialised body to look after shelter crisis. This implies the existence of 
a policy to tackle crises. 
" The project through physical and community development contributed to a better healthy 
and clean environment with acceptable standards of infrastructure services ensuring 
clean water delivery, waste collection, sewage disposal accompanied by medical care 
and a communal spirit raised through community facilities. It offered job opportunities 
through a project and training centre. 
" Success was based on preserving and enhancing informal settlements, creating a 
satisfactory environment with amenities, good visual appearance, shelter quality and 
essential community services. 
" Community participation in different stages of the project was a necessity. Social 
acceptance was achieved through: 
" Continuous communication with residents via socio-economic surveys, visits to 
families and through community centre activities. 
" Designing residential units according to their desire. The corporation architect had 
revised the proposed design at the beneficiaries' request. 
" Being flexible in plot allocation, giving plots near roads to those having cars and 
allowing relatives to have adjacent plots. 
0 To ensure sustainability of a project, 
" The project set an example of achieving affordable solutions for housing by 
employing an incremental building concept, applying minimum acceptable 
standards, and providing low interest building loans. 
" Introducing new building regulations and planning criteria. 
" Creating awareness through training campaigns. 
" The project facilitated the self-help improvement of houses. 
" The corporation delivered tasks and partial responsibilities to local NGOs to foster 
the development programme. 
The HIJDC staff's help in gathering experience and information has influenced positively 
the development of the author's research and opened a new spectrum for his thinking. 
4.4.6 Researching on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Areas Conference York 
May 2000 
The conference was organised jointly by PRDU and Norwegian University of Science 
and Technology. Over three days the participants discussed topics related to research in 
conflict areas. The Conference covered four themes: ethics of conducting research in 
conflict-affected areas, reflexivity to local circumstance: security, physical environment and 
cultural sensitivity, epistemological concerns for researching in conflict areas, and 
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appropriate research methods and data gathering techniques. From the conference 
recommendations, the author finds the following are the most relevant to this research: 
" The way researchers interact with local communities is crucial to the success of the 
research process. 
" There is no need for methodological tools to be reinvented but there is a huge need for 
sharing experiences and learning from each other; different researchers utilise research 
tools in many innovative ways. 
" There is no need for formalised guidelines, which can be used in planning and 
implementing research in conflict areas. 
The conference showed the need for such event to cover issues such as: confidentiality in the 
collection and dissemination of information, emotional issues during research in conflict 
area, dilemmas and challenges in the interpretation of data, who interprets it, and how, and 
issues of culture and respect for different cultures. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The chapter addressed the research and fieldwork methodologies employed over the 
last three years. It introduced the research strategy, methods and the author's gained 
experience through the course of this research. 
The coming three chapters (5,6 and 7) present the fieldwork carried out in the Palestinian 
Territories 
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Chapter Five 
RECONSTRUCTION UNDER ADVERSITY, 
THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 1993-2000 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
With the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in September 1993, there were 
high expectations for a quick recovery of the Middle East region. Israel and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) agreed to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, 
to recognise mutual legitimate political rights and to strive to live in peaceful coexistence and 
mutual dignity. By any measure, the changes worked out between the two parties in the 
Declaration of Principles (DoP) and the subsequent agreements have been historic. 
Consequently, Israel has re-deployed its military forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and 
from a number of population centres in the West Bank, with the exception of East Jerusalem. 
However, sensitive issues were left unresolved. Several subsequent agreements have been 
signed but only a few have been implemented. The international community showed its 
commitment to support the peace process by providing financial and technical assistance to 
foster the post-settlement recovery. The aim of this assistance was to provide tangible 
benefits to the Palestinian population quickly, equitably, and efficiently while laying the 
foundation for sustainable development over the long term (The World Bank, 1993: 2). The 
uncertainties of the political situation and the slow implementation of the peace agreements 
have hindered Palestinian efforts to achieve their aims. 
In this chapter, the author aims to portray the general situation in the Palestinian 
Territories in the aftermath of the peace agreements. The chapter discusses how the political 
process has moved forward with successive agreements as envisioned under the Declaration 
of Principles, reviewing the main events, phases, and arrangements. Further, the chapter 
examines the determinant factors of peace success such as: parties ripeness, third party 
intervention, and the provision of agreements 
Despite expectations that the last seven years would witness advancement in the 
quality of life for the Palestinian people, the chapter 
demonstrates how the economy has 
deteriorated due to the continuous Israeli policy of border-closure. Other factors such as 
emergence of monopolies and corruption, the 
decline of public morale. the increase of 
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unemployment, are discussed. The author ends the chapter by examining the situation of 
shelter in the Palestinian Territories. 
5.2 THE ISRAELI PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS 
More than seven years have passed since Israel and the PLO concluded secret 
negotiations at Oslo that led to the extension of formal mutual recognition and the signing of 
the Declaration of Principles (DoP) on interim self-government arrangements for the West 
Bank and Gaza. After the historic handshake between the Israeli Prime Minister (Yitzhak 
Rabin) and the PLO leader (Yassir Arafat) on the White House lawn on 13/9/1993, the road 
toward a just and durable peace has produced a mixture of significant accomplishments and 
disappointing failures. Despite the promising implementation at the early stage of the Oslo 
agreement, serious violations continued to confront the peace process. In November 1995, 
an Israeli extremist opposed to the agreements assassinated Prime Minster Rabin, a major 
counterpart in the process. Further in May 1996, a new government under the right wing in 
Israel was elected followed by a government led by a military General. 
The scope of the Palestinian Israeli agreements was initially perceived as an asset. 
Nevertheless, the slow implementation has fed the mistrust between the two sides, as 
political relations deteriorated. The past four years have witnessed tremendous difficulties 
and obstacles that complicated the implementation of agreements signed and, therefore, 
reduced the expected benefits to the Palestinian side. 
In the following pages, the author analyses the different factors, which have 
contributed to the success or failure of the process: Were the PLO and Israel ready to enter 
direct negotiations? What roles did third parties, Norway, and the United States in particular, 
play in the process that produced the Oslo accords? What are the main provisions of the 
agreements? Did the accords address the conflict root causes? What accounts for the 
breakdown of the peace process? 
5.2.1 Ripeness for Peace 
Chapter two of this research showed that peace could be difficult to achieve if both 
parties were not in a state of ripeness. Makovsky (1996: 15) identified several factors that 
impelled Israel to enter direct negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. By 
late 1992 and early 1993, it became apparent to the Israeli government that the PLO had 
been severely weakened by the end of the Cold War and by the aftermath of the Gulf War. 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the PLO was deprived of a historically important 
source of diplomatic support and military training. In addition, the PLO's annual 
budget was 
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cut by one half after Kuwait and Saudi Arabia stopped their contributions in retaliation for 
the PLO's alignment with Iraq in the Gulf War. Therefore, the PLO was forced to shut down 
several institutions and to curtail many of its activities in the occupied territories. In the 
Israeli viewpoint, a politically and financially weaker PLO not only posed a reduced threat to 
Israel but also made it a potentially more malleable and receptive negotiating partner. 
Furthermore, Savir (1998: 10) indicated that the Israeli government came to realise those 
previous efforts to create a Palestinian authority in the West Bank and Gaza that would 
exclude the PLO's leadership, had failed '. The Israeli leadership therefore sought to exploit 
the Oslo channel as a secret forum to reach compromises on issues that seemed to impede 
progress 
According to Makovsky (1996: 17), Israeli leadership expected to reap three important 
benefits for Israel as a result of the direct negotiations with the PLO, 
" First, a deal with the PLO would reduce the incidence of resistance and bomb suicides 
and thereby enhance the personal security of the citizens of the Israeli State. 
" Second, striking a bargain with Israel would give the PLO added incentive to combat 
radical Islamic groups committed to the destruction of the Jewish State, such as Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad. 
" Lastly, reaching agreement with the PLO would enhance prospects for resolving long- 
standing disputes between Israel and neighbouring Arab states. 
Motivations for the PLO 
While the Jewish State sought to negotiate directly with the PLO due to security 
considerations, the PLO's participation in the Oslo channel represented the culmination of 
the organisation's long-standing quest for Israeli and USA recognition and eventual creation 
of an independent Palestinian state. Mahmoud Abbas (1995: 39) noted that beginning with 
the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council (PNC) in March 1974, the PLO 
sought on numerous occasions to establish contacts with peace-oriented Israeli individuals 
and organisations Z. According to Abbas, dozens of such meetings were held focusing on the 
establishment of a Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
' As Director-General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Uri Savir was his country's chief negotiator with the PLO 
between 1993 and 1996. 
2 Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen), a member of the Executive Committee of the PLO and head of 
the PLO's Department for National and International Relations, served as a key adviser to Yasser Arafat during 
the negotiations. 
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The PLO continued to seek a channel with the Israeli government. Such a secret 
channel, Abbas noted, would allow negotiations to take place with a minimum of formalities 
in a setting that would enable everyone to talk freely and probe matters without inhibition. 
The PLO's determination was further reinforced by the heavy toll inflicted on the 
Palestinians by harsh Israeli policies and by the rapidly deteriorating economic and social 
conditions in the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, Makovsky (1996: 22) pointed out that 
PLO leaders entered the Oslo process believing that their compliance with an interim 
agreement for the territories would inexorably result in Palestinian statehood. Abbas 
(1995: 45) confirmed this view by noting that "The mechanism by which the terms of the 
Oslo Accord will be implemented will eventually give rise to the emergence and 
crystallisation of many features of sovereignty, and this process will go on until complete 
national sovereignty is realised. " 
5.2.2 Third Parties: Norway and the US 
Miall et at (1999) demonstrated that establishing a secret and unofficial Israeli-PLO 
back-channel was the idea of Terje Larsen, a Norwegian sociologist who, along with 
Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Egeland and his Israeli counterpart Yossi Beilin, 
helped to set up several rounds of exploratory discussions in Oslo beginning January 1993. 
Held under the cover of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science, the initial talks 
involved two Israeli academics, and three PLO officials. Makovsky (1996: 17) and Savir 
(1998: 19) provided ample evidence that after the talks were elevated to an official level in 
late May 1993, Larsen, Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst, played critical roles 
in advancing the talks. In addition, he provided liaison between Oslo, PLO and Israel. The 
three Norwegians offered their good offices and on more than one occasion managed to 
bridge gaps between the parties. Foreign Minister Holst was instrumental in extracting 
mutual concessions that led to agreement on several difficult issues in the DoP, and he 
played an essential role in proposing acceptable wording regarding mutual recognition. 
Abbas (1995: 61) emphasised that in addition to assuring utmost secrecy and providing a 
congenial atmosphere for the talks, Holst's integrity in relaying ideas and choosing subjects 
for discussion with both sides was critically important for cementing mutual trust among the 
interlocutors. 
On the other hand, Makovsky (1996: 22) confirmed that the US had been aware of the 
Oslo channel when it «-as informed by the Norwegians of the secret negotiations. Several 
factors may have accounted for the American orientation toward Oslo and the mediation 
betw\ ecn the Palestinians and the Israelis. To the present day, US remains the sole and only 
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mediator. With suspicion, Edward Said (2000) wrote "US mediation has been dominated by 
Israeli lobby officials and a president whose ideas about the Middle East were those of a 
Christian fundamentalist Zionist. " Said (1998) argued that American Zionism has a very 
active role during the period of the `peace process'. It seems that mediation in United State 
policy is another thing far from bringing the two parties together to grasp every available 
opportunity to make peace. Murray (1995) indicated how US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright had developed quite a strange way of describing what the role of `honest mediator' 
means in practice. According to Albright the Israeli and Palestinian leaders were like trapeze 
artists who had to jump and reach for each other in mid air. She commented "What the US 
tries to do is to help the jumpers to understand the moment, so they can all synchronise their 
jump and catch each other. If for some reason they do not catch each other, we are the safety 
net. But the leaders themselves have to be jumpers. " As a matter of fact, Phill Reeves in the 
Independent, 10/9/2000 reported that "America's credibility as mediator had long been 
questioned by Palestinians, and with reason. " He quoted an Israeli source that said, "The 
Palestinians always complain that we know the details of every proposal from the Americans 
before they do". The source continued "There is good reason for that: we write them. " Said 
(1998) commented on the United States' biased position as a mediator stating that 
The United States has been a terrible `sponsor' of the peace process. It has 
succumbed to Israeli pressure on everything, abandoning the principle of land 
for peace ... pushing the 
lifeless Palestinian leadership into deeper and deeper 
holes to suit ... 
[the Israelis'] preposterous demands. 
Having reviewed the two parties' motivations for the peace and the third party 
mediation, it has become clear that the PLO was not negotiating from a position of 
maximum strength, but of maximum weakness. The Israelis knew that PLO was in a 
weakened position and it was ready for a revolutionary change while on the other hand 
Palestinian side had no power. This of course affected the process and produced fragile 
agreements. 
5.2.3 Agreement Provision: Postponing the Root Causes 
On September 28,1995 the Israeli and Palestinian sides reached the transitional 
agreement. They agreed to establish a Palestinian Authority through free and direct general 
elections of a Palestinian Legislative Council representing the people in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip and the Palestinians of Jerusalem. Since then, the Council has assumed its 
limited legislation and power in the Palestinian Territories. PNA is the first national 
authority established on Palestinian land in modem history. 
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Date Signed Title Key provisions and target Dates 
October 1991 Madrid Peace Conference Inaugurated two separate yet Parallel tracks of 
negotiations to achieve just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace settlement, based on UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
Ten rounds of negotiations follow from 1991-1993 
September 13, Declaration of Principles on Interim 
1993 Self Government 
Arrangements(Declaration of 
Principles, Oslo Agreement, DoP) 
Set out overall framework for interim period and 
Palestinian self-government in The West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. 
Mutual recognition of the PLO and Israel. 
Pledge to begin permanent status negotiations. 
Hold Palestinian elections by June 1994. 
Sign Early Empowerment in July 1994 
April 29,1994 Protocol on Economic Relations 
May 4,1994 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and 
the Jericho Area( Cairo agreement, 
Gaza-Jericho agreement) 
August 29,1994 Agreement on preparatory Transfer 
of powers and responsibilities (Early 
Empowerment Agreement) 
Codified economic relations between the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip and Israel for the interim 
period in monetary fiscal and trade relations. 
Established framework for transfer of power and 
responsibilities to PNA. 
Agreed on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip and 
Jericho. 
PNA to assume authority in Gaza Strip and Jericho 
in all spheres except those related to final status 
issues. 
Israel transferred authority in the West Bank to 
PNA in education and culture, health social 
welfare, tourism, direct taxation and vat on local 
production in December 1994. 
Parties to explore possible expansion of transfer of 
powers to other spheres. 
August 27,1995 Protocol of further transfer of Israel transferred authority in the west Bank in 
powers and responsibilities agriculture, census and statistics, energy, 
insurance, labour, local government, postal 
services, and trade and industry. 
September 28, Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
1995 Agreement on the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip (Oslo 2) 
Confirmed expanding territorial and functional 
control of PNA, including police. 
Detailed composition of Palestinian Legislative 
Council. 
Hold Palestinian elections in January 1996. 
Additional Israeli re-deployments to occur in 
intervals of six months from September 1996. 
Sign protocol for re-deployment in Hebron in 
March 1996. 
Recognition of Palestinian water rights. 
Provided for co-ordinating mechanisms in 
security, legal, judicial and economic fields. 
Did not contain provisions for a safe passage 
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as 
provided in Oslo Agreement. 
Commence permanent status negotiations no later 
than May 1996. 
April 22,1996 Amendment of PLO Charter Palestinian National Council voted to amend 
charter and delete clauses that coitradict the 
agreements signed. 
Chapter Five 140 
Reconstruction under Adversity 
Permanent status Negotiations for Address borders, settlements, security 
May 5,1996 the first time. arrangements, refugees, Jerusalem, water, and 
sovereignty. 
Scheduled to start in May 1996; interim period 
originally intended to end in May 1999. 
Despite formal opening in May 1996, substantive 
negotiations postponed to March 1997 under 
Hebron Protocol. 
Oct. 23,1998 Wye River Memorandum Facilitation of implementation of the Interim 
Agreement. 
Further re-deployment from the West Bank 
Operation of Gaza international airport 
The safe passage to be opened between the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip 
Sep 4,1999 Sharam E1-Sheikh Memorandum Release of prisoners. 
Further re-deployment. 
Sept. 13,1999 Permanent status talks resume 
(Erez, Sept 13,1999) 
July 2000 Permanent status negotiation 
Camp David (USA) 
Nothing has been achieved 
October 2000 Regional Summit, Egypt Commitments to resume talks as soon as the 
violence ceases. 
Table 5.1: The Palestinian Israeli Agreements and their Key Provisions 
Source: Byrnen (1999: 29) Adopted by the Author. 
Also the lengthy and detailed agreements confirmed the process of expanding the territorial 
and functional control of the PNA. It contained a number of articles related to re- 
deployment, transfer of jurisdictional and functional control, governance, water rights, 
taxation, and co-ordinating mechanisms. The agreement detailed the composition of an 
elected Palestinian Legislative Council and its executive authority, including a directly and 
popularly elected president. After the initial re-deployment of Israeli forces, Palestinian 
elections were to be held under international supervision through the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. The president and Palestinian Legislative Council were to hold office for an initial 
period of up to five years. 
Though the agreement could be seen as a historical breakthrough, it has failed to meet 
the Palestinian people's aspiration for a just peace. The European Union (2000) doubted the 
justice of it, stating the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation produced vulnerable peace accords 
which: 
" Offered no interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions 
242 and 338, therefore no 
guiding principles on which to base the talks. Each party therefore interpreted them 
differently as regards territory. 
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" Provided legitimacy for direct negotiations between the parties, which inhibited outside 
powers from playing a role to ensure fair play. 
" Never defined the end goal, but left the controversial questions of Jerusalem, settlements, 
refugees, borders, and security to negotiations in a second phase. It has been assumed 
that these issues would be discussed at later date. 
Regarding the last point, the two parties have left crucial and sensitive issues to later 
final negotiations, which was considered as a potential threat for renewed confrontations 
with the Israeli army in the West Bank and Gaza. They started negotiating these issues in 
September 1999; however, no sign of success has been reported. In the following a brief 
review is offered to highlight how these issues affect the ongoing reconstruction and 
development in the Palestinian Territories: 
Land and Sovereignty 
The Palestinians officials have been outspoken about their insistence upon Palestinian 
statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as their capital. However, 
an accurate reading of the many agreements shows the main feature of these is the division 
of the West Bank and Gaza into three zones each with a different mix of Palestinian and 
Israeli responsibility. According to Byrnen (1999: 33), it includes, 
" Area A, which comprises the major cities in the West Bank. In area A, the Palestinian 
Authority has complete authority for civilian security. 
" Area B comprises all other Palestinian population centres except some refugee camps 
and totals 27 percent of the West Bank 
" Area C comprising 72 percent of the West Bank including all Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, military bases and areas some on private Palestinian land and 
state lands. Israel retains sole security authority, which covers most of the territory 
including agricultural land, the Jordan valley in the West Bank and the coastal zone in 
Gaza nature reserves, areas with lower population density, Israeli settlements, and 
designated military areas were assigned to zone c. 
It was agreed that "In order to maintain the territorial integrity of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, and to promote their economic growth and the 
demographic and geographical links between them, the parties would protect the normal and 
smooth movement of people vehicles and goods within the West Bank and between the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. " The agreement did not address territorial control of 
Jerusalem. as that issue was reserved for final status negotiation. 
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Under the right-wing government 1996-1999, the two parties reached an 
understanding memorandum called Wye River. The Wye River Memorandum was supposed 
to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 
the other related agreements. The main provision of the memorandum was a further re- 
deployment of 13 percent from area C: 1 percent to Area A and 12 percent to Area B and 
14.2 from Area B to Area A. 
According to Aronson (1997: 25), the Oslo agreement secured the critical recognition 
by the Palestinians of the legal rights of Israel related to Government and Absentee land 
located in areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian territories. This was a 
crucial concession on the part of the Palestinians since by the time the original DoP was 
signed Israel already had classified substantial portions of the West Bank as State land. 
Aronson estimated that from just under 50 to just 70 percent of the total land area fell under 
this category. The agreement also established a precedent for the continuation of settlements 
and their expansion even in the event of their transfer to nominal Palestinian control 
(Aronson, 1997: 36). 
The agreements granted new land confiscation under two pretexts: for infrastructure, 
such as water and sewers; and to enable the construction of bypass roads between 
settlements and around Palestinian population centres (Aronson, 1997: 36). 
Due to the above, PNA has faced many obstacles and challenges to any prospective 
recovery. Among the most significant problems and complexities are the following, 
0 The fact that Israel is still an occupier. 
" The differences in the level of its jurisdiction levels in Zone A, B and C distract PNA's 
efforts. For example; Palestinian official institutions and NGOs enjoy more freedom in 
Zone A, and in specific sectors, but have limited powers in zones B and C especially in 
areas such as zoning water, and security. 
" The current overlap between the PNA jurisdictions 
in the various Palestinian 
zones and those of the occupation authority causes different and sometimes 
contradictory Palestinian priorities in the three zones. Such as overlap causes 
differences in approach concerning the best means to achieve an integrated 
Palestinian development plan. 
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The Israeli Settlements 
The Oslo agreement secured a protection for the Israeli settlements and settlers in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip during the interim period. The protections include: 
" No settlement would be evacuated during the 5-year interim period scheduled to end in 
May 1999. 
" Exclusion of settlements, settlers, vital arteries, main roads, water pipelines, electrical 
and telephone lines, and water resources from any Palestinian jurisdiction, interference, 
or control. 
" The creation of blocks of settlements, where the territorial continuity between them has 
been assured. 
" Extensive and complex arrangements for security co-operation between Israeli and 
Palestinian military, police, and internal security forces. 
0 Limitation on the size armaments and jurisdiction of Palestinian security forces. 
0 Continuing Israeli supervision over the use and registration of all lands. 
" Limitations on Palestinian land use near settlement areas and continuing Israeli control 
over Palestinians' zoning and land use decisions (Aronson, 1997: 3 8). 
The agreement does not give the Palestinians the right to exercise any kind of authority over 
the settlements and the settlers. It cited that 
Settlers and Israelis in the autonomous areas would under no circumstances be 
placed under Palestinian authority, even in criminal matters. Thus, Palestinian 
legislation can not deal with a security issue, which falls under Israeli 
responsibility, or seriously threaten other significant Israeli interests protected by 
this agreement. 
These settlements and the Israeli Defence Forces have been locked in a symbiotic 
embrace. Settlements require the army to protect them and limit the power that Israel can 
cede to the PNA. The Israeli Army which still wants to control the occupied territories after 
a final settlement, requires the mission of protecting settlements if it is not to become simply 
an army of occupation. It has become clearer than ever that Israel does not intend to remove 
more than a small ratio of settlers and settlements as part of a negotiated end of the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict. 
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Figure 5.2: The Israeli Settlements in the Gaza Strip 
Source: Foundation for the Middle East Peace: http: //www. finep. org 
The Palestinian Refugees 
The Palestinian refugee problem originates from the establishment of the Jewish State 
in 1948. In the course of this conflict, and the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War, some three- 
quarters of a million Palestinians were expelled from the land occupied by the State of Israel. 
The refugees settled in many areas: the Jordanian-Controlled West Bank, the Egyptian- 
Controlled Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon and further afield. Later, a further three hundred 
thousand Palestinians were displaced after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in June 1967. Within the parameters of international law, it is understood that a 
displaced person has the right to return to his/her home according to his/her willingness. 
These parameters are applicable to the Palestinian refugees. The right of their return to their 
home has been recognised by the international community and expressed through the UN 
resolution (194), which declared: 
Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible, and that 
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return 
and for loss or damage to property which under principles of international law 
or equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible. 
According to Zuriek (1997: 3), Palestinian refugees and their descendants means any 
person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period from 1 June 1946 to 
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15 May 1948 and who lost both their home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 
conflict 3. Since the displacement issue remains unresolved, the refugee population has 
grown. In February 2000, although some 3,677,882 refugees were registered with UNRWA 
in its various operations, it should be noted that this number represents only about half of all 
Palestinians world-wide. 
The Refugee Issue and the Peace Process 
So far, the peace agreements have failed to produce a solution for the Palestinian 
refugees issue. The peace process has based its scope on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 
without any reference to the primary Resolution 194 embodying the Palestinian's right to 
return. Resolutions 244 and 338 call for "... a just settlement of the problem of the refugees". 
This formulation does not exceed what was contained in the preface of the agreements "That 
the permanent status negotiation will lead to the implementation of both resolution 242 and 
338" (Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 1994). The 
negotiation arrangements have been in harmony with Israeli strategy of not facing the 
refugee issue since it has not been a priority for the Palestinian negotiator. This trend has 
confirmed Israeli policy of treating the refugees as a demographic concern. It anticipated a 
solution based on the formula of rehabilitation and resettlement, having invalidated the right 
to return. 
These uncertainties toward major issues laid the burden on the Palestinian policy 
makers. Despite the fact that the peace negotiation produced unsatisfactory agreements, 
Palestinians complain that Israel has never honoured its signature. The Palestinian 
Development Plan (1998-2000) summarised the violations: 
" Delay in re-deployment of Israeli forces from Palestinian territories: based on the peace 
agreement signed as shown in different places and time. Re-deployment from 90% of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip should have been implemented, although in reality there 
has only been re-deployment from less than 10 % of the total area. 
" Delay of implementation of the safe passage for Palestinians: creating a safe passage for 
the free movement of Palestinians and goods between the West Bank and Gaza Strip has 
still to be implemented. 
This definition does not include all the Palestinian refugee categories such as: 
" Palestinian refugees from the 1948 War who settled 
in other places other than UNRWA areas of operation, 
for example, Egypt, North African countries, Iraq, and the Gulf States. 
" Residents from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and their 
descendants who were displaced for the first 
time in the 1967 war. 
" Palestinians who became refugees in 1948 
but their pride prevented them from accepting UNRWA 
registration. 
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" Opposition to the operation of the airport and seaport; allowing Palestinians to operate a 
seaport has still to be implemented. 
" Continuation of settlement activity: there has been continued activity in building new 
settlements and the expansion of existing settlements, in addition to the confiscation of 
Palestinian lands, although these activities were to have ceased. 
" Enforcement of closure policies: there has been a continued policy to close the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip off from one another creating segregation and economic hardship: 
this is in addition to inaccessibility to Israel. 
" Continued arrests and collective punishment: these antagonistic activities based on 
policies of occupation were to cease. 
" Blockage of development projects and economic growth: the obstruction of 
infrastructure projects and economic projects such as industrial estates are clear 
violations of the rights awarded the Palestinians in the peace agreements. This includes 
the right to import and export freely, which is also being blocked. 
" The withholding of tax revenues: Israel has been withholding funds due to the 
Palestinians. 
" The reports claimed that these violations in addition to others committed by the Israeli 
government lead to feelings of mistrust and insecurity, social instability and create a 
hostile environment inappropriate for healthy reconstruction and development. 
5.3 PEACEBUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTION 
With the emergence of peace in the Middle East, the International community showed 
commitment to provide a lifeline to the peace process by fostering reconstruction activities. 
The World Bank (1993) explained that such assistance aimed to provide tangible benefits to 
the Palestinian population quickly, equitably, and efficiently while laying the foundation for 
sustainable development over the long-term reconstruction. Khader (1999: 112) noted that 
groups of donor countries have been established, such as (1) United Nations Special Co- 
ordination Office which had a mandate to co-ordinate UN agencies and facilitate processes 
on the ground, (2) Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC): an international committee, chaired 
by Norway, including key donors (EU, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and US) (3) Local Aid Co- 
ordination Committee: LACC was established by AHLC to accelerate the development 
efforts in the Palestinian Territories. 
Such assistance would open the way to build the inceptive state and its economy. 
Despite many challenges, The World Bank (1993), the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(1993) and different Israeli politicians promised to achieve a long-term recovery taking into 
account the capabilities and potentials of the Palestinian society. The parties stressed of the 
following main opportunities that constitute the main pillars of such thinking. 
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5.3.1 Opportunities 
The Palestinian Human Resources According to the World Bank (1993: 2) the 
Palestinian community was noted to be blessed with a high-quality human resource base 
with a large percentage of its population with degrees in higher education. Despite the 
significant interruption caused by the Israeli occupation, there has been no shortage of either 
enlightened talent or professional skills. Joseph Stiglitz the Senior Vice President and Chief 
Economist of World Bank (1999: 5) argued that the Palestinians community was blessed 
with excellent people. Its general development indicators including life expectancy, literacy, 
and child mortality rates have been among the best in the Middle East and North Africa 
region. The Palestinian human resources must represent the first pillar on which a 
Palestinian reconstruction strategy should be based. In this context, the Palestinian 
Development Plan (1998-2001) considered human resources as the principal driving force 
for the realisation of reconstruction and development of the Palestinian State. The Plan 
attributed the argument to the following facts 
" The Palestinian work force has enjoyed a relatively high standard of education. It was 
characterised by diverse and top-level skills acquired in numerous fields. 
" There was the unique trait that distinguished the Palestinian people: resilience and 
resourcefulness, in the face of impediments and under difficult conditions. 
" The Palestinian private sector has been highly active and resourceful on the West Bank 
and in the Gaza Strip with a demonstrated ability to operate under challenging 
conditions. The removal of constraints, establishing support institutions, and 
infrastructure would consolidate the role of the private sector generating economic 
development. This would assist in creating job opportunities for the Palestinian 
community and alleviate their difficult circumstances. 
Diwan and Sha'ban (1999) added that successful Palestinian entrepreneurs in Europe and the 
United States could help the Palestinian economy through networks and capital. 
World Sympathy it was believed that the continuous Israeli victimisation of Palestinians 
could motivate more international assistance to help the Palestinians overcome their financial 
and technical obstacles. The World Bank (1993a: 12) added that the strategic location of the 
Palestinian Territories is a good prospect for attracting international official assistance to help 
overcome infrastructure bottlenecks and deficiencies. The Palestinian Economic Council for 
Development and Reconstruction (1996: 9) mentioned the fact "There is an unprecedented 
international interest in the region that has emerged as a direct result of the peace process. 
Chapter Five 149 
Reconstruction under Adversity 
Reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis has fundamental support reflected in the 
generous aid committed to the Palestinian people". 
The Palestinian Development Plan (1998-2001) assumed that such aid would continue to 
flow over the next years. The Plan presumed that all of the money pledged by donors in the 
different Conferences to support Middle East peace and development would be disbursed 
over time to finance most of the vital investment projects especially the physical and social 
infrastructure sectors. The Plan also assumed that such international financial support would 
be accompanied by an increasing international political support in order to relieve the 
situation in the Palestinian Territories and to help advance the peace process so as to get the 
region out of the current state of instability and volatility. 
Location and Cultural Asset There was a prospect that the strategic location of the 
Middle East and particularly Palestine could be an opportunity. It has a distinct location with 
a wide collection of potential resources to attract both capital and tourists. According to the 
Palestinian Development Plan (1998-2001) the availability of rich archaeological, religious 
and tourist attractions, and consequently, the possibility of promoting and marketing the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip as international commercial, financial and tourist centres 
represented an opportunity. Under peaceful and stable conditions, and through regional 
projects, Palestine could play a central role in strengthening economic ties within all 
neighbouring countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) and throughout the 
region. There were centres of attraction for believers throughout the world owing to the 
historic, religious and holy status they enjoy in Islam and Christianity. In addition, it was 
assumed that the distinct location of the Gaza Strip might be utilised as a connecting link 
between East and West in the fields of commerce and finance at both the regional and 
international levels. The Gaza Strip beaches could be exploited to attract part of the tourist 
activities coming to the Middle East from the rest of the world. 
Right time for a Newcomer The World Bank (1993: 4) indicated that the time for 
emergence of the Palestinian identity was a real opportunity. The Bank argued that unlike 
most other developing countries, Palestine did not have to deal with the burden of the 
crushing external debt. Therefore, there was no need to undertake structural reform 
measures similar to those taken in a number of developing countries. This in itself was an 
advantage that should make the starting point less complicated. The Palestinian 
Development Programme (1998-2001) cited another advantage of the current time for 
reconstruction, that Palestinian policy makers did not need to follow old-fashioned policies. 
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According to Diwan and Sha'ban (1999) the Palestinians were newcomers to the world of 
development, they could learn form the mistakes and successes of others in policy 
formulation and implementation. This meant that the PNA must adopt successful theories. 
According to the Palestinian Development Programme (1998-2001), the Palestinian 
Authority tends to adopt a market mechanism in allocating resources. This implied 
entrusting the private sector with a leading role in the economic activity, and establishment 
of a genuine partnership between the private and the public sectors where the latter acts to 
prepare the administrative, organisational and institutional framework effectively and 
efficiently; and calls for integration with the world economy in order to benefit from the 
opportunities offered by such integration. 
Developmental Culture Development schemes were assumed to be facilitated through the 
strong ties among the Palestinian community. Due to cultural and religious incentives, 
Palestine has historically been characterised by a high degree of popular participation in 
developing responses to emerging circumstances. Before the 1948 war, Palestinians shared 
each other's resources to build houses for the poor, participated annually in harvesting crops. 
These communal habits still exist, having been passed onto the present generation. Diwan 
and Sha'ban (1999: 9) stressed the fact that "There is a vibrant and well-organised civil 
society. Many institutions were formed during occupation to deliver public services, which 
were not adequately provided by the Israeli occupation. " The Palestinian Human 
Development Report (1998) mentioned that the first few years of the Intifada witnessed 
large-scale participation by a wide spectrum of social and political parties. The report 
showed a public opinion survey, which indicated that 24% of the population took a direct 
role in political social and economic activities in support of the Intifada. This has established 
maturity within the Palestinian community, through the many development programmes 
initiated during the last three decades. 
Considering these structural potentials, Palestinian planners and policy-makers had 
real opportunities for success. This would be facilitated by experience gained of several 
Palestinian attempts, which have been made over the last twenty years to produce a survival 
strategy sometimes, and development strategy in others. In the following, the author reviews 
briefly the most serious endeavours. 
First: Local Palestinian Initiative 
The development experience of Palestinian society under Israeli occupation was 
unique in terms of its thought, content, and objectives, especially given the absence of a 
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Palestinian State. The formulation of strategy was in reality a reaction to a way of life 
imposed by the Israeli occupation. In the early 1980s, the slogan development in service of 
steadfastness was adopted. A conference, which was convened in 1983 to examine this 
concept, lasted several months, concluding with recommendations from many local 
institutions and individual leaders. In 1986, another conference was held on financing the 
development process including sources of financing, the location of those sources and 
foreign development plans. These and other conferences and seminars gradually became 
nation-wide activities. According to the Palestinian Human Development Report (1998: 17) 
the Palestinian experience of development took different forms in order to cope with the 
weakening of the social economic and political structures and with the concepts and cultural 
patterns which emerged under the occupation. In addition, Palestinians had to initiate 
mechanisms to resist the occupation and protect steadfastness. 
In the absence of a state, local institutions, various NGOs, charitable societies, and 
political parties held part of the responsibility. Despite the inadequate structures and visions 
of some of these institutions, and in spite of the disruption of the role played by previous 
traditional institutions, they made a crucial contribution to the general performance, cohesion 
and continuity of Palestinian society. 
In the light of a variety of challenges, local initiatives played a central role in the 
establishment of institutions and cushioned the effects of the transitions to Israeli occupation. 
Palestinian NGOs, political parties, and organisations began to bond the societies of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip together, thus promoting a single unified identity. In addition, NGOs 
expanded the capacity of local people and provided services. 
Second: PLO Programme for Reconstruction and Development (1994- 2000) 
In the wake of the Declaration of a Palestinian government in exile in November 1988, 
it was agreed to set up a Palestinian Plan. The PLO Department of Economic and Planning 
Affairs began to prepare a general programme to develop a Palestinian national economy for 
the years 1994- 2000. This programme was published in July 1993. The cost of the plan's 
activities was estimated to be $11.6 billion at the year of its publication (1993) 4. The 
Programme was designed on a number of important assumptions, rectifying the deficiencies 
originating from the occupation, creating job opportunities, developing infrastructure, 
encouraging the export sector, and constructing houses. According to a Palestinian official, 
the program ne was not appropriate to the Palestinian situation where it assumed that full 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation, (1993). Programme for Development of the Palestinian National 
Economy ofthe Year 1994 -2000 PLO (Tunisia). 
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control and sovereignty over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank would exist. Further. it 
assumed the availability of funds for reconstruction activities, which have never been 
sufficient. However, the programme provided a comprehensive analysis of the situation in 
the Palestinian Territories where it still represents an important resource for researchers, 
planners and programmers in Palestine. 
Third: The World Bank and the Donor Countries Plan 
Another plan was formulated by the World Bank and was named the Emergency 
Assistance Programme for the Occupied Territories (EAP). The overall objective of the 
EAP is to provide tangible benefits to the Palestinian population quickly, equitably, and 
efficiently while laying the foundation for sustainable development over the long term 
(World Bank, 1994: 1). The programme considered four assumptions, 
" The Occupied Territories were inheriting very weak and fragmented institutions with 
little capacities for preparing and implementing development programmes. 
" Further, it was expected that the Palestinian administration would be slow and 
complicated. 
" Large uncertainties about a number of issues critical to development there. These 
uncertainties include, the political settlement, the economic future of the region and the 
speed of creating Palestinian institutions. 
" An urgent need to show the people the fruit of peace. This meant investments in public 
infrastructure, supporting private sector, poverty alleviation and employment creation 
progranunes. The programme addressed two objectives: to maximise Palestinian inputs, 
and to promote speedy implementation capacity. 
The EAP plan commenced with the highest priority tasks and reconstruction needs in 
the first three years of PNA. The programme focused on `quickly removing bottlenecks' 
which included rehabilitating and upgrading public facilities and services in key sectors such 
as economy, transport; water supply and wastewater; solid waste management; power; 
municipal roads and facilities; housing; telecommunications; and agriculture. (The World 
Bank, 1994: 3). The World Bank co-ordinated with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
and with the donor groups to, 
" Launch rehabilitation and maintenance activities that make better use of existing 
infrastructure. 
Support a temporary work plan to help alleviate immediate poi ert`, and unemployment 
pressures. 
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0 Concentrate efforts on areas where living standards are especially low as in Gaza. 
" Support investments that will help correct existing imbalances in access to services. 
particularly in rural areas. 
" Maximise the use of local inputs, particularly skilled labour. Where necessary, however, 
outside expertise should be tapped selectively to supplement local capacity. 
" Make use of all locally available capacity for programme implementation, including the 
Palestinian NGOs, universities, and research centres. 
" Emphasise training and institution building particularly for the management of 
development programmes. 
" Initiate feasibility studies and technical analyses to provide the basis for longer-term 
investments. 
" Institute mechanisms for efficient and transparent procurement, accounting monitoring 
and reporting to ensure effective use of funds 
" Ensure sufficient flexibility to permit ready incorporation of changes dictated by the 
unfolding peace negotiations, actual experience with implementation and the results of 
the various feasibility studies and technical analyses. 
There is no doubt that the programme helped the PNA to lay the foundation for its 
institutional building. After two years of its establishment, the PNA was able to produce its 
first Development and Reconstruction Plan. In 1997, the PNA introduced its first three years 
programme 
Fourth: The Palestinian National Authority Development Plan 
According to the Palestinian National Authority Development Programme 
(1999: 2001) the plan aimed at policies, which must be followed on the national and local 
levels, as well as on the levels of the different ministries, institutions and units. The Plan 
identified priorities to be adopted in the plan's three years in order to surmount the pressing 
obstacles and face the challenges standing in the way of development. In view of the 
difficulties and constraints, the PNA aspired to realise the following four major goals during 
the time span of this development Plan. These goals were (1) economic growth and 
employment generation, (2) rural revival and development. (3) improving social 
conditions/human resources development and (4) development of financial institutions. The 
PNA claimed that it sought policies to achieve balance and integration among various sectors 
of the economy to ensure the realisation of comprehensive and well-rounded development. 
These policies included support for basic infrastructure projects, ensuring adequate access to 
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basic public services such as telecommunication, roads, transportation, and health and 
educational facilities. They also included policies targeted towards the agriculture sector 
such as credit institutions and co-operative societies, as well as extension services and 
scientific research. Policies encouraging the private sector to invest in export industries and 
establish promotion and marketing centres and institutions which contribute to the generation 
of new employment opportunities to absorb the surplus manpower and solve the 
unemployment problem to the level which the economy can sustain. Examples of these 
policies are Rehabilitating and Developing Physical Infrastructure and enhancing the role of 
public institutions. 
The ambitious plan has been facing numerous obstacles 
nature of the transitional stage in the peace process. 
5.3.2 Challenges 
These have been related to the 
Since its establishment, the PNA has been charged with a new kind of challenge. 
Continuing to encounter the negative impact of the occupation, the PNA has become 
responsible for the task of spearheading the reconstruction process. Below the author 
surveys the obstacles facing the reconstruction in Palestine. 
Weak Performance of the Palestinian National Authority 
Said (2000) guessed that Palestinian frustration and anger changed to be directed at the 
Palestinian leadership. Said claimed that the leadership has led its people astray with false 
promises, and maintained a battery of corrupt officials holding down commercial 
monopolies even as they negotiate incompetently and weakly on the people's behalf The 
Palestinian Human Development report (2000: 6) admitted the fact that after six years of the 
establishment of the PNA, there has been an absence of unified recovery visions. This led to 
confusion and conflict within its institutions, and presented it with challenges. This situation 
hindered the PNA from assuming its leading role in development. Each ministry and public 
institution continued to formulate its own development policies according to a limited vision 
and without referring to a comprehensive nationally embraced one. 
A report prepared jointly by the World Bank and Japan (2000) blamed what it called the 
`disappointing' level of PNA's activity since 1993 on a complex legal system and weak 
judicial system, increasing reports of public sector corruption, and the murky operations of 
PNA linked commercial enterprises. Roy (1998) argued that the PNA was increasingly seen 
as corrupt, dysfunctional and lacking credibility. Political power was 
divided far less along 
faction, ideological and nationalist lines than along positional lines -for or against PNA, for 
Chapter Five 15 5 
Reconstruction under Adversity 
example- with direct correlation to social class. According to a survey conducted by the 
Development Studies Programme in Ber Ziet University (1998), a significant number of 
government institution employees believed that there were no clear policies or plan for their 
institutions. A large percentage of those employees did not feel that they had job security 
and did not find their work conditions adequate. The majority maintained that they did not 
participate, while the Palestinian Development Programme admitted that most PNA 
institutions did not have clear administrative procedure nor an organisational structure, 
which led to the overlap of responsibilities between them. Officially authorised 
comprehensive guidelines containing the laws, regulations and procedures for managing the 
organising between the various sectors and authorities and developing the capacity of the 
ministries and institutions, have not been formulated as yet. This has led to a poor level of 
productive co-ordination between ministries and institutions. The Palestinian Human 
Development report (2000: 9) noted that: 
" The role of the Ministerial Cabinet vacillated between that of an executive body and a 
political one. This vacillation made it difficult to evaluate its development performance, 
especially in the absence of a development vision that directed its work although there 
was a written statement about the work plans and policies of the ministerial cabinet. 
" The ministerial cabinet had not established clear structures for ministries and public 
institutions. 
0 There were increased numbers of employees in the governmental sector. 
" There was the phenomenon of power centres within institutions and ministries, along 
with duplication, conflict and overlapping of authority; laws also differed between the 
West Bank and the Gaza strip. 
" The absence of laws, regulations and instructions that govern work 
in Ministries and 
public institutions sometimes results in misspending of public funds and in misuse of 
official positions. This could be seen in practices such as exceeding the general budget 
and the participation of some officials as investors or board members in private 
companies. 
" There were no laws that regulate the work and specify the specialisation of the existing 
nine security bodies. Therefore, there was much overlapping and duplication in their 
work and the number of people belonging. 
Donor Policies 
Diwan (1999: 5) claimed that at the time of the `Declaration of Principles' donors were 
caught by surprise and had little time to prepare projects and their approach to aid. 
He 
explained that despite initial delay, by mid 1995 appropriate mechanisms to share 
information and to a lesser extent, to formulate development policy and prioritise 
investment 
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were in place to permit a smoother flow of assistance. At the October 1993 Conference to 
Support Middle East Peace, the international community committed itself to jump-start the 
Palestinian economy and pledged $2.4 billion over the ensuing five years. Additional 
pledges contributed by 38 countries and several international organisations raised the total 
pledged to $3.4 billion. About three-quarters of the assistance pledge was on grant terms, the 
remainder consists of loans, mostly on concessional terms. 
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Figure 5.3: Aid Fluctuation between 1994 and 1999. 
Source: The World Bank-Japan Report (2000) 
Commitment 
Disbursement 
1999 
The inflow of aid coincided with the establishment of PNA ministries to address 
donors directly. The donors had managed to achieve disbursement levels successfully and 
established institutions for channelling assistance. Unlike the experience in many 
developing countries, according to the joint World Bank-Japanese report (2000), donor 
countries had disbursed more than $2.7 billion since the first donors' conference in 
Washington in 1993. It pointed out that donor aid has helped to build and sustain a 
Palestinian administration to provide a broad range of services to its population, as well as 
offset economic decline and put in place the infrastructure for future economic growth and 
social development. Aid declined in recent years as donor countries had shifted from 
supporting emergency government expenditure and recurrent costs to financing only 
infrastructure projects. However, the aid amount to infrastructure did not increase in 
absolute terms. The report clarified that donor aid had declined from 18 per cent of the GDP 
in 1994 to 11 per cent in 1999. According to figures supplied by the Ministry of Planning 
and International Co-operation. donor aid had declined over the years. While commitments 
in 1994 have reached $819 million, disbursements did not exceed $515 million. In the 
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following year. 1995, commitments dropped to $638 million and disbursements also 
dropped to $417 million. With the difficult year of 1996 that witnessed many closure days 
and restriction on movement, commitments increased to $789 million to offset the 
difficulties caused by Israeli policies. However, disbursements stopped at $512 million. In 
1997, commitments dropped again to $622 million and disbursements remained at $513 
million. However, in the following year, 1998, while commitments reached $666 million, 
only $409 million was disbursed, and in 1999, commitments dropped to $547 million and 
only $417 million were disbursed. The World Bank-Japanese Report (2000) claimed that 
Decline in donor assistance is worrisome, not only because fewer resources are 
available to support peacebuilding and economic development, but it also 
hampers PNA economic planning and erodes donor credibility. 
Donor Pledged Committed Disbursed 
US 500 296 207 
EU 357 357 230 
EIB 300 89 N/A 
Japan 256 231 232 
World Bank 230 185 66 
Saudi Arabia 200 185 83 
Netherlands 151 150 90 
Germany 150 149 89 
Arab Fund 150 149 0 
Spain 123 122 31 
Total 3439 2799 1514 
Table 5.2: Aid Flows to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, (Millions of Dollars). 
Source: Financial Times (June 1997) 
Dr Dina Assaf, the Director of the Development Planning Unit at the Ministry of 
Planning and International Co-operation, commenting on the donor policies, mentioned the 
discrepancy in the direct benefit received by Palestinians. Also she pointed out how donor 
countries placed conditions to use their expertise and companies and purchase their 
equipment, and how this had led to delays in implementation and the loss of benefit to local 
Palestinian companies from a large portion of the committed aid. She stated that the donor 
countries have their own agendas. "We prepared a Palestinian development plan as a 
shopping list and then according to their policy the donors choose which project is suitable to 
pursue, to be frank, it is a puzzle! " she said. 
The World Bank-Japan report (2000) correlated the Palestinian disappointment, and outlined 
several implications associated with the donor aid policy. 
Delays in fulfilling pledges and commitments diminished the PNA's ability to finance 
necessary investments and to plan for the future. 
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" It created a sense of dependency of the PNA of its expectations of future donor 
assistance. 
" PNA would be required to assume a larger share of capital expenditures and 
maintenance costs. Public investment has been almost entirely donor-financed. 
" PNA needed to develop effective procedures for setting national priorities for donor 
assistance and especially for borrowing, in order to insure that future borrowing would 
be integrated into a broader strategy of social and economic development. 
" As donor disbursements declined, the PNA must shift toward greater use of loan-based 
assistance, which may have important fiscal implications. 
Deterioration of the Economic Situation 
The peace agreements were accompanied by promises to develop the economic 
situation in the region, which motivated Middle Eastern countries to accept the process. The 
Palestinian economy is small and poorly endowed with natural resources, especially in light 
of the separation of the economics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has experienced 
negative consequences from the Israeli application of a permanent system of restrictions that 
caused great difficulties and disruptions to the daily economic activities in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. This policy, in effect since the establishment of the Palestinian National 
Authority, restricted the movement of individuals, goods, and factors of production between 
the Palestinian territories and Israel, between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and between the 
Palestinian territories and the outside world. Airtight and comprehensive closures 
represented the highest and strongest application of this system where movements of goods 
and people come to a nearly complete stop. 
The restrictions also complicated the implementation of the economic agreement signed 
between the PLO and the Israeli Government to regulate the economic relations between 
both sides during the interim period. The articles of this agreement granted the Palestinian 
side free movement of individuals and goods to and from the PNA territories. But the 
Palestinian side was not permitted to establish direct geographical relations with the Arab 
neighbouring countries, and to import and export some commodities through international 
non-Israeli crossing points. Because of these restrictions and constraints, the Palestinian side 
found itself unable to freely reach international markets and take full advantage of the free 
trade agreements they have signed with other countries. 
A small percentage of the community reported a positive change in their economic 
conditions \vhile the majority either reported a negative change or did not see any change. 
The degree of change positive or negative reported was greater in Gaza than in the West 
Bank. 
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Border-Closure Policy 
In 1993, Israel imposed its first general closure over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Since that time, permits to enter Israel (including East Jerusalem) have been required by all 
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On several occasions, this general 
closure has been heightened by completely shutting off all access into Israel, cancelling all 
previous permits of work and issuing far fewer. Israeli closure policies have been 
increasingly enforced since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and have created 
obstacles and challenges to the progress of the peace process and Palestinian development 
and reconstruction. 
The Gaza Strip's industrial and manufacturing sector has been in deep crisis due to the 
repeated closure measures. Israeli restrictions on the export of industrial products and the 
import of essential raw materials have shut down at least 157 local factories in the Gaza 
Strip. On the construction sector, the impact had been severe: the Gaza Strip, for example, 
required an average of 3,000 tons of cement daily but received only 300 tons under the 
closure situation, bringing the construction sector to a virtual halt and making at least 16,000 
workers idle (Roy: 1998). During the repeated closure, nearly half the necessary volume of 
cement entered Gaza. Other materials such as gravel, plaster, and iron were also in very 
short supply. 
Other sectors of economy have also suffered. According to the Palestinian Ministry of 
Agriculture (1997: 5), agriculture depends upon the export of 70 percent of its products, 
including citrus, fruits, vegetables and flowers. Due to the closure, citrus exports had 
dropped to $440,000 compared to $4 million at its usual level. No citrus products from the 
Gaza Strip were allowed to enter Israel or the West Bank. The closure has resulted in a 
direct daily loss to citrus producers of $1.05 million. The agricultural sector, moreover, 
employs between 15,000 and 30,000 persons depending upon the season, many of whom 
had no work for almost the entire period of closure. 
Gaza has also experienced a shortage in its basic food supply since all such foodstuffs 
were imported from Israel. In 1996, the author experienced a flour shortage crisis. The 
Palestinian Ministry of Economics estimated that the Gaza Strip requires a daily average of 
275 tons of flour. In the closure, only 3,114 tons were permitted to enter Gaza or 111 tons 
daily (40 percent of the total requirement). It was proposed that the Palestinian Authority 
must impose a ration system forcing Palestinians to wait daily for hours, sometimes 
overnight, to obtain their share. Similar shortfalls also occurred in the supplies of sugar, rice, 
butter, oil, salt and tea. 
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Attempts have been made to gauge the loss to the Palestinian economy due to the 
border-closure. The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), for example, has 
estimated the cost of closure policy to the Palestinian economy at about USD 2.8 billion 
annually. While the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation 
(1999: 13) measured the economic cost to the Palestinian economy of the application of the 
system of restrictions between 1993-1998, at about $7 billion. 
Monopolies and the Peace-lords 
The Palestinian Legislative Council on a number of occasions has voiced its 
dissatisfaction with the existence and malpractice of monopolies. (Alquds newspaper, 1998) 
Monopoly is another contributing factor to the deteriorating situation of the Palestinian 
Territories. A Palestinian businessman told the author "You should know that every 
revolution has its fighters, thinkers and profiteers. Our fighters have been killed, our thinkers 
assassinated, and all we have left are the profiteers. These don't think even primarily of the 
cause, they don't think, about it at all. " According to Roy (1998) there are at least 13 known 
monopolies under the control of no more than five individuals. These individuals have total 
control over the import of such commodities as flour, sugar, vegetable oil, frozen meats, live 
animals, concrete, gravel, steel, wood, tobacco and petroleum. The existence of these PNA- 
controlled monopolies has precluded fair competition by introducing market-distorting 
mechanisms. The result was a price-fixing, which had artificially inflated prices, particularly 
for basic food commodities, building materials making it even more difficult for people. 
These monopolies demonstrated how the Palestinian Authority was taking advantage 
of a deteriorating situation. An example, a local contractor narrated that Gazan importers of 
gravel were anxious to increase their stock and it was through Sufa cross point that these 
importers had been able to avoid the gravel monopoly established at Erez, the main entrance 
into the Gaza Strip. However, since those individuals in charge of the gravel monopoly at 
Erez had no control over the Sufa crossing, the Palestinian Authority kept Sufa closed for an 
additional two weeks until monopolistic control could be imposed there as well. The price 
of gravel has doubled in a few months. Roy mentioned that monopolies generated 
considerable revenue. Profits were believed to be between $100- $400 million per year. 
Moneys from the monopolies were deposited in banks to pay the salaries of police and other 
agencies, which donors were reluctant to finance. Roy concluded, "If monopoly revenues 
are indeed paying these salaries, the monopolies are generating considerable profit". 
The Al-Bahr Company is a case in point. Five years ago, the al-Bahr company 
existed. , 4l-Bahr means 
`sea'. But Gazans called it Almuheet `the ocean', because, they said. 
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"it is swallowing everything". According to a Palestinian civil servant "It is not being 
officially registered, it should not be operating at all. It even uses the Authority's 
letterheads. " Gazans believed that the company incorporate different business activities such 
as real estate, entertainment, computers, advertising, medicine and insurance. According to 
Gazan businessman `Only the most powerful Gazan businessmen can resist its power. These 
are pressed into `partnership' with Al-Bahr. ' It complements already existing monopolies, 
for the import of such basic commodities as cement, petrol or flour. " The businessman said 
that he was thinking seriously of migration. 
Monopolistic control over basic commodities also creates a strong disincentive to 
foreign investors, and undermines activity in the private sector, the domain with the greatest 
potential for initiating economic development. Gaza's (housing) construction and 
contracting sector the only indicator of economic growth over the last few years is now in a 
state of decline since the monopolies and the closure have made the costs of doing business 
prohibitively high. Some local contractors operate at a loss while others have completely 
shut down. 
The Increase in Unemployment 
Unemployment has been considered one of the most critical economic and social 
problems facing the Palestinians. Despite the growth in the employment capacity of the 
Palestinian economy, created after the establishment of the PNA, there has been difficulty in 
absorbing the obvious rise in unemployment due to the closure of Israeli and Arab markets to 
the Palestinian work force. It is believed the most devastating effect of the heightened 
closure has been a dramatic rise in unemployment levels in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Because the closure restricted the movement of all people (and goods) in and out of the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank, as well as movement within the West Bank itself, workers from these 
territories have been unable to reach their places of employment. According to the 
Palestinian Ministry of Labour (1998: 7), unemployment in Gaza increased from 50 percent 
to 74 percent (and from 30 percent to 50 percent in the West Bank). Before the heightened 
closure, 22,000 Gazans (down from 80,000 in 1987) and 26,000 West Bankers had permits 
to work in Israel. Almost all of these 22,000 Gazans were now unemployed. 
The United Nation Special Co-ordinator in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (UNSCO) 
(1998: 13) reported that losses from unemployment amounted to $1.04 million daily for the 
Gaza Strip alone--$750,000 from lost wages in Israel and $290,000 from lost wages in local 
sectors. At present, some Gazans hold permits to work 
in Israel, part of whom work in the 
Ere_ industrial zone inside Gaza. Permits have been restricted to men 45 years of age and 
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older. The possession of a work permit, however did not guarantee work. Given that each 
worker supports an average of seven people, at least 600,000 people in Gaza have been in 
desperate need of income. This increase of unemployment has contributed to heighten the 
tension between the social classes in Gaza Strip. 
Social Unrest and Deterioration of Public Morale 
The Palestinian Human Development Report (2000: 22) admitted that political and 
economic deterioration has generated considerable rage among the local population and 
there has been some protest. According to Roy (1998), the widening gap between the Gaza 
Strip's classes suggested three problems: the existence of an increasingly repressive regime 
opposed to dissent, a population too debilitated to challenge this regime, and a separation of 
national issues from their economic and social counterparts. When he first came to Gaza, 
President Arafat said he would turn Gaza into a Singapore of the Middle East. However, he 
could not achieve any of his aspirations but saw more suffering come to the population. 
Nowadays, Palestinians are frustrated, faced with the great task of the daily confrontation 
with the Israelis. Along with the pressure, they have started to lose their belief in the PNA 
and in the current peace process. It seems more like a false dawn that, to them, is just 
increasing their suffering. Roy (1998) described the dilemma: "The struggle is no longer 
against Israel or even the Israeli occupation; it is now against hunger and humiliation. " 
Further aggressive behaviour from Palestinian security forces against the local community 
has threatened the social fabric of one of the remaining traditional Arab communities. Some 
Palestinians residents' feeling of being second class citizens, especially after the PLO 
returnees from exile have become established, could weaken national unity. 
Various commentators have noticed the gap in the Palestinian Territories. Gaza Strip 
is the most conservative of Palestinian communities. During the days of Intifada, wearing 
the scarf was an obligation for every woman in accordance with Islam regulations. Gazans 
set fire to the sole cinema in the city and other such places. However. the Palestinian 
Authority and its upper officials have never considered this fact. Tunis was the headquarters 
of the PLO and the Tunisians' was a nickname which David Herst claimed that Gazans 
gave to those, officially known as `returnees', who came with the peace to Gaza, following 
the Oslo Accords. David Herst, the Guardian correspondent described in the Guardian 
Weekly, 27/4/97 that there are about 10,000 of them, bureaucrats who run the Palestinian 
Authority, former fighters who dominate the enormous security apparatus of the PNA. The 
Tunisians as Herst reported come home to the soil of Palestine itself, but the irony is that 
they are not merely strangers in their ov i land, they are 
for the most part disliked, despised, 
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even hated. Challenging the tradition, they introduced places such as Zahra al-Mada'in 
night-club in Gaza City which provoked much anger in the strip 5. "Because they are 
Palestinians, and came as `liberators', the shock is even worse. " Herst claimed. In Gaza, 
those former fighters have been leading the collaboration with the Israeli foe. It is hard for 
Palestinians to be arrested and punished by other former fighters. 
The criticism extended to the accountability of the PNA's high strata. Herst claimed 
that they could attract money in the form of international aid to the poorest Palestinian 
communities. Nevertheless, they took at least as much away from it. A Palestinian civil 
servant told the author that those knew that they were just transients here, and, they think 
only of profiting from being in the Palestinian Territories while they could. 
In fact, the injustice has been clear. The district of Rimal is less than two kilometres from the 
Al Shati camp. Rimal means, "sand", and in this district, there are luxurious villas. It is 
considered as the most up-market neighbourhood of Gaza. Herst explained that in Rimal "it 
is mainly here that `the Tunisians' have taken root, with their amazing array of `ministries', 
`authorities' and special `agencies', police stations and posts, choice rooftop apartments, 
villas and places of entertainment. " For contrast with Rimal, just a walk to the end of the 
main street Omar Almukhtar, one is shocked by the reality of the awful and open sewers of 
the Al shati refugee camp where a UN survey describes that "... some refugees no longer 
think it a shame to send their children out to beg. " Roy (1998) pointed at the emergence of 
child labour in Gaza. Today, children work as roadside peddlers well into the late evening. 
Some people have been seen selling televisions and VCRs. Others have returned medicines 
to local pharmacies to get money to buy food. This happened while part of the community 
enjoyed high life standards. Those were working in high official positions in the PNA. 
Herst argued that "Those know that there is a point beyond which even they can not go 
without risking their people's wrath. They know, better than anyone, that the peace process, 
and all they get out of it, is built, on nothing more solid than the fine white powdery sands of 
Rimal. " 
The lack of Natural Resources 
According to the Palestinian Development Plan (1998-2001) there is a scarcity of 
natural resources needed for productive sectors and development in the Palestinian 
Territories. The Palestinian National Authority controls a small portion of the Palestinian 
lands in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while Israel still controls the remainder of the land. 
5 It ended with burning one of these premises in the latest events. 
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Israel controls 80-85% of the Palestinian water resources and does not allow the Palestinians 
to utilise their share for agriculture, although the percentage is declining due to encroachment 
and the need of land for built areas. 
The Deteriorated State of Infrastructure 
The poor state of infrastructure is considered the principal obstacle to development in 
Palestine. The lack of infrastructure in the form of water, electricity, telecommunications, 
and roads correlates to a large extent to the reluctance of investors to invest in Palestinian 
territories, therefore, leading to a slowdown in economic growth and a decline in social 
conditions. This is in addition to the acute shortage of adequate shelter. 
Having described the situation in the Palestinian Territories, it is imperative to 
examine if reconstruction programmes can achieve success under the above circumstances. 
Due to the significance of the human settlement issue, the author selects two case studies to 
be examined in the following two chapters. Before doing so, a review of the characteristics 
of human settlements in Gaza Strip is offered: 
5.4 SHELTER CRISIS IN GAZA STRIP 
The inadequacy of decent shelter in the Palestinian Territories is not only derived from 
the size of the task and natural constraints, but also as we reviewed in chapter one, from the 
Israeli policies. These assigned little value to the needs of the population and less value 
when conflicting with the Israeli State's aims. The acute shelter crisis arose through the 
Israeli government's deliberate failure to facilitate the sector, restriction on private 
construction, and control of municipal zoning and urban planning. These factors, aggravated 
by the policy of land confiscation, have left Gazans with little space to build in. The 
government of Israel has taken no measure to alleviate crises, resettlement of refugees being 
the only step undertaken towards resolving the problem of housing provision in the 
Palestinian Territories. 
To understand the characteristics of the shelter, Tuqan (1997: 541) explained that the 
Palestinian community has lived in four settlement patterns: 
. Urban communities: These have definite urban characteristics with centres that perform 
administrative, commercial and social functions. For example, Gaza city. 
" Semi-Urban communities: These 
include a number of rural towns and villages, which 
acquired urban characteristics as a result of their location, increased population, changed 
functions and economic activities. For example Jabalya. 
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" Rural communities: These include all communities predominantly active in agriculture 
with no significant administrative commercial or service functions. The author believes 
that these communities are going to vanish in the Strip. 
" Refugee camps: These include Palestinians who lost their homes in historical Palestine 
after the creation of the State of Israel. Most camps are located near or within urban 
centres. 
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Figure 5.4: A Typical Private House in Gaza Strip 
Source: The Author, (May: 2000) 
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A survey, conducted by a team of Norwegian and Palestinian researchers, concluded 
that while Gaza comprises less than 6 per cent of the total area of the Palestinian Territories, 
it holds 37 per cent of the population (Heirberg, 1993). Heirberg showed that three out of 
five persons live in urban areas. The survey indicated that in the Gaza Strip the percentage 
was higher with four out of five persons living in urban districts. The trend to urbanisation 
can be attributed to the massive influx of refugees in 1948. Data showed that there was an 
urgent need for 200.000 housing units in urban and rural area since no substantial housing 
projects has been initiated under the occupation. Another estimation came from the PLO; 
the Programme for the Development of the Palestinian National Economy for the period 
1994-2000 estimated that: 
A total of 185.000 housing units for an average household of six persons are 
needed between 1994 and 2000 in order to absorb the natural rate of increase in 
population and replace poorly built unsafe and overcrowded housing including 
those in the refugee camps for an expected 500,000 returnees. 
In addition to the acute crisis in cities like Gaza, the real problem appears in the 
refugee camps either in the Gaza Strip or in the West Bank. In Gaza, Ziara (1997: 13) 
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claimed that two-thirds of the 1.200.000 were living in the eight overcrowded refugee 
camps. He emphasised that the refugees' need for housing has been greater than in any other 
sector. 
5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Almost seven years have passed since the historic handshake between the late Israeli 
Prime Minster and the Palestinian leader on the White House lawn. Israel and the PLO 
concluded secret negotiations at Oslo that led to the extension of formal mutual recognition 
and the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) on interim self-government 
arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. Due to the weak position of the PLO and the 
unlimited support of United States to the Jewish State, the two parties concluded unjust and 
fragile agreements. The agreements have offered no interpretation of UN Security Council 
resolutions 242 and 338, therefore no guiding principles on which to base the talks. In 
addition, the agreements provided legitimacy for direct negotiations between the parties, 
which inhibited outside powers from playing a role to ensure fair play. Furthermore, the 
agreement never defined the end goal, but left the controversial questions of Jerusalem, 
settlements, refugees, borders and security arrangements to negotiations in a second phase. 
Murray (1995) commented on the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements, 
It is difficult to image the maps, as well as the 450 page text, in which `opt out' 
clauses for Israel are buried in mountains of detail giving Palestinians their 
marching orders, being translated into a workable action plan in the congested 
West Bank, where thousands of settlers are determined to destroy it... [the 
agreements] contain no restraints on settlement expansion, no brake on the 
closures that are killing the Palestinian economy, no guarantee that the timetable 
will be adhered to and no indication of light in the shape of Palestinian self- 
determination at the end of the long tunnel. Palestinians remain on probation, 
with re-deployment dependent on their good behaviour. 
The international community in an attempt to support the peace process has 
established a mechanism to help the Palestinians, financially and technically. Politicians 
have raised expectations that the New Palestinian State would have the potential to be 
Singapore of the Middle East. Contrary to initial expectations, economic conditions for most 
of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza have deteriorated as well, the 
unemployment rate has risen, and the per capita income has dropped by 20 percent. 
Furthermore, one-fifth of all Palestinians in the occupied territories live under poverty and 
that the current unemployment rate among Palestinians is approximately 30 percent. It has 
been demonstrated that the situation in the Palestinian Territories is more complicated due to 
the Palestinian governing system, which is fluctuating between institutionalisation and the 
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attempts to establish sound principles amid rumours of corruption and self-seeking.. To sum 
up, Said (2000) argued that 
So much has been written and proclaimed about the new era of peace, the 
benefits of peace, the economy of peace, etc., that with seven years of non- 
peace, people are understandably disaffected, fed up with lies, fed up with 
Israeli arrogance, fed up, above all, with their own sense of powerlessness and 
failure. 
This raises the question 
Can Palestinians launch successful rehabilitation programmes under unsatisfactory 
agreements in deeply restrictive circumstances? 
To examine this question, the author focuses on two initiatives aimed to enhance the peace 
process in Gaza through alleviating the shelter conditions. The next chapter discusses the 
Peace Implementation Programme. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Gaza, refugee camps are the most explicit sign of continuous suffering of the 
Palestinian people. The camp residents face a combination of rising socio-economic 
hardship and substandard living conditions, which in turn negatively affect human health and 
creativity. The housing in the camps is deemed the most important and complicated issue 
facing refugees. The importance of this issue is shown in the serious and clearly visible 
dilapidation of dwellings in the camps. Its complicated aspect is exposed in the dilemma that 
possible solutions could be interpreted as a conspiracy targeting the refugee, feeding fear of 
'resettlement'. 
Since its establishment, the refugee camps in all fields of UNRWA operations have 
faced a housing crisis, the problem worsening under the general housing shortage in the 
Palestinian controlled areas. Housing is only one problem of many facing residents. 
UNRWA (1992: 6) described the situation: 
It was disconcerting to see.. . most of the refugees... continued to 
live in extreme 
poverty, many families were still deprived of that basic element of life and 
adequate shelter to provide defence against the heat, the cold, the rain. It was 
sad to witness that under the pressure of demographic growth and worsening 
political, social, and economic factors, the standards of living were gradually 
being eroded even further. 
To support the peace process in the Middle East, and to show Palestinians tangible 
benefits, the United Nations General Assembly have called for UNRWA to make a 
contribution towards giving a fresh impetus to the economic and social stability of the 
occupied territories. UNRWA responded by the Peace Implementation 
Programme (PIP). 
After the signing of the Declaration of Principles, UNRWA identified projects that could 
be 
undertaken to improve living conditions in the refugee camps. 
Pursuing primary objectives, 
PIP was to effect the following changes: (1) rehabilitation of existing 
houses, (2) providing 
better social and physical infrastructure, (3) creating employment opportunities and (4) 
supporting the needy and hardship cases. 
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The author through fieldwork conducted in November 1999 and May 2000 examined 
the agency's rhetoric. comparing the situation on the ground with what had been 
documented in published and unpublished reports. A variety of post conflict peacebuilding 
and reconstruction issues have been surveyed. Responding to allegations that this 
programme was designed to help I NRWA terminate its services. the chapter discusses these 
accusations, explaining the impact of politics on the international community's efforts to 
fund this project. 
6.1.1 Why UNRWA and Peace Implementation Programme 
The author selected UNRWA and the Peace Implementation Programme for different 
reasons (1) PIP is an example of the interrelationship between reconstruction and 
peacebuilding. The aim of the project was to support peace in the Middle East. (2) The 
target group of the programme represents nearly two-thirds of the population in the Gaza 
Strip. (3) PIP is the biggest recovery programme implemented in the Palestinian Territories 
in the last six years. (4) PIP illustrates different issues of post-war reconstruction. These 
include: challenges facing the rehabilitation process, actors and co-ordination, local 
involvement and building local capacities, politics and donor involvement, etc. (5) UNRWA 
is a unique organisation. It runs several activities and services in various spheres, including 
shelter, health, education and income-generation projects. 
6.2. SETTING THE SCENE 
6.2.1 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA) 
During the first years, after the 1948 war, refugees who had lost all their property 
depended on the supply of basic goods, shelter and services from external actors to prevent 
starvation and epidemic diseases. In response, organisations such as the International 
Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) and the American Friends Service Committee began 
refugee aid programmes. Similarly, United Nations (UN) responded with the establishment 
of the United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees (UNRPR) in November 1948. 
UNRPR was set up to co-ordinate humanitarian and emergency programmes conducted by 
various voluntary agencies. 
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian in the Near East 
(I NRWA) was formed to replace UNRPR on 8 December 1949 and began operations on 1 
May 1950. UNRW 'A was instituted by the General Assembly in Resolution 302 IV. Thus, 
UNRWA is formally responsible to the General Assembly alone. In addition, it collaborates 
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with host governments, exercising humanitarian responsibilities in five regions: Syria. 
Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. UNRWA provides a variety of 
services including provision of education and health care, helping hardship cases and 
upgrading both the social and physical structure of the community (UNRWA, 1997). Its 
mandate is renewed periodically for three-year periods. The current mandate, issued in 
1999, expires in 2002; thus, the agency is expected to continue its work until that date at 
least. 
UNRWA's work is associated with another important institution in the international 
setting: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR has the 
mission of looking after refugees world-wide but the UN's special refugee agreement (1951) 
put the policy of Palestinian refugees outside UNHCR. The agreement relieving UNHCR 
from supervisory responsibility left UNRWA as sole provider of the refugee population with 
their basic needs. This structural arrangement implied firstly, a positive value ensuring that 
the Palestinian issue would not be ignored or marginalised. UNRWA's mandate legitimated 
the Palestinian refugees' inclusion in the implementation of UN Resolution 194, which 
granted their `right of return'. Nevertheless, this imposed distinction portrayed the possible 
loss of international protection if for any reason the Agency was dismantled. 
Area Camps Refugees in camps Refugees not in the camps Total 
Deir el-Balah Deir El Balah 13,717 13.717 
Maghazi 16,767 30,816 61,300 
Khan Younis Khan Younis 48,752 75,116 123,868 
Al Nuseirat Al Nuseirat 33,067 33,067 
Bureij 30,469 20,157 83,693 
Rafah Rafah 71,706 47,063 118,769 
Rirnal Al Shati 62,362 51,936 114,262 
Jabalya Jabalya 79,177 44,689 123,866 
Gaza Town 91,172 91,172 
TOTAL 8 Camps_ 378,279 338,651 716,930 
Table 6.1: Palestinian Refugee Camps in Gaza Strip 
Source: UNRWA Facts Sheet (2000) 
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Figure 6.1: Map of UNRWA's Area of Operations 
Source: UNRWA's Web Site: http: //www. unrwa. org 
6.2.2 The Magnitude of the Problem 
Initially, in 1948, Palestinian refugees took shelter wherever they could, although they 
preserved a communal identity by travelling as neighbourhood groups. UNRWA's first 
annual report (1950-1951) described the situation as follows: 
The refugees took refuge in temporary camps; some in caves; the majority found 
shelter in towns and villages, in mosques, churches, monasteries, schools, and 
abandoned buildings. Two thirds, of the total number of refugees, were housed 
in improvised quarters suited only for temporary use, but under the 
circumstances were the only ones available. Some of the buildings had no 
hanging space in family quarters, with each family whatever its size with its 
clothing, cooking utensils etc. occupying the limited floor space of its single 
cubicle. Births, deaths, wedding celebrations and all phases of ordinary life 
were carried out in these confined spaces. 
United Nation Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) started to provide shelter for the 
refugees. Sites were located and several camps were established on government lands or on 
lands rented by UNRWA from local residents. Each camp, divided by a main road, had sub- 
roads to facilitate the movement of UNRWA's cars while providing services to refugees on 
both sides of the roads. The size of the housing units allocated to refugees correlated with 
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the size of the family. The `Za'mout' tent with one post, was allocated to small size families 
i. e. less than five members while the relatively big size families were given the 'Jamloun' 
tent with three posts. UNRWA clustered tents into straight rows with a divider space of 
several meters between them. UNRWA's installations were also housed in big size tents 
situated in one designated area opposite to the refugees' tents. 
Afterwards, UNRWA offered to replace tents with housing units. Slowly the building 
of concrete shelters progressed. By 1953 all tents had been removed from Gaza. In 1959, 
UNRWA's Director claimed that huts had replaced all tents. The size of shelters varied from 
one camp to another. The area of land on which a hut was constructed did not exceed 
usually 80-100 square metres. The construction of these units was as follows: 
"A units- space 3X3 meters housing 1-5 member families, 
"B units- space 4X3.75 meters housing 6-9 member families. 
"C units- space 4X4.45 meters housing 9-11 member families. 
" AA unit `container 6x3 meters' includes two rooms connected with an inside corridor 
housing 11-12 member families. 
" BB units `container 8x4 meters' including two rooms with an inside corridor housing 
more than 12 members families. 
On this land, occupants were permitted to grow vegetables or erect additional rooms as 
the family expanded through birth and marriage. During the same period, UNRWA's 
installations were also constructed i. e. schools, clinics, distribution centres and offices of the 
camp service officers, and public latrines. Communal water points were established so those 
refugees could be provided with their needs of water during the morning hours. Tents were 
employed as shelters and as classes for schooling. These primitive conditions had a severe 
effect on the refugee community, especially during bad winter weather. 
In 1950s and 1960s, there were large spaces of land and wide alleys inside the refugee 
camps. There was no housing crisis; all families had shelter despite the extremely dense 
population. This is attributed to the fact that the housing units were composed of one or two 
rooms with simple utilities. The refugees, due to their hard economic situation, were unable 
to construct better housing units. Refugees refrained from doing so because of their belief 
that living in camps was a temporary solution, until they would return to their original 
homes. The rural background of the refugees let them to establish households where the 
extended family (grandparents, children and grandchildren) could live as well. By the turn 
of 1967, the number of refugees had increased dramatically, giving the first warning of the 
upcoming housing crisis. By the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the 
refugees started to improve their housing conditions by constructing additional rooms next to 
their units. 
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In 1960s, refugees started to improve their shelters. 
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Figure 6.2,6.3,6.4: Development of the Refugee Camps since its Establishment in 1948. 
Source: The Courtesy of UNRWA. 
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Supported by T NRWA, they built their own units and gave up using the communal 
latrines. With the improving economic conditions of the refugees, due to the availability of 
job opportunities in Israeli industrial and agricultural sectors, they expanded their shelters 
using vacant land they had previously occupied. At the beginning, refugee families took 
over as much as possible of adjacent plots of land and established a wall to preserve their 
entitlement. By the turn of the 1980s, most of the housing units became stabilised in terms 
of space. In the present conditions, 80 percent of the houses are cement brick shelters with 
asbestos roofs. Some houses built of concrete have two or three floors. Reflecting the 
financial progress of 1970s and 1980s extensions to the original plans were built, but despite 
ameliorative efforts, `hardship conditions' persist. Walls still lack proper insulation and the 
timber roofs, tiles, doors, and windows can be seen to be in deplorable state. Roy (1995: 165) 
described the prevailing conditions: 
Most of these same physical creatures remain in place although they have long 
since lost their political anchor. All sense of the temporality has vanished, 
leaving people to contend with the objectives and prosaic difficulties of the 
present. As families grew, any space between them diminished. The original 
UNRWA's units remain largely unchanged; after more than fifty years, most are 
in extremely poor condition. On average, three to four people live in each room. 
A typical room in a refugee shelter is between 9 and 12 square meters of 
inhabitable area. Per occupant, the inhabitable area can be as little as 2 square 
meters or as much as 20. 
This description is still relevant enough in 2001. The housing crisis becomes more 
apparent and acute in the camps. The large increase in the number of the population and the 
fixed area of the refugee camps since their establishment have aggravated the problem. It is 
anticipated that the natural population growth and the returns of refugee with the PNA had 
aggravated the problem in the last few years. The number of refugees since the 1950s has 
steadily risen. According to UNRWA's figures, the number in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip refugee camps at that time stood at 215,026. This increased to reach 555,542 refugees 
in 2000, living on an area of 20,678 dunums (total area of the West Bank and Gaza refugee 
camps). Thus, the density of the population is estimated at 37,35 square meters per 
individual. The situation is worsened due to other factors attributed to the proximity of the 
workplaces of refugees to the camps and the exorbitant 
house-rents in the cities, which in 
turn compel refugees to maintain their shelters in the camp. 
Living in refugee camps has 
created special features of behaviour for those who 
find it difficult to assimilate into the non- 
refugee communities. 
Chapter Six 176 
Peace Implementation Programme 
6.2.3 UNRWA's Contribution to the Construction Activities: Peace Implementation 
Programme (PIP) 
For almost 50 years, when no solution to the refugee question was in sight, UNRWA's 
role has been to provide services to the scattered Palestinian refugee population, curtailing 
social and political upheavals. Since 1993 successive General Assembly resolutions have 
called for UNRWA to make "a decisive contribution towards giving a fresh impetus to the 
economic and social stability of the occupied territories" (UNRWA, 2000: 1). UNRWA 
responded through the initiation of the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP). PIP was 
introduced after the signing of the Israeli Palestinian Declaration of Principles in 1993, to 
support the peace process in the occupied territories. The Secretary General of the United 
Nations established a task force on economic and social development of the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho. The task force made a number of recommendations in its report entitled Supporting 
the Transition: an immediate response of the United Nations to the Interim Period in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to UNRWA (1999), the programme was intended to 
act as a link between the organisations' traditional programmes and a new envisaged role. 
Two main recommendations were adopted, 
" First, that UNRWA's traditional programmes and services should be preserved and 
enhanced. 
" Second, new investments to be made in securing better life through providing basic 
physical and social infrastructure, improving public services and creating jobs. 
PIP objectives were pursued mainly in spheres where UNRWA already has a role, 
such as in education and vocational training, health care and environmental sanitation, 
income generation activities, relief assistance and social services (UNRWA, 1994: 45). 
Nevertheless, pressure has been put on these spheres of social well being since the relatively 
high levels of extra-budgetary funding for PIP coincided with continuing shortfalls in 
funding for UNRWA's regular programmes. UNRWA claimed that under the intended 
reduction in financing the regular programme by the donor countries, PIP allowed the 
agency to meet urgent needs that it might have been unable to meet and to prevent 
qualitative deterioration in many aspects of its programmes. 
PIP was worked over two stages. According to UNRWA sources, the first PIP was 
concluded in September 1994. The source emphasises that PIPII was 
developed in 
conjunction with the relevant departments of the Palestinian Authority, as well as the 
Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) with the 
goal of complementing projects undertaken by the PNA. PIP 
has remained active until 
1999. 
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6.2.4 Funds for the Project 
All funding received under PIP was earmarked by donors for specific projects to be 
undertaken by UNRWA. UNRWA (1999: 3) clarified that in November 1998 total pledges 
and contributions received, amounted to $221.3 million, of which $90.4 was under the first 
PIP and $130.9 million under the second PIP. The total number of projects funded under 
PIP was 124 financed under the first PIP and 210 under the second PIP. 
Using geography as a measure of allocation, the Gaza Strip accounted for the largest 
share of PIP pledges and contribution: $122.4 million or 56 per cent of the total. The West 
Bank, with the second largest share, was allocated $50.4 million (23 per cent). The unequal 
distribution of the PIP budget has given rise to frequent criticism. It is seen as unjust that PIP 
programmes benefit only refugees in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank, subjects of the 
current peace process, while neglecting Palestinian refugees in other regions, especially those 
in Lebanon who have greater need of help in facing the restrictions imposed by the Lebanese 
State. 
On the other hand, education related projects absorbed the largest portion of PIP 
pledges and contributions: $90 million. Initiatives in the health sector, including 
environmental health received $58.4 million. 
6.3 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF FIELDWORK MAY 2000 I 
In chapter three of this research, we saw that improving living conditions has come to 
mean securing an adequate standard of living. A good policy includes adequate shelter for 
all, adequate social and physical infrastructure, enforcement of legal framework, setting up a 
land system, creating job opportunities, supporting local capacities and enhancing the 
relationship between authority and people. A programme to alleviate the living conditions 
customarily indicates a package of improvements in streets, footpaths and drainage as well. 
Solid waste collection is included with its positive impact on health, along with streetlights 
for security and night activity. Programmes should address health issues by providing clinics 
and health education programmes, school facilities and teacher training are needed to attack 
1 The fieldwork was conducted over two periods, the first in November 1999 and the second in May and June 
2000 in the following camps. 
" Jabalya Refugee Camp: Located in the north of Gaza Strip, this camp was named after an adjacent village. At 
present, 96,737 refugees live in Jabalya Camp over an area of 1.4 square kilometres, which, is one of the most 
densely populated areas in the world. 
" Al-Shati Refugee Camp: It lies on Gaza Beach, north of Gaza City. Today the camp holds 72,888 residents on 
747 dunums, less than one square kilometre. 
" Nuseirat Refugee Camp: Located 8 kilometres south of Gaza City. The camp took its name from a Bedouin 
tribe from the area. Most of the camp (now home for 58,269 refugees) is located on the two sides of the main 
road in Nuseirat. The poorest section is known as the new camp on the north-western side. 
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the lack of basic education, and lastly programmes are offered to increase income earning 
opportunities and the general economic health of a community. 
According to UNRWA reports (1994,1995,1996,1997,1998,1999) the primary goal 
of PIP was to demonstrate to Palestine refugees the tangible benefits of the peace process by 
improving their living condition. Pursuing that outcome, the main objectives of PIP were to 
effect the following changes in refugee communities: (1) Rehabilitation of existing houses, (2) 
providing better social and physical infrastructure, (3) creating employment opportunities and 
(4) support the needy and hardship cases. UNRWA (1999: 4) claimed that after years of 
implementation, PIP largely succeeded in meeting objectives. The document stated: 
Infrastructure has been developed through the construction or expansion of 
facilities to an adequate standard, and enhancements to camp infrastructure. 
Living conditions have been improved through shelter rehabilitation schemes, 
upgrading environmental health systems, enhancing facilities refugees access on 
a daily basis, and maintaining the qualitative level of certain key I NRWA 
services. Employment opportunities have been created through use of local 
contractors for construction projects, provision of loans to small scale and micro 
enterprises, and targeted job creation initiatives. 
The discussion with UNRWA officials extended to cover various issues regarding the 
PIP. In different meeting with local committees and camp residents, the author could detect 
points of success as well as major shortcomings of the project. 
6.3.1 The Shelter Rehabilitation Programme 
Responding to the appalling shelter situation, UNRWA identified the need for a 
programme of shelter rehabilitation. UNRWA officials claimed austerity measures within 
the agency have reduced the capacity of the ambitious programme to reconstruct or simply 
maintain the homes of the families registered as special hardship cases (SHC). More cases 
were added to the list of SHC because of the natural growth rate and the poor economic 
conditions. The housing problems of the Special Hardship Cases range from substandard to 
often-hazardous conditions, in particular, structurally unstable walls, inadequate ventilation 
or limited space. An UNRWA report (1994) revealed that 
The objective of the PIP Shelter Rehabilitation Programme was two-fold: to 
ensure that dwellings meet the minimum requirements of space, health 
conditions and the needs of the family and to generate employment in refugee 
communities. 
In 1993, UNRWA started to construct shelters for the families whose original shelters had 
been demolished or had become dilapidated. The quality of the shelters constructed by the 
Agency under this programme is better than those constructed in 1950s. 2050 shelters have 
been repaired and 2380 reconstructed as a result of PIP. In human terms, approximately 
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22,095 persons have benefited in Gaza As UNRWA's documents showed, many more 
refugees have been employed from the construction industries through the work of the 
Shelter Rehabilitation Programme. 
In various visits to several of those shelters rehabilitated under the PIP programme, the 
author interviewed beneficiaries asking how they felt about their new dwellings. They 
clarified that UNRWA hired a local contractor to build concrete new house for them under 
the supervision of the Agency engineering staff. It is worth noting that the beneficiaries' 
involvement was limited to the use of the new built house. The standard shelter 
rehabilitation project provides one living room and sanitation facilities, at an average cost of 
$5,000. In addition, many shelters have been fitted with a connection to the sewerage 
system in the camp if available. 
Though the programme seems to have improved the lives of a number of Palestinian 
refugees, the rest are enraged at the deteriorating situation of their dwellings. They insisted 
that the PIP projects and Shelter Rehabilitation Programme in particular brought no benefits 
to them. An example of the adverse comments came from a teacher at an UNRWA school. 
He explained how the ratio between those helped and those receiving no help remains 
severely unbalanced: 
It is true that houses have been constructed and others have been repaired and 
that they are important. However, while twenty out of a thousand of houses 
were improved many people fell out of the Special Hardship Cases programmes. 
A refugee invited the author to have a look in his house, describing the hard life he 
experienced. He asserted that he applied to the UNRWA Shelter Rehabilitation Programme 
but because he was not registered in the SHC, he discovered he was ineligible. His problem 
was aggravated due to the infrastructure deterioration. The small shelter was not connected 
to a sewerage network, forcing him to use a small pit in his bedroom for collecting waste. 
Surveying the shelter, the author also found that the kitchen was adjacent to the WC. 
Cooking spaces were limited with kerosene burners placed in open family areas, in turn 
increasing the risk of injury to the inhabitants. The refugee continued, reporting that his 
application was refused because his son was an unmarried adult. However, the 
Agency's 
assessment seems misguided since his son was not working anywhere and therefore a 
dependant, not an income-provider. 
Other comments by refugees were made such as the programme criteria's unfairness, 
and the very limited numbers who have been assisted. 
An example of challenging 
comments by a refugee was The Agency constructed shelter 
for him comprised of 3x3 
(2.5 meters hei(Tht) room". He claimed that many 
families have transformed these shelters 
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into warehouses and sought houses in other areas. Another point regarding the design of the 
shelter units, as a beneficiary reported, was that the Agency failed to take into account the 
extremely high temperature in the summer. This requires the installation of ceiling fans, a 
need completely ignored. 
Contradicting what the refugees said, Manna' the Director of the Projects Department 
at Gaza Field Office, and other beneficiaries emphasised that the process was clear and easy 
to monitor. When determining a need for shelter rehabilitation, the agency's social workers 
examined the circumstances of the family, the physical condition of the shelter and eligibility 
criteria. 
Figure 6.5: Shelter Rehabilitation Programme in One of the Refugee Camps. 
Source: The Courtesy of UNRWA. 
Problems existed as one refugee's complaint attested: "It took me two years to be 
chosen from the long queue". Another refugee alleged that his neighbour succeeded in 
winning improvement on two houses, by registering under two different names. The 
complainant added he might have a relative working as social surveyor. Manna' claimed 
that he never heard such criticism and emphasised again that fair selection was implemented 
according to the overall criteria". Abu Ouda, an UNRWA official working in the Public 
Information Office supported his colleague's claims "Despite my position, my sister's case 
took two years to be chosen. " 
At various meetings with local committee members, and public gathering such as Aldhvan, 
many people doubted the project relevance to their real needs. The author recognised 
refüugees' demands regarding the housing crisis in the camps. These claims can assist 
UNRWA to formulate a policy for intervention in other projects. spheres ignored in PIP. 
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Land Ownership and Houses Prices 
All land in camps is either owned or rented by UNRWA from Palestinians originally 
from Gaza Strip. Over the years, the vast majority of people have built and upgraded their 
shelters incrementally. In addition, refugees tend to buy and sell their shelters to each other. 
As a refugee explained "Due to the displacement in the wake of 1967 war and early 1970s, 
UNRWA approved at the time the practice of registering more than one housing unit under 
the same individual. This resulted in a situation where certain refugees own extensive areas 
of land inside the camps, while others hardly satisfied their housing needs. " This in turn 
caused the shelter-rent phenomenon or prices of shelters to be exaggerated: this is not only 
limited to shelters but also applies to commercial premises. On the other hand, due to the 
cramped living spaces and units and the increasing needs of the population, the demand on 
housing units and plots of land subsequently increased. The prices of housing units and land 
in the camps reached unimaginable rates. For example, during the authors last visit on May 
2000, the price of one square meter was anywhere between $20-30; in the main streets, the 
price reached $100 to $150. A refugee said that he bought his house from another refugee 
who moved to a larger house in the same camp. He paid fifteen thousand dollars for his new 
shelter. 
Refugees treat shelters as their property. However, Hossam Manna' explained 
"UNRWA considers the refugees as tenants and not as owners even if the refugee incurs 
building expenses. " This statement is verified by documents signed by refugees when 
receiving shelters. The Agency is entitled to repossess the shelter at any time. The author 
believes that there is an absence of regulations. It is not clear if there are controls on any of 
these practices. Moreover, if there are, who provides and enforces them? 
The Absence of a Law Enforcement Body 
The absence of law enforcement to supervise the rules of construction in the camps 
has led to a particular type of problem. When the old cramped rooms became unfit to absorb 
the increasing numbers of family members, refugees started to demolish their shelters and 
constructed new ones using iron bars and cement. UNRWA has failed to technically 
supervise the construction, leaving it to the discretion of owners and the contractors. 
Consequently, refugees started to build vertically. The Agency seems never to object to two- 
storey shelters though it did not supervise the foundations and concrete on which the first 
floor originally was established. Further, refugees started to construct three and four stories 
on top of their shelters. It was observed that these added 
floors are composed of rooms built 
on top of each other. 
Chapter SLY 182 
Peace Implementation Programme 
With the lack of regulations. some Palestinians working in the Security apparatus and 
the PNA encroached upon privately owned lands situated in the camps, causing pathways to 
become further narrowed. As one refugee reported "During funerals, the deceased are 
moved from one shelter to the other through the windows so as to reach the main street to be 
placed in the coffin. " Consequently, the traditional view of the camps became totally 
different. The green trees and house-gardens that the refugees used to maintain in order to 
mimic the environment of their original homes gradually has vanished. 
Considering that the original foundations of the shelters in the camp were not designed 
to hold multi-storeyed shelters, one can note that there are prospects of a future catastrophe. 
He wonders what will happen if the residents decide to increase the stories on already 
existing multi-storey shelters. The author himself suffered from this problem during his stay 
in Jabalya refugee camp between 1995-1997. Both adjacent neighbours decided to build two 
and three stories respectively. Thus, the author's house, located between the two high 
dwellings, was deprived of natural light and ventilation in addition to privacy. The 
proximity of the housing units to each other and the non-compliance to technical regulations 
has caused problems among neighbours. Due to cultural customs, the author's family was 
unable to complain in the above case. 
In another problem noted, a refugee merchant abused the privilege of the camps being 
tax-free areas, and the availability of cheap labour. He constructed a warehouse for building 
materials in the centre of a neighbourhood that resulted in an environmental hazard. None of 
the refugees complained, either due to the cultural tradition or since the man is supported by 
the PNA. 
Refugees are objecting, because UNRWA had stopped registering housing units and 
transferring property from one refugee to another. This has compelled the refugees to resort 
to individual contracts, though UNRWA does not recognise the validity of these. As Abu 
Faiz a local leader in Jabalya Camp anticipated "This will cause ownership and property 
disputes among the refugee population in the future. " Abu Faiz justified the chaos: "The 
refugees pay no attention to the position of the Agency or the Palestinian Authority due to 
their pressing need for housing, and the absence of a an executive body to enforce laws and 
regulations. " 
The author asked UNRWA sources why they ignored these problems. No answers 
were offered, as was the case when the author investigated PNA circles. The author 
understands that during the Israeli occupation, the Israelis tended to seize power 
from 
UNRWA. Therefore, UNRA'A did not enjoy authority over its owned and rented land in the 
ar\ camps. The Israeli authorities employed various policies to suppress any 
Palestinian milit 
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resistance such as widening the street, and demolishing houses without any consideration of 
UNRWA and its mandate as representative of the international community. Israel launched 
a policy of presenting the reality in the camps as the only acceptable solution to the refugee 
problem. In the last seven years, neither UNRWA nor the PNA has re-assumed legal power 
in refugee camps. Lax regulations have resulted in many complicated social and physical 
problems. It is also clear that the sensitivity of the refugees' issue in the ongoing peace 
process has limited the role of different stakeholders in order to avoid criticism on political 
grounds. 
,, x 
Figure 6.6: Enviornmental Hazards in Jablaya Refugee Camp 
Source: The Author (May 2000) 
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Figure 6.7: Building without Regulations 
Source: The Author (May 2000) 
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Abu Faiz demanded that UNRWA should "Establish an urgent and executive body to 
organise and technically supervise construction activities". 
He proposed that this body 
should be responsible for supervising refugees who wish to construct multi-storey 
houses 
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and make them pay attention to technical rules and regulations and to take into account 
public safety requirements. 
" Expanding the boundaries of those expandable camps, particularly those bounded by 
public lands. 
" Resuming the policy of registration of housing units under the names of refugees, i. e. 
transfer of property from one name to another. In this regard, UNRWA should transfer 
the registration of housing units for refugees living outside refugee camps to those who 
live in camps and suffer from housing crisis. 
" Establishing new camps to absorb the increasing number of refugees. These camps, 
however, should fall under UNRWA's responsibility so as not to be interpreted as an 
attempt to resettle refugees. 
" Establishing improved infrastructure in the refugee camps (e. g. sewer system, roads, and 
water supplies), and to establish public squares and playgrounds. 
Responding to refugees' recommendations Manna' said, "The other components of 
the PIP programme meet their needs of adequate infrastructure. The project aimed to 
improve the physical as well as the social services. 
6.3.2 Adequate Infrastructure 
Isam Miqdadi, Chief of the Special Environmental Health Programme (SEHP), stated 
that his department initiated a component of the PIP package to provide adequate 
infrastructure. The work included carrying out feasibility studies for sewerage, storm water 
drainage and solid waste management. He mentioned that the total cost of the project was 
$1,549,000 and more than $15 million invested in environmental health projects. UNRWA 
(1999) claimed that PIP contributions had a very positive impact on the quality of life for 
many refugee camps. It contributed to the improvement of the environmental health of 
refugees. Better quality of water, sound sewage network and regular solid waste disposal 
reduced the frequency of communicable disease and exposure to bacteria. 
Through field observation and refugees' comments, the author examined the impact 
and effectiveness of this component of PIP. Below evidence is presented to portray the 
conditions of what the author recorded in November 1999 and May 2000. 
Water: A refugee from Jabalya Camp described the drinking water situation, pointing 
out some anomalies: 
Yes, all shelters in the camps have some form of piped water supply. In many 
cases, however, services are intermittent, resulting in as little as a half=hour's 
supply per day. Although most shelters have roof tanks in some cases water 
Chapter Six 185 
Peace Implementation Programme 
may be unavailable for a long time. In the summer, the roof tanks are not 
enough. 
The quantity of water is insufficient for average family needs. This must be considered 
unsatisfactory. As one refugee reported: "It is much better to have sufficient water of 
acceptable quality than to have small amounts of water of superior quality". The author 
visited a local well and surprisingly observed how the water was dirty and full of nitrates. 
According to Emteer, the Municipality's engineer: "This high salinity level exceeds the 
World Health Organisation recommended upper limit. " He further commented it also has an 
unpleasant taste. High quantities of nitrate can be dangerous causing disease. 
Figure 6.8: Sewerage Plant in Refugee Camp 
Source: The author (May 2000) 
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Wastewater Collection: Although all houses in the camps are connected to the water 
supply systems, the handling of wastewater has received limited attention with only 47% of 
shelters provided with conventional piped sewer systems (UNRWA, 1999: 13). Pits of 
variable size and construction serve all other houses, which are supposed to collect the water 
from kitchens, bathing and washing. Therefore, the pits have to be emptied from time to 
time. Environmental health conditions worsen during the winter, when sewage in the gullies 
mixes with storm-water. In addition, flooding is common in that season due to the poor 
drainage facilities, a situation creating further health hazards for the population. Due to the 
overcrowding in refugee camps and the proximity of shelters to each other, the foundations 
of these shelters are liable to be affected by the leakage of wastewater and there is a real risk 
that drinking water may be contaminated. In addition, the existence of thousands of pits 
could be the potential for a disaster if that area were subjected to an earthquake irrespective 
of its magnitude, a refugee claimed. 
y. `° -l 
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Figure 6.9: Rainwater in Refugee Camp 
Source: The Courtesy of UNRWA. 
The problem is complicated due to the quality of roads, which are seldom paved. 
Only the major routes have asphalt layers and even in these cases, the surface is irregular. 
The majority of roads and all footpaths consist of loose fine sand without any sort of 
treatment for creating cohesion with the top layer. The loose sand on most roads and 
footpaths creates problems during heavy rainfall, when the sand is washed away, particularly 
from sloping streets, into the few existing rainwater gullies and wastewater sewers causing 
extensive blockages. 
Another problem faces the refugees in the rain water disposal. The problem is 
rendered more serious due to the height of the houses, which lack guttering. All storm-water 
runs straight off from roofs and spreads out across unpaved streets and pathways; there are 
only a few empty lots and other unpaved areas to accommodate overflow. During intensive 
rainfall, the streets and alleys quickly become conduits for excess run-off. As a result, 
especially in low areas and depressions within the camps, serious flooding occurs. 
Solid Waste: T NRWA operates garbage sweeping and collection services for the 
streets and pathways. Yet, solid waste can still be seen in many areas. Inevitably, 
depositories over flow, resulting in the accumulation of piles of garbage that, in the summer, 
rapidly provide breeding grounds for flies and other insects. Although there is little 
accumulation of solid waste in and around the dwellings themselves, indiscriminate dumping 
can be observed on access routes. The environmental conditions that arise from uncontrolled 
dumping are well known, including support of disease, risks from direct human contact with 
the waste, and the danger of contaminating surface water and groundwater supplies. 
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Figure 6.10: Solid Waste in Refugee Camp 
Source: The Author (May 2000) 
Social Infrastructure 
The most important social services are education, health and recreation, each essential 
for the development of Palestinian life. 
Education: When UNRWA began its programme in 1950, schools were 
accommodated in tents or rented premises. Gradually temporary structures were replaced 
with a comprehensive network of educational facilities. It is evident that during the past fifty 
years, UNRWA has provided Palestine refugee children and youth with basic education 
services, vocational and technical education and teacher training. According to the Deputy 
Director of the Education Programme in Gaza field office: "The Peace Implementation 
Programme mobilised funds to mitigate the shortage of schools classroom space and 
specialised facilities". Mrs Mohysen added: "Funds from PIP have built 68 schools, 
upgraded 165 schools, built and furnished 187 classrooms and 46 specialised rooms and 
allowed comprehensive maintenance of 64 schools. These projects have boosted the 
education programme's capacity to deliver services. " 
An UNRWA official document claimed that the PIP programme stabilised the 
classroom occupancy rate as well as the student teacher ratio. Further, related to the issue of 
class space, PIP projects have also avoided additional double shifting and the possibility of 
triple shifting. 
Accessibility to improved facilities has improved the capacity of UNRWA 
schools to promote extra-curricular activities, educational resources such as 
libraries, laboratories, computer rooms and multipurpose rooms and to tailor 
technical training courses to the demands of the local labour market. 
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Picture 6.11: New Refurbished School in Refugee Camps in Gaza Strip 
Source: The Author (May 2000) 
In May 2000, Mr Mohram, a headmaster of refugee school in Jabalya Camp, saw the 
education problems, which still exist, as "... an acute shortage of classroom space, lack of 
facilities, equipment and dilapidated structures". He argued that UNRWA schools have 
witnessed an almost 4 to 6 percent annual increase in enrolment or some 10,500 additional 
pupils per year and the educational facilities have not been able to match this rate of increase 
for many years. The UNRWA school infrastructure simply could not accommodate the 
existing cohort of students. The high class room occupancy rate threatened to compromise 
UNRWA standards and schools were frequently double shifted. Double shifting of schools 
has the effect of reducing class items and accessibility to specialised facilities and extra 
curricular activities. Given the expanding student population and austerity measures, double 
shift is one of the problems facing the agency. Often when student enrolment exceeded 
school capacity UNRWA has been obliged to accommodate students in unsuitable rented 
buildings. 
The headmaster continued "In addition, rented buildings have not been designed for 
educational purposes and they lack adequate class space, specialised rooms and suitable 
health standards, a number of schools have deteriorated to such as extent that it has been no 
longer safe to conduct classes in the building. There has been an acute shortage of 
specialised science laboratories, computer facilities, vocation workshops and library; lack of 
external works, physical activity facilities, water reservoirs and latrines". 
With these limitations, it is debatable if the UNRWA's programme can achieve any 
distinction or play a meaningful role in the life of refugees. The headmaster's comments 
show that despite spending on such a scale, UNRWA has not improved the situation, but just 
stopped it getting worse. It shows the enormous problems facing UNRWA and the PNA. 
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Health Services 
UNRWA identified primary health care facilities as a major target for infrastructure 
improvement under PIP. An UNRWA report (1999: 14) claimed that the following 
objectives have been achieved: 
The refugees have improved access to medical consultations. dental 
consultations and basic medical care dressings and injections; as a measure of 
increased UNRWA capacity to deliver medical care additional primary health 
care. 
The fieldwork findings reveal conflicting facts. UNRWA has 17 health centres and 
sub-centres making up its health infrastructure, with a health centre in each refugee camp. 
For example, Jabalya Camp (largest camp in Gaza) is served by only one health centre. It 
undertakes outpatient care, concentrating on a broad spectrum of services: re-hydration and 
nutrition, obstetrics care, health education and paediatrics care. Dental services are provided 
on a very limited scale. No hospitalisation service exists within UNRWA's system and 
patients are transferred to PNA hospitals, which have been partially upgraded but still lack 
vital equipment. Patients in need of specialised treatment usually are transferred to Israeli, 
Jordanian, or Egyptian hospitals, but not all Palestinian have access to these services due to 
the high expenses involved and the corrupted health care structure that is said to favour 
certain patients - perhaps with PNA connections over others. 
The total number of people registered at UNRWA clinics in 1999 was 746,050, while 
doctors working in UNRWA health centres did not exceed 200 (UN, 1999), an average of 
one doctor per 3,730.25 patients. UNRWA clinics are cleaner and better-staffed facilities 
than those under PNA supervision. However, they suffer from a severe lack of equipment, 
staff, and physical space. Furthermore, UNRWA operates laboratories (located in its health 
centres) though limited in the tests that can be performed, they are still able to serve the basic 
needs of the centres. 
Recreation Facilities 
Unfortunately, there is an apparent lack of recreation places for both adults and 
children. UNRWA operates only eight youth centres spread throughout the camps. 
Nevertheless, these centres introduce a variety of activities; for instance. sport and social 
services. Simultaneously, youth centres contribute by improving the community's 
level of 
knowledge through running computer courses, as well as being sites where public meetings 
are convened. or conferences and lectures held. Further affecting the provision of 
recreational spaces, controversially, in order to cope with the 
large number of children in 
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school, UNRWA has built new classrooms in the form of so-called "school playgrounds and 
gardens. " These measures could be seen as retrogressive as they deprive children of a basic 
right: places to play. To alleviate the conflict, since 1995 the Palestinian Economic Council 
for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) has co-operated with the Norwegian 
government to provide Gaza Strip's children with playgrounds. Despite the resulting 
increase, there are insufficient places to accommodate the high number of children in the 
population, as demographic facts. A refugee pointed out how limited and gender-specific 
recreation opportunities are: 
Here in the camp the only social centre or place of organised entertainment is 
the UNRWA club, and it only caters for adolescents and young men. I am 
happy that they have somewhere to go where they can play sport, sit, and 
discuss things, but what is there for the women, the children and older people 
like me? There are no cinemas or theatres, libraries, garden or restaurants, if I 
want to go somewhere for entertainment I will not find. You can say there is no 
playgrounds for the children either, so they spend their time playing in the piles 
of rubbish that never disappear or damming the sewage with sand in the 
alleyways. 
M' 
p rl : ýl I HI ýrf' 
p .I tl4l iiLL 
]l I 
19 ý, 
. 
`'ý. j 
ýý ", 
Figure 6.12: A Closed Public Garden in Jabalya Camp 
Source: The Author (May 22000) 
6.3.3 Creating Job Opportunities 
UNRWA launched its Income Generation Programme in the Gaza Strip in response to 
the region's quickly deteriorating economic conditions, marked by high unemployment and 
spreading poverty following the outbreak of the Intifada and the Gulf War. Alex Bolloc, 
Chief Director of the Development and Planning Unit in Gaza Field Office, explained that 
the proorarnnie was organised around three revolving loan funds making credit to small- 
scale enterprises. 
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The three programmes were the Solidarity Group Lending, the Small Business and the 
Micro-Enterprise Credit. Bolloc elaborated that the three loan funds helped promote small 
business development opportunities, create new and safeguard old jobs. The loans 
reinforced businesses ranging in size from micro vending employing one or two to small 
industries employing up to 28. He further outlined that the funds' clients represented distinct 
groups of borrowers, so that the Income Generation Programme met a variety of needs. It 
provided working capital and investment funds to industries and services firms and also 
contributed to alleviate poverty and generating incomes among owners of smaller 
enterprises. Nasser Jabber, official in charge for the loans, argued that the project facilitated 
the funding of 313 projects amounting to $6,350,400 in Gaza. He praised the initiative. 
calculating: "PIP loans were instrumental in creating 1,129 new jobs and maintaining 809 
jobs in the recipient business". 
Jabber contended: "We are the only Programme, which empowers the local 
community through involving poor women in our work. Through the Solidarity Group- 
Lending (SGL) programme we make credit available to women working in micro 
enterprises. " These women number among the most needy in the population. The 
programme helped to ensure that women gained a fairer share of the value of the sale for 
their products. 
SGL clients were organised into solidarity groups that serve as a guarantee mechanism 
as long as each member is current in her repayments. All members were eligible for 
additional loans. Until clients established reliable credit, an individual loan was limited to 
$300 and repayment period set as six months. The peer-lending model was successful in 
repayment rates with 100 percent of all loans repaid. The SGL programme received moneys 
to fund 2,249 individual loans to women in 386 groups in Gaza: 
" As each woman has 9 dependants on average, the loans benefited approximately 22,490 
people including the borrowers. 
" The programme encouraged women to save, in order to repay their loans enabling them 
increase income. 
" The programme promoted co-operation and the exchange of 
information among 
different group members. It also provided opportunities for them to participate in group- 
decision-making and fostered social relationships. 
The programme achieved reasonable success as its employees claimed. However. an 
economist commented that this programme despite the apparent benefits had disadvantaged 
the local economy. Reflecting the peace agreement limitations, PNA has been unable to 
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enforce legislation in the Palestinian Territories. It was possible to import commodities from 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and China at a lower price than the Palestinian value. 
Beneficiaries' women used to travel to Egypt and return with smuggled commodities, selling 
them in Gazan markets under-cutting local suppliers. This practice helped to diminish the 
small business industry in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. According to the same 
economist, in the last year at least, 500 small textile workshops have closed down due to the 
unfair competition from Chinese products and the like. 
4 
Figure 6.13: Beneficiaries of PIP Programme 
Source: The Courtesy of UNRWA. 
Another complaint from refugees was the difficulties they experienced in trying to 
qualify for the loan programme. According to unofficial information provided by UNRWA 
staff, who would-be businessmen/women needed to present feasibility studies, which many 
could only provide if they were able to pay for expert services. If the loan application was 
denied, resources invested for the feasibility study were lost. 
The same economist further disputed the value of the Income Generation Programme, 
arguing that the programme had a short-term budget. It allowed UNRWA to employ 2,700 
persons for a period of no more than five months, far short of meeting the needs of refugees 
in the Gaza Strip. Jobs created in this framework were mainly simple public services 
(especially street cleaning) with few alternatives for the qualified unemployed. Camp 
Improvement Programmes were introduced in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The 
economist wondered if cleaning the streets amounted to a successful income generation 
programme. 
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6.3.4 Promoting Participation and Building Local Capacities 
The community in human settlement projects plays an essential role. Popular 
participation in the decision-making process concerns the setting up of projects and 
determining goals, components and priorities. This participation extends through all stages 
of a project's life: from planning to completion. 
In PIP, it has been noted that refugees had no weight or influence in the decision- 
making process. Adopting a top-to-bottom strategy, decisions were made without any 
involvement from beneficiaries. In the meantime, huge sums of money have been spent 
without consideration for building local capacities and thus creating more dependence on the 
Agency. Another point is the excluding of local staff in decision making in programmes 
such as PIP. The local staff of UNRWA has no influence over the Agency policy as one 
member illustrated: 
We among the UNRWA staff have very little control over policy, which is 
usually decided by offices in the headquarters or even there in New York. We 
just carry out their policy. Occasionally a Palestinian initiative is accepted but if 
the key people are against the idea, they can just say that there is not money 
enough in the budget for it. 
In support of the author's observation, the British Department for International 
Development (DFID) has funded a programme to provide the Al-Shati Camp with a 
sewerage system. UNRWA implemented the project under the PIP budget. According to 
Save the Children Federation (SCF) employee Sahar Abu Samara, "DFID was not satisfied 
with UNRWA's performance in the project due to lack of public participation and many 
technical shortcomings". DFID has mandated SCF to evaluate the project in the Al-Shati 
Camp. An Evaluation Report, prepared by Save the Children Federation in Gaza Strip, 
supported the above observation. The report indicated the inadequacies of the sewage 
project disclosing that community leaders disapproved the infrastructure design and 
construction. The Save the Children report mentioned that UNRWA did not take into 
consideration public awareness, essential for the sustainability of the project. The committee 
found that "Many house connections have been broken directly into the sewer mains, and 
house sewer lines connected directly into the storm water conduits. " It has been observed 
that the beneficiaries due to lack of awareness have misused the system in different ways. 
For example they use toilets as garbage bins; sweeping dirt from the floors of houses into the 
floor drains; putting garbage down sink drains; opening manholes to let storm water and 
sand into the sewers; and workers leaving manholes open and unattended. 
Miqdadi rejected the SCF report's findings. He said that the report is unfair, biased 
and lacks accuracy and does not differentiate between observation, facts and opinions. 
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Despite his objections, one can argue that the report indicated many facts and by using the 
methodology of Rapid Participatory Appraisal, SCF has listened to the real beneficiaries, 
drawing lessons from their points of view. The evaluation report ended by setting a 
guideline for future UNRWA involvement in environmental health programmes. These 
included technical, environmental, economic, financial, institutional and social 
recommendations. In summary, according to the SCF report, projects should not be 
conceived and service levels set without close examination of existing cultural habits, 
incomes and hopes and aspirations of the community. Without the full participation and 
understanding of beneficiaries, the project can not be expected to have a successful outcome. 
The author inquired about the limited level of public involvement in UNRWA project. 
Alqura UNRWA Public Relation official questioned "What is the need for public 
involvement in these projects? " He continued to say "Do you think that refugees in the 
camps know more than us. We usually prepare a list of projects and send it the donor 
countries. This is a simple process, which has worked in every programme in the Palestinian 
Territories". Alqura's questions regarding public participation was answered by a 
Palestinian refugee who managed to bring people to participate in public activities. `Maher' 
described his voluntary committee's work, its successes and the problems it faced: 
Once, we decided to establish a voluntary work committee in the camp. Our 
aim was to deal with the problem of lack of adequate services in the camps. Our 
plan was to recruit and channel some of the youths to offer their services to the 
people and so on. 
Maher and his friends started work; cleaning roads and generally helping people 
victimised by the camp's conditions and occupation. He reported: "Things were not easy at 
first. We had no material resources for our activities because it was forbidden by laws to 
collect money. Sometimes, after we had cleaned the sand away from the roads, we had 
returned later to find that it had all blown back. We also had to overcome the suspicion of 
some people in the camp. 
Maher's experience relied on the ground that his work was not a new phenomenon 
among the Palestinian community. The concept of helping each other in difficult times has 
always existed. Maher explained that it was important for his group to establish good 
relations with the community. They started to organise a series of lectures to explain their 
aims and plans. After this, they felt that the committee's activities would spread their 
message through contacts with committees in other refugee camps. 
He continued to outline "We broadened our activities to renting a space in the centre of 
the refugee camp. We arranged to have a public library, computer room, and classrooms 
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built". Unfortunately.. Maher contacted UNRWA to help him sustain and develop his 
successful scheme, but he received no response. The author went to the UNRWA field 
office to enquire their reluctance to help this group. The answer was "It is not our job to 
empower communities". Maher expressed his frustration with UNRWA, and greatly 
motivated, he presented his viewpoint: 
Our activities expanded, and now it is quite varied depending on what wk-e can 
organise at any given time. It may involve disposing of rubbish in the streets, 
arranging medical trips, bringing a specialist volunteer doctor to visit the camp's 
kindergartens or organising extra classes for students 
Maher argued that the youths `find themselves' when they become involved in the 
voluntary work. They discover their potential to give, they learn about themselves and each 
other. This group's commitment has proposed a way for the younger generation to become 
aware of their cause and the refugee community's potential to build a new state. 
In the past, political consideration, technocratic modes of planning and paternalistic 
attitudes towards refugees have distorted policy-making and lessened the value given to the 
refugees' viewpoint. The experience of Maher shows that the involvement of intended 
beneficiaries in planning, management and service provision is vital for the success of a 
specific project. Accordingly, the Palestinian refugees must be consulted in relation to their 
needs, priorities and be involved. They represent the party, which is well aware of its 
conditions and problems and is most capable of prioritising and addressing them in 
accordance with their own needs. Refugee participation must be meaningful at every stage, 
not only planning, but also during implementation and evaluation when there should be an 
explicit comparison made between actual and projected results. To reinforce this process, 
beneficiaries need to be trained to equip themselves with necessary skills to achieve project 
objectives. It will also be necessary for UNRWA staff to understand this, and to change their 
attitudes. 
6.3.5 Institutional Co-ordination and Supporting Local Authorities 
When UNRWA identified the projects that could be undertaken to improve living 
conditions in the refugee camps, consultations were carried out with the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation leadership in order to secure political support for the project. 
(UNRWA, 1999: 2). In addition, the UNRWA document showed that consultation was 
undertaken with the major donor countries to reach a common understanding of the agency's 
role. Following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, UNRWA showed its 
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keenness to co-operate in several joint ventures. The existence of UNRWA-PNA projects, 
usually called `projects of co-operation', was affirmed by Issa Alqura. This applies to the 
European Hospital near Rafah: being built within the framework of a special UNRWA 
project financed by the European Community. UNRWA delivered the responsibility to the 
PNA to take over the hospital's administration. Clearly large-scale infrastructure projects, 
e. g. sewage systems, financed by foreign donors through UNRWA or the PNA, require the 
co-operation of the two bodies. Declining standards in UNRWA health and education 
provisions because of the crisis in the regular budget has compelled an increasing number of 
refugees to seek PNA's public services. Hossam Manna' gave examples for co-operation 
between the two parties: "The PNA asked UNRWA to build schools in certain locations and 
we did. " He added that UNRWA helped to build houses for the returnee and police forces. 
Miqdadi mentioned how UNRWA combined with the Palestinian Authority and worked to 
transfer experience to the new Palestinian institutions by organising joint workshops and 
courses. He stressed "Co-operation with the authority is inevitable". It is not possible to 
build the infrastructure of refugee camps without integrating it in the national plan. 
Nevertheless, no explanation has been offered for the lack of co-ordination with 
municipalities to provide services for the refugees i. e. clean water. Findings of this research 
reveal that co-ordination is weak between local councils and UNRWA. The water provision 
in Jabalya Camp is an example. The Municipality of Jabalya's engineer claimed that he has 
been ready to solve the water dilemma for a long time. But he alleged "We have offered 
UNRWA several ways to provide the refugees with better quality and quantity of water, but 
unfortunately they insisted on a `take it all or leave it all' approach". He understood it as an 
UNRWA ploy to cancel its services in the camps. "Our people in the camps are the 
victims", he argued. 
Also refugees showed concern about the lack of co-ordination between PNA and 
LTNRWA. A refugee and UNRWA officer in the camps complained about disappearing 
money in the process of implementation of projects carried out in co-operation with the 
PNA. He attributed this to the lack of co-ordination, corruption, high administrative 
expenses, and mismanagement within UNRWA. Frequently, projects must be re-planned 
after discovering that the original plans do not meet the conditions found during 
implementation. This wasted large sums of money not visible in the final programme result. 
UNRWA sources clarified that aid was often re-programmed, delayed, or re-channelled for 
many reasons, frequently associated with the donor's priorities. Donors delay and re- 
channel their f zds, and have the habit of announcing a single contribution on more than one 
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occasion creating the impression that they were contributing more, but in fact, no matter the 
occasions, the money was paid once and often with long delays. 
6.3.6. The Peace Process and its Consequences 
In the author's first visit to UNRWA office in Gaza, the Department of Public 
Relations was reluctant to assist in carrying out the research investigations. A little help was 
offered providing the author with descriptions of T NRWA's mandate and press releases. 
After several attempts they co-operated, justifying the initial attitude to the political 
sensitivity of the subject under study. Was it coincidence that Hossam Manna' attributed the 
limitation of PIP activities to political sensitivity? He argued "It is not expected that 
UNRWA go and carry out a large-scale upgrading programme in the refugee camps because 
Palestinian public opinion would understand the step as a trick to terminate UNRWA 
services and liquidate the refugees question. " 
Understandably, the Palestinian refugees are the backbone of the Palestinian question. 
Their fundamental concern is the right of return to their homes and properties. The Israeli- 
Palestinian agreements failed to guarantee or promise this basic right. The Oslo Accords left 
the refugee issue to the so-called final status negotiation. Over time, the feeling has spread 
among Palestinians that improving the living conditions in the camps might imply the 
termination of UNRWA services and solving the issue by resettling the refugees. This has 
raised suspicion among the refugees as well as the intellectual and academic Palestinians 
towards PIP. 
Rabah (1997: 35) doubted that PIP involved a political not technical and humanitarian 
agenda. He argued that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the PNA had become a test 
case for the transfer of T NRWA services. If it proved feasible -taking into account the 
political acceptance among the local refugee community- the organisation and its 
counterparts would likely be more proactive in working toward similar results in other host 
countries. The author discussed this issue with PNA, UNRWA official and local refugees. 
In general, PNA officials reiterated that the PNA does not wish to take over 
UNRWA's tasks. The Director for Co-operation with NGOs in the PNA Ministry of NGOs 
emphasised that UNRWA should remain until a final solution to the refugee problem is 
achieved. He would like to see UNRWA an active participant in the search for a solution, 
which must include all refugees. At the same time, he stressed that no official PNA position 
towards a hand-over of UNRWA tasks exists. 
Statements by UNRIA'A officials reflected a similar attitude. On several occasions, 
UNRWA's political mandate has been emphasised. Asked if UNRWA favoured refugee 
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integration by means of the hand-over of services, Gaza Public Relation Director Issa Alqura 
replied: "The agency promotes return or compensation. UNRWA wants to keep the refugee 
issue alive". On the other hand, he was cautious when asked whether the current decrease of 
UNRWA services could end in a de facto hand-over. "This has to be discussed when the 
situation is clearer" he responded. Asked if this was not just wishful thinking, as a voluntary 
take-over of UNRWA's services seemed unlikely, he referred to the uncertain conditions, 
that the final negotiations about refugee issues remains to be controversial, and that clear 
answers are still missing. 
On the other hand, the refugee community, who daily experience the reality of 
decreasing traditional services in the Palestinian Territories, expresses their suspicion that 
PIP is a move against their rights. A Palestinian refugee believed that UNRWA's existence 
from the very beginning was a Western conspiracy, stating: 
UNRWA is giving us morphine injections; its creation was a conspiracy of the 
world, if we had been left also we would never have accepted being transported. 
But we were pacified by the meagre of two kilos of oil, two kilos of rice and the 
blankets, which the entire world had used before us, they have made beggars out 
of us. Now they repeat the ploy. 
Against this, one refugee told the author: If UNRWA finishes its work, the refugee 
problem will be finished", "It is very easy, if UNRWA hands over we will lose every thing 
because we will lose our identity". An interviewed UNRWA official, himself a refugee said: 
"We need a Palestinian Authority and not strangers to rule us, but I oppose any hand-over to 
the PNA. If this takes place I will retire from my job; the people will even start another 
Intifada against the PNA, if they take over the services. " Another UNRWA employee 
rejected this polemic, arguing, "I know some people say that UNRWA pacifies, making us 
less likely to resist. This is not true. It was UNRWA that created the idea of resistance, they 
have not been able to stop it nor have they wanted to. The PLO has good relation with 
LTNRWA, there is no conflict of interest in UNRWA providing services and not leadership". 
The author attributes Palestinian suspicion toward the project (PIP) to several 
reasons. 
" Refugees fear that this project is the 
last UNRWA service. In addition, the fear exists 
that standard of services will further decline, if the PNA take over. 
" Refugees doubt that the PNA would actually 
be granted the same amount of funds 
UNRWA currently receives. 
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" Refugees say that they are aware of the corruption and nepotism prevailing in PNA's 
institutions. They argue that political affiliation of the applicant might become the major 
criteria for access to services. 
" UNRWA services and employment opportunities are indispensable for the refugee 
communities. 
Finally, refugees fear that a hand-over of UNRWA responsibilities to the PNA would 
result in the loss of their special, internationally protected refugee status. The issue 
would be dropped from the agenda of the international community, and they would 
forfeit their chance to benefit from the enactment of UN resolutions on the refugee 
question. 
6.3.7 PIP and Aid Policies 
A refugee working in UNRWA headquarters claimed that the reason behind the 
generosity towards PIP was that donor countries preferred to stop financing UNRWA's 
regular service re-directing their funds to special projects. He continued "When the Oslo 
Accord was signed, it was widely believed that peace and stability would soon emerge in the 
Middle East with Palestinian statehood the inevitable outcome. " At that time, Taman 
(1996: 76) claimed that Western governments seemed determined to dissolve UNRWA as 
early as possible. From this perspective, PIP and other projects for improvement of living 
conditions in refugee camps were presented to the Multilateral Refugees Working Group 
(RWG) in which Western governments' research claimed that "UNRWA regular aid was 
wasteful and not meeting the requirements of the new period" 
Despite the growing consensus of the unlikeness of the dissolution of LTRWA, there 
are fears of a de facto dismantling through continuous cuts of the regular budget. Donor's 
policy of responding generously to special UNRWA projects (mainly PIP) meant neglecting 
the requirements of regular programmes. According to Rabah (1997: 37), UNRWA would 
soon be unable to provide adequate services. Then it would be forced to relinquish the 
responsibility of vital services, which will need to be provided by the PNA. During the last 
six years, financial problems have severely affected the Agency's regular programmes, 
restricting the expansion and improvement of services. The health services are a case in 
point. 
According to UNRWA's health centre personnel, budget retrenchment is a common 
situation. During 1998, budget cuts reached 20% of the total budget. In the same year. 
UNRWA introduced a cost-sharing system at its contract hospitals, which required patients 
to contribute 40% of the costs for their treatment (Special Hardship Cases exempted). The 
requirement suggested that UNRWA health care system could not keep pace with the 
exigencies of the expanding refiigee population; similarly, overcrowded 
health care centres 
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generate impossible working conditions for their physicians. These circumstances do not 
encourage careful diagnosis and as result, treatment can be reduced to handing out medicine. 
Frequently. the required medicine is not available; shortages occur especially in expensive 
drugs. A nutrition programme, designed for the newly born to 12 years old, has been 
curtailed until only children four years or under are considered. The programme has been re- 
located from special nutrition centres to general UNRWA health clinics; the author, speaking 
to medical workers, observed that these new arrangements demand additional effort from 
already overtaxed physicians. In addition, family planning courses, the treatment of diabetes 
and hypertension have been added to the duties of general health centres. With UNRWA's 
extreme problems in maintaining adequate supplies often, the medicine's use-by date has 
expired before the full demand is met. Medicine is delivered to UNRWA clinics once every 
three months and must be distributed in portions of one-third per month. Often supplies are 
exhausted before the 30-day period is completed, forcing residents to obtain medication at 
private clinic rates. Control and limitation in practices has given rise to mounting criticism 
(Author's interview, 1998). Other austerity measures could be noted in all UNRWA regular 
services. 
UNRWA (1999) demonstrated that USA is the biggest contributor to PIP. Refugees 
often express concern about what they believe to be US policy: "The US and Israel would 
like to see UNRWA disappear. " They describe the strategy as consisting of reducing US 
contributions to UNRWA's regular budget, while pumping money into PIP and other 
projects. It is understood that USA has a strong interest in a de facto solution for the refugee 
issue. USA has been interested in UNRWA services for a refugee population that would 
have been otherwise Israel's responsibility. This can explain the United State's attitude and 
aid policy toward UNRWA and its project. Dr Sadeq a teacher at the Al Azhar University in 
Gaza explained "The United States is the major UNRWA donor and as such a powerful 
policy maker, its policy towards the agency could be viewed in the light of American interest 
which gives its major ally, Israel, an influential position. Perhaps, because of Israel's ally 
status, the USA has been informed of, and provided support for, such programmes. " The 
commentator made the point that the American policy following the Oslo Accords refrained 
from exerting pressure for a more flexible Israeli position on the refugee question, and has 
supported the Israeli argument that international resolutions on Palestinian refugees - 
including Resolution 194 are subject to bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Moreover. 
since 1993. the USA has abstained from voting for Resolution 194 in several UN 
bodies, 
most recently in May 1999 on the renewal of UNRA'A's mandate 
by the U General 
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Assembly. This attitude will serve to diminish the scope of Israeli and international 
responsibility for Palestinian refugees. Arguably, outstanding issues will then be dealt with 
as national problems of the individual countries '. 
Commentators consider the launching of PIP expressed a political optimism that this 
project will be the final investment initiative undertaken by the Agency. At the same time, 
UNRWA proposed to donor countries a five-year financial and planning scheme for 
guaranteeing refugees the provision of services until the end of its current mandate, and then 
proceed with the already agreed transfer of service provision to the PNA. Seemingly, the 
early optimism has vanished, especially within UNRWA. UNRWA's General- 
Commissioner emphasised this common feeling in his speech to the fiftieth anniversary of 
UNRWA in Gaza: T NRWA will continue its work until the refugee problem is solved [but] 
hardly anyone believes that a solution will be reached in a short time (Hansen, 2000). 
Refugees' disappointment is directed against both the donor countries and UNRWA. 
Dr Sadeq, justified the refugees' expectation, arguing: "UNRWA is expected to encounter 
donor strategies and to defend refugee rights by means of innovative ideas". Other refugees 
argued it is the role of the Arab rich countries to face these policies and support the T NRWA 
programmes against what is called by refugees `the western conspiracy'. Abu lyad as an 
administrator for over thirty years in UNRWA is aware of the limitations imposed on the 
agency. He reserved the thrust of his criticism for Arab donor countries. In his opinion, they 
could solve the deficit problem easily, but they lack the political will. "Their principle is that 
the Western Countries are to be blamed for creating and maintaining Israel, so the West 
should bear the responsibility of the services that UNRWA now provides". He continued to 
claim that it is a conspiracy to avoid finding a real solution, if the Saudis increased their 
contribution then the deficit would just be bigger next year until the Western powers ended 
up paying nothing, 
6.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, a number of issues of post-conflict reconstruction of human settlements 
have been addressed by studying the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP). Responding 
to the deteriorated living condition in the refugee camps, UNRWA introduced its 
programme in 1993. PIP aimed to demonstrate to Palestine refugees the tangible benefits of 
the peace process. Pursuing that outcome, the main objectives of PIP were to effect the 
The American president Bill Clinton in a speech to the Institute of Israel studies Januar-ti 2001 expressed his 
attitude regarding the Palestinian refugees. He denied them the right of return. 
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following changes in refugee communities: (l) Rehabilitation of existing houses, (2) 
providing better social and physical infrastructure, (3) creating employment opportunities and 
(4) support the needy and hardship cases. 
UNRWA after years of implementation claimed that the programme has largely 
succeeded. It argued: living conditions have been improved through shelter rehabilitation 
schemes. Infrastructure has been developed through the reconstruction or expansion of 
facilities to an adequate standard, and enhancements to camp infrastructure, upgrading 
environmental health systems, enhancing facilities refugees access on a daily basis, and 
maintaining the qualitative level of certain key UNRWA services. Employment 
opportunities have been created through use of local contractors for construction projects, 
provision of loans to small scale and micro-enterprises, and targeted job creation initiatives. 
Based on the literature survey (Chapter two, three, four) the author analysed PIP as a post 
conflict reconstruction exercise. The following issues have been addressed: 
" The timing of action was right 
The impact of the Gulf war and the Israeli policy of border-closure were severe on the 
local Palestinian economy. At the same time with the onset of the peace process, 
UNRWA launched its programme to alleviate the living condition in the refugee camps. 
" Comprehensive approach for meeting objectives: 
The case study showed that UNRWA employed a comprehensive approach when 
tackling the problem in the refugee camps. While it worked to provide better 
infrastructure, it also addressed the issue of unemployment. More job opportunities were 
offered. In addition, the hardship cases were helped to attain better and upgraded shelter. 
Nevertheless, the programme did not address the root causes of the refugee problem. It 
seems that the problem is beyond the organisation's capacity. 
" Efficiency or discrepancy: the former means achieving your goals in the short time and 
with fewer resources. In this programme, it appears that there is a discrepancy between 
stated objectives and outcomes. The following are some of the programme's failures: 
" Shelter Rehabilitation Programme: The proportion (0.002 
%) of houses constructed and 
those repaired, is only twenty out of every thousand dwellings in the camps. Their 
excluded householders complain. As a commentator describes the criteria for the 
programme, "Who shouts loudest get the improvements. '" 
" Providing infrastructure: While UNRWA 
documents claimed that the programme has 
largely succeeded, the author's findings prove that the refugees still suffer from a lack of 
adequate services, including education, health, and physical infrastructure. 
" Job opportunities: the programme aimed to 
help the community and the micro-economy 
projects. Despite noted success, the complaint was that the programme contributes to 
undermining the local and small business industry. 
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" Public participation and building local capacities: 
After prolonged occupation, it is assumed that recovery programmes should give much 
weight to the development of local capacities. Public participation has become 
respected as a tool to maximise the use of local resources. However, the survey shows 
that no participation by Palestinian refugees occurred in any programme stage. One of 
UNRWA's officials reply "What is the need for public involvement in these projects... 
do you think that refugees in the camps know more than us. " 
" Co-ordination with the PNA: The chapter shows that co-operation has taken place 
between organisations and the Palestinian National Authority in different spheres. 
UNRWA has worked with the PNA to transfer experience to newly formed Palestinian 
institutions by organising joint workshops and courses. 
" Consequence of the peace process: 
The programme was initiated in response to the peaceful environment that began to 
emerge during 1993 in the Middle East reflected in the Oslo Accords of the same year 
between PLO and the State of Israel. However, the last chapter pointed out that the 
refugee question was postponed with other crucial issues until the so-called final status 
negotiations. The ambiguity regarding the refugee's position has reduced the project's 
effectiveness. For example, a suspicion has grown among Palestinians particularly 
refugees that this programme is a new conspiracy against them. "The programme is a 
political tool to achieve a hidden agenda". This is an allegation that has been repeated 
since the very beginning of the project. It alleged that the programme is designed to 
defend status quo as a permanent solution to the refugee question. However, UNRWA 
officials on different occasions have rejected this accusation, pointing out that the 
organisation will exist until a final and lasting remedy to the refugees problem is found. 
This theory could explain why USA and other Western governments were unexpectedly 
generous to fund the programme activities while they do not donate to the organisation 
regular programmes. It seems that donors predicted that PIP would be UNRWA's final 
investment initiative in the refugee camps. 
Finally, in present context, it is difficult to propose one concrete solution for the shelter 
crisis in the Palestinian refugee camps. The root answer to this problem and others facing 
refugees is directly connected to the political dimension of the postponed refugee question. 
Then, only under a situation where they exercise their right of return to their previous homes 
can a viable solution exist. Nevertheless, this should not hinder improving living conditions. 
It is their right as human beings to have an acceptable standard of living, since it is evident 
that no contradiction exists between improving living conditions in refugee camps and 
adherence to the right of return. At the time that it is difficult to solve the problems facing 
refugees, it is possible to alleviate certain disadvantages and prevent their aggravation. 
Therefore, efforts should be concentrated on improving the living conditions in refugee 
camps. To put it briefly, 
As the peace process has failed to tackle the refugee question in an appropriate 
manner, and since the Palestinian refugees issue was excluded from the Oslo 
process, no recovery programme targeting refugees can finally succeed. 
Chapter Six 204 
Peace Implementation Programme 
The subsequent chapter discusses another project in the Palestinian Territories. In 
addition to the main issues, the author examines the refugees' attitude towards improving 
their living conditions, and the influence on the refugee population. 
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A PALESTINIAN HOUSING COUNCIL PROJECT 
IN THE GAZA STRIP (ELKARAMA NEIGHBOURHOOD) 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Housing is a historical dilemma. No one can claim that there is a community 
without housing problems. Koenigsberger (1987) pointed out the longevity of the 
dilemma: 
A healthy, growing society will always have a housing problem. If I ever met a 
society that claimed to have solved all its housing problems, I would look at it 
with great suspicion and conclude that it must be in a worrying state of decline. 
Housing shortage is not only a Palestinian or Third World problem. Despite available 
resources the developed countries face continual housing crises. Hamdi (1995: 7) noted that 
"Millions are homeless in the United States and Britain... millions of people are sheltered in 
temporary accommodations". He added that local authorities in England put up large 
numbers of people in temporary bed and breakfast accommodations. In the Palestinian 
Territories, Al-Agha (1997: 3) reckoned housing to be the most difficult problem topping the 
list of priorities for the PNA. The predicament is worsened by the political situation. Crises 
are exaggerated by Israeli settlements occupying extensive areas in the Gaza Strip, the large 
size of Palestinian families, the deteriorated economic situation, and the lack of national 
banks operating in the field of housing. The continuity of occupation and its implication, 
which can be noted in the demolition of houses either as a punishment or for the failure to 
produce a license and the confiscation of Palestinian land, altogether represents an added 
severe obstacle. Thus, the housing problem has become acute. It has further deteriorated 
because of the existence of the Palestinian refugee camps and the high rate of Palestinian 
population growth. According to different authors (Shaded, 1997, Abd Alhadi, 1994: Ziara, 
1997) there is an urgent need for constructing 120,000 to 180.000 housing units. Palestinian 
policy makers seeking solutions would need to construct thousands of housing units 
annually. 
The institution of the Palestinian Housing Council in 1992 was established to carr- - out 
responsibilities of planning and implementing 
housing policy in the occupied territories. It 
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succeeded in providing 1200 housing units in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, for 
the last four years, news of the Palestinian Housing Council (PHC) has largely occupied the 
Palestinian media. Trials, quarrels, arguments and heated professional discussions have 
taken place on this issue. In this chapter, the author investigates the evidence behind the 
current disputes between the Council and beneficiaries of its projects. The chapter starts by a 
short description of the Palestinian Housing Council and its activities subsequently are 
offered. In his fieldwork, the author distributed questionnaire. The questionnaire was five 
pages long with eighty questions, some of which were open-ended allowing as many 
households as possible to respond. (See 4.3.4, page 124). In this chapter, the author 
discusses the main findings of the field survey of Elkarama Housing project through 
examining the answers of the project's beneficiaries and the Council officials. Issues such as 
the socio-economic characteristics of residents, public participation, process of allocation, 
satisfaction, perception of the project and refugee's attitude are discussed. Finally, the author 
in open dialogue with the Director of the Palestinian Housing Council diagnoses the 
shortcomings of the project. 
7.2 THE PALESTINIAN HOUSING COUNCIL 
7.2.1 Background 
In 1996 the Council published an information bulletin (named Adwa') detailing a 
variety of facts about the Council's work. The bulletin was distributed to beneficiaries. 
Below, the author summarises its important points, comparing the document's rhetoric with 
the reality experienced by the Council in its short life. To counterbalance his argument the 
author uses other sources of documentation such as interviews with PHC officials, articles in 
Palestinian Newspapers and proceedings from conference workshops. 
In 1992 Ibraheem Shaban the Director of the Council (1992-1996) remarked that 
the idea for the formation of the Council emerged soon after the declaration of the 
Palestinian Government in Algeria in 1988 and its invitation to build Palestinian 
institutions such as PHC. Palestinians realised the necessity of a housing strategy in 
light of population growth, changes in Palestinian society and the absence of an existing 
strategy. He further pointed out that lack of funds and the outbreak of the 
Intifada in 
1987 put these plans on hold. Not until 1991 did Palestinians revive the 
idea of a 
housing Council. Following extensive co-ordination and dialogue, the Palestinian 
Housing Council was established as a non-profit and non-governmental organisation 
based in Jerusalem. The Council was endorsed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
as the sole body responsible for planning and 
implementing housing policy in the 
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occupied territories. It was also recognised by governments and international bodies as 
the national Palestinian institution in charge of housing. This made the PHC the first 
national Palestinian institution entrusted with carrying out housing projects for middle 
and low income Palestinians. 
Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, gradually administration of the West Bank and 
Gaza was transferred from Israel to the Palestinian National Authority from which arose 
the Palestinian Ministry of Housing. Nevertheless, the Palestinian Housing Council 
continued to perform its task, and in agreement with the ministry, fulfilled the role of 
implementor of future housing plans. 
7.2.2 Management and Organisation 
The PHC is administrated by West Bank and Gazan personalities, and was instituted 
to lay down general policies and solve the housing problem. Three dimensions were 
considered at the founding of the Council with a governing Board: geographic, political and 
professional. As Sha'ban suggested the latter became the most significant along with other 
unconsidered influences. The bulletin indicated the Board draws together policies and 
oversees implementation of the projects. Also 70 employees of various professions such as 
engineering, finance, are sited in Jerusalem with another four branch officers located in 
Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron, and in the Gaza District. Management includes a Director 
General assisted by directors from departments of administration, finance, technical and 
planning. 
Directors meet once every two weeks or whenever necessary to discuss the Council's 
operations and make relevant decisions. Further, the Board delegates authority to four 
different sub-committees to follow up the Council's various functions. These are classified 
as finance, technical, public relations, and planning and research. 
The bulletin cited that the Council is run on a daily basis by a professional staff. The 
staff is divided into five departments, administration, finance, technical. planning and 
marketing. The technical contingent is noted as the backbone of the Council, taking 
responsibility for the beginning of construction with the on-going task of appraising 
plans until completion. Management of the units after completion is handled by the 
administration. 
7.2.3 Goals and Objectives 
In 199-' Sha'ban spoke at a conference organised by the Arab Forum in Jerusalem, 
outlining the overall stnlte-gy of the Council in the following terms. The main aim is: 
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Securing appropriate housing for those with limited income. The economic 
factor will be prevalent in building and trying to reduce the cost of housing 
units. It should deliver the desired services and should also be compatible with 
the spirit of the age and be consistent with the cultural legacy and environment 
of the Palestinian people. 
This statement gave an early inference of subsequent dilemmas the Council has 
encountered. Possibly, too many objectives have been stressed for all of them to be carried 
out. The document tried to narrow the scope by stating, "Perhaps the main objective of the 
Council is to find practical solutions to the housing problem in Palestine through the 
construction of low-cost housing and drawing up plans towards that end. " To reach this goal 
the Council has set up the following utopian list of objectives to: 
" Study the housing problem and propose ideas and a mechanism to provide a solution. 
" Participate in drawing up a national housing strategy. 
" Utilise modem planning and construction techniques in low cost construction without 
compromising the social structure and values in Palestine. 
" Build low cost housing for families of limited income and sell the units under an easy 
long-term payment plan. 
" Be partners in home improvement plans and upgrading of residential areas through loan 
programmes and technical assistance. 
" Market housing units to low and middle income groups. 
" Encourage the establishment of local housing co-operatives. 
" Join in establishing and running a Palestinian housing bank. 
" Lobby the international community to fund low-cost housing projects on the West Bank 
and in the Gaza Strip. 
" Develop and encourage the private housing sector. 
" Inspire co-operation between Palestinians and international businesses in the housing 
field. 
Despite this ambitious plan Sha'ban at the 1992 conference expected various obstacles 
would block the way of implementation. The author also disputes if the newly born Council 
with very limited experience could succeed in carrying out such a broad range of varied 
activities. Understandably. these listed objectives represent the strategy of a Ministry of 
Housing in a sovereign state, with mechanisms in place to manage its resources, personnel 
and plans. In the opposite case where the Israeli occupier has controlled every single step, 
arguably it could have been a better strategy to highlight a small range of manageable and 
perhaps achievable goals. 
7.2.4 International Aid 
PHC's documents indicated that not long after its establishment, the European 
Commission representative of the European Union signed an agreement with the PHC 
granting the Palestinian people 219 million Echo as a revolving fund for the construction of 
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housing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Soon after, the United States Agency for 
International Development, USAID, endorsed a similar agreement with the PHC for the 
construction of housing units in Gaza worth over 7 million dollars. This amount was part of 
an overall 25.5 million dollars. The Japanese government also contributed another 10 
million dollars for the construction of housing units in Gaza for the benefit of the Palestinian 
police. The United Nations Development Programme supervised the implementation of the 
project in co-operation with the Council. 
7.2.5 Construction 
The Council official in charge claimed that soon after it received the international aid. 
funds started to be allocated for the various housing projects being undertaken on the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. The land was purchased for that purpose as state land due to Israeli 
policies, was unavailable for Palestinian use. When land was acquired, plans were set in 
place for initiating the projects. The Council invited architectural design offices to submit 
design ideas for the projects. The best work, selected by a committee of professionals, was 
adopted as the design of the building or set of buildings, which would be constructed. 
However, a close look at the architectural drawings, illustrates the lack of experience at that 
time. Free hand drawing, poor models, old-fashioned designs reveal the limited quality of 
different offices' architectural experience. Participant architects were mostly graduates from 
Egyptian or local universities in 1970s and 1980s. It has to be acknowledged that they 
lacked the experience of handling this kind of professional work. This opinion was 
reinforced by the fact that referees of the committee recommended to competitors they 
should revise their drawings and re-submit at a later date. 
After that, pre-qualified contracting companies were invited to submit bids for the 
housing projects. The most qualified contractors or group of contractors with the best 
price were then authorised to undertake the construction and started on the project 
immediately. The PHC technical staff supervised the construction process along with 
the contractor's engineers until the work was completed. Then management of the 
project was taken over by the Council. An interview with a contractor disclosed that the 
Council was highly respected for their managing of the bidding process, with no deal 
being completed behind closed doors. Every measure was honestly and openly 
presented to competing contractors. Although apparently satisfied, the contractor had a 
problem with the Council when a misunderstanding about who should pay VAT (Value 
Added Tax) to the Israeli Civil Administration, occurred. The Council expected 
contractors to pay VAT on building materials. Contractors had reckoned the value- 
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added tax when proposing their bids. Nevertheless, they appealed to the court and the 
jury took their side in the dispute meaning the Council carried the extra expense and 
passed it on to prospective residents. 
7.2.6 Allocation of Housing Units 
The Council set up criteria for applicants to the flats. It specified five conditions for 
eligibility for a housing unit or a loan. The applicant should be: 
" Residents living on the West Bank including East Jerusalem, or in the Gaza Strip. 
" Of limited income yet able to make the required down payment; in the case of buying a 
housing unit, the following monthly payments for the mortgage period. 
" Financially unable to build a standard-sized home. 
" Unable, or any of the applicant's family members, to own a housing unit. 
" Have not received, or any of the applicant's immediate family members (dependent 
children), a housing loan from any party. 
As soon as the Council was ready to receive applications, it advertised its intention 
accompanied with conditions in daily Palestinian newspapers. Every applicant paid 20 NIS, 
which equals £3. Sha'ban (1992: 4) stated that 5,600 Palestinians applied to the Council. 
Contrary to the Council assumptions, few applications were received from Gaza Strip. In all 
the number did not exceed 1,500 applicants. The author attributes this low turnout to the 
resident's mistrust in any top-down project. Having applied to the Council, the applicant was 
exposed to a social survey to check the given data in his or her application. 
The Council established committees from local residents. Every committee was composed 
of 7- 9 members. In an interview, Alaa' Yaghi, the Loans & Marketing Manager explained 
that every member must be a respected citizen in the Strip, and exhibit a desire to work for 
the public good. Further, the member was required to have experience in building co- 
operative relationships with other economic, social, medical, educational institutions in 
Gaza. The commentator added that conditions included that members must have a strong 
knowledge of the living circumstances of residents, especially the applicants. One of the 
varied roles of the local committee was to recommend which individuals and families 
deserve to have housing units in the Council projects. 
Sha'ban (1992: 4) maintained there would not be any compromising on the flats' 
prices. They would be based on a long-term loan. A down payment of between 10 to 
15% of the overall cost would be required. He continued, that there «ere two incentives 
implicit in this attitude: the first, to diminish the free-recipient mentality. which he 
isolated as the reason for the failure of many national projects during the Israeli 
occupation time. The second, he claimed, was to ensure that residents realised that 
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receiving without paying would weaken the solidarity between the Palestinian people. 
He asked and expected applicants to make the effort and pay for a flat in the Council 
project. He concluded that the housing units would be affordable for low-income 
people emphasising that the monthly payment would be $100, equal to $1,200 annually. 
Over 15 years the overall outlay would amount to $18,000. 
To test these declarations the author conducted a fieldwork including the distribution 
of questionnaires to the residents, interviews with key figures and participating in the daily 
life of in particular the beneficiaries of the Elkarama project. The following offers a 
compilation of his work '. 
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Figure 7.1: Locations of the PHC's Housing Projects in the Gaza Strip 
7.3 FIELDWORK FINDING 
7.3.1 Who are the Beneficiaries? 
Residents' socio-economic characteristics are seen as a main indicator for 
planners, managers and policy makers. Practitioners consider the kind of beneficiaries 
with whom they are dealing to draw up a programme that relates to their actual 
requirements, abilities and circumstances. This should include recognising how much 
or little change the respondent group can accommodate in their established, often 
traditional, life patterns. In short, by recognising the socio-economic characteristics of a 
The fieldwork was conducted between 1/10/1999 and 30/11/1999. 
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project's beneficiaries, one can judge if the project reached its intended target group or 
failed to do so. An assessment of recent projects discloses a discrepancy between 
programmes undertaken and the target group's actual needs. In the Elkarama project 
under study, findings reveal that the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries 
stand in conflict with the project's design expectations. (See 7.2.6 Allocation of 
I-lousing Units) 
Age, Marital Status and Education 
Researching different target groups' socio-economic features illustrate the 
importance of certain variables, such as age, marital status and education, in planning 
and developing policies. For example, in the Elkarama project, the figure shows family 
household ages ranged from about 20 to over 50: the main age for households between 
20 - 30 and 30 - 40. The sample's mean age was 33.3 with a standard deviation of 6.1 
with the minimum and maximum age 22 and 58 years respectively. Based on these 
statistics it could be argued that the age distribution is natural, especially acknowledging 
that residents between 20 and 40 tend to be those most in need of housing provision. 
Gender Number Percent 
Male 33 85% 
Female 6 15% 
Table (7 1): Gender Distribution in the Sample 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999. 
Age Number Percentage 
20-30 5 13% 
30-40 13 33% 
40-50 13 33% 
50-over 8 21% 
Table (7.2): Age Distribution in the Sample 
Source: Field Survey findings, November-December 1999. 
Marital Status Number Percentage 
Married » 85% 
Divorced 2 5%, o 
Widowed 2 5"° 
Engaged 0 0.00% 
J°ö Single 
Table 7.3: Marital Status vN ithin the Sample 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999. 
In the Elkarama project, the vast majority. some 85 ö. were married with 
families. 
As small percentage as 5% w ere single. with 5o 
% divorced and 5% ww-idowed. The 
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average family had six members. The smallest grouping was composed of two; in 
contrast, there were two family households containing as many as 11 persons. 
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Figure 7.2: A Multi-storey Residential Building, Gaza Strip 
Source: The Author (May 1996) 
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Another important, proven variable is the spread of gender. In the above example, 
without previous arrangement, the author met 6 women, five of whom were acknowledged 
as heads of their respective households. The other 33 respondents were male. Another 
critical feature of residents was their educational background. Research showed that the 
residents' primarily were from upper secondary school and university level. 
Education Level 
Under Secondary School. 
Secondary School 
Diploma 
University Students 
University Degree 
Percentawe 
13% 
23% 
21% 
5% 
33% 
Master or Doctorate Decree 5% 
Table 7.4: Education level in Elkararna Housing Project 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999 
This high degree of education equates with the residents' relatively high economic status, 
therefore the table betrays a contradiction. The Palestinian Statistic Bureau consensus (1997) 
4 
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showed that low-income households are mostly engaged in small scale enterprises or 
working in Gaza in humble jobs 
Employment Number Percentage 
No Job 7 18% 
Jobs In Gaza 25 78% 
In Israel 7 22% 
PNA Institutions 18 72% 
Other Institutions 4 16% 
Privately work 3 12% 
PNA Police 5 28% 
PNA Civil 13 72% 
Table (7.5): Employment in Elkarama Housing Project 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999. 
Employment and Household Income 
From various backgrounds, residents of Elkarama were found to be professionals 
mainly employed within the economy's formal sector as teachers, civil servants, 
engineers and vets to name some. The socio-economic characteristics of these residents 
contradict the announced policy of the PHC: to dedicate Elkarama houses to low- 
income people living in Gaza. 
This survey indicated that households in the Elkarama scheme were employed in 
both public and private sectors with a small percentage engaged in earning a living 
through self-employment. Among the residents interviewed 82% were found to have 
jobs. 78% of the interviewees said they worked in Gaza, in PNA institutions 72%, 
while others such as UNRWA and NGOs made up 16% of the workforce. Only 3% 
admitted to having a private source of income. These were in trade, in a small video 
club or were brokers. Of those employed in PNA ministries, 28% were shown to be 
members of one or the other of the Authority's police forces. 
Unemployed residents had worked in either Gaza or Israel, before being laid off 
for a variety of reasons. For example, one labourer had been denied permission to 
return to his workplace in Israel. Another had resigned from his job in Gaza and was 
seeking a new appointment. A further interviewee had lost his leg while working in 
Israel, and now expected the arrival of a large sum of money in insurance compensation. 
The survey also revealed that another man who lost his job in Israel due to health 
troubles - now classed as unemployable - 
depends totally on his wife's temporary 
employment with a Palestinian NGO. 
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Salary Numbery Percentage 
Under IO00NIS 1 4% 
From 1000-1500 N1S 7 24% 
From 1500-2000NIS 7 24% 
From 2000- 2500NIS 5 17% 
From 3000-4000NIS 6 21% 
4000 - over 3 10% 
Table 7.6: Monthly Salaries. 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999 2 
An assessment of incomes during the field survey detected that 32 residents have jobs. 
The survey indicated that about 3% of residents earned less than 1000 New Israel Shekel 
($100 equal 420 New Israeli Shekel). The author found that 24% earned from 1000 to 1499 
NIS, another 24% 1500 to 1999 NIS. These figures compare with the income of a physician 
working in PNA hospitals; at the time of the field study taking home 1,900 NIS per month 
and reckoned to be one of the highest salaries in Gaza. But the research statistics uncovered 
that 17% earned more, between 2000 to 2499 NIS, and 21% received as much as 3000 to 
4000 and a small number, 10% reached an income level of over 4000 NIS. 
Household Expenditure 
In the carrying out of most housing programmes, income is used as a determinant of 
the proposed client's ability to afford the housing. In this study, different households 
maintained that they ended up spending all their salaries and incomes on household 
expenditure. Respondents spent all their resources before paying a monthly instalment to the 
PHC. Household expenditure ranged across low, moderate and high levels of earning. 
The below table reflects a population group of relatively stable conditions in which about 
69% expend between 1000 NIS to 1999 NIS. 10% fall below the 1000 NIS benchmark. 
This represents a very low expenditure while 21 % spend over 2000 NIS - an extremely high 
outlay in relation to the conditions in Gaza Strip. 
Number Percentage 
Under 1000NIS 4 10% 
From 10001499NIS 12 31% 
From 15001999NIS 15 39% 
From 20002499NIS 7 18% 
2500 NIS over 1 2% 
Table 7.7: Monthly Expenditure 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999. 
2 The author did not face a considerable problem to know the household 
income. It could be attributed to 
the local culture, where the poor is willing to complain, and the better off is willing to show 
God' reward. 
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As explained earlier Ibaraheem Sha'ban, former chairman of the PHC. described 
the main aim of the Council as extending housing services to beneficiaries from the low 
income bracket and working classes (Sha'ban, 1992: 44). However, after the 
implementation of these projects, the former chairman of the PHC Shaded (1996: 11) 
adjusted the principal aim of the Council to meeting the actual needs for housing among 
the low to middle-income groups. The inclusion of the latter group still can not be 
reconciled with the outcome of the project that seems to have provided housing for a 
very small minority. As above data suggests the Elkarama scheme has created a 
residential area of relatively high stability in relation to the rest of the Palestinian 
population. Decisively the gathered evidence shows that different (higher) income 
groups have been catered for, in the programme, far beyond the means of those the 
original project document targeted. 
Usama Elsa'dway, currently Director of the Palestinian Housing Council in Gaza, 
admitted that the Council has not managed to accommodate the publicised target group. 
He explained that original plan was to build houses to match the socio-economic 
conditions of low-income people. However, severe constraints such as the cost of land 
and the Israeli border closure policy, resulted in delays in the project's implementation 
which in turn inflated the cost. He further acknowledged that the lack of experience in 
the Palestinian community affected detrimentally the progress of the programme. On 
the other hand, one resident alleged that a member of the Council Board bought the land 
from a Palestinian absentee and then sold it back to the Council at a higher price. This 
statement implies that something worse than inexperience was at work in elevating the 
cost. Elsa'dway claimed that the lack of experience included a shortage of practical 
skills on the part of contractors, workers and engineers. On various occasions, during 
implementation, contractors sought advice from the Council on such technical matters 
as how to fix an elevator. The deficiency extended to engineers who since the Israeli 
Occupation had little or no experience of working on large construction projects. 
Labourers were the only group who had gained enough experience from similar 
initiatives in Israel. Elsa'dway insisted all these factors contributed to the unexpected 
rise in prices that led to the exclusion of the initially proposed target group. 
Meeting Yaghi. he justified why the project failed to reach its publicised aim. 
Yaghi conceded that the Council was mainly instituted to meet the needs of those in the 
low-income class that were deprived members of the community. Nevertheless, he 
defended the project's outcome, asserting that the original group was hesitant in coming 
and paying the required deposit before the handing over of their flats. In 1996, at the 
Chapter Seven 218 
The Palestinian Hosing Council 
close of the project implementation, the Council published a notice in the national 
newspapers that beneficiaries had to come and pay $10,000. However. only a small 
percentage met their obligation and paid the deposit. The Council found itself obliged 
to put these flats on the market for other client groups to purchase, believing that this 
step also would serve the Palestinian community. 
Having listened to these arguments, the author decided to ask members of the original 
target group to explain why they had been slow in taking up the offer of the Elkarama flats? 
The unanimous answer was cost. Members of the original target group complained that the 
Council had not honoured its promise to produce affordable flats, as it stated in 1992. One 
interviewed resident claimed that the Council promised the flat would cost between $25,000 
to $30,000 with a monthly payment of between $50 to $70, over 25 years without interest. 
Despite these official declarations, Palestinian households have been expected to give 
$10,000 as a first payment followed by monthly instalments of $226. Understandably, low- 
income beneficiaries refused and were unable to pay the requested sum. 
7.3.2 Delivery of Units: Was it a Fair Process? 
Generally, it is admitted that for most Gazans home ownership can only be the final 
stage of a time-consuming process. Nevertheless, 5% of those interviewed, had houses in 
other areas of the Strip, a situation that Council requirements attempted to avoid during 
allocation. It was stipulated that no applicant should own any other house in the Gaza Strip. 
If the original plan had come to fruition and the target beneficiaries drawn from the most 
needy, the problem of multiple ownership would have rarely been a concern. An assessment 
of the houses an individual owned before taking up places in the Elkarama project discloses 
that 55 % were residents in refugee camps and 25% returnees. 
In the sample of respondents interviewed, a significant percentage was shown not to be first- 
time buyers. This evidence illustrates the rate that publicly funded housing, aimed at low- 
income groups, changes hands. A short report, prepared by the PHC in 1999, also profiles 
how plots changed hands during the project. It can be verified that this outcome has many 
precedents in developing countries. For example, in different countries, housing units, 
designed for low-income groups, were seen to be changing occupants immediately after 
allocation. In the Elkarama project, an owner of two flats explained: ``In addition to my t« o 
flats here I own three houses in Gaza City, Jabalya Camp and Tal Elza'tar Neighbourhood. " 
He continued that he bought the first flat from the Council, but the other property from 
another buyer. 
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As noted, home ownership is advocated as a means to solve the housing problems of 
low-income groups. In contrast, the findings of this study expose that the process is tedious 
and expensive for the households of low wage earners. Among residents, in the project. the 
process was found to include a number of issues relating to the administrative and financial 
as well as recognition of the self-sacrifices required, before a person finally occupied their 
house. Before the allocation or buying of the units, beneficiaries had to engage with a 
number of procedures and investigations. 
Asked to point out some of the administrative difficulties they faced when confronting 
Council bureaucracy, a significant percentage of inhabitants said they had no problems. The 
second largest percentage alleged they had experienced some problems, such as difficulty in 
obtaining application forms, short time allotted for raising the deposit and cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures. 
The Council looked across the entire original target group. Yaghi proudly reported 
every case had been separately examined. A social survey was conducted to choose the 
beneficiaries according to drawn-up criteria. The applicants were asked to fill-in a coded 
questionnaire. Questions included their ability to pay, their social and economic condition, 
and if they have a martyred family member or someone who has been imprisoned for a long 
time. These factors were scrutinised. In addition, a local committee was asked to 
recommend applicants as a further safeguard against missing the original target grouping. 
However, some residents criticise the surveyors' performance. Abu Saleh objected because 
the surveyor came to his workplace at the same time the applicant was on his annual leave 3. 
Thus, the surveyor falsely concluded that Abu Saleh was out of work "It took me a long time 
to convince members of the Council that I had a job, only proved finally by letters from my 
employer, " Abu Saleh said. Another case was refused, but by using his own methods he was 
able to occupy a flat in the project. Salah, a Palestinian returnee, applied, but his condition 
did not meet the Council's criteria. He asked the help of the Palestinian Chief of Staff; since 
Salah was working as one of his personal guards. "Then, every thing went as smooth as I 
wanted. I paid less than other applicants did. I paid $3000 while others had to make a 
financial outlay of $8,000 - 10,000. " Significantly, some residents avoided all procedures. 
These purchased flats from the Council after the original beneficiaries had shown reluctance, 
or from other buyers. 
Abu Saleh is a resident of Elkarama Housing Project. The author interviewed him 
in October 1999 
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Did you get any help of any kind to have your flat? 
Yes 20 51% 
No 10 26% 
No Answer 9 23% 
Table 7.8: Help to Get a Flat. 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999. 
Finance was the main problem facing the vast majority of residents. Different 
studies express concern about how members of the target group are to access resources, 
and if they can not, how can the programme be affordable? Doubt is raised about the 
feasibility of developing an effective and accessible financial system with proper 
intermediaries. Reviewing different experiences from many countries, Mutallah 
(1993: 214) concluded it was acutely difficult to solve these three needs of finance: 
affordability for households, viability for financial institutions and resource mobilisation 
for the expansion of the sector at national level. She also emphasised, in developing 
countries; housing finance has been left largely to market forces, co-operatives and 
informal networks. 
These models are repeated in the current study where most respondents acquired financial 
support in form of loans either from banks or from their relatives. Abu Rami remarked that 
he found himself obliged to sell his wife's jewellery. Ibraheem described how he secured 
help through his brother, who, he related, is one of the Fatah leaders in Gaza North. Nemer 
Illian reported that he sold his old car, borrowed from his brother, and sold his wife's 
precious jewels to obtain the necessary capital to pay the deposit, leading to other dilemmas 
that these `marginal' residents are unable to meet the monthly instalments 4. How can one 
pay $220 monthly while at the same time is required to repay the bank, a relative or even his 
wife? 
7.3.3 The Project and the Local Culture 
Planners designed Elkarama hoping that it would provide a good dwelling for 
occupiers to reside in. This admirable intention has gained a mixed reception from the 
respondents. Fewer households claim they prefer to live within the project boundaries, 
whilst 65% would rather live eventually outside of it. The main reason for this preference to 
leave the project flats is a traditional desire to have one's own house when the householder 
has accumulated sufficient capital. In Elkarama, as Elsa'dway held that every Palestinian 
seeks to live in an isolated private house, which means that one third of residents treat this 
' Fatah is the main faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. 
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project as only providing temporary accommodation. This attitude could influence the 
degree to which a resident adjudges the project a success or a failure. 
Investigating the preferred methods residents would use for their own houses, 
78% of respondents answered they would like to have access to land which could be 
developed according to his/ her needs. 20% were satisfied to live in flats ready for 
occupancy as in the Elkarama project. One householder described this approach as 
more `civilised', given Gaza's `modernised' circumstances. Another resident, a 
returnee rationalised this option, declaring that since they had lived in exile in flats for 
more than twenty-five years what is the difference now! Others seem more pragmatic 
in their answer; Abu Saleh represented this view 
It is my dream to have the money to build my own house on my own land, but 
do you think this is realistic? I see by my low-income, and the limited area of 
land in Gaza Strip, that my dream is impossible to achieve. 
He understood that affording at least $50,000 to buy land and another $50,000 to build a 
house is beyond his dream. 
A further enquiry, what respondents consider when looking for a house, revealed that a 
combination of factors was normal. Reasons included: the house's affordability and level of 
security, quality of the neighbourhood and the good attitude of neighbours, as well as a high 
standard of the infrastructure services available. Interviewees suggested that a good housing 
unit within a fine environment combine all these elements. 
The layout of Elkarama project is dominated by multi-storey housing of eight floors 
clustered around open paved squares with small green areas. Flats were designed from two 
models: the first consisting of two bedrooms and the second with three. The flat contains a 
living room, guest-room, kitchen, toilet and bathroom. The project did not allow for open 
spaces that had once been prominent around the residents' original houses or even shelters. 
The designer produced these standardised flat models believing in the concept of efficiency, 
minimum costs and rapid installation. In fact, the proportions of the flat suggest that the 
designer has had no real experience in living with a large family in a compressed space. 
There is no recognition of the critical functions that a house fulfils through accommodating 
an extended family, or facilitating the special needs of large families. Shortcomings in the 
design are excused as the consequences of financial constraints. But observation confirms 
that user needs receive the lowest priority from the Council whose main goals seem to be 
recouping the cost, allocation procedures and approval of alterations in the dwellings. 
Mohi Ed-deen Alfara, the designer of Elkarama project, defended himself. He 
insisted that he followwed the PHC specifications in the project. The architect claborated 
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that in a meeting with Dr Abed Ar-rahman Hamad, Deputy Chairman of PHC. he 
explained to the competing architects that the Council was seeking uniformity. a 
standardised product and spaces that conform to the international standards for low- 
income houses. Alfara added local variations in physical and socio-economic 
conditions have been overlooked. 
No programming before or post-occupancy evaluation was undertaken when they 
were considered essential. One can justify the low standards in the belief that higher 
standards than these provided in Elkarama housing would have encouraged the higher 
socio-economic group to try to take possession of the houses. However, these lower 
standards, as findings revealed, did not ensure that the project would reach its target 
group. If the Council provided more spaces, the cost would rise, consequently the low- 
income and the poor would not be able to afford the flats. But we need to ask how a 
family of ten could be expected to live in a two-or three bedroom flat? The discrepancy 
resulted from families' differing ability to pay. But it can be argued even in low-income 
housing, there is a certain threshold below which the quality and size of the shelter 
should not be allowed to fall. A 3.30 by 3.30 metres room, as in Elkarama housing, 
meets the requirements of only a minimal shelter with no provision for privacy and 
varied activities that make up the structure of everyday life in a household. 
Enquiring into the impact of design on the social relationship between residents 
divulged a range of complaints. Very often government and development agencies 
assume they know what is in the best interest of the people and consequently, projects 
are identified, designed and implemented for them rather with them Seventy Four per 
cent of residents found that no social problem has resulted from architectural design. 
However, by repeating the question in another form, residents objected to the small 
rooms, lack of privacy, the limited washing and drying areas. absence of garden, 
playground, and the insufficient car parking space and complained about the misuse of 
elevators. Others opposed this type of project, because they observed how social 
relationships between residents were given a low priority. Every resident is busy and 
isolated in his own life, therefore, little time seems available for socialising with others. 
This situation allowed the existence of four flats being utilised as brothels in the 
projects, a circumstance totally unfamiliar in the traditional Palestinian communit}y. 
Returning to construction issues, a lady from the project accused the designer of 
not knowing that a Palestinian woman spends her whole day in the kitchen, as those in 
the flats are too small to be practical. In addition, she disapproved of there being no 
space provided for drying wet clothes, further suggesting the designer assumed every 
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household had a washing machine and a dryer. While another resident thought the 
complaints about wet clothes potentially could cause daily problems between the 
project's women. In an interview with another lady. she subtly expressed her concern 
about the flats' lack of privacy. Privacy is a fundamental concept in the Muslim and 
Arab culture and architecture. However, the design under study did not consider this 
fact. A lady, the author interviewed, pointed out that the limited space between the 
buildings meant that to preserve decency she had to cover her body and hair every-time 
she opened a window in her flat. "My neighbours have a clear view of my bedroom. " 
Also checking the plans, one discovers that the designer ignored Palestinian 
tradition when he put a small toilette to serve guests and strangers too close to the 
bedroom, and very far from the flat's door. Dissatisfaction has been noted as well 
regarding social diversity as different backgrounds have been collected together in this 
project. This gives rise to tension between residents. Respondents with Gazan 
backgrounds seemed accustomed to blame returnees for all pitfalls that have happened 
in the projects and visa versa. The Council's architect, Hossam Koraz, endorsed the 
above critique attributing this pitfall to the donor's intervention. He accused residents 
that they had misused the project's properties. He reported that on different occasions 
women have used the motion of the elevator as a way to pacify their children. Others 
have used fire exits as storage areas for flour, sugar and garlic. Arguably, this is not the 
fault of residents, as the design of the flats failed to include appropriate storage space 
for these household needs. Koraz held that the Council established a unit for 
community development. This unit's duty was to introduce residents to the modern flat, 
helping them adapt to their new accommodations. However, the unit failed to perform 
this function. 
Surprisingly, and contrary to assumptions that Palestinians like living with 
relatives, as they had for generations until their expulsion in 1948, the author found that 
56% of residents preferred living far from their relatives. The author wonders if this 
opinion resulted from the cultural changes that may have taken place as residents accept 
certain spatial restraints after living in the project for a period. Another reason could be 
anticipated that living together in refugee camps for over the last fifty years have caused 
tendency to change. While 10% felt indifferent, 33% still claimed they would rather 
live with their relatives. 
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Numbers Percent 
Yes - -- --- - 13 --- 33% 
No 22 56% 
No Difference 4 10% 
Table 7.9: Residents who prefer to live with Relatives. 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999. 
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Figure 7.3: Typical Floor Plan of Elkarama Housing Project 
Source: The Palestinian Housing Council (1996: 54) 
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Figure 7.4: Blocks of Elkararna Housing Project 
Source: The Author (October, 1999) 
t1 
ill 
II 
H 
I 
I 
1 
Those who answered `yes' explained that they felt more secure when their 
relatives lived with them. They found more Izwa, in English translated as 'solidarity 
and support', through sharing the same tradition and even dialect. To sum up this 
discussion, it could be argued that the project lacked sensitivity towards people's 
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cultural and traditional need for interior space to accommodate a large family group and 
for privacy from neighbours. 
7.3.4 Beneficiaries' Satisfaction 
It could be posited that the length of residents' stay in a neighbourhood is a measure of 
his/ her satisfaction, related to the ability of a household to sustain the cost of living in this 
project. In Elkarama, vacant flats were observed. This implies that the assumed 
beneficiaries have bought the flat for commercially expedient reasons. These are usually the 
wrong target group who were able to speculate and afford paying the down payment. They 
intend to wait for the best financial opportunity to sell the flat to another beneficiary. 
Elsa'dawy conceded that the Council knew that the price of a flat on the project site has 
reached the almost unattainable figure of $18,000. 
Provision & Management of Services 
Next to land, provision of essential infrastructure services to settlements is the most 
important obstacle in meeting the shelter-demands of all income groups. Due to pressing 
economic conditions, most public institutions have had problems in supplying adequate and 
efficient services. 
Although infrastructure services are deemed as crucial in the operation of a successful 
human settlement, residents of Elkarama said that the project offered below average or 
unsatisfactory provisions. The range of comments on the level of services delivered is 
recorded by percentage below: 
..... Service ý.... .... _.... _.,,.. ým., ý..... ýý.... ý. Very good 
_..,. e. Good .. _ Average ,. Below average 
... Bad 
------------ Health 5% 15% 33% 15% 31% 
School 3% 15% 33% 10% 39% 
Water 46% 23% 28% 0.00% 3% 
Sewage 18% 18% 39% 10% 15% 
Roads 0.00% 15% 49% 21% 15% 
Transportation 5% 13% 44% 15% 23% 
Shopping 500 15% 33% 21% 26% 
Security 33% 46% 5% 10% 5% 
Car Park 8% 33% 29% 15% 150, o 
Green areas 3% 10% 33% 26% 28% 
Children Playgrounds 8% 13% 26% 20% 33% 
Table 7: 10: The Residents' Comment on Service Provision in Elkarama Housing Project 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999. 
\\'hile a large portion of residents appreciated the security. ý, v: -ater services. a 
considerable number remonstrated about the low level of services, especially 
in the 
provision of refuse collection and removal, health 
facilities and schools. On the other 
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hand, the author asked respondents to give their opinion of the overall habitability 
experienced in the neighbourhood. Their answers were as follows: 
Excellent Satisfactory Acceptable Unsatisfactorti, 
Location 46% 33% 46% 3% -- 
Management 23% 41% 21% 150, o Dwelling 18% 46% 28% 8% 
NciThbourhood 21% 41% 18% 21% 
Table 7.11: The Residents' Comments on the Habitability of the Project 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999. 
The above table shows that to some extent residents were satisfied with the 
location, management, and surrounding neighbourhood. This can be attributed to the 
fact that the Elkarama dwellings were built on a site in one of the best areas to be found 
in the Gaza Strip. The design is much better than in other areas of the Strip mainly 
occupied by refugee camps, or in Gaza City's poor neighbourhoods. 
Community Participation and Provision of Services 
The author asked residents to assess the performance of the PNA, PHC, and 
Municipality of Jabalya, NGOs and the local committees. Regarding the PNA 8% claimed 
they were excellent, 8% satisfactory, 14% acceptable while 70% thought PNA practices 
were unsatisfactory. 
Excellent Satisfactor}, Acceptable Unsatisfactory-___ 
PHC 3% 15% 51% 51% 
PNA 8% 8% 14% 70% 
Municipality 15% 18% 33% 33% 
NGOs 10% 19% 71% 
Local Committees 8% 13% 59% 21% 
Table 7.12: Performance of the Major Actors 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November-December 1999 
The inhabitants attributed PNA's poor performance to its incapability, often being 
characterised as corrupt. Some residents justified the authority's low level of performance on 
the basis of its heavy responsibilities, and the obstacles facing the administrators. While 
others judged that PNA should take a greater role in the residents' daily life and more 
directly try to solve their problems with the Council. 
The Council was not in a better position in the eyes of residents. Only 3% appreciated and 
were grateful for its activities, calling its work excellent. Findings showed that 15% 
considered the Council's performance satisfactory, 31% acceptable, and 51% felt it was 
disappointing. Arguably, these views are subjective. Problems between the Council and 
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residents could hinder the latter from objectively assessing the Council's strengths. Naturally 
they stressed its shortcomings. 
The municipality of Jabalya was given a reasonable level of approval: 15% 
thought it excellent, 18% satisfactory, 33% acceptable, and 33% found the involvement 
of the municipality unacceptable. Conversely, NGOs did not receive the same level of 
appreciation from residents. 70% of the sample thought its performance was deficient. 
Residents of Elkarama showed their sympathy for the local committees: whereas 59% 
presented its performance as acceptable while another 13% were satisfied. Not 
surprisingly, a larger percent of interviewees could not recognise the term NGOs. 
therefore they did not comment on its performance, which highlights the poor 
performance of the former. This raises doubts about the feasibility of numerous NGOs 
working in the Palestinian Territories consuming large amounts of donations to tackle 
issues unrelated to immediate Palestinian concerns, such as gender equality issues, and 
human rights violation. 
It is understood that the aim of public participation in any project is to engage 
beneficiaries and to focus on their needs from the beginning. This was not 
accomplished at Elkarama. Residents expressed the opinion that they did not participate 
at any stage. Though officials can blame non-involvement in the early projects on the 
varied restrictions of the Occupation, they did not take the opportunity to adopt a 
participatory approach when local conditions improved. Officials have countered by 
saying they were aware of the beneficiary's demands and problems via the work of local 
committees or by the questionnaire and social survey. 
The author investigated the level of residents' belief in a bottom-up approach, by 
asking them what do they think about residents' role. 59% believed that residents must 
participate in the management of their life, 33% answered in the negative. 8% gave no 
answer. The author supported this view by enquiry into residents' conviction in the Popular 
Committee approach that they experienced during the Intifada (1987-1994). The Popular 
Committees had managed different aspects of the Palestinian daily life. During the first four 
years of Intifada, their activities varied from civil to quasi-military. They provided education 
and health services, refuse removal, social welfare, and traffic organisation. As well. they 
organised the struggle by dedicating days for confrontation, days for public strikes, 
distributing Intifada announcements, and events timetable. In addition, they protected the 
community by punishing drug-dealers and porno-videotape sellers, also interrogating 
Israeli 
collaborators and executing numbers of them. 
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Despite these facts, 46% of residents disapproved of a popular- committee- 
approach in their everyday life. This answer emerged from a range of reasons: for one, 
by the end of Intifada era the performance of the Popular Committee seemed ineffectual 
or haphazard. Notably, the apparent spread of corruption, injustice and chaos 
undermined the Committees' work as Salah remembered: 
In 1992, they came to my home asking my brother to go with them. We did 
not intervene because we knew that they would punish us. Then it would 
have been easy for them to condemn us as collaborators. They lead my 
brother to an isolated site close to sea, interrogated him and then shot him 
in the leg. Everybody knows that my brother has been a loyal nationalist, 
more than any of them. He has committed himself to the Palestinian cause 
since secondary school. He left his faction when he discovered a theft 
among his group, deciding to become an individual activist for the cause. 
The author heard several stories regarding the misbehaviour of committee members to 
discredit all reports. Abu Rami has witnessed how this tactical approach could lead to 
disorder and injustice. He narrated his experiences: 
During the Intifada, I, as much as any other Palestinian, took part in daily 
confrontations with the Israeli army. But I did not belong to any faction. I 
disliked divisions within our community. Hamas, leftist, nationalist, communist 
and Islamic Jihad were working and had their popular committees. Anyhow, 
every committee used to provide its followers with food, money, and basic 
supplies especially during the curfew. By God! In seven years of Intifada, I did 
not receive anything even a beef can. 
Returning to the present case study, the author feels the lack of effective community 
participation in Elkarama could be overcome. This could have been through initiating 
programmes using the popular committee approach in a carefully regulated manner. 
Such committees might correct some of the clumsiness of the more centralised 
administration, as in the following example. A resident narrated how he had agreed 
with a group of neighbours to build a small mosque during the project. Generously. 
another resident provided the raw materials. But no institution would financially 
underpin the building project. The involved resident, when interviewed, stressed that 
the Council had prevented them from letting their small project to be realised. He was 
very disappointed. He decided not to participate in community activities. 
Refugees' Attitude 
In the last chapter, the author discussed the betterment in refugee life and its 
impact on their political status. It was showed that that improving living condition 
amounts to abandoning the rights of Palestinian refugees. This is not exclusively an 
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academic view since politicians have adopted the same platform from the outset of the 
refugees plight. In Elkarama, in the project's early stages, refugees living in camps 
looked unfavourably toward the project. The attitude was reflected in the low number 
of applications received from them. (Sha'ban, 1994). However, research showed that 
74% of the residents were refugees; 72% of them coming from camps, while the rest 
moved from cities, villages in the Gaza Strip or were returnees from exile with the 
PNA. 
Investigating whether refugees think that improving their living conditions could 
deter from their national and political rights or not, 15% said `no' while the great 
majority `yes'. Asking those who answered `yes' why they had moved to this project if 
it might affect their national rights, most replied they had moved under pressure to 
relieve the very poor living conditions they suffered in the transit camps. Though 
answering `yes' Abu Nemmer related: 
I believe this kind of project will affect our national cause. The PNA's plan 
is to initiate projects to re-house refugees from camps. After 10 years, they 
will be able to declare that there is no refugee problem any more. But I 
moved here because the two-room shelter in El-shati camp was not adequate 
for my large family. It was bearable until my brother came from Iraq after 
the Gulf war, from then he resided in our home. 19 souls were living in two 
small rooms. 
Newly weds wanted to start their family life independently so they decided to leave the 
larger extended families and buy or rent a flat away from their previous crowded 
accommodation. 
..,, ý,. w. '. _. _.... _.. __ Yes No No answer 
Do you think that your movement to this project will affect your rights, 6 15 0 
Are you aware of the current development of the Palestinian refugee's 14 70 
issue in the peace process? 
Do you think that the negotiation will achieve a fair solution for the 3 16 
2 
refugees' issue? 
Do you think that the peace process had resulted in improving the living 
4 17 0 
condition in The refugee camps? 
Do you think that UNRWA should terminate its services? 
0 21 0 
Table 7.13: Refugees Attitude 
Source: Field Survey Findings, November- December 1999. 
The above table shows that 67% of refugees were aware of the 
Palestinian Israeli 
negotiations, whereas 1600 believed that the negotiations would achieve a 
just and fair 
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solution. Refugees did not believe that the peace process would have a favourable 
impact on their living conditions, while 20% returned it would. There have been 
improvements exemplified in the sphere of security, infrastructure, and sewage projects. 
The questionnaire included a query about UNRWA and its future. All refugees expressed 
the same point of view. They argued that UNRWA should continue its services until a final 
and just solution has been achieved. 
The findings showed that the project did not achieve its expected success. It missed the 
targeted group and experienced extreme financial problems with both the community's 
beneficiaries and the international donors. It has become clear that the wide-ranging goals of 
the PHC's programme could not be accomplished. This shortfall was the overall 
consequence of different factors, which are analysed in the next section. 
7.4 SUCCESS OR FAILURE: WHY? 
In chapter Three, we mentioned the key elements of the Singapore shelter policy. 
These include a strong political commitment to public policy; financial system; legislative 
support which allows the government to acquire land cheaply and quickly and to exercise 
legal authority on matters related to public housing development and administration; and 
finally supportive government policies. None of these components has been available in the 
Palestinian experience. Below the author sets out what he sees as the shortcomings of the 
Palestinian experience 
7.4.1 Weak Performance of the Palestinian Authority 
As seen in Chapter Five, the peace agreement did not produce a strong Palestinian 
authority, able to plan and implement developmental projects. While the Palestinian 
Authority has been busy negotiating endlessly details of the details with the Israeli 
counterpart delegations, it was incapable of intervening to solve the Housing Council 
problems. Problems such as lack of legislation, enforcement of law, corruption were clear 
in the Council's short life experience. 
Sha'ban (1997) posited that in Palestine, the legal system is complex and difficult to 
comprehend. An element in this condition, is the manner in which laws accumulated 
when the Ottomans introduced changes at the end of the nineteenth century. Since this 
date through the political upheavals the region has suffered various and contradictory legal 
systems have successively governed the country. As part of the Ottoman Empire, 
Palestine was subject to all its applicable systems until that Empire collapsed. However, in 
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practice, some Ottoman laws survived and at present are still applied in Palestine. It was a 
surprise for the author to discover that land law in Gaza is based on Ottoman legislation. 
Politically in Palestine, the British succeeded the Ottoman Empire. This era witnessed the 
establishment of a new legal system and the introduction of British precepts. The mandate 
authorities established a system of courts and judicial institutions. Notably the British code 
covering planning, land registration and the transfer of immovable properties represented a 
significant advancement on the previous arrangements at that time. But other alterations in 
the law occurred as the twentieth century progressed, including those imposed by Israel after 
the mandate ended in 1947. After the Arab-Israeli war, an Egyptian Military Government 
administered Gaza. During the Egyptian era, a legislative Council was established in 1962. 
New laws replaced old fixtures. These measures are still in use. Subsequently, an effect of 
the Israeli occupation has been the prevalence of legal distortions. Shehada (1988) stated 
that "The Israeli Military Governor issued more than 1300 military orders, which amended 
or abolished most of the previous laws, in questions related to land-reviving as a first 
priority". 
The Oslo agreements introduced a new and even more complex legislative 
environment, since the treaties permitted laws to be promulgated to a limited extent. But 
amendments have been slow in reality as large parts of the Gaza and the West Bank are still 
under occupation. The Agreements, Shehada (1996) argued, have prevented the authority 
from exercising legislative power except with the approval of the Israelis. He added that that 
concordat paradoxically has given legitimacy to the military orders existing on the eve of the 
signing of the Cairo Agreement. Consequently, in the Palestinian Housing Council's short 
experience one can argue that the legal system in the territories has been the main obstacle to 
achieve success. Sha'ban (1997) claimed that compulsion is a fundamental element of law; 
without this, it would become only advice or a recommendation. It makes no difference 
whether the law is ratified by a legislative authority or by the executive authority. It should 
be noted that judicial authority does not establish law, it just interprets and applies laws. The 
lack of legal support and lawful authority has deprived the Council of substantial powers 
when facing opponents. 
According to a PHC officer, the law is not a problem. The old canon could work as a 
tool to enforce it. He contended that the Council appealed in the court. He said, "We have 
enough documents to convince any judge". However, strong political inclinations prevented 
the judge from carrying out his duties. He noted that even after we have a judge on our side, 
the Minister of Justice asked his officials not to implement the jury's decision. The PHC 
manager further alleged that the Palestinian people have inherited a weak and complicated 
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network of institutions with limited co-ordination, which contributes to lack of speedy 
action. 
On the other hand, Palestinian people have come to appreciate disobedience of the law 
as honourable gesture when acting against the Israeli Occupation. Field findings disclose 
that residents emphasise the idleness of the Palestinian law authority. A wide range of 
residents expressed an attitude of dissidence towards the legal system. In some cases, the 
author felt that residents take it as culturally acceptable to disobey law. Their fixed point of 
view can be traced back to the way residents used to obstruct Israeli Authorities during the 
occupation. Their recalcitrance has been closely linked to the incapacity of the housing 
Council to impose a code of regulations. A resident said that we are sure that they can not 
evict any resident from here "This authority can not eject the Jewish from their settlements in 
Gaza, therefore they will not be able to do this against Palestinians either. " Evidently, 
residents have learnt that PHC can not enforce its regulations, or even charge an occupant in 
the court with those signed contracts. 
One wonders what is the role of the PNA as the sole authority in Gaza Strip. The 
PNA is supposed to legislate on many issues, but so far, it has failed to enact new laws due to 
the agreement limitations. How can new principles be put into effect in the absence of the 
legislative power and political stabilisation? It could be argued there are many laws that 
must be amended, others must be implemented and in some cases, new laws should be 
developed along with relevant regulations and decrees. None of this will be of use, however, 
if the government can not act as a sovereign power because of the agreement limitation and 
if the laws can not be fairly enforced. 
7.4.2 Lack of Expertise and Managerial Skills 
The issue of housing is multifaceted and needs financial, architectural, social and 
administrative solutions. As Naser (1997) put it, "The real problem is that none of the 
agencies in the Palestinian Territories has expertise or previous experience in the field of 
housing. Elsa'dway, the Director of the Gaza branch of the PHC commented that when the 
Council was established it faced a critical shortage of skills in planning and implementation 
for large housing project. He added, "Until this moment there is no national code of 
standards and specifications for building in the Palestinian territories". Admittedly, the 
absence of a national administration augmented the inability to enact such a code. 
E1sa'dway asked the author to see the drawing of the first phase of the project and to 
compare it to the current situation. He asserted that "We contributed to improve the 
engineers' performance in Gaza Strip and the West Bank". 
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It is a fact that Palestinian professionals in construction have graduated from 
universities all over the world. The wide range of institutions, which trained them, has 
increased the lack of uniformity in methods and structures. Further the limited nature of the 
market during the 1970s, 1980s did not provide these professionals with opportunities to 
practice what they had learned. Together with the shortage of coherent national plans and 
codes, the situation was bleak. A few large projects were implemented in Gaza before the 
PNA was instituted. For example, Gaza El Shifa Hospital was designed entirely by an Israeli 
firm. Elsa'dway recognised that one problem confronting the Council was only a few 
engineering and contracting firms were equipped to produce overall plans and designs for 
large-scale construction projects. From another perspective, the Director said that we 
decided to rely entirely on local capacities, causing a rise in building costs due to contractors' 
lack of experience. 
The political uncertainties and the vague agreements prevented the Council from 
hiring Palestinian professionals working in the Gulf States, Europe and North America. On 
one hand, it is difficult to obtain permission from the Israeli authorities to let these 
professionals enter the territories. At the other hand, Palestinian expatriates are reluctant to 
sacrifice their jobs, and livelihood abroad to return under ambiguous and highly problematic 
situations. 
7.4.3 Finance and Affordability 
Hamdi (1997: 417) noted that "Public housing, with its policy of building directly 
for the poor, has failed to provide adequate numbers of houses for all sorts of reasons, 
including high costs. Even when it did, the housing fell largely into the hands of 
middles income families who can afford to pay for it. . . there are also examples of empty 
public housing, too expensive for the poor to afford but undesirable for these who might 
afford them". 
Having reviewed the PHC experience, it seems no analysis of factors contributing 
to the total cost of construction, was made before the project started. In different 
interviews with PHC officials, contractors, engineers the author discussed the issue of 
housing cost in Gaza. Several different factors that inflicted the discrepancy between 
the estimated prices and the real cost. These include, land, building materials. labour, 
infrastructure, design and management costs. These components should be accounted 
for when seeking potential reductions in the cost of dwellings. In the following. the 
author calculates the impact of these causes on the Palestinian Housing Council project 
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Elkarama__ý El Nuserat El kal'a Rafah 
Area sq. m 22127 21460 5908 8760 
Cost of land $2319780 $917000 $295970 $29000 
No. of Buildings 13 10 4 7 
No. of Flats 416 320 96 116 
Flat size, sq. m 115,5 116.5 109 116 
99.5 102.5 106 90 
Block Size, sq. m 480 505 444 380 
Block Cost $950000 $950000 $680000 $450000 
Infrastructure 
Cost $1500000 $1500000 $500000 $500000 
Table 7.14: Data and Cost Estimation of Palestinian Housing Council Projects in Gaza Strip 
Source: The Palestinian Housing Council Bulletin, Adwa (1996: 57) 
Land 
Land is reckoned to be the most important factor to indicate success or failure. Its cost 
constitutes the largest share. In some cases, it may reach 50 per cent of the total cost for the 
dwelling. Turner (1980) affirmed that unless land is available through public ownership in a 
city, the acquisition of land becomes a major problem. In addition, the cost is likely to be 
high near commercial or industrial places of work. Consequently, as usual, poorer 
communities who would suffer more. Abed Elhadey (1994) indicated that land prices and 
their rate of charge differ in various parts of occupied Palestinian Territories. They are 
influenced by a number of factors: zoning, distance from urban centres, availability of 
infrastructure and services and the general economic conditions prevailing at any given time. 
Mukhtar (1997) demonstrated diverse methods to reduce land prices, that could be 
controlled by buying large areas of peripheral land at low cost and strategically scheduling 
development in relation to demand. He continued that a government could depress land 
prices by taking steps within its power to prevent increases on ground designated for public 
use and housing development. In contrast, the Palestinian Housing Council had no control 
over the situation in Gaza and West Bank. Therefore, the Council was obliged to buy land to 
build its projects. As the above table points out to pay for land required a great deal of 
money from the Council which was passed on to the buyers. In a meeting with residents of 
Elkarama, a few of them stressed that corruption was apparent in the process through which 
the Council obtained land for the project. They claimed that a Council Board member had 
bought land from an absentee, then sold it to the Council at a considerable profit. The vast 
majority of residents were conscious of the exaggerated price of land in the case of the 
Elkarama project. 
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Construction Materials 
Habitat (1995: 12) exemplified the problem, stating, most developing countries are 
endowed with abundant natural resources that could meet the demand for basic building 
materials using largely indigenous inputs, but local production of building materials in a 
large number of countries falls short of demand. A contractor involved in the PHC project 
construction maintained that most of the materials used in projects had been imported from 
Israel or other foreign markets, either through Israeli agents or, in a few instances, directly by 
local traders. He justified these arrangements on the grounds that no local substitutes existed 
for materials such as cement, wood, steel, glass and aluminium. However, some imported 
supplies, such as tiles, marble and some plastic products, have local substitutes. He went on 
to say that some items are imported in basic forms and then processed for local usage. 
Elsa'dway remarked that the Council encouraged local industry as much as possible, 
however, there could be no compromise in quality specifications. On different occasions, 
the Council accepted local material if a specialised lab approved and could reassure members 
that the product met quality specifications. 
Time and again, the Occupation appeared to impose restrictions on industrial 
development. Sabri (1997) suggested that Israelis prevented new construction and have 
curtailed the building of new construction material industries or the upgrading or existing 
plants. A publicised case is the opposition raised against building a cement factory in the 
Hebron area. Further projects that met resistance include; steel pipe factories, electrical 
cable, wire factories and others. These constraints, coupled with excessive limitations on 
direct imports of construction material by local traders, have inflated the cost of materials. 
A Gazan contractor commented on the cost of construction material rejecting, any 
responsibility for price rises. He said, "The price of construction materials, whether 
imported or manufactured locally, is generally subject to fluctuations. These fluctuations 
depend on local and international markets and the exchange rates between the three most 
commonly used currencies the Israeli Shekel, the Jordanian Dinar, and the American Dollar. 
Labour 
The workforce is another factor that tends to `pump-up' housing costs. Obviously, a 
shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers and the need to pay increased wages often 
forces up the cost of dwelling units. As stressed earlier in this research, the last three decades 
have witnessed the proletarianisation of a large section of the Palestinian community. The 
new proletarians have frequently had little option but to enter the Israeli labour-pool, which 
operates like the `slave-market'. Though construction workers can be categorised as: skilled, 
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semi-skilled and unskilled, wages in all sectors of the economy have been deflated through 
trend of Palestinians working in Israel and other Arab nations in the Middle East. The wages 
of skilled construction workers has increased, due to Israel's high demand for these workers 
over the years. The Gazan contractor stated that a construction labourer in Israel earns a rate 
of about 200 NIS daily. In Gaza, contractors have never been able to afford this amount. 
The prevailing political situation, which influences the mobility of construction workers 
within the occupied territory and between it and Israel, also determines the degree of 
exchange in the labour market. However, it is not always clear whether the increase in the 
number of workers in a certain location is owing to expanded activity in that area, to 
decreased activity in Israel, or to restrictions that are frequently imposed on travel to work in 
that country. 
To summarise, the author understands that the labour wages in Gaza is a determining factor 
in the cost of house building. This is due to competition with the greater appeal of the Israeli 
market, offering higher wages to Palestinian skilled and semi-skilled workers. 
Infrastructure: 
Infrastructure also affects housing costs. Mokhtar (1997) pointed out that the 
most required services to facilitate a housing project include: access and circulation 
such as roads and footpaths, storm water drainage, water supply, sewerage, gas and 
electricity, street lighting and refuse collection. At the same time, installing these 
services inflates cost and reduces the affordability of individual dwellings for low- 
income groups. Outlay also depends on location and type of land required. Elsa'dway 
complained that in the projects the PHC bore overall cost of providing infrastructure, 
which he argued had been presumed to be the responsibility of other institutions not the 
PHC's. In the Elkarama project, the Council further thought that Jabalya municipality 
would supply the basic infrastructure. But the municipality refused to do so, justifying 
their position by stating there were no available funds for this expenditure. While the 
municipality refused to supply the project with the required infrastructure, the Council 
generously paid some hundred thousand dollars to the municipality in licence fees. This 
conflict represents another example of the lack of applicable legislation and weak co- 
ordination between different Palestinian institutions. 
Delays in Implementation 
It is agreed that delays are common and represent a constraint on human settlement 
projects. This is due to various factors such as poor estimates, variations b\ the client, 
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inappropriate technology and design, inappropriate tendering and contractual procedures, 
inefficient on-site supervision and construction management. Chapter Three of this research, 
showed the reasons causing delay as including inadequate capacity for the planning and 
design of projects, projects which are too large for local contractors to handle. inefficiency in 
planning, design and construction, and difficulties in obtaining materials and other crucial 
inputs. The author claims that all these factors are present in the Palestinian Housing 
Council projects. Inshasi (1997) pointed out that project was behind schedule. He added to 
the above reasons allegations of the Israeli policy of border closures. These closures 
constituted a severe problem for local contractors, preventing them from purchasing from 
Israel the materials required for executing the projects. Postponements were often caused by 
poor or confusing designs and by the slow issuing of drawings and instructions. Slowness in 
awarding of contracts was another reason for delay. 
A related problem stemmed from the fact that a large number of project managers 
in Gaza were too inexperienced to manage projects effectively. There were a number of 
further problems holding up the project, the most common being an inadequate 
formulation of the scheme, lack of proper implementation and poor management 
practices. 
Finally, it can be concluded from the last discussion that varying factors have 
contributed to the flats' high costs. Some of these determinants are external and others 
internal. However, inexperience in such projects might be the chief factor for the failure of 
the Palestinian Housing Council to carry out the implementation of this task. 
7.4.4 Lack of Institutional Co-ordination 
Ambiguities in the relationship between stockholders such as international 
organisations, state ministries and local agencies and authorities is a factor leading to human 
settlements' project failure. Institutional co-ordination problems arise between different 
ministries in the same cabinet. In the Palestinian Housing Council, it is clear how resources 
were wasted as a result of the lack of the institutional co-ordination. Every stage of the 
project has been marked by this pitfall. 
" In the stage of planning and preparation, there was no co-ordination 
between the Council 
and the Land Directory in the Israeli Civil Administration. If this co-operation occurred, 
it would be cheaper option to acquire State land for a public project instead of spending 
millions to buy private land. 
. In the stage of implementation: The Council paid nearly 
$100.000 as licence fees to the 
Municipality of Jabalya. It was expected that in return the Municipality must provide 
infrastructure service. The Municipality refused to do its part. 
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" Collecting Agencies and executing authority: the Council has been unable to co-ordinate 
with the legal and executive authorities in order to collect its due payment. 
" The Council failed to co-ordinate properly with the project donors. This led to 
reluctance of these countries to continue funding the Council's proposed projects. 
7.4.5 Irresponsible Aid 
Hamdi (1991: 5) pointed out that international aid targets developing countries 
according to the political influence and commercial interests of the donor, not according to 
the beneficiaries' need. It seems the PHC experience correlates to Hamdi's statement. As 
indicated earlier in this chapter, the finance for the Council projects was entirely funded by 
European Union (EU), USAID and Japan. This fund coincided in 1990s with the 
blossoming peace process in the region. However, the question rises, did the donors 
influence the different stages of the Palestinian initiative? 
The author has noted that there is a general unawareness of `donor management' in 
official Palestinian circles. Separate donors with different approaches have taken part in the 
story of the Elkarama project. The European Union entrusted the Council with the work and 
little supervision was provided. Elsa'dway extended the argument: the European Union used 
to disburse its money in instalments. Now, in another case, the Council can not build the 
sewage infrastructure of El-Nuseirat project due to the European refusal to pay the due 
payments. It must be added that this refusal is based on the Council's failure to initiate a 
mechanism to collect money from residents. The EU evaluated the Council's performance 
in September 1999 and decided on the above action. When the author visited the Council in 
October 1999, it seemed that Council officials were disturbed by the approach the evaluators 
had taken. They had been willing to put Palestinians in caves not flats, as Elsa'dway 
commented. Having received such condemning snippets on the European performance, the 
author found different reports in national newspapers that reinforced Elsa'dway's 
contentions. A series of officials of the Council asserted that imposed conditions from the 
donor aggravated the current crises. 
The Sunday Times 29/11/1998 published a report based on a European Union 
evaluation report. It claimed that "British aid earmarked for poor Palestinians has been used 
by the European Union to finance luxury flats -with Italian granite- fitted designer kitchens- 
for rich supporters of the Palestinian leadership". The paper continued "In effect, $20 
million has been spent without any economic controls and is not recoverable". The money 
had been targeted for cheap housing. Each apartment is more than 100 square metres in size, 
with three bedrooms, a kitchen fitted with polished wooden cupboards and granite work- 
Chapter Seven 240 
The Palestinian Hosing Council 
surfaces, and a bathroom complete with a large bath and shower area, decorated with either 
pink or blue ceramic tiles. Satellite television dishes sprout from the walls, the paper 
reported. 
The report stated that most of the apartments have been given to Arafat's political cronies: 
"90% of the EU flats had been given to `returnees'-loyalists who had been in exile with 
Arafat and now serve in his administration" 
The author supports the PHC Director's claims. The European Union report is quite 
exaggerated and misleading. The British newspaper reported fabricated information, which 
contradict the real situation. 
Contrary to the European attitude, Japan is a major donor for reconstruction activities 
in the Palestinian Territories, but it has never delegated full responsibility to a local 
institution. In the Council's case, Japan agreed with United Nation Development 
Programme to supervise their funded project. The Council's contribution was to prepare the 
project drawing, sharing as a partner in fieldwork supervision. One Council official said, 
ironically, it is the only project that has no trouble with beneficiaries. 
The third donor USAID appointed American consultants to oversee its funded 
projects in the Gaza Strip. Two million dollars were allocated to the American firm, 
expenditure that now the project's residents are required to bear. Nothing innovative 
was discovered in these projects, despite the noted pride of residents that their flats were 
supervised by Americans while neighbouring blocks only by Palestinians. Hamdi 
(1991: 178-179) argued that the consultant firm "Inevitably... will be working under the 
auspices of their employers, who will often have a very different agenda". He 
continued 
If consultants have been appointed, they will usually come as part of the 
funding package and will be under pressure to ensure that the demands set 
by the agency are implemented. They will be inclined to define or even 
invent problems to fit client's intentions. At best, they will cut off pieces of 
the problem that do not fit their general schema. 
Hamdi's argument offered an explanation to the niggling question of why PHC has had 
more troubles than achievements in its short life. 
7.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter Ne have reviewed the experience of the Palestinian Housing Council 
and its project Elkara na. At its establishment in 1992, the PHC was faced with a drastic 
need for housing units, which was a result of neglect of the Israeli occupier of the housing 
sector. The first part of this chapter reviewed the Council history, ambitions. objectives. 
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programmes and plans. It offered information regarding the administration and supports 
received by the Council to fund its few housing schemes. 
Based on comments of residents, interviews with the Council's key informants and 
questionnaire, the author built his judgement. It was shown that the project has the following 
pitfalls: 
A Strategy Unable to meet the Need in the Palestinian Territories 
" It is clear that the Council did not wait for any change to occur especially in the light of 
the peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
" The scope was limited. The Council put a finger in a small hole at one end of a dike that 
is caving in at the other end. While providing a very limited number of housing units, 
the Council failed to introduce a national housing strategy relying on the local resources. 
" The construction of Elkarama housing project is an example of centrally controlled 
projects. Top-down approaches were adopted. The Council upper officials made 
planning decisions, sometimes under a pressure of the Palestinian Leadership in Tunis to 
grasp political gains. 
" No consultation has been made with the target group in any of the initial steps of the 
project. The Council strategy built on the basis that the beneficiaries are nothing but 
clients for the investment project. 
The Architectural Design has failed in providing a Cultural Identity for the Palestinian 
Community 
" The project is dominated by multi-storey housing of eight floors clustered around open 
paved squares with very small green areas. The flat contains a living room, guest-room, 
kitchen, toilet and bathroom. The project did not allow for open spaces. Also 
complaints were reported regarding the area of the spaces. 
" Lack of privacy. The design under study did not consider the Palestinians need for 
privacy. The limited space between the buildings meant neighbours have a clear view of 
each other's bedroom. 
" Residents complain that social relationships between residents were given a 
low priority. 
Every resident is busy and isolated in his own life; therefore, little time seems available 
for socialising with others. This allowed the existence of brothels in the projects, a 
circumstance totally unfamiliar in the traditional Palestinian community 
The Council has failed to achieve its Promises to provide Affordable Housing Units. 
The chapter showed that the PHC has failed to a proper create financial mechanism. 
This causes the major problem with the beneficiaries. It could be summarised in the 
follo\ving: 
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" While the Council's early documents showed that the project was designed to target the 
low-income groups, there is agreement that the project missed its original purpose. 
" Residents complain that the required payments are not affordable in relation to their 
income. Having paid the first instalment and occupied their dwellings, they refused to 
pay the monthly payment at the due time. 
" The Council officials indicate that the cost has risen due to variety of reasons, these 
include, the cost of land, labour, building materials and the Israeli policy of closure 
which caused delays in implementation. 
The Council has been unable to collect its Due Payments: 
Over the last years, the conflict between the Council and the beneficiaries proved to 
be unresolved. The Council has been unable to collect its due money from residents. This 
caused the slow implementation of the final stages, and the cancellation of other proposed 
projects. The Council disability can be attributed to the following: 
" Worsening economic and political situation resulted in beneficiaries' non-compliance 
with their commitment. 
0 Lack of co-ordination between the different PNA institutions. 
0 Weakness of the legal system, and the executive authority. 
" Political interference in the decision making where a considerable percentage of the 
beneficiaries are working as police officers in the PNA. 
The Peace Agreements and the Project Failure: 
The author claims that political uncertainties in the Palestinian Territories have 
contributed to large extent to the project failure. The pitfalls of the peace agreement made it 
difficult for the Palestinian policy makers to solve the Council problem. For example, 
" The PNA has been unable to legislate on many issues. So 
far, it has failed to enact new 
laws due to the agreement limitations. The lack of legal support and lawful authority has 
deprived the Council of substantial powers when facing opponents. 
" The Council was obliged to buy land for the project due to the Israeli control of 
State 
Land. 
" The Israeli policy of border closures. These closures constituted a severe problem 
for 
local contractors, preventing them from purchasing from Israel the materials required for 
executing the projects. Postponements were often caused by poor or confusing designs 
and by the slow issuing of drawings and instructions. Slowness in awarding of contracts 
is another reason for delay. 
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" The continuation of the Israeli settlement activities in Gaza has been used as a pretext for 
the beneficiaries' reluctance to pay their due instalments. A resident said "This authority 
can not eject the Jewish from their settlements in Gaza, therefore they will not be able to 
do this against Palestinians either". 
" Israel attracted skilled construction workers to work with higher wages. Therefore, the 
Gazan workers demanded higher earning. 
" Due to the prevailing conditions, the council could not hire Palestinian professionals 
working abroad. Obtaining permission from the Israeli authorities is difficult and there 
was no strong incentive encouraging expatriates to leave their jobs and return under 
problematic situations. 
In addition to the above illustration of the problem, the chapter addressed two 
major issues in relation to the reconstruction process in the Palestinian Territories. 
Responding to inquiry from the last chapter, the author investigated refugee residents' 
attitudes regarding improving their living conditions. Despite their clear suspicion 
towards these projects, they showed willingness to see a genuine betterment of their life. 
The second issue was the role of the donor countries to help the Council to revise its 
policies. Nothing has been done form their side except blaming the Council for its 
inability to collect the money and a decision to stop final disbursements. 
The subsequent chapter highlights the significant issues that have arisen in all of the 
research. 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research mainly concerned how post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding 
are linked particularly following the peace settlement in the Palestinian Territories. It has 
given rise to three principal observations that: 
" Occupation in reality is a continuation of warfare, and the Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories since 1967 is a typical example of how the long occupation can be 
as devastating as a full-scale war. 
" In peacebuilding, the third party (the international community) can assist, but the 
legitimate rights of the occupied people need to be recognised no matter how much aid is 
supplied; justice is the cornerstone of sustainable peace. 
9A successful reconstruction of the human settlement is directly related to a sustainable 
peace process. 
Having established a theoretical understanding of the main issues of the research, 
employing several learning methodologies to analyse case studies in the Palestinian 
Territories, in this chapter the author concludes by concentrating on interrelated points. The 
first section discusses the summaries that have emerged. It aims to identify principles and 
issues to guide reconstruction of human settlements in the Palestinian Territories. The 
second part translates these conclusions and issues into practical recommendations or 
guidelines for the reconstruction of human settlement in Palestine. Responding to the 
political situation and to continuous Israeli punitive measures, the author suggests that a 
flexible reconstruction approach would be most effective. This is followed by a set of 
recommendations to solve the Palestinian Housing Council's troubles and the refugees' 
shelter problems respectively. The author suggests further areas for research. 
8.2 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This study started by exploring the phenomenon of military occupation. Chapter one 
considered the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories as an internal colonisation. 
The chapter stressed that according to international law. Israel has been a belligerent 
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occupant of the Palestinian Territories since 1967 and should respect the Law regarding the 
governance of these territories. The conduct of the occupying power should reflect the 
occupied people's status as `protected persons. ' 
The author proclaimed that the Israeli occupation has been an act of undeclared 
war launched against Palestinian civilians. The term of war is appropriate since Israel 
has and still refuses to adhere to the de jure applicability of the International Law 
specifically the 0' Geneva Convention. Instead of treating Palestinians as 'protected 
persons', from the outset, Israel imposed countless repressive measures. Palestinians 
were ill-treated throughout the prolonged occupation. As Ibish (2000) puts it, the Israeli 
occupation 
is to come home from school eager to play, only to find your home reduced to 
rubble; to be a father carted off in the middle of the night into the oblivion of 
Israeli detention; to be a child watching your parents be beaten; to be denied 
education; to be imprisoned in your home for weeks or months unable to walk 
out of your front door for any reason day in and day out until your master lifts 
the `curfew'; to be a mother who must beg to leave her home in order to get 
medication or bread for her family; to have a coloured ID card that permits you 
to roam only within a few square miles; to have a coloured license plate that 
guarantees you will be stopped and questioned at every `checkpoint'. stealing 
hours out of each day; to go without enough water to drink while your Jewish 
neighbours lounge on green lawns and swim in private swimming pools; to live 
without honour; to have your history stolen and your dignity smashed. 
The Israeli military occupation has had destructive impact on various spheres 
including human capital, the country's resources, the economy, social fabric and institutional 
building. 
Destruction of settlements probably best portrays the horror of war. Though there has 
been no settlement destruction in the Palestinian territories, the author argued that Israel has 
exercised a similarly detrimental policy. Components include: the deteriorating of 
infrastructure, restriction on land, difficulties in gaining a permit for development, abuse of 
the legal system, expropriation of local resources, and finally and crucially through policies 
to undermine Palestinian identity, human rights and self-respect. Each Israeli practice has 
employed its methods and tricks. The chapter concluded by questioning how Palestinians 
can achieve a lasting peace and sustainable reconstruction against a background of continual 
occupation, living under uninhibited Israeli control that affords them no dignity and no 
111crC V. 
Chapter Two provided a review of different issues of post conflict reconstruction and 
peacebuilding. It «was claimed that research in this field with its concomitant writing has 
expanded rapidly through the last decade of the twentieth century to the present. The author 
, -c ievv ed ho\\ di f't crc not scholars. examined what is necessary to achieve a sustainable peace 
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process. Issues such as ripeness for peace, third party intervention, considering root causes, 
and targeting the combatants were discussed. The chapter examined the notion if 
reconstruction can bring about long-term peace, arguing in doing so, efforts must be 
coherent, comprehensive, integrated and addressing the root causes of conflicts. Having 
outlined the relationship between peacebuilding and post settlement reconstruction. the 
author surveyed issues such as local capacity building, the role of state and the policy of 
donors, exploring how different authors or organisations present these issues. The following 
specifies the main points in chapter two, 
" Peace is best thought of not as a single or simple good, such as an absence of war or 
violent conflict, but instead as a complex and variable process. However, no peace is 
perfect. 
" The relationship between peacebuilding and reconstruction is symbiotic. Proper 
development can not take place without lasting peace: peace can never be sustained 
without proper reconstruction and long term development. 
" Post conflict reconstruction calls for a special approach emphasising integrative 
strategies, political development and rapid and flexible action. It must be dealt with as a 
long-term development challenge, planned and implemented in a manner to encourage 
peacebuilding. 
With co-ordination between internal and external actors, confidence and peacebuilding 
efforts will be further strengthened. 
" The local community is the primary resource for reconstruction. It is crucial to work 
with and not for the community. The community must have a sense of ownership and 
responsibility towards reconstruction projects. 
" The support and assistance external actors give to societies emerging from conflict is 
important, though not determinant, and present forms of assistance are often ineffective, 
inappropriate, and can be harmful. The main donors' task is to enhance the local 
capacities. The quality of post conflict assistance is more important than its quantity. 
The Chapter concluded by recognising that physical reconstruction is a critical tool to 
achieve peace. 
In Chapter three, the author reviewed policies adopted for post-conflict 
reconstruction of human settlements, suggesting a framework for reconstruction, showing it 
as a process. Seeing the deficiencies evident in different theories, the chapter reviewed the 
options that exist within a viable strategy. The author studied issues that must be considered 
when formulating a reconstruction strategy and highlighted how undesirable outcomes can 
be avoided. Issues such as features of the transitional stage were reviewed, along with post 
contlict reconstruction challenges and the approaches and involvement of actors. 
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The chapter revealed that the problem of shelter is not confined to post-conflict 
countries. Instead, the problem exists in almost all Third World countries. Adequate shelter 
even in suitable conditions is an uphill battle. The rapid pace of urbanisation, the weakening 
rate of economic growth, the unavailability of land for housing and public services. the 
increase in land prices and inappropriate strategies for urban planning and land appropriation 
all directly contribute to the shelter dilemma. 
The chapter asserted the need for adequate infrastructure and provision of essential 
services. This statement gave rise to the related issues of how to `get right' the framework of 
land management and put into place an appropriate and affordable financial system to bring 
properties within reach of all citizens. Another major component of this strategy is that the 
construction sector must be stimulated. However, for it to be successful, the whole 
population needs to be catered for, involving economic stimuli and special provisions to 
supplement the poorest members of society. 
In conclusion, the author proposed why policies fail to achieve their expected success. 
Various causes were detected such as, vagaries of the legal system, restrictive regulations, 
lack of institutional co-ordination, the issue of political interference or lack of political will 
and finally the beneficiaries' non-compliance with the legal framework to facilitate an 
effective shelter policy. 
Chapter Four reviewed the methodology of fieldwork in addition to other 
adopted methods. It offered a theoretical review of the research strategy with an 
evaluation of the chosen case studies. Experiences in fieldwork were outlined, 
describing objectives and difficulties, the various techniques and instruments used to 
collect data were explained and how best to store, analyse and present findings, was 
discussed. 
Chapter Five presented the case studies, with the author describing the general 
situation in the Palestinian Territories in the aftermath of the peace agreements. Issues such 
as the conflicting parties' motivation for peace, intervention of a third party and the 
agreement provisions were examined. The chapter demonstrated how the agreements have 
fallen short of tackling the crucial issues, which include the Israeli settlements, the fate of the 
Palestinian refugees, Palestinian sovereignty and the future of Jerusalem. 
The author clarified how in an attempt to support the peace process; the international 
community had established a mechanism to help Palestinians financially and technically. 
Thus, politicians have raised expectations that a new Palestinian State would be established 
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soon. Contrary to initial hopes, economic conditions for most of the Palestinian population 
in the West Bank and Gaza have deteriorated. The unemployment rate has risen and the per 
capita income has dropped by 20 percent. It has been estimated that one-fifth of all 
Palestinians in the occupied territories live in poverty. International reports have shown 
mounting evidence proving that the Jewish State has never lived up to its obligations under 
the Oslo Accords. The Israel Journalist, Amira Hass (2000) reported, 
For Palestinians in the streets, events after the ceremony on the White House 
lawn in 1993 showed that Oslo was part of the problem and not part of the 
solution. Under Oslo, Israel continued to expand settlements, confiscate more 
Palestinian land, demolish Palestinian homes, build bypass roads, keep 
thousands of political dissidents in jail, and tighten the economic strangulation 
of the Palestinian population centres. 
The chapter enquired: "Can Palestinians launch successful rehabilitation programmes 
under unsatisfactory agreements in deeply restrictive circumstances? " 
Having presented background information, Chapters Six and Seven analysed the 
findings of the field research. Chapter Six discussed the first case study. showing that the 
United Nation General Assembly - responding to the Palestinian Israeli peace process 1993 - 
has made a decisive contribution in the attempt to ensure the occupied territories' economic 
and social stability. UNRWA responded by initiating the Peace Implementation Programme 
(PIP). The main objectives of PIP were to effect the following changes in refugee 
communities: (1) Rehabilitation of existing houses, (2) providing better social and physical 
infrastructure, (3) creating employment opportunities and (4) support the needy and hardship 
cases. 
UNRWA claimed that the programme has largely succeeded in meeting objectives. 
However, the findings of this research disclosed various pitfalls. The Agency has failed to 
address important issues such as building regulations and providing adequate shelter for 
refugees. Lack of local participation and co-ordination between the agency and the PNA has 
been reported. 
The chapter showed how the inadequacies of the peace agreements have limited the 
objectives of the Peace Implementation Programme. The status of refugees has remained 
ambiguous, reducing this project's success. To some, this programme was suspected to be a 
conspiracy. It was alleged The programme is a political tool to achieve a hidden agenda" to 
keep the status quo as a permanent solution to the question of what status Palestinian 
refugees should hold. 
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The author concluded that under current circumstances it is difficult to stress one 
concrete solution for the shelter crisis in Palestinian refugee camps. To put it briefly: 
As the peace process has failed to tackle the refugee question in an appropriate 
manner, and since the Palestinian refugees issue was excluded from the Oslo 
process, no recovery programme targeting refugees can succeed. 
Chapter Seven mentioned how housing has been the problem heading the priorities of 
the PNA. The predicament has been worsened by Israeli settlements occupying extensive 
areas in the Gaza Strip. Other reasons are the tendency toward large Palestinian families, the 
deteriorating economic situation and the lack of national banks in the field of housing. In 
addition, the demolition of houses either as punishment or as the result of the failure to 
produce a license and the confiscation of Palestinian land represent severe obstacles. 
With international help, the Palestinian Housing Council was established to provide houses 
for the Palestinian people. The chapter described the PHC and its activities. The author 
discussed the main findings of the field survey of the Elkarama Housing project through 
examining issues such as the characteristics of residents, the level of public participation, 
process of allocation, perception of the project and refugee's attitude toward it. He showed 
that the project has the following disadvantages: 
" The strategy was unable to meet the need of the Palestinian territories. The Council put a 
finger in a small hole at one end of a dike that is caving in at the other end. While 
providing a very limited number of housing units, the Council failed to introduce a 
national strategy. 
" No consultation was undertaken with the target group in any of the initial steps of the 
project. The Council perceived the beneficiaries as nothing more than clients. 
0 The architectural design has failed to reflect the cultural identity of the Palestinian 
community. 
0 The Council fell short of its promise to provide affordable housing units. 
Finally, the author claimed that political uncertainties contributed largely to the 
project's failure. Shortfalls of the peace agreements made it difficult for PNA policy makers 
to find a remedy to the PHC's managerial problems. 
" Due to limitations resulting from the peace agreements, the 
PNA has not been able to 
legislate on various issues or enact new laws. The lack of legal support and la\\ful 
authority- has deprived the PHC of enough power when facing opponents. 
" Disastrously, the Council needed to waste resources on 
buying expensive land because 
Israel still controls a large proportion of the Strip's Land. 
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" Israeli border closures presented an undeniable problem for local contractors, preventing 
them from importing essential building materials. 
" Indirectly. on-going Israeli settlement activity (implying the weakness of the PNA 
government) has given the beneficiaries a pretext for showing dissidence, for example, 
not paying their due instalments. "This authority [PNA] can not eject the Jewish from 
their settlements in Gaza, therefore they will not be able to do this against Palestinians 
either. " 
" The PHC could not attract Palestinian professionals working abroad, and obtaining 
permission for their return from the Israeli authorities was very difficult. Both 
factors have deprived the PHC of needed expertise. 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the summary and findings of the fieldwork, a set of recommendations is 
proposed for reconstruction of Human Settlements in the Palestinian Territories, translating 
the above conclusions into a set of actions. All recommendations aim to generate real 
progress toward the improvement of living conditions of the Palestinian people, by being 
realistic and manageable and by taking into account the limitations and interests of all 
participants involved in the reconstruction process. The recommendations are a response to 
the research question identified in the introduction of this study. 
Considering the impact of Israeli Occupation and the ill-fated peace agreement 
can Palestinians (the Authority and people) with the help of the international 
community, achieve successful reconstruction programmes and sustain the 
peace process? 
In answer, the author offers the following thoughts and suggestions. 
Peacebuilding in the Palestinian Territories 
" No substantial peace is expected to be reached through signing agreements, or even by 
implementing them. If peace agreements do not address the root causes of the 
Palestinian Israeli conflict or fail to gain the people's acceptance; then there is a strong 
potential for renewed conflict. 
" The `negative' peace, which usually follows the signing of peace agreements, 
is not 
sufficient. The challenge is to build a `positive peace' that is sustainable because it can 
ensure social, political, economic and military security and stability and mitigate new 
tensions and conflicts. 
" Justice is an essential element in conflict prevention. Without 
justice. there is little 
chance of post-conflict reconciliation. For a lasting peace to take root there must be 
perception of and tangible evidence that justice has been served. 
" In the Palestinian case, this can 
be achieved if a fair solution to the crucial issues is 
reached; issues such as the fate of Palestinian refugees, future of the Israeli settlements, 
the sovereignty over Eastern Jerusalem etc. 
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" To reach this agreement, the author expects that the international community must play a 
prominent and honest role and acknowledge the legitimacy of Palestinian demands in 
accordance with International law and United Nations resolutions. 
" The international community should support peacebuilding by fostering reconstruction 
activities. 
" Reconstruction supports peacebuilding. Nevertheless, it can not be a substitute for the 
recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights. The recent past has shown that 
the flush of aid and various reconstruction programmes in the Palestinian Territories 
could not sustain unsatisfactory peace agreements. The eruption of the new popular 
uprising (Intifada) on 28/9/2000 proved that without addressing the root causes of the 
conflict no peace can be maintained. 
Inventing a new Approach to Reconstruction in the Palestinian Territories: 
It has become obvious that Palestinians live and operate in an unstable, volatile, risky 
and politicised environment. Due to the Israeli punitive policies, it is quite unrealistic to 
anticipate that Palestinians (authority and people) would attain quick results through their 
reconstruction programmes. At the same time, the author believes that a special approach to 
reconstruction - tailored to the requirements of the Palestinian people - must be developed. 
There is an urgent need for operational reform to make rules and practices conducive to 
effective policies. 
Reconstruction, approached in an appropriate manner, can help in the peacebuilding 
process. It can restore dignity, trust and faith in the future, as people together learn to cope 
with the past and regain control over the present and the future. On the other hand, 
embarking upon reconstruction activities without proper planning leads to a waste of 
resources and long term social problems within the community. Rebuilding strategies must 
pay proper attention to the political and relational context in which they are applied. 
Reconstruction methods should be designed and applied in such a way that they not only 
address their primary objective but also improve relations and build trust. If poorly 
designed, they can fuel tensions and lead to new conflict. 
In setting objectives, the government should be realistically modest and not 
utopian, accounting for resources, needs, perceptions, expectations, 
potentialities, and constraints. More importantly, there is a need to be realistic 
in terms of accounting for global trends as well as international and national 
constraints and opportunities. 
"A strategy has to be supported at the highest political level while being formulated at 
regional and local planning levels. 
" It must be properl}' and efficiently managed. 
The Palestinian Authority must assume 
ultimate responsibility for management. 
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"A strategy needs to be based on a holistic and in-depth understanding of problems and 
the way they relate to each other, an understanding of actors and their respective 
agendas. 
" It considers internal actors as the main forces for rebuilding and they must be harnessed 
in a collective effort in which the authority plays a key role. 
" It understands and accepts that the politicised and highly volatile nature of the Palestinian 
Territories increases the tendency toward conflict. The PNA must manage this risk 
efficiently. 
" It recognises that reconstruction is a development exercise that must be based on a long- 
term perspective. 
" It must be able to accommodate both the need for urgent action in response to immediate 
problems, and the need for patience and the ability to wait for solutions to mature. 
" It needs to have adequate flexibility, room for pragmatic ad hoc solutions and decision- 
making and possibly suggest a downward transference of authority, from PNA to the 
Palestinian people. 
" The strategy must be monitored, and show an awareness of the secondary and tertiary 
impact of policy measures in different fields. 
" The strategy must be redefined on the basis of periodic reassessment of problems, 
resources and priorities. This should be based on a participatory consensus of local and 
national actors. 
" Reconstruction plans should not be built on anticipated external help. Outside agencies 
can help, but only if they have a clear idea of what is needed by the indigenous 
community. 
Identifying and Mobilising Existing and Potential Resources for Reconstruction 
" Existing and potential resources must be identified and mobilised. Resources must 
be 
identified in relation to their type, quality, amount, distribution, costs, function, ease of 
use, and impact. 
" Indigenous resources need to be distinguished 
from external ones, and these must be 
weighed in terms of their tendency to cause dependence, unwanted control over 
development and/or uneven development. After resources are identified and analysed, 
they must be mobilised. 
" Mobilisation will depend largely on the 
Authority's action, but can be effectively 
augmented through the utilisation of grass-roots organisations. 
Capitalise on the Social Coping Mechanism: 
" Prolonged Israeli occupation 
has motivated the Palestinians to show a high degree of 
self-reliance in providing relief and shelter through different social mechanisms 
(savings. 
social networks, and grass-root organisations). 
Chapter Eight 254 
Summary and Conclusion 
" During reconstruction, the community must play a powerful role if provided with 
appropriate incentive and suitable means for mobilisation. 
" The variety of human resources (architects, engineers, teachers, doctors, etc. ) needs to be 
capitalised on as reconstruction proceeds. 
Attracting Diasporic Palestinians Back to Support Reconstruction Activities 
Palestinians who made fortunes abroad need incentives if they are to return to the 
territories to contribute in building the State. As important, businesses, banks, insurance 
companies, small industries, etc. need to be attracted. More investment in infrastructure. 
financial and physical security as well as social and political stability would be attractive to 
institutes and individuals and could stimulate a movement of return to Palestine. 
Careful Consideration of Local Culture and Conditions 
" People are the principal factor in recovery and reconstruction not objects to be arranged. 
They are lifetimes, dreams, customs and hopes, there are pasts, presents and futures. 
Therefore, reconstruction should respect people's culture: norms, tradition, customs, and 
ways of life, social pattern and economic means. 
" It should pay detailed attention to physical aspects of the settlement: layouts, climate, 
topography, natural resources, etc. 
" Reconstruction should conserve the positive traditional elements and incorporate modem 
requirements. 
" Reconstruction programmes should carefully consider the various conflicting forces 
emerging in the community. 
Enhance Social Reconstruction and Prevent Potential Conflicts 
" Co-operation and mutual aid are embodied characteristics in the culture of the 
Palestinian community. 
" Reconstruction should encourage positive characteristics. In this respect, projects can be 
used to advance social justice; up to now a missed opportunity because of misguided 
policies. 
" Just reconstruction requires fair and equal access to resources and decision- making 
mechanisms for all members. Therefore, no direct subsidy is needed, given the 
community's socio-economic conditions, but support should be provided through soft 
loans and professional advice. 
Clear Allocation of Actors' Roles 
" Rebuilding requires a collective 
initiative in which the state plays an essential role, 
guiding the combined efforts and resources of local people, private actors and new social 
forces. Communal consensus and participation are crucial for optimal mobilisation, to 
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define a common vision, and concrete policies if they are to be applicable and 
sustainable. What counts is working out politically realistic approaches supported by all 
the actors involved. 
Improving External Assistance 
Work in the Palestinian Territories calls for a great degree of flexibility and capacity in 
adapting to a volatile and rapidly changing context. This implies far-reaching changes in the 
way assistance programmes are formulated, funded and implemented. Efforts to rebuild trust 
among civil society and other institutions can be thwarted if not matched by strong political 
will. The peace process had great momentum in the beginning. In September 1993 aid 
organisations agreed on a blueprint for the development of infrastructure and social 
rebuilding and acted in co-operation toward this end. Yet, little has been accomplished, as it 
was assumed that the development process could proceed separately from the political 
process. Donors and development agencies presumed that politicians would successfully 
continue along the track toward peace and that this process did need not to be directly linked 
to the efficacy of development intervention. 
The author is convinced that the quality of external assistance must be improved if that 
assistance is to encourage peacebuilding and reconstruction. To achieve this requires major 
reform and explicit political commitment. The aid provision must be reformed to: 
0 Recognise that peace and solutions to fateful issues can not be imposed from outside, 
" Identify positive local initiatives and dynamics that contribute to rebuilding, and attempt 
to build on these and strengthen them. 
" It must be careful not to weaken the Palestinian Authority by using external NGOs as 
interlocutors and counterparts. 
" Give particular attention to basic principles of reconstruction and development such as 
participation, self-reliance and local or national ownership. 
" Set priorities with the aim to face the magnitude of demands but also to promote long- 
term and stable commitments. Regularity of assistance is often more important than 
quantity: small but stable commitments are more useful than large and erratic assistance 
on which Palestinians can not depend. Irregular assistance greatly limits the capacity of 
national actors to plan rebuilding strategies and has a debilitating impact. 
" It must recognise that long-tern assistance can 
lead to aid dependency, for this reason 
long-term commitment and partnerships require periodic reassessment of orientations. 
programmes, plans, and terms of collaboration. 
. It must accept that the legitimate and useful space 
for external assistance should be 
periodically redefined through regular consultation between external and internal actors. 
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A timetable of joint assessment of problems, resources and priorities should be 
prioritised. 
" Long term assistance needs to share effectively information and knowledge with local 
and national actors, 
" Promote local or national ownership going beyond participation. It implies transferring 
technology from donors to recipients and accepting how local actors could redefine 
objectives that lead to a'nationalisation' of the project. 
Providing Adequate Shelter for all: 
Shelter is both a basic need and natural right. Adequate shelter that provides protection 
from adverse climate and access to social and technical infrastructure is an important 
prerequisite for an individual's health, productivity and participation in society's political 
and social life. It also makes important contributions in creating income to increase the 
country's wealth. Further, adequate shelter helps secure political stability and social peace. 
Al masri (1992: 320) recognised the multifaceted nature of the housing issue 
A reconstruction of housing programme... requires a broad understanding of 
housing, not simply in terms of the buildings, but as a process, consisting of a 
blend of labour, skills, capital, financing, settlement patterns, culture, status, 
environmental protection and tradition. 
From the analysis of this research's fieldwork, adequate shelter is a major problem 
facing the Palestinian people. This situation must be improved by providing essential 
services. Understandably, this is not a simple task because there is a lack of technical 
expertise, lack of regulations, political interference, etc. Below, the author proposes measures 
that should be taken: 
Proposed Role of the Palestinian Authority 
The weakness of the Palestinian Authority has been a major problem in relation to the 
Palestinian Housing Council projects. PNA has failed to have clear, well co-ordinated 
policies. It must work to strengthen the capacity and efficiency of the Palestinian Housing 
Council by taking measures such as to: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Promote stronger co-operation between the Authority's institutions and the Council. 
Empower the Council to act with a greater measure of independence in relation to 
formulation of housing policies and implementation. 
Encourage the reform of laws, by-laws, regulations and procedures, and development of 
instruments for a socially oriented housing market. 
-\ssist the Palestinian Housing Council in recovering loans in order to channel such 
finds into ncvv housing schemes. 
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" Enforce the implementation of the existing court's decisions regarding the problem 
between the residents and the Council. 
" Provide the Council with the required land with competitive prices to initiate new 
schemes. 
" Support local initiatives to establish a Palestinian building-industry. 
" Conceive new ideas to solve the problem of housing in Gaza, since traditional 
approaches are not expected to succeed. 
" These ideas must be based on both private and public enterprise, with the active 
participation of NGOs working in the area of the shelter. 
The Palestinian Housing Council: 
The Council must review its efforts on housing policy and its relation with the 
Authority, the beneficiaries as well as with the international donors. There are a number of 
policy moves the PHC needs to undertake to facilitate its future work. The Council should: 
" Concentrate its efforts around the goal of low-income housing and mobilise the relevant 
local and external resources required to implement such schemes, building on the 
experience they have already obtained. 
" Involve the target groups in the different stages of future schemes recognising that they 
are actors and not merely target beneficiaries. 
" Generate resources locally, starting with the council's existing housing stock and funds 
generated from down payments of housing projects, such as Elkarama. 
0 Plan and design appropriate funding methods for supplying low-income housing. 
0 Assist in designing appropriate methods for implementation of low-income settlements. 
" By co-operating with other institutions, the Council should be able to manage the future 
development of its projects. 
UNRWA, Refugees and Improving their Living Conditions: 
Under current circumstances, it is difficult to isolate one group of concrete solutions 
for the housing crisis in the Palestinian refugee camps. The solution for this problem and 
other problems facing refugees is directly connected to the political dimension of the 
question of their status. In consequence, the only tangible remedy to the problem is that the 
refugees exercise their right of return. However, this should not impede improving their 
living conditions; therefore, efforts should be focused on improving camp conditions. 
Regarding the housing crisis, UNRWA should establish an executive body to organise and 
technically supervise the construction activities in the camps. This body should 
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" Supervise refugees who wish to construct multi-storey dwellings and advise them in 
technical rules and regulations and to take into account public safety requirements. 
" Increase the boundaries of those expandable camps, particularly when adjacent to public 
land. 
" Establish new camps to absorb the increasing number of refugees. These camps, 
however, should fall under UNRWA's responsibility so as not to be interpreted as an 
attempt to resettle refugees. 
" Improve infrastructure in the refugee camps (sewer system. roads, and water supplies), 
and to construct public squares and playgrounds. 
" Continue running and refining successful programmes such as the income generation 
scheme. 
8.4 AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
Issues of post-conflict reconstruction are wide and varied. Therefore, this study does 
not claim to have exhausted the issues entailed in the reconstruction of the Palestinian State 
and related policies. Some lay beyond the scope of this study and require further 
investigation in order to formulate a complete and detailed policy. Topics for further full- 
length studies could include: 
" Evaluation of reconstruction policies of the Palestinian National Authority since its 
inception. Further case studies must be examined. 
" Shelter policies in the Palestinian Territories. This study must entail an examination of 
the issues of land use and tenure, regulatory framework, and look in detail at alternatives 
for housing and finance. 
0 Donors' intervention, and the management of external assistance. 
"A study that points out how dependency on international aid and the Israeli economy can 
be minimised. 
" How the fate of the Palestinian refugees and the possible influx of returnees will affect 
plans for reconstruction? 
To conclude, the author believes that reconstructing the Palestinian State was never 
going to be easy, even with the best intentions of all parties involved. In the present climate 
of suspicion, cynicism, ill-will and the outright violence, the task is far harder and will take 
much longer or might even seen impossible. In the meantime, the Palestinian people still 
urgently need decent shelter. The author has examined past shortcomings and proposed 
ways to improve performance. He feels that the initiative must be made without delay. The 
Palestinian people, who have endured hardship and struggled against injustice over the last 
fifty years, deserve nothing less. 
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Appendix (1) 
International Humanitarian Law: Some Articles Relevant to Israel's Belligerent 
Occupation of the Palestinian Territory 
The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, of August 12,1949: 
Article 1- Respect for the Convention 
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances. " 
Article 2- Application of the Convention 
"... The present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognised by one of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the 
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations... " 
Article 4- Definition of protected persons 
"Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at any given moment and in any 
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a 
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals... " 
Article 6- Beginning and End of Application 
"The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned 
in Article 2. 
In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention shall cease 
on the general close of military operations. 
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one 
year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be 
bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the 
functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the 
present Convention: Ito 12.27,29 to 34,47,49,51,52,53,59,61 to 77,143... " 
Appendix (1) 261 
International Law 
Article 7- Special Agreements 
"... No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of protected persons, as defined 
by the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them ... it 
Article 8- Non-renunciation of rights 
"Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured 
to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the 
foregoing Article, if such there be. " 
Article 11- Substitutes for Protecting Powers 
"The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to entrust to an organisation which 
offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting 
Powers by virtue of the present Convention... " 
Article 27- Treatment I. General Observations 
"Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their 
honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and 
customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially 
against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity... " 
Article 29- III. Responsibilities 
"The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be, is responsible for the 
treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which 
may be incurred. " 
Article 31- Prohibition of coercion 
"No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to 
obtain information from them or from third parties. " 
Article 32- Prohibition of corporal punishment, torture, etc. 
"The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking 
any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of 
protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder. torture. 
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corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by 
the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality 
whether applied by civilian or military agents. " 
Article 33- Individual responsibility, collective penalties, pillage, and reprisals 
"No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally 
committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are 
prohibited. 
Pillage is prohibited. 
Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited. " 
Article 46- Cancellation of restrictive measures 
"In so far as they have not been previously withdrawn, restrictive measures taken regarding 
protected persons shall be cancelled as soon as possible after the close of hostilities. 
Restrictive measures affecting their property shall be cancelled, in accordance with the law 
of the Detaining Power, as soon as possible after the close of hostilities. " 
Section III: Occupied Territories 
Article 47- Inviolability of Rights 
"Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any 
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as 
the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said 
territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories 
and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the 
occupied territory. " 
Article 49- Deportations, transfers, evacuations 
"Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from 
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country. 
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive... " 
"... The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into 
the territory it occupies. " 
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Article 52- Protection of workers 
"No contract, agreement or regulation shall impair the right of any worker. whether 
voluntary or not and wherever he may be, to apply to the representatives of the Protecting 
Power in order to request the said Power's intervention. 
All measures aiming at creating unemployment or at restricting the opportunities offered to 
workers in an occupied territory, in order to induce them to work for the Occupying Power. 
are prohibited. " 
Article 53- Prohibited destruction 
"Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or 
to social or co-operative organisations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is 
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. " 
Article 64- Penal legislation. I. General observations 
"The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they 
may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a 
threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention... " 
Article 146- Penal Sanctions I. General observations 
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the 
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article... " 
Article 147- II. Grave breaches 
"Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the 
following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present 
Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, 
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or 
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to 
serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of 
fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly. " 
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Article 148- III. Responsibilities of the Contracting Parties 
"No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting 
Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of 
breaches referred to in the preceding Article. " 
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CHECKLIST FOR PROGRAMME'S EVALUATION 
" What is the underlying perception of the situation before the onset of the programme? 
" How does the project fit into the broader development context? 
" What are the underlying interests of the stakeholders? 
" At what stage and level should participation occur? 
Is the level of intervention appropriate catalyst to get things started or more intense supporting 
implementing efforts? 
" What type of project is appropriate upgrade in place, clear and redevelops, clear and relocate? 
What are the scope and objectives? Project or programme basic services, economic development, social, 
education, and health improvement? 
" How to relate user demands and services? 
" Did the programme fit into comprehensive development plan? 
" Does it consider issues of sustainability? 
" Is it sensitive to political factors? 
" Is it sensitive to cultural factors? 
" Does the organisational structure include sufficient co-ordination and political support? 
" Is it financially viable? Are there sufficient financial resources to carry the programme? 
" Is the scope/ scale affordable to the families and has willingness to pay been assessed? 
" Will lows and regulation need t be modified? 
" Is there any tenure problems? 
" Is the location appropriate to upgrade? 
" Does it support local initiatives? 
" How to assure continuity of staff and community representatives? 
" What is your role during the project life? 
" What role does you delegate to the NGOs during implementation? 
0 How are lessons being captured? 
0 How are lessons being incorporated? 
0 What impact has the programme done on the improvement of the 
living conditions? 
AppendL (2) 266 
Checklist Refugees' Questions 
CHECKLIST: QUESTIONS FOR BENEFICIARIES IN THE REFUGEES CAMPS 
IN GAZA STRIP 
UNRWA POLICY TO IMPROVE THE LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS 
INFORMATION ON RESPONDENT 
1. Name .................. 
2. Sex 
.................... 
3. Age .................... 
4. How many persons stay with you in this house? .................... 
5. In total how many people normally stay in this house?........... . 
HOUSE INFORMATION 
6. How many rooms in your shelter? 
7. Could you please indicate the function and the area of the architectural spaces in your house 
No. Dimensions & Area Comment by the surveyor 
Bedroom 
kitchen 
Guest room 
Living room 
wC 
Backyard 
bathroom 
8. Do you have any other house elsewhere? Yes No 
9. If yes, where? Refugee camp .......... 
City 
............. 
Village.......... 
10. Why do you keep living in the refugee camp while you have another place to live in? 
Living Condition and Service Provision: 
11. Could you please comment on the level of provision of services after the peace agreement 
Service 
Health 
Water supply 
School 
Sewage 
Refuse removal 
Transport 
Shopping facilities 
Security 
Others, specify 
12. Are you aware of any development occurred in this camp since the peace agreements ? Yes........ 
No...... 
If yes, could you please elaborate 
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13. Could you please assess the performance of each institution of the following 
Excellent Satisfactory Acceptable Unsatisfactory 
UNRWA 
PNA 
Municipality 
Refugee committees 
NGOs, specify. 
14. Do you think that the UNRWA is playing an important role to achieve better life? Yes ....... No........ 
15. Please explain your answer 
16. Do you think the Authority has played any role in improving the living condition in the refugee camps? 
Yes 
....... 
No........ 
17. If yes, what role did they play? 
18. Do you think that there is any chance to improve the living condition in the refugee camps? Yes ....... 
No 
19. If yes, could you please list in order of importance the type of assistance which could improve such type of 
human settlement. 
20. Do you think that the `Popular Committees' approach can be used now to improve the living condition? 
Yes ........... No......... 
21. If yes, elaborate your answer 
22. Which of the following option will you choose to improve the living condition? 
- Obtain land and personal development ` the Israeli Model 
-A flat in one of the housing ministry schemes `the Palestinian Model' 
- Improvement of the living condition in the same site of the refugee camps 
23. Would you please explain why did you choose this option. 
24. Have you ever experience any social problem ? 
Yes 
....... 
No......... 
25. If yes , please elaborate the nature of the problem. 
26. Are you aware of the development in the refugees issue in the peace negotiation between PNA and Israel/ 
yes....... No....... 
27. Do you think that the peace process resulted in improving the living condition in the Refugees camps? 
28. Do you think that they will achieve a fair settlement for this issue? Yes........ No............ 
29. If yes please elaborate what do you think is fair to be solution of the problem? 
30. Do you think that UNRWA should terminate its services? Yes........... No ............... 
31. If yes, please elaborate your answer. 
32. Do you support the opinion that PNA should assume full responsibility for everything in the refugee camps 
in the Gaza Strip? 
If yes, could you please justify 
Yes 
............. 
No 
.............. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
My name is Ghassan Elkahlout. I am studying for PhD degree in Architecture- Post-war Reconstruction 
and Development-at the University of York. My research concern is the human settlement reconstruction 
in the Gaza Strip. I would like to ask some questions aiming at identifying and understanding the 
problems of human settlement in Gaza Strip. Also, to find out whether previous projects have been 
successful or not. All information given remains confidential and will be used in my PhD research. I 
greatly appreciate your time and co-operation and I would be most grateful to have your comments on my 
questions. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Ghassan Elkahlout 
University of York 
The King's Manor, York YO1 7EP 
Tel: 0044 1904 43380 
Fax: 0044 1904 433949 
E-mail: eý; k100gyork. ac. uk 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN ELKARAM HOUSING 
SCHEME. 
Sample No 
............... 
Plot No ...... 
Flat No............ 
INFORMATION ON RESPONDENT 
1. Name: ........................................... 
2. Sex: 
............................................. 
3. Age: ............................................. 
4. Martial status: single.......... Married .......... 
divorced 
.......... widowed .......... separated.......... 
5. If you are married, do you have any children? Yes.......... No ......... . 
6. If yes, how many? ......... . 
7. How many stay with you in this house? ......... . 
8. Education level? .......... 
9. Are you employed? Yes .......... 
No.......... 
10. If yes, please mention where do you work? Gaza Strip.......... Israel......... . 
11. Which type of work do you have? ......... . 
12. How much do you earn per month? ......... . 
13. Do you have another sources for income? Yes.......... No.......... 
14. If yes please specify ............................................................................................... 
15. If you are not employed, could you please explain 
how you satisfy your basic needs? 
....................................................................................... 
16. Does any member of your household work? Yes........... No ......... . 
IT If yes, what type of work do they do? ......................................... 
18. Do they assist you financially? Yes.......... No .......... 
19. If yes, roughly how much do they give you per month? .......... 
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20. Do you get any other assistance form anybody wife/ husband .... ...... relative.... ...... 
friend..... 
.... welfare 
from PNA........ , welfare 
from UNRWA....... relatives working abroad........ 
political organisation .......... 
21. If yes, please indicate the type of assistance............ 
22. Could you please indicate how much you spend per month on the following item: 
Item Israeli shekel 
Family Subsistence 
Personal Transport 
Dependants Transport 
Dependants Education 
Electricity 
Water 
Saving 
Rent 
Other, Specify 
Total 
HOUSE INFORMATION 
23. How many rooms in this unit? .......... 
24. Do you own this house or you are renting it? Owning .......... Renting ......... . 
25. Do you have any other house elsewhere? Yes .......... No.......... . 
26. If yes, where? Refugee camp .......... 
City.......... Village 
.......... 
27. Could you please assess the overall habitability of the project using the variables listed below; 
Excellent Satisfactory Acceptable Unsatisfactory 
Location 
Services and management 
Dwelling unit 
Neighbourhood 
28. Could you please clarify the function, area, numbers of every architectural space in your flat 
Space No. Dimension & Area Comments 
Bedroom 
Guest room 
Living room 
Bathroom 
Kitchen 
Water closet 
29. Could you please comment on the level of provision of services: 
Service Very Good Good Average 
Below 
Average 
Bad 
Health 
Water supply 
School 
Sewage 
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Refuse removal 
Roads 
Transport 
Shopping facilities 
Security 
Car Parking 
Green areas 
Children playground 
30. Could you please mention your origin? .......... 
31. Do you prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited overwhelmingly by your relatives? Yes ......... . 
No........... 
32. Please elaborate your answer ........... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 
33. Have you ever experienced any problem with any of your neighbour? Yes No 
34. If yes, please elaborate the nature of the problem. 
........................................................................................................................ 
35. If you have the opportunity to design, what type of a house would you prefer to live in and why 
- Having a land and building for yourself........... 
-A flat in the current housing projects........... 
- Upgrading your shelter in the refugee camp (This question is to refugees only).......... . 
36. Why do you choose this option. 
FINANCIAL PROBLEM 
37. When did you move here? .......... 
38. Please indicate how you acquired this house. 
.................. 
39. Did you get any help of anyone to be here? Yes .......... 
No 
......... . 
40. What type of help did you get? ............................................................................... . 
41. Did you face any difficulties to get your flat? Yes .......... 
No.......... 
42. If yes, how did you manage to overcome these difficulties? 
4 33. What is the total cost of your flat? 
44. Did you pay deposit? Yes.......... No .......... 
45. If yes how much did you pay ? ......... . 
46. How much do you pay monthly to the administration? .............. 
47. Do you think what you paid is a reasonable for your flat? Yes .......... 
No 
......... . 
48. If no, Could you suggest what you think would be fair payment for this flat? ......... . 
49. Do you have any problems of paying the monthly payment? Yes .......... 
No.......... . 
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50. If yes, could you please the causes and suggest possible solutions. 
51. Apart form this problem, do you have any other problems? Yes.......... No........... 
52. If yes, please elaborate 
Maintenance, Follow up and Development 
53. Has any development of the neighbourhood been undertaken since you occupied it? Yes........... No.... 
54. If yes, please specify 
55. Would you please comment on the performance of the following bodies according to their service in this 
project? 
Excellent Satisfied Acceptable Bad Comments 
PHC 
PNA 
Municipality 
NGOs 
Local committee 
56. Who do you think should be responsible for the general management of this neighbourhood? 
UNRWA.......... resident committees.......... PNA.......... Municipality.......... 
57. Do the local committees play any role in solving problem you face in your life? Yes.... ...... 
No.... ...... 
58. If yes, please elaborate, 
59. Do you think that UNRWA still plays a role in providing the Palestinian refugees in this scheme with the 
basic services? Yes.......... No .......... 
60. If yes, please elaborate your answer 
61. Do you think the Authority has any role to play? Yes.......... No.......... 
62. If no please elaborate why? 
............................................................................................................. 
63. What should PNA do toward solving Elkarama problem? 
................................................................................................. 
.......................................................................................... .. 
64. Do you believe that residents have any role to solve this problem? 
Yes...... No...... 
65. If yes, please explain how would this happen? 
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66. So you think that the popular committees approach during the Intifada is appropriate to provide the residents 
with their needs? Yes ...... 
No..... 
. 
67. Please elaborate your answer 
The next questions are to the Palestinian Refugees who moved here from refugee 
camps 
68. Do you think that your movement to this project will affect your rights, which were approved by the 
International community? Yes...... No...... 
69. If yes, why did you move here? 
........................................................................................................................ 
70. Are you aware of the current development of the Palestinian refugees in the peace process? 
Yes...... No....... 
71. Do you think that the negotiation will achieve a fair solution for the refugee issue? Yes ...... 
No...... 
72. Do you think that the peace process had resulted in improving the living condition in the refugee 
camps? 
Yes......... No ........ 
73. What is the fair solution from your point of view? ....................................................... 
74. Do you think that UNRWA should terminate its services? Yes...... No...... 
75. Could you please explain your answer? 
Recommendations 
76. Do you think that this project has solved part of the housing problem in the Gaza strip? Yes ....... 
No....... 
77. Please explain your answer 
............................................................................................................. .... .......... 
....................................................................................................................... 
78. Do you think that the PHC should repeat its experience? Yes...... No..... 
79. Could you please explain your answer? 
80. What do you advise the PHC to avoid in his next projects? 
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Ii 77at did Papers Say? 
Appendix (5): What did Palestinian Newspapers say regarding the 
Palestinian Housing Council problems? 
PHC Official Tells (Al-Ayaam Newspaper): The Rest of the Council Infrastructure 
Project will be completed when Beneficiaries Pay Their Dues. 
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What did Papers Say? 
Residents of the Council Project Demand New Terms for their Contract. 
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What did Papers Say? 
Beneficiaries of the Housing Projects escalate their Protests. 
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List of Interviewees 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Abu lyad: Refugee working in UNRWA Field Office. 
Abu Faiz: Leader of Local Committee in Jabalya Camp 
Alaa' Yaghi: Manager. The Palestinian Housing Council 
Alex Bolloc: Director of Development and Planning Unit, UNRWA 
Ayop Al Alem: Director of the Health Programme UNRWA, Gaza Field Office 
Dina Assaf: Director of the Planning and Development Unit, Ministry of Planning and 
International Co-operation 
Dr Sadiq: University Lecturer 
Hamdi Emteer: Municipality Engineer 
Hossam Abu Ouda: Public Relations Officer, UNRWA Headquarters. 
Hossam Koraz: Architect. The Palestinian Housing Council 
Hossam Manna': Director of the Projects Department, UNRWA, Gaza Field Office 
Ibraheem Abu Hmeed: Director General of the Ministry of Housing, Gaza 
Issa Alqura: Public Relations Officer, UNRWA Field Office, Gaza. 
Issam Miqdadi: Chief of the Special Environmental Health Programme, UNRWA, Gaza 
Field Office 
Mahaseen Mohysen: Deputy Director of the Education Programme, UNRWA, Gaza Field 
Office 
Mohi Ed-deen Alfara: Architect, Designer of Elkarama Housing Project. 
Mustafa Al-Hayk: Planner, Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation. 
Nasser Jabber: UNRWA Official of Charge of Loans 
Refugees in Jabalya, Al Nuseirat and Al Shati Camp 
Residents of Elkarama Housing Project 
Sahar Abu Samra: Save the Children, Gaza Office. 
Staff of the Planning and Development Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Co- 
operation 
Usama Elsa'dway: Director of Gaza Office. The Palestinian Housing Council 
Yusri Mohram: Headmaster of Refugees' Schools. 
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Abbreviation 
ABBREVIATION 
DAC: Development Assistant Committee. 
DFID: British Department for International Development. 
DoP: Declaration of Principles. 
EAP: The Emergency Assistance Programme for the Occupied Territories. 
ECHO: The European Community Humanitarian Office 
EPA: Expanded Programme for Assistance 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
HUDC: Housing and Urban Development Corporation 
ICRC: International Committee Red Cross 
ILO: International Labour Organisation. 
MAS: The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute. 
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations 
NORAD: Norwegian Aid 
ODI: Overseas Development Institute 
OECD: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development. 
PECDAR: Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction. 
PHC: Palestinian Housing Council 
PIP: Peace Implementation Programme 
PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
PMUN: The Palestinian Mission at the United Nation 
PNA: Palestinian National Authority 
PNC: Palestine National Council 
PRDU: Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit 
RWG: Refugees Working Group 
SCF: Save the Children Federation. 
SEHP: Special Environmental Health Programme. 
SGL: Solidarity Group-Lending. 
SHC: Special Hardship Cases 
UN: United Nations 
UNCHS: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements. 
Appendix l" 280 
a_. 
Abbreviation 
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees 
UNOSCO: United Nations Office of the Special Co-ordinator in the Occupied 
Territories 
UNRISD: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
UNRPR: The United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees. 
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees in the 
Near East. 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
WBGWG: The World Bank Group in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
WSP: War-torn Societies Project. 
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